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IN MEMORIAM: THE HONORABLE JUDGE PHILLIP S. FIGA

(1951-2008)'
When a righteous man dies, he dies only to his own generation. It is
like the parable of a man who lost a pearl: wherever the pearl is, it is
still a pearl-itis lost only to its owner.2

President George W. Bush nominated Phillip S. Figa to the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado on June 9, 2003. The
nomination "breezed" through the Senate, 3 and confirmation occurred on
October 2, 2003. Tragically, Judge Figa's tenure came to a premature
end when he succumbed to an aggressive form of brain cancer on January 5, 2008.
After Judge Figa passed away, his court staff found a small post-it
note, attached to his reading glasses case, left on his judicial bench. On
the post-it note, Judge Figa had written the following:
1. "Be patient!"
2. "Be humane."
3. "Be firm."
4. "Be polite."
5. "Give all fair, due process."
Lawyers and clients hope that all judges before whom they appear
will adhere to those five simple principles. That Judge Figa gave himself
a constant reminder of them as he sat on the bench shows what he expected of judges when, he was a practicing lawyer and his resolve to fulfill those expectations himself.
Phil Figa was born in 1951 in Chicago, Illinois, the son of Holocaust survivors. His parents, Leon and Sara Figa, immigrated to this
1. The Historical Society of the Tenth Judicial Circuit has commissioned this biographical
memorial, which can be found in its entirety on the Events and Projects page of the Society's website, www.10thcircuithistory.org, and which will be republished in whole or in part in an updated
print history of the Federal Courts of the Tenth Circuit. The authors of this article are Mal Wheeler,
Julie Walker, Ramona Lampley, and Jeremy Moseley of the Denver law firm Wheeler Trigg Kennedy, LLP.
2.
Talmud, Tractate Megillah 15a.
3.
Burt Hubbard, Phillip Figa Brought Passion to Law, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 6,
2008, available at http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/j an/06/phitlip-figa-broughtpassion-to-law/.
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country in 1950 after meeting in a displaced persons camp in Berlin.
Phil's father had served as a partisan during the war, hiding in the Russian forests and fighting a guerilla war against the Nazis. Phil's mother
had been interned in a labor camp. Phil's parents' history had a profound
positive impact on his overall view of what was important in life, including his devotion to his family, his faith, his community, and his profession.
Along with his younger brother, Stewart, Phil was raised in Chicago
until he moved to Skokie, Illinois, at the age of twelve. He attended
Niles East High School, graduating in 1969. One of his major activities
during his high school years was to work as a caddy at the Evanston Golf
Club. In his senior year he was awarded the Evans Scholarship, a fulltuition college scholarship sponsored by the Western Golf Association
for high school students with strong academic records and financial need
who have worked at a country club. Later, in response to frequent remarks that he must be an excellent golfer, Phil would chuckle and say,
"Playing golf and carrying another person's golf bag are not the same
skills by any means." To ensure that the scholarship would remain
available for other needy, hard-working students, Phil made financial
contributions throughout his life to fund it.
Phil attended Northwestern University, where he met his beloved
wife, Candace ("Candy") Cole Figa, during their freshman year "ecology
teach-out." After spending the night listening to lectures and folk singers
in support of the movement that later resulted in Earth Day, Phil walked
Candy home. It was the beginning of a lifelong relationship.
After their sophomore year at Northwestern, Phil and Candy went
camping in Colorado and fell in love with the mountains, the wide open
spaces, and the outdoor activities they offered. In the summer after their
junior year, they returned to Colorado for summer jobs in the Denver/Boulder area.
In 1973, upon graduating from Northwestern, Phil and Candy married and moved to Ithaca, New York, so that Phil could attend Cornell
Law School. Candy used her degree in English and secondary education
to obtain a job teaching high school English to help put Phil through law
school. They lived in the back half of the second floor of a widow's
house five blocks from the law school. It was small, and their budget
was tight, but they were happy.
While Phil was in law school, he and Candy found their way back
to Colorado each summer. For the summer after his first year, Phil approached the law firm of Miller and Gray in Boulder. He volunteered his
time at first, which the firm accepted. As the summer progressed and the
lawyers saw the quality of his work, however, the firm began paying
him. For the summer after his second year, he secured a job at the Den-
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ver law firm of Sherman & Howard. That clerkship led to an offer for
employment upon his graduation from law school. He accepted.
After Phil graduated from law school in 1976, he and Candy moved
to Denver, and he began his law practice at Sherman & Howard. Just as
Candy had worked to help finance his law school education, he helped
finance hers: she obtained her law degree from the University of Denver
School of Law in 1978.
In 1980, Hugh Bums, one of the senior partners at Sherman &
Howard, told Phil he was tired of large-firm practice and wanted to open
his own firm. Having noticed Phil's strong work ethic, professional
manner, and pleasant personality, Hugh asked him to take the leap with
him and form the firm of Burns & Figa. Hugh had one condition: they
would not add more lawyers. Phil agreed, and the firm opened its doors
in May 1980. Soon thereafter, Hugh approached Phil about making an
exception to their agreement, urging that Candy be brought in as a member of the firm. Phil agreed, and Candy joined Bums & Figa in 1981.
A few months later, Phil and Candy discovered they were expecting
their first child. Benjamin Todd Figa was born on May 10, 1982. Their
second and last child, Elizabeth Dawn Figa, was born on March 29,
1984. Candy took time off after each child, returning to practice law on
a part-time basis, in addition to her involvement in various government
positions including serving on the Greenwood Village City Council from
1993 to 2001.
In 1988, Hugh Burns was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and had
to reduce his practice to a part-time practice. When that untoward development relieved Phil of the agreement not to add more lawyers, he hired
two associates, Geoff Anderson and Dana Eismeier, to help him. They
began looking for new space for the firm, and in the process met with
Phil's future partner, J. Kemper ("Kemp") Will. In 1991, Phil and Kemp
formed Bums, Figa & Will, P.C. When they began, the firm had eight
lawyers. In January 2009, the firm continues to thrive with twenty-eight
lawyers, including both Kemp Will and Candy Figa as senior partners.
The firm's practice at first focused mostly on environmental and
commercial litigation. Phil and Kemp shared a common devotion to the
utmost professionalism in the practice of law, both in how they trained
the more junior lawyers at the firm and in dealings with lawyers outside
their own firm. While Hugh Burns was alive, Phil periodically arranged
field trips to Hugh's home to introduce new associates and provide them
with the opportunity to hear the same wisdom that had meant so much to
Phil as a young lawyer. Phil always kept a framed photo of Hugh in a
prominent place on his office wall at the firm, and later in his courthouse
chambers.
As the firm grew, so did Phil's reputation in the Colorado legal
community as someone passionate about the law and the profession. He
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served on the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee from 1976 to
1993, including serving as chairman from 1984 to 1985. He developed a
strong practice in legal ethics and attorney conduct, often representing
attorneys before the disciplinary board. Clients also often retained him
as an expert witness to provide his opinion on various issues related to
the practice of law, including disqualification, conflicts, and reasonableness of attorneys' fees. He eventually developed a reputation as a national expert on ethics and professional responsibility.
Phil was extremely outgoing and participated in a wide variety of
professional activities. In addition to serving on the Colorado Bar Association's Ethics Committee, he served as president of the Colorado Bar
Association from 1995 to 1996, on the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Committee from 1994 to 1997, and on the Colorado Commission on
Judicial Discipline. He taught at the University of Denver College of
Law and the National Institute of Trial Advocacy. Prior to his appointment to the bench, he was one of the founding members of the Faculty of
Federal Advocates. He also is credited with the development of the Colorado Bar Association's very successful and still instrumental Pro Bono
Mentoring Program.
Phil described his personal philosophy of public service in an article
he wrote as president of the Colorado Bar Association in 1995. He explained the motivation of an attorney in the public sector as follows:
Money is not how government lawyers keep score of professional
success. The currency of public sector practice is professional excellence, client service,
justice achieved and recognition for hard work
4
ably performed.
In addition to his passion for the law and his law practice, Phil felt
strongly about giving back to his community. His longtime friend and
colleague, Wiley Y. Daniel, who became Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado in 2008, explained,
"One of Judge Figa's greatest gifts was his belief in unselfish kindness to
others without the need for recognition."5 Phil was actively involved
with the Mountain States Region of the Anti-Defamation League
("ADL"), including serving as chairman during the years 1996 to 1998.
Bradley Levin, a close friend who worked with Phil on behalf of the
ADL, recalled that Phil always brought the right balance of humor and
graciousness to each matter he oversaw as chairman, even those that
were controversial or widely unpopular. Phil was known for using his
eloquence and engaging demeanor to encourage and inspire others to
fight against prejudice and bigotry.
4.
Phillip S. Figa, Colorado Bar Association President'sMessage to Members: Government
Lawyers and the Bar Association, 24 COLORADo LAWYER 2687,2688 (1995).
5.
Interview with Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel, Colorado District Court (Jan. 9, 2009).
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Phil also volunteered his time to the Rose Medical Center Board of
Trustees from 1987 to 1995, at which time the hospital changed ownership. 6 Thereafter, Phil offered his time to the Rose Community Foundation, one of the largest charitable foundations in Colorado, including
serving as trustee from 2002 to 2003. 7 While serving with the Rose
Community Foundation, Phil chaired the Jewish Life Committee, which
was devoted to supporting efforts to creating and sustaining a vibrant
Jewish community. According to Sheila Bugdanowitz, president and
CEO of the foundation, Phil "saw this work as an extension of his work.
at the Anti-Defamation League, because providing equal access was important." His colleagues who operated the foundation said that he
"pushed for more transparency in the foundation" and that he insisted the
foundation take particular courses of action "because it was the right
thing to do."
In 1994, Phil instituted a sabbatical policy for partners at the firm,
and he was the first one to take advantage of it. During his sabbatical, he
traveled with Candy and their children, then ages 10 and 12, to Israel and
France for the first couple of weeks and then to Hawaii for several
weeks. He returned a week before the rest of his family to teach at the
National Institute for Trial Advocacy. A few years after the sabbatical
program had been in effect, Phil commented about it, "I think you come
back refreshed, energized to do whatever your priority is-and it may not
be the same as before. It gives you the opportunity to see that law isn't
the be-all and end-all of existence. No one has had any regrets."
After twenty-five years of law practice, Phil told some of his colleagues that, although personally and professionally satisfied with his
career as a lawyer, he wanted a new challenge. He had served his clients
and his profession well, and had been honored in many ways as a result;
for example, he had been elected to the International Society of Barristers (membership limited to "600 outstanding trial lawyers dedicated to
excellence and integrity in advocacy"), the American Bar Foundation
(membership limited to 1/3 of 1% of each state's bar), and the Colorado
Bar Foundation.8 He had long thought he would eventually like to be a
judge. He saw it as the perfect opportunity to combine his love for the
law and his love for public service. To those who knew him well, it was
the perfect fit.
In 2003, Phil Figa was one of five names submitted to the White
House by Colorado Senators Ben Nighthorse Campbell and Wayne Allard for appointment as a judge in the United States District Court for the
6. Interview with Sheila Bugdanowitz (Feb. 5, 2009).
7. Rose Community Foundation: 2007 Annual Report (In Memoriam tribute to Judge Figa
noting that he served as trustee in 2002 & 2003).
8.
U.S. Rep. Diana Degette, Tribute to Phillip S. Figa, United States District Court Judge,
154 CONG. REC. E25-01, 2008 WL 150171 (Jan. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Tribute].
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District of Colorado. His interview in the West Wing of the White
House was scheduled for President's Day-unfortunately, the same day a
100-year snowstorm struck the East Coast. Upon learning that his flight
to Washington, D.C., from Denver had been cancelled, Phil took the
flight he was told would get him closest-a flight to LaGuardia Airport
in New York. He then took an Amtrak train to D.C. and a van to his
hotel from the train station. On the following morning, the White House
scheduler was shocked to see that Phil had managed to appear on time;
no one else had. Phil's interview was postponed for a day.
During the confirmation process, Phil's friends, family, and associates praised him as "one who brought passion and integrity to the field
of law," "a humble and gracious man who genuinely cared about helping
other people," "even handed," and "a great jurist." 9 Sheila Bugdanowitz,
former colleague to Judge Figa on the Rose Community Foundation,
recalls that during the confirmation process,
I was questioned, and whoever was doing the questioning just blurted
out, "There must be something about this man that people don't
like." But there was nothing about him that people didn't like, and
that was that.
At Phil's investiture ceremony, more than 1,000 well-wishers
crowded into the federal courthouse to pay homage to their friend, colleague, and mentor.' 0 "He was like a kid in a candy store," offering personal tours of his new judicial chambers and grinning as he showed off
the framed letters and congratulations of his confirmation. He was ecstatic, his happiness exceeded only by the pride of his immigrant parents,
who kept asking, "Can you believe our son is a federal judge?"
Although Judge Figa's tenure on the bench was short, he took to the
role with the same passion and professionalism that he applied to everything else. Senior United States District Judge John Kane, Jr. remarked
after Judge Figa' s death:
He went with the law. It wasn't a question of whether he thought it
was a good law or not, and that was the devotion he had-that the
law itself governs. He was a fine judge,1 and the public has been deprived a great many years of his service.
On the bench, Judge Figa's continued commitment to the highest
standards of professionalism in the practice of law was apparent. In one
matter involving an attorney's lien of less than five thousand dollars,
Judge Figa held a hearing at which he required the attorney seeking
9.
id.
10. Hubbard, supra note 3.
11.
Manny Gonzales, Judge Figa Mourned as FairRole Model, DENVER POST, Jan. 7, 2008,
available at http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_7902809.
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payment to submit detailed invoices and testimony.' 2 Judge Figa reduced the amount of the lien, even though the plaintiff had signed a retainer agreement that did not require expenses to be reasonable. Judge
Figa instead cited the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, which
required attorneys' fees to be reasonable. Judge Figa concluded, "[N]o
attorney's lien should be permitted where the amount of fee or expense
reimbursement sought is not reasonable' 13in light of the circumstances
under which the services were rendered."
In another matter, Judge Figa considered whether an attorney
should be disqualified from representing his client based on the client's
social contacts with the opposing counsel's paralegal.' 4 The defendant
argued that plaintiffs counsel should have acted to "undo the taint" that
the relationship placed on his client's case. 15 Relying on an ethics opinion issued by the Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee, Judge
Figa pointed out that the defendant's counsel arguably could have been
subject to disqualification under this same rationale because he was responsible for supervising his assistants to prevent any violations of the
ethical standards. 16 Thus, Judge Figa found that defense counsel's position lacked merit and appeared more likely to be an effort to argue disqualification only as a litigation tactic. Judge Figa declined to disqualify
imthe plaintiffs counsel, finding that disqualification would "severely
7
pinge" on the plaintiffs right to retain an attorney of her choice.1
Judge Figa was always mindful of the sacrifices that jurors were required to make for jury duty, and he treated each juror with the utmost
respect. Michel Walter, one his law clerks, recounted that Judge Figa
was particularly stern with attorneys who were not respectful of the
jury's time.' 8 He strove to make each trial as efficient as possible to
demonstrate to the jurors that he appreciated their service.
Judge Figa's opinions reflected the same recognition of the importance of juror service. In one decision involving a train accident in Nebraska, Judge Figa granted the defendant's motion to transfer because,
among other reasons, he found that jury duty should not be imposed on
the citizens of Colorado for an accident that had not occurred in this
state.' 9 In another decision, he granted a defendant's motion to transfer
the trial venue, over the plaintiff's expression of concern for regional
bias, because the plaintiff could not demonstrate "why members of that
12.
13.
14.
2006).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Apa v. Qwest Corp., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (D. Colo. 2005).
Id.
Carbajal v. Am. Farn. Life Ins. Co., No. 06-608, 2006 WL 2988955 (D. Colo. Oct. 18,
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Interview by Michel C. Walter with Phillip S. Figa, U.S. Dist. Judge (Nov. 12, 2008).
Bailey v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233 (D. Colo. 2005).
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jury pool would tolerate higher health services prices and fewer provider
choices for themselves and their neighbors as a result of the alleged antitrust violations. ' 20
He also paid careful attention to the appearance of judicial propriety, even when it meant giving up charitable work near and dear to his
heart. After his appointment to the federal bench, Judge Figa stepped
down from his position as trustee of the Rose Community Foundation.
Although the foundation asked him to return as a voluntary trustee in
2006, he declined, believing that as a public servant he should devote his
time to his work in chambers and avoid any appearance of any conflict of
interest. He also was very mindful of the caseloads of other judges and
did not want to have to recuse himself because of community affiliations.
After Phil's death, Sheila Bugdanowitz remarked, "Phil brought us a
sense of humor, and a joy, that it was even possible to do things, and a
unique sense of integrity about what we did and how we did it."
During his brief tenure on the bench, Judge Figa authored 240 written opinions, 42 of which were published. Eight of his published decisions addressed civil rights issues or issues of constitutional law; seven
addressed areas of employment law; five focused on the interpretation of
contracts; and the majority of the remaining decisions addressed procedural matters intended to prepare the case for trial. His 198 unpublished
opinions addressed a similarly broad array of legal issues: 28 addressed
civil rights or constitutional law; 38 addressed employment law; 26 addressed contract interpretation; and another 52 focused on issues of federal procedure. Of the 240 written opinions, 24 were appealed. Of these,
twelve were affirmed; four were affirmed through a denial of a certificate
of appealability; three were affirmed in part; four were reversed; and one
was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Judge Figa handled complex First Amendment cases with methodological tenacity. In Mason v. Wolf he had to adjudicate the First
Amendment rights of a pro-life/anti-abortion group. 21 The plaintiffs asserted 28 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the defendants, officials at the
Auraria campus of the Auraria Higher Education Center, based on the
defendants' refusal to permit the plaintiffs to demonstrate at a specific
location on campus. Judge Figa undertook a detailed analysis of the applicable First Amendment precedents and made a personal visit to the
site. He concluded that the site offered by the defendants provided an
ample alternative channel of communication where "60 to 70 paces are
all that is required to walk from the Plaza Building to the flagpole area,"
and "[a]ny person in the flagpole area could easily observe any demon-

20.
Four Comers Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 464 F. Supp. 2d
1095, 1099 (D. Colo. 2006).
21.
356 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (2005).
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stration occurring on the steps of the Plaza Building., 22 His comments
appear to reflect his own personal observations made during his site visit.
Nonetheless, he ruled for the plaintiffs because he found that the defendants' regulation was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant govemment interest. Holding that the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights had
been violated by the school's unwritten policy, he awarded them nominal
damages.2 3
One of the decisions Judge Figa liked to talk about arose from his
first encounter with patent law. In Barreca v. South Beach Beverage
25
Co., Inc.,24 Judge Figa entered an order following a Markman hearing
in which he was called upon to construe the claims of the plaintiff's patent for an energy-related chewing gum. In a lengthy order, Judge Figa
parsed the patent claims and set forth the explicit limits of the patent. As
is common with Markman decisions, the losing party promptly took an
interlocutory appeal to the Untied States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the federal appellate court that specializes in patent and trademark appeals.
Judge Figa noted to his chambers that, at a Federal Judicial Center
training class, he had been provided with statistics regarding appeals of
patent cases, and the numbers reflected that more than 50 percent of all
district court patent decisions were reversed in the Federal Circuit. But
in an order entered on August 17, 2005, in Barrecav. South Beach Beverage Co., Inc.,26 the Federal Circuit affirmed Judge Figa's Markman order with just a one-sentence opinion. Although a bit disappointed that
the Federal Circuit had not elaborated, Judge Figa said he just figured
that there was nothing to add to what he had written. His chambers personnel were pleased with the result for another reason: Judge Figa
shared with them the bottle of high-quality champagne he had received
from a friend, at the time of his investiture, with the condition that it not
be opened until he was affirmed by a higher court in a significant case.
The decision that garnered Judge Figa perhaps the most public attention of his judicial tenure was in a qui tam action brought by Bobby
Maxwell, an auditor for the United States Department of the Interior,
against Kerr McGee Oil & Gas Corp. regarding underreported royalties.27 Maxwell initially had reported his findings to senior department
lawyers, and he claimed that he had been instructed to "back off." He
later filed suit as a private citizen.

22.
Id. at 1161.
23.
Id. at 1161-62.
24.
322 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Colo. 2004).
25.
A Markman hearing is a hearing in which the court construes the claims stated in a patent.
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
26.
141 Fed. Appx. 912 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
27.
486 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220 (D. Colo. 2007).
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Judge Figa initially denied Kerr McGee's motion for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, finding that the relator had satisfied the "original
source" requirement and relying on the distinction drawn in First
Amendment analysis between a government employee's speech within
the scope of his official duties and speech as a private citizen. Judge
Figa found that "Mr. Maxwell was acting as a citizen in voluntarily telling the government, also his employer, that he intended to use the information he obtained to file this qui tam suit. '28 At trial, the jury returned

a verdict of $7,555,886.28, representing the amount of underpaid royalties.29
Judge Figa overturned the verdict, citing arguments made by Kerr
McGee before and during the trial, and found that Mr. Maxwell could not
meet the original-source requirement because he provided confidential
information to a state auditor, which he ruled constituted a public disclosure that barred a qui tam action. The New York Times reported that
many big oil companies had warned that the case would "open the floodgates" to litigation if Maxwell was allowed to proceed. a
Judge Figa was a generous man who expected hard work from others, but gave even more of himself in return.3 1 His goal was to provide
efficient justice to the parties who appeared before him. His former law
clerk Michel Walter recalled that he "wanted to see justice done,"3 and
"it
2
was very important to him to keep his docket moving efficiently.,
Judge Figa expected the attorneys who appeared before him to be
prepared, because he did not want to waste anyone's time or resources by
making the case last longer than it should. To those who appeared before
him, Judge Figa was always firm, but polite. 3 He did not allow his
many friendships built throughout his years of practice, particularly in
representing attorneys, to influence his decisions. 34
Judge Figa received widespread recognition as a jurist during his
few years on the bench. The Colorado Supreme Court honored him for
"outstanding leadership of the Coalition for the Independence of the Colorado Judiciary." In January 2006 he was named one of the Leading

28.

Id.

29.
486 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
30.
Edmund L. Andrews, Verdict Backing Oil-Royalty Whistle-blower Is Overturned, N.Y.
TuMEs, Apr. 3, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/business/03royalty.html
?_r=l&scp=2&sq=figa&st=cse. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed Judge Figa's post-trial ruling
based on its finding that no public disclosure occurred and remanded the case for further proceedings. United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 540 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir.
2008).
31.
Interview with Michel C. Walter (Nov. 12, 2008); Interview with Judge Richman (Dec. 5,
2008).
32.
Interview with Michel C. Walter, former law clerk to Judge Figa (Nov. 12, 2008).
33.
Interview with Bradley Levin (Jan. 7,2009).
34.
Id.
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Judges in America by The Lawdragon.35 As those who knew him best
could attest, Judge Figa's time on the bench reflected those principles set
out on the post-it note found at his bench.
Judge Figa's sense of honor in the judicial office was nowhere more
evident than when he performed the naturalization oath ceremony for
making immigrants citizens of the United States. According to Judge
David Richman, who was a career clerk and former law partner of Judge
Figa's before becoming a judge on the Colorado Court of Appeals, these
ceremonies were one of Judge Figa' s favorite aspects of his position, and
he took pride in learning the personal stories for each citizenship candidate.36 Judge Figa's heritage as the son of immigrant survivors of the
Holocaust became a cornerstone at these proceedings, as he sought to
make each applicant aware of the opportunities and obligations inherent
in American citizenship. At each ceremony he would tell the citizenship
applicants a bit about his own background and that his own parents were
naturalized citizens. According to Judge Figa's assistant, Lee Ross, he
would instruct the applicants with the same words of wisdom given to his
father after becoming a citizen, "Always pay your parking tickets. 3 7
The joy with which Judge Figa regarded the ceremony is apparent in the
oath that he himself crafted:
Do you swear, affirm, or avow, as your principles allow, that on this
day you freely choose to become a citizen of the United States of
America, if necessary giving up your citizenship in, but not memories
of or a sense of identity with, the land of your birth; will you cherish
the freedoms which the Constitution and laws of the United States
guarantee to all citizens, at the same time accepting the duties and responsibilities which the Constitution and law require of all of us; will
you, to the best of your individual ability, do that which you can to
support and defend your country in times of crisis and national emergency, bearing arms if called upon to do so; and, most importantly,
identify yourself first and foremost as a United States citizen and
treat all others with respect, fairness and dignity consistent with the
democratic principles of this Republic for which so many died defending, including many new to this country? If, with a clear conscience and a heart filled with joy, you now are prepared to accept
both the blessings and burdens of citizenship in the United States of
America, please say "I do." 38
Phil was also active outside the courtroom as an avid skier and bicyclist. Candy often said he had no fear when it came to skiing, frequently treating out-of-town guests to expert black runs. "Phil was al35.
See Tribute, supra note 8.
36.
Interview with Judge Richman (Dec. 5, 2008).
37.
E-mail from Lee Ross to author (Dec. 18, 2008).
38.
Judge Figa, Additional Naturalization Oath, (Dec. 18, 2008) (provided by Lee Ross,
former assistant to Judge Figa).
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ways leading them to [difficult] places, like taking them down something
called Tornado Alley. In fact, one of our friends from Chicago brought
him a button to wear that said, 'Trust me."'
He also liked to bike over mountain passes. One of Phil's long-time
friends was quoted as saying, "When we were up in the mountains together, I'd say 'I'm going for a walk,' and he'd say, 'I'm going to ride
over Vail Pass."'
A persistent team player, Judge Figa loved to organize chambers
outings for the court staff. Be the outings white-water rafting on the Arkansas River, climbing 14,000-foot mountains, or running as a relay
team in the Denver Marathon, the judge was always eager to include
everybody, participate himself, and include his family in the adventure.
From the moment he was appointed to the bench, Judge Figa loved
being a judge. Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel recalled, "He 39had a passion
for being a judge and was a thoughtful, clear legal thinker.,
When describing the position of judge, he often told others the description of the job that the late Judge Sherman Finesilver had given
him.40 Judge Finesilver told him that being a federal judge is like shoveling coal into a furnace. You get to the job in the morning and there's a
big pile of coal. You shovel the coal all day long into the furnace. You
go home. You come back the next morning, and there's another pile of
coal waiting to be shoveled.
That description may sound like a complaint, but for Judge Figa
shoveling the coal was a job he loved to perform. He loved arriving
every morning, moving the cases along, getting the cases to trial, and
getting results for the litigants. That is what he strove to do. He often
said he would like to do that job until he reached the age of 99, like
Judge Wesley Brown of the District of Kansas.
Unfortunately, Judge Figa's shovel broke all too soon. He was diagnosed with an aggressive brain tumor in March 2007, at the young age
of fifty-five, after having served only a few years on the bench. On January 5, 2008, he lost his short battle with cancer.
On January 16, 2008, Congresswoman Diana Degette paid tribute to
Judge Figa in the United States Congress. She recounted his numerous
accomplishments and his praises from family and friends, and lamented:
Judge Figa lived a life that is rich in consequence, and our country is
a better place because of his labors. Truly, we are all diminished by
the all too early passing of this remarkable gentleman ...
39.
40.
41.

Interview with Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel (Jan. 9, 2009).
Judge Richman, Eulogy for Judge Figa (Jan. 9, 2008).
Tribute, supra note 8.

IN MEMORIAM: JUDGE PHILLIP S. FIGA
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Shortly thereafter, on February 4th, 2008, the Anti-Defamation
League presented Judge Figa with the Distinguished Community Service
Award "for his commitment to human rights and dignity and his dedicated service to his community, state and nation. 42 The Colorado Bar Ethics Committee recognized Judge Figa with the Don W. Sears Ethics
Award, and the Colorado Judicial Institute also honored him posthumously.

42.

Id.

A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ETHOS FOR THE LEGAL
PROFESSION: WHY BOTHER?
JUDGE MARCIA S. KRIEGERt

For as long as I can remember, I have believed that members of the
legal profession share a common commitment to something greater than
their own self-interest-a professional ethos. The seed of this belief undoubtedly was sown when, as a small child, I played under the kitchen
table where my father and his law school classmates studied. Then, as I
grew, my father nurtured this belief with stories about how the law applied to situations that he encountered in his law practice and, when he
became a judge, how the law resolved controversies that he heard.
Despite periodic examples to the contrary, I have held firm to this
belief during fifteen years in law practice and another fifteen years on the
bench. However, recently, while serving on a curriculum review task
force for a local law school, I began to have doubts.
The curriculum review task force was composed of professors,
practicing lawyers, and judges. Our task was to consider the recommendations of the 2007 report produced by the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching-EducatingLawyers.' One of several comparative 2 studies of professional education, EducatingLawyers examined
how well law schools met the challenge of preparing law students for
their professional lives as lawyers. The report identified three critical
components to legal education: instruction in the law (doctrinal instruction), practical experience, and development of a professional identity
(ethos). It posited that law schools are particularly strong in doctrinal
instruction, but correspondingly weak in providing sufficient practical
experience and in instilling a professional identity. The report also made
specific recommendations to address these deficiencies.
Judge Krieger serves on the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. She
t
expresses her appreciation for the assistance of many in the development of this article. Harry
Roberts, Esq., Justice Michael Bender, Judges Russell Carparelli, Christina Habas and David Prince,
Professors Emily Calhoun and Melissa Hart, Jim Lyons, Esq., and Capt. Miriam Krieger, USAF,
have all offered helpful ideas and constructive criticism. Thank you, too, to those who have helped
in research and editing-Madeline Kriescher of the 10th Circuit Library, Michael Smith, Kevin
Aoun, and Michelle Brand at the Denver University Law Review, law clerks Brian Bergevin and
Michelle Cormier, court reporter Paul Zuckerman, and legal assistant Janine Aguero.
1.

WILLIAM

M. SuLLivAN

ET AL.,

EDUCATING LAWYERS:

PREPARATION

FOR THE

PROFESSION OF LAW 22 (Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teaching 2007) [hereinafter
EDUCATING LAWYERS].

2. This report is part of the Carnegie Foundation's Preparation for the Profession Series. It is
based upon the report entitled Advancement of Teaching's Preparation for the Professions Program,
a comparative study of professional education in medicine, nursing, law, engineering and preparation for the clergy. Id. at 15.
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My assignment on the task force, along with a member of our state
Supreme Court, was to analyze the curriculum and make specific recommendations that would address the ethos component. EducatingLawyers ties ethos to professional identity and purpose:
Professional identity is, in essence, the individual's answer to questions such as, "Who am I as a member of this profession? What am I
like, and what do I want to be like in my professional role? and What
place do ethical-social
values have in my core sense of professional
3
identity?"
Educating Lawyers contends that the answer to these questions and
the starting point for professional behavior is the student's understanding
and adoption of professional values. A professional ethos defines our
purpose and transcends our self-interest. A professional ethos binds
lawyers, judges and academics together with a shared identity and commitment to something that is broader than, and the foundation for, the
minimal ethical standards set forth in Canons or Codes governing professional conduct.
Consistent with our assignment, my partner and I offered several
suggestions that we thought would foster students' understanding of the
history and values of the legal profession. In discussing these matters,
however, it became apparent that we educators, lawyers and judges could
not agree on the components of a professional identity or a common set
of values that should be taught to law students. We debated over the
profession's purpose, what role lawyers should play in society and
whether we had any cohesive professional beliefs. Ultimately, unable to
agree on a professional ethos, we reverted to discussing methods for
teaching the mandatory provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The inability of this task force to identify any common commitment
or value that constitutes the ethos of the legal profession led me to ponder whether we have one and whether having one matters. This article
chronicles my attempt to answer these questions.
I conclude that because American society is unique in its belief in
and dependence upon the Rule of Law, the beliefs and behavior of lawyers matter. American society is experiencing a Cycle of Cynicism that
threatens public confidence in the law and legal institutions. If we do not
find ways to reverse this Cycle of Cynicism and restore public confidence, the cohesiveness of American society and our individual rights
and freedoms will be in jeopardy. Lawyers have the ability to combat
this Cycle of Cynicism, but only if they are willing, as a profession, to

3.

Id. at 135.
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explore, articulate and adopt a common commitment to a value greater
than their self interest-to the Rule of Law.
I. IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, WHAT LAWYERS BELIEVE ABOUT THE LAW
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS MATTERS

Law is essential to social order and justice: it requires specialized
knowledge that only lawyers possess; the public needs lawyers to facilitate their intercourse with one another and to protect them from
harm by others and from government; lawyers
have a special role in
4
the state as guardians of the legal order.
A. The existence ofAmerican society and government is premised upon
law
Few would dispute that America is unique. We are a heterogeneous
nation comprised predominantly of immigrants, and the descendants of
immigrants, from every country on the globe. Due to this diversity, we
lack the underpinnings that unite and stabilize more homogeneous societies-a common language, ancestral history, culture, religion, traditions
or clan/tribal ties. We highly prize individuality, initiative and freedom;
indeed, it is such freedom that has attracted immigrants with vastly different backgrounds and values to our shores.
To unite such a diverse population while ensuring individual freedom, we rely on law. Law acts as the mortar that holds the disparate
bricks of our society together. Although we may disagree with the wisdom of particular laws, or we may wish that some could be changed or
set aside, we accept this system of law because it provides Americans
with unparalleled liberty, democratic access, security, stability and economic opportunity.
We come by our reliance on law honestly. Our country's first European immigrants came from societies with strong legal traditions. The
sojourners on the Mayflower governed themselves by legal compact, as
did other early colonial communities. As the English colonies expanded
the scope of their self-government, they formally recognized reciprocal
rights and obligations between citizens and the king, and it was the perceived breach of the king's and parliament's obligations to British citizens in the Americas that led to the American Revolution.
Many of our nation's founders were students of the classics. They
read Socrates, Aristotle and Cicero. They adopted classical notions
found in Enlightenment thinking, among which was the idea that there
are certain "natural laws" that govern relationships among people. The
political ideals of John Locke set forth in his Second Treatise of Govemnment (1690) and Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Bride et de
4.

BIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 138 (2006).
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Montesquieu, described in the Spirit of the Laws (1748) are reflected in
the Federalist Papers (1787-88) written by James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton and John Jay.
Locke believed that guided by reason, and subject to natural law,
individuals could enjoy perfect freedom and equality. He reasoned that
natural law requires individuals to do no harm to others in their enjoyment of life, health, liberty and possessions. 5 By extension of this idea,
he thought that individuals could and should bind together to create a
government of limited powers that would make, execute and apply laws
for the common good. He contrasted dominion by one person over
another to a society that was ruled by law. In a society based on law, the
law would preserve individual freedom and equality for everyone.
[F]reedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to
live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all
things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man .... 6
Montesquieu reinforced this ideal in the context of individual liberty. He identified "liberty" as living under the rule of law.7 He reasoned
that if every person was free to do what he or she desired, all would be
under threat of others doing the same. Individual liberty would thus be
maximized if everyone was restrained from doing harm to others. Law
would act as the consensual restraint. In essence, the law would set
boundaries within which people could act
as they chose. "Liberty is a
8
permit.",
laws
the
whatever
doing
of
right
Locke and Montesquieu derived their view of the role of law from
what they believed was divinely inspired "natural" law. Embedded in
their views is a paradox that was perhaps most concisely stated centuries
earlier by Cicero, "[W]e are all servants of the laws, for the very purpose
of being able to be freemen." 9
A paradox is an apparent contradiction. By recognizing the fundamental connection between apparent opposites and holding them in tension with each other, a paradox often embodies a fundamental truth and
produces great energy. Here, the apparent contradiction is that the law

5. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ'g 1980) (1690).
6. Id. at 17.
7. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 52 (5th
ed. 2007) (referring to THOMAS L. PANGLE, MONTESQUIE'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM 109
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1973)).
8.
I BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 150 (Thomas Nugent trans., P.F. Colier
& Son 1900).
9.

I MARCUS TULLiUS CICERO, THE ORATIONS OF MARCuS TULLIUS CICERO 164 (C.D.

Yonge trans., G. Bell & Sons 1917).
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which restrains individual behavior also guarantees individual freedom.
The energy of this paradox was the hope of our nation's founders.
The Declaration of Independence reflects notions of natural law in
its announcement that "the Creator" has given every person an "unalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." In drafting the
Constitution, our forefathers attempted to translate the paradox recognized by Locke, Montesquieu and other Enlightenment political philosophers into a functioning governmental structure in which a limited government would protect individual interests and maximize individual liberty. Through a careful calibration of what we refer to as "checks and
balances," the Constitution was designed to preserve popular democracy
but prevent complete control by the government or by the largest, most
0
organized or powerful groups. It became the
'' I "fundamental law"' to
men.
of
not
and
laws,
of
secure "a government
Consistent with that purpose, our state and federal governments
have been animated and constrained by the law, and virtually every social development in our country's history has been tied to the law. Law
has supported economic and geographic expansion and forged international connections.1 2 Our nation's history has been punctuated by events
either of legal significance or which have legal components. For example, the Louisiana Purchase was a commercial transaction. Treaties with
Native Americans and foreign countries are contracts. The justification
for the civil war, according to President Lincoln, was the breach of the
Constitution by the southern states' decision to secede. As a student of
the classics and an accomplished lawyer, Lincoln initiated a process that
eventually converted the natural law concept that "all men are created
Equal" (found in the Declaration of Independence) into the law of the3
land (the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).'
During the nineteenth century, industrialization and expansion were both
facilitated and limited by state and congressional legislation. And in the
twentieth century, a multitude of social changes, including expansion of
workers rights, recovery from the depression and implementation of civil
rights, have been embodied in statutory enactment or judicial decree, or
both.

10. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books 1961).
11.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
12. For example, bankruptcy and commercial laws were enacted, repealed and modified to
facilitate the growth of business and to address economic fluctuations. The first bankruptcy law was
enacted in 1800 in response to the economic panics of 1792 and 1797. It was repealed in 1803. This
was followed by another national bankruptcy act in 1841, repealed a year later. The panic of 1857
and the financial cataclysm of the Civil War spurred consideration of another bankruptcy act in
1867. This act was repealed in 1878. In 1898, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act, which was
amended several times, but not replaced until adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. This was
most recently modified in 2005.
13.
Susan Schulten, Professor of History, Lincoln and the Constitution (Jan. 2009) (presentation at the Univ. of Denver) (manuscript on file with author).
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In this country, we expect the law to reflect and reinforce our social
values and protect the rights of every citizen, and we expect our legal
institutions to do the same. Indeed, this expectation is chiseled into the
cornice of the building that houses the United States Supreme Court"Equal Justice Under Law." We proudly proclaim to14 the rest of the
world that we are a society based upon the Rule of Law.
B. Law remains an ever-present component of American culture even in
the Twenty-First Century
For better or worse, modem American society is even more infused
with the law and legal processes than it was in prior generations.15 One
need only turn on the television, open the newspaper, surf the Internet,
go the bookstore, examine most any institution or listen to popular conversation to see legal threads woven into our culture.
A quick internet search for television programming reveals ten faux
courtroom programs (e.g. Judge Judy) and thirty-six legal dramas (e.g.
Boston Legal). 16 Many stations and producers have hired legal experts to
opine on the legal news item du jour. Every newspaper contains multiple articles with a legal theme--criminal investigations, court proceedings, the effect of judicial rulings, the anticipated or actual impact of
statutes or regulations, commentary on what the law should be, or stories
about miscreant lawyers and judges. The Internet is filled with websites
and blogs that assess legal thought, court opinions, legal/social issues,
judges and attorneys. Books of all genres 1include
legal themes; there is
7
even an independent genre of legal thrillers.
Virtually no social, business or governmental institution operates in
the absence of rules and procedures for enforcing them, or without an
attempt to comply with laws and regulations. 18 Schools have codes of
14. See, for example, the ABA Rule of Law Initiative website, which states that "rule of law
promotion is the most effective long-term antidote to the pressing problems facing the world community today, including poverty, economic stagnation, and conflict." ABA RULE OF LAW
INITIATIVE, http://www.abanet.org/rol/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). For a more recent example of the
emphasis on the "rule of law" in the international community, see News Release, Human Rights
Watch, Southern Sudan: Protect Civilians, Improve Rule of Law (Feb. 12, 2009), available at
http:llwww.hrw.orglenlnews/2009/02/12/southern-sudan-protect-civilians-improve-rule-law.
15.
Some commentators argue that the root of this is a surplus of both lawyers and laws. See
generally, e.g., PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW (1998) (explaining lawyers contribute to the overuse of laws in the United States); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH
OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994) (explaining that inefficient de-

crees suffocate Americans); PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS: LIBERATING
AMERICANS FROM Too MUCH LAW (2009) (explaining that Americans are flooded with legal rules).
16.
See Yahoo, Legal Drama TV Shows, http://dir.yahoo.com/EntertainmentfFelevision_
Shows/Drama/Legal/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
17.
For examples of recent legal thrillers, see MICHAEL CONNELLY, THE BRASS VERDICT
(2008); LINDA FAIRSTEN, KILLER HEAT (2008); LINDA FAIRSTEIN, LETHAL LEGACY (2009); JOHN
GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008); JOHN GRISHAM, THE ASSOCIATE (2009); JOHN LESCROART,

BETRAYAL (2008); RICHARD NORTH PATTERSON, ECLIPSE (2009).
18.
In this context, I am reminded of a question that my daughter raised when her fighter pilot
squadron wanted to acquire a bus in order to ensure that pilots who had partied too much could be
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conduct and procedures for imposing discipline. Employers maintain
employee manuals, dress codes and privacy codes and create whole departments to ensure that employees comply with applicable laws and
regulations. Home owner associations and other informal groups adopt
policies to regulate behavior of members and to avoid running afoul of
the law.
Even casual conversation reveals legal threads. Everyone who has
watched Law and Order knows what it means to "read somebody their
rights." Indeed, it would not be surprising to learn that most children
over the age of 12 can recite the Miranda advisements. Arguments and
disagreements often include challenges and dismissals such as, "So sue
me . . ." or "See ya in court." Even the most non-adversarial among us
recognize the idioms, "Don't make a federal case out of it," or "I'll take
this case all the way to the Supreme Court."
To resolve our disputes, we file thirty times more lawsuits per capita in the United States than do citizens of any other country. 19 For example, in Colorado, which currently has a population of approximately four
million, over 750,000 new cases/appeals were initiated in the state
courts 2 ° and another 17,000 were initiated in the federal courts 2' during
2007. A recent study conducted by the Institute for the Advancement of
the American Legal System and the League of Women Voters reports
that almost half of the respondents said they or a family member had
been in a courtroom within the past five years-39% of that number as
jurors,
22% in family court matters, and 18% as a party in a civil law22
suit.

C. The pervasive role of law in American society is evidence of a core
value-reverencefor the Rule of Law
Although we may feel overburdened by the law, and indeed we may
have too many laws, our unbroken history and tradition of relying on the
law and legal institutions reflects the energy of the paradox upon which
our society rests-that law exists to maximize our liberty and opportuniassured of a safe drive home by a designated driver. Such a laudable objective was to comply with
laws regulating drinking and driving and the regulatory fallout of failing to do so in both a civil and
military context. This very simple and sensible solution necessarily required exploration of who or
what should own the bus, how ownership could be transferred as membership in the squadron
changed, how it could be insured, and how the cost of its operation, maintenance, and insurance
could be shared (enforced) among its beneficiaries.
19.
See Power of Attorneys, Are there too many Lawyers?, http://www.power-ofattorneys.com/arethere_toomanyjawyers.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2009).
20. Colorado State Judicial Branch, Court Facts, http:llwww.courts.state.co.uslCourtsl
Education/CourtFacts.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
21.

JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 151 tbl.3-C, 297 tbl.F (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.govl
judbus2007/contents.html.
22.
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYSTEM & LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS, 2007 COLORADO VOTER OPINIONS ON THE JUDICIARY 3 (2007), available at

http://www.lwvcolorado.org/executivesummaryl.pdf.
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ty. This esoteric concept has long since been absent from popular parlance; our modem reference to the paradox is found in the phrase the
Rule of Law.
Although many cannot define what the Rule of Law is, they readily
advocate it as a core value. Indeed, in recent years, reference to the Rule
of Law has become increasingly common. The phrase often appears in
political speeches, is used to justify political policy, has been the subject
of books and articles, and was even the annual theme for the American
Bar Association in 2008.
Widespread reference to the Rule of Law may have caused it to be-3
come trite to some, but the concept continues to inspire both interest
and devotion. 24 Scholars have written a multitude of books2 and articles 26 seeking to define it and explain its effect. Just recently in an interview published as part of the "7 Questions-The Law" series, Judge
23.
Websites on the Internet dedicated to the rule of law include: ABA Rule of Law Initiative
(www.abanet.org/rol); Center for the Rule of Law (www.centerfortheruleoflaw.org); and the Rule
of Law Resource Center (law.lexisnexis.com/webcenters/RuleoflawResourceCenter).
24.
Of note outside of the U.S., lawyers in Pakistan have protested for reinstitution of the Rule
of Law and an independent judiciary. See James Traub, Can PakistanBe Governed?, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Apr. 5, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/magazine/05zardarit.html?partner=rss.
25.
There are too many books and articles addressing the Rule of Law to provide a comprehensive list. The following are only a few examples of recent, scholarly discussions: RONALD A.
CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA (2001); DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW (Jose Maria
Maravall & Adam Przeworshi eds., 2003); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (2003); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW (2004); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION (3d ed. 2007).
Some much older writings include: T. R S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: THE

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM (1993); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
(Terence Irwin ed., 1985); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Stephen Everson ed., 1988); RANDY BARNETr,
THE STRUCrURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998); CICERO, THE REPUBLIC AND
THE LAWS (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE

(1986); LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961);
F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1976); F. A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE SOCIETY (1979); F. A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER, (1973); F. A. HAYEK, THE
POLITICAL IDEA OF THE RULE OF LAW (1955); F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944);
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); LOCKE, supra note 5; ROSCOE POUND, AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 6th ed. 2003); REDRAFrING THE RULE OF LAW: THE
LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999); THE RULE OF LAW (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994);
THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY (Allan C. Hutcheson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987); THE
RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMAN AND OTro KIRCHHEIMER
(William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY (1979); SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEx, REX, OR THE LAW AND THE PRINCE: A DISPUTE
FOR THE JUST PREROGATIVE OF KING AND PEOPLE (1644).

26. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998); Paul
Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law, 1997 PUB. L. 467 (1997); Ofer
Raban, Real and Imagined Threats to the Rule of Law: On Brian Tamanaha'sLaw As a Means to an
End, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 478 (2008); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as Law of Rules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989); Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't Count: The 2000 Election
and the Failureof the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2001); Robert S. Summers, A Formal
Theory of the Rule of Law, 6 RATIO JURIS 127 (1993); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137 (2002); Azar Nafisi, Hiding Behind the
Rule ofLaw, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at A39.
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Deanell Tacha, former Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, was asked how the Rule of Law relates to professionalism among
lawyers. 27 And not surprisingly, recent comments about U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused upon implementation of a
rule of law.28
Defining the Rule of Law is a matter of much debate among both
scholars and pragmatists. What are its essential components? How do
they stabilize societies? Often these questions have different answers
depending upon the context or the society being considered. Recognizing this, scholars have characterized the varying definitions of the Rule
of Law in degrees from "thin" to "thick." Generally, a "thin" definition
pertains to universal qualities-for example, the Rule of Law is a system
of laws that protects liberty and property rights, and the laws are universally applied. A "thicker" definition might incorporate ideas unique to a
particular culture-for example, the Rule of Law incorporates a democratic process to create and revise laws, the existence of written laws,
predictable procedures and methods for enforcement of laws and the
existence of a fair and impartial judiciary, and the right to due process.
For the purposes of this article, one need not precisely define the
Rule of Law nor, in scholarly fashion, characterize it by its "thinness" or
"thickness." Instead, recognizing that the Rule of Law is a shorthand
way of characterizing the fundamental paradox of the role of law in the
United States, one can focus on the meaning the Rule of Law has in the
minds of the American public.
Americans understand the Rule of Law to mean that no man is
above the law.29 We often attribute this idea to the Magna Carta, but
actually it implemented the Rule of Law by imposing unprecedented
constraints on the king. In our own national history, the concept is mirrored in our foundational documents, democratic values, and the structure of our government.

27.
See Matthew Crouch, 7 Questions-The Law Series: An Interview with Honorable Deanell Tacha of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, MILE HIVE, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://tinyurl.com/db92np.
See Training and EquippingAfghan Security Forces: Unaccounted Weapons and Strateg28.
ic Challenges: Hearing Before the Subconm. on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (Feb. 12, 2009), available at 2009
WLNR 2870483 (testimony of Mark L. Schneider, Senior Vice President, International Crisis
Group) ("I would hope that the end of the current review of U.S. strategy for Afghanistan will raise
the priority attached to establishing an effective Afghan National Police force within a functioning
rule of law."); New Court House Opens in Bagdad, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 10, 2008, available at
2008 WLNR 17342770 ("Iraqi Chief Justice Medhat referred to the importance of the Justice Palace
in establishing the rule of law in Iraq. Medhat gave thanks to the Coalition forces and a special
recognition to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the workmanship and diligence.").
29.
Interestingly, this is the definition given for the "Rule of Law" in the Colorado Model
Content Standards for Civics. See COLO. MODEL CONTENT STANDARDS FOR CIVICS 25 (1998),
http:llwww.cde.state.co.uslcdeassessldocumentslOSA/standardscivics.pdf.
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From this basic tenet grow several expectations. First, no person or
group may ignore or violate the law without consequence. In other
words, the law should be equally, consistently and predictably applied to
everyone. Second, the government, too, is be bound by the law. Our
government has limited power, and as a consequence, no person working
for the government, no agency, and no branch of government may violate the law. We expect those in government to follow it. Third, the
law should be public rather than secret. This is why we require public
legislative and judicial sessions, have written statutes and published judicial opinions, 30 and why we are deeply suspicious of secret communications by those in power. Finally, the law should be created, modified and
replaced only by the process that society has prescribed in the law.
In practical terms, we believe the law is something that we create,
but once created, it binds us all. The law stands separate from us, as individuals and groups. Even though each of us, from time to time, resents
the fact that we have to comply with the law, we nevertheless count on it
to protect us and the society in which we live. It is this universality that
integrates the diverse, heterogeneous American society in which we live.
D. In American society, the beliefs and behavior of lawyers matter
Although lawyers are often the target of criticism and humor, in
American society lawyers exert profound individual and collective influence. The influence of the legal profession grows from a number of
sources--our specialized knowledge about the law, our number and diversity, and the wide variety of roles we play.
In his classic study Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville
presaged the important role that lawyers would play. He wrote:
In visiting the Americans and studying their laws, we perceive that
the authority they have entrusted to members of the legal profession,
and the influence that these individuals exercise in the government,
are the most powerful existing security against the excesses of de31
mocracy.
More recently, scholars have directly tied the role of lawyers to the
very foundations of American society. Judith Shklar observes:
The tendency to think of law as "there" as a discrete entity, discernibly different from morals and politics, has its deepest roots in the legal profession's view of its own functions, and forms
the very basis
32
of most of our judicial institutions and procedures.

30.

And public court records.

31.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve

trans., Everyman's Library ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1994) (1835).
32.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 9 (1964).
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Put in a more popular and humorous context, Jerry Seinfeld explained,
A lawyer is basically the person who knows the rules of the country.
We're all throwing the dice, playing the game, moving our pieces
round the board, but if there is a problem, the33 lawyer is the only person who read the inside of the top of the box.
Another reason lawyers are influential is that there are a lot of us.
Currently, there are more than 1.1 million lawyers in the United States,
more in toto and per capita than in any other country in the world. 34 In
195 1, one out of every 695 persons was a lawyer; but by 2001, the ratio
of lawyers to non-lawyers had almost tripled to one out of every 264
persons. 35 And, more are coming. As of June 2008, there are 200 accredited law schools in the country. 36 Enrollment in these schools is just
shy of 150,000 students each year.3 7
Finally, lawyers play a wide variety of vital roles in American society. According to national ABA statistics, more than 750,000 lawyers
are in private practice, more than 88,000 work for the government, approximately 95,000 are employed in private industry or for private associations, 33,000 serve as judges and 11,000 teach.3 8
Twenty-six of our forty-three presidents have been lawyers, 39 and
two have had spouses who are also lawyers. 4° Routinely, upwards of
40% of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and more in
the U.S. Senate, are lawyers. 41 Their office staffs and the staffs of congressional committees are dominated by lawyers, as are members of the
executive branch and regulatory agencies. In my home state, eighteen

33. Seinfeld: The Visa (NBC television broadcast Jan. 27, 1993), available at
http://www.seinfeldscripts.comiTheVisa.html.
34. AM. BAR Ass'N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2008), http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/
Lawyer_-Demographics_- 2008.pdf [hereinafter LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS].
35.

CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S.

LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000 27 (2004); BARBARA CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND.,
THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990's (1994).
36. ABA Approved Law Schools, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/
approved.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
37.
See Memorandum from David Rosenlieb, Data Specialist, Section of Legal Educ. &
Admission to the Bar, to Deans of ABA-approved Law Schools (Feb. 15, 2008),
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/resources/2007-08%2EnroUment%2OMemo.pdf (providing detailed
information on enrollment statistics for law schools in 2006 and 2007).
38.
Id.
39.
See America's Lawyer Presidents, http://www.abanet.org/museumI/exhibit.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009). At time of publication, the article has not been updated to reflect the election
of President Barack Obama.
40.
Hillary Clinton and Michelle Obama are lawyers.
41.
See MARK C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 59 (1995); C-Span: 109th Congress Statistics,

http://www.c-span.org/congress/lO9congress.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
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governors have been lawyers, 42 and the ratio of lawyers to non-lawyers
in the state legislature is only slightly less than in Congress.4 3
In recent years, we have become more diverse as a profession. No
longer are American lawyers invariably members of a wealthy, white,
male elite. ABA statistics in 2000 reported that 27% of lawyers were
women and 12% identified themselves as people of color. 44
Put simply, lawyers are trained in the law and, we sincerely hope, in
its value to American society. We populate all walks of life. We are
mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, daughters and sons. We are
employers and employees, writers, teachers, litigators, advisors, business
owners, legislators, government officials and judges. We work for government, for private clients and in business. We live in a variety of
neighborhoods, belong to churches, synagogues, mosques and clubs, help
in charitable and political causes, teach our children and converse with
our neighbors and families. We make the news, enforce, create and
change the law, and we are, whether we like it or not, role models for
other citizens. What we believe about the Rule of Law, and how we implement it, matters.
II. A CYCLE OF CYNICISM THREATENS CONFIDENCE IN OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM AND THE RULE OF LAW

A. Public Distrust
Few would disagree that since the middle of the twentieth century
American society has become increasingly distrustful of its governmental
and legal institutions. Some historians mark the advent of popular skepticism as beginning with the Vietnam War or Watergate. Some trace its
roots to moral and political relativism that developed in the early decades
of the twentieth century. Yet others would claim that such skepticism
has long existed. For example, we all remember the Shakespearian reference to killing all the lawyers.45
Part of the public distrust is attributable to our nature and habits. At
the very fiber of American populism is a distrust of government power
and fear of its excesses. To the extent that governmental structure and
42. See About the Governor, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/SatelliteIGovRitter/GOVRI
1177024890365 (last visited April 10, 2009) (describing Governor Bill Ritter's educational background); Colorado Governors, http://www.colorado.gov/dpaldoit/archiveslgovslindex.htm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009) (providing biographical information on all Colorado Governors from 1876 to
1975); DU Portfolio Community I Dick Lamm, https://portfolio.du.edu/pc/port?portfolio=rlamm
(last
visited
April
10,
2009);
Colorado's
Governor
Roy Romer:
biography,
http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/romer/govbio.htm (last visited April 10, 2009).

43. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, OCCUPATIONAL DATA WESTERN
REGIONAL STATES TABLE 1, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/about/OccupationWestl.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
44. See LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS, supranote 34.
45.
"The first thing we do [when we take over the government], let's kill all the lawyers."
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2.
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legal institutions are intertwined, skepticism with regard to one can bleed
into skepticism about the other. Indeed, our country has gone through
several cycles during which the public became distrustful of legal institutions. The Jeffersonians repealed judgeships. President Jackson defied
Supreme Court rulings. During the Civil War, Congress reduced the size
of the Supreme Court and stripped it of its jurisdiction to determine
whether Congress had the power to impose military rule in the southern
states. In the nineteenth century, many states abolished the appointment
of judges and replaced the selection systems with popular elections.
In recent decades, however, public distrust of lawyers and legal institutions has surged again. A number of new factors may contribute to
the current situation.
First, there has been a decline in knowledge about civic organization and citizen responsibilities. For several decades, there has been 46a
decline in focus on substantive civics education in the public schools.
According to Bert Brandenburg, the Executive Director of Justice at
Stake, many Americans cannot correctly name all three branches of government; one-third cannot name any of them; and more than one in five
Americans do not believe that the Supreme Court can declare an act of
Congress unconstitutional.4 7
To the extent that citizens have not formally learned about the purpose of the law or how legal institutions work, it is human nature to fill
in the gap with popular information. We rely on urban myths, what our
friends or the media tell us, what we hear over the back fence, from Nancy Grace, or what we see on Law and Order. Many of the jurors who
serve in matters before me comment after the trial that they were surprised to learn how a trial actually works; that it is not like anything they
have seen on TV, and that, based on their experience, they would look
forward to serving again sometime.
Second, we have become a nation of consumers who believe we can
purchase anything we want. In this expectation, we do not differentiate
between goods and services. We shop for cars, colleges and legal representation. We believe that we get what we pay for, or that "money
talks." Clients, corporate and private, are often savvy customers who do
not hesitate to specify the results they expect. In the litigation context, I
call this the attempt to buy "Burger King Justice," i.e., justice, my way.

46.
Research has shown a marked trend away from civics and social studies in the elementary
grades, and that civic education in high school is usually limited to a single course. See, e.g., Joyce
Baldwin, Civic Education in Schools, 2 CARNEGIE REPORTER 12, 15 (2003), available at
http://www.carnegie.org/pdf/camreporterfaU03.pdf. In Colorado, there is no requirement for a civics
or government class. Instead, civics themes are to be included in the content of classes devoted to
other topics.
47.
Bert Brandenburg, Exec. Dir., Justice At Stake Campaign, Address at the Colorado Judicial Institute's Judicial Excellence Dinner (Nov. 18, 2008).
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Third, we are increasingly savvy about science and technology, and
as a result, we naively believe that scientific and technological methodologies apply to every walk of life. We take pills for ills, and so we
expect them or their technological cousins to solve all our problems.4 8 In
trials, it is not uncommon for jurors to be disappointed if no "CSI" type
forensic evidence is presented. In addition, we are used to communicating quickly and efficiently using a host of media-face to face, email,
cell phone, instant message, Twitter or Facebook. We expect prompt, if
not instant, responses. It is quite a disappointment, therefore, to discover
that, unlike other aspects of life, legal affairs are rarely characterized by
certainty or speed.
Fourth, lawyers are frequently caricatured in jokes and by the media
in ways that promote distrust. They have been characterized in the movies as "miserable human beings, either unethical or incompetent at their
jobs. 49 In her book, In the Interests of Justice, Deborah Rhode analyzed
survey data showing that a substantial portion of the public perceives
lawyers as greedy, unethical and arrogant. °
Marc Galanter, a law professor who has long studied public impressions of lawyers, reported in 1998 that the public's estimation of lawyers,
which has not been high in the past, continues to drop. 51 Those who
thought lawyers less honest than most people rose from 17% in 1986 to
31% in 1993. In 1991, a national survey inquired as to "what profession
or type of worker do you trust the least." "Lawyers" was far and away
the most frequent response. Almost as many people (23%) identified
lawyers as untrustworthy as the next two categories (car salesman 13%,
politicians 11%), combined. But Galanter goes on to argue that the public does not condemn lawyers without qualification. Rather, the public
approves of lawyers' commitment to their clients, but it distrusts lawyers' commitment to anything else-such as to honesty, truth, or the law.
Because lawyers play so many roles in society, distrust of lawyers
bleeds into distrust of the law and legal systems. And it is fed by general
skepticism about government. This is not at all surprising given the
steady drumbeat of scandals involving business people, government fig48. This brings to mind a recent advertisement in The Economist for a course in history. The
advertisement reads, in part, "Now More than Ever, We Must Learn the Lessons of History.... The
challenge Professor Fears poses ... is especially pertinent during the 'ahistorical age' ... an era
when too many people are willing to invest in a 'dangerous delusion' that 'science, technology, the
global economy, and the information superhighway all make us immune to the lessons of history,'
and that 'in an age of global economy, war and tyranny will become things of the past."' Advertisement, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2009, at 43.

49. Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism, Address at Dedication of the William W. Knight
Law Center, in 78 OR. L. REv. 385, 386 (1999) (quotations omitted).
50.
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
3-5 (2000).
51.
Marc Galanter, Robert S. Marx Lecture: The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in
Public Opinion, Jokes and PoliticalDiscourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 805, 809 (1998).
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ures, lawyers and judges. One only need reflect on recent scandals that
embroiled prominent leaders (many of whom were lawyers): President
Bill Clinton, U.S. Congressmen Randy Cunningham and Robert Ney,
Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez,
Alaska Senator Ted Stevens and the justice department attorneys that
prosecuted him, as well as a variety of federal and state judges.
In addition, for decades the news has been telling the public about
policy-infused court decisions. Sometimes the portrayal of the court as a
policy maker is accurate, but sometimes it is not. News reports that identify judges by political party or the president who appointed them, and
then go on to short-circuit legal and factual complexity by reducing court
rulings to sound bites, imply that judicial decisions are merely the result
of judges' political beliefs. To the extent that people do not have a clear
understanding of how various courts work, the profusion of stories about
the Supreme Court's policy cum legal decisions understandably leads
many to assume that all judges engage in social or political policy making. Unfortunately, such notion is also fueled by lawyers who argue to
lower court judges that they should base their decisions on political or
social policy and by lower court judges who do so.
Thus, it is not entirely surprising that a 1999 Hearst Report commissioned by the National Center for State Courts concluded that a growing
portion of the public believes that courts are out of touch with the reality
in their communities and that judicial decisions result from personal or
political biases. Many members of the public believe that using the judicial process costs too much, takes too much time and favors the rich.
The Annenberg Public Policy Center's September 2006 study reported
that 75 % of those surveyed believed that a judge's ruling is influenced by
his or her personal political views to a great or moderate degree, 62%
believe that courts favor the wealthy and another 62% believe that the
courts in their state are legislating from the bench rather than applying
the law.
The upshot of all this is that references to "judicial activism" and to
judges as "tyrants in black robes",5 2 have become a staple of talk radio,
cable and the blogosphere. Readers Digest regularly publishes a list of
"America's Worst Judges." Criticism of courts and judicial decisions is
routinely incorporated into the speaking points of politicians. For example, at the national "Justice Sunday" event organized a couple of years
ago, the organizer referred to judges as supremacists, adding that the
Supreme Court poses a greater threat to representative government than
budget deficits and terrorist groups.53

52. These comments, interestingly, iterate the public's fundamental view of the law-no
person, not even a judge, should be above it.
53.
Brandenburg, supra note 47.
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As in prior historical cycles, it is not surprising that citizens who are
dissatisfied and distrust legal institutions have initiated a number of
measures to restrain judges and restructure court systems. The 2006
election cycle brought Amendment 40 in Colorado, JAIL4JUDGES in
South Dakota, and Measure 40 in Oregon. 54 In 1997, the majority leader
of the United States House of Representatives (also a lawyer) declared
that "judges need to be intimidated. 55 More recently, Congress considered the appointment of an Inspector General for the federal judiciary,
which inspired the creation of a special committee chaired by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer to investigate and report on the
manner in which complaints of judicial misconduct are handled.56
The foregoing factors have blurred the boundaries separating the
three branches of government. When courts are perceived as encroaching upon the prerogatives of the legislative branch by fashioning and
imposing social policy, the legislative branch retaliates. There are inquiries by the Senate into the political views and anticipated judicial rulings
during confirmation hearings for federal judicial nominees, legislative
efforts are made to reduce federal court jurisdiction and attempts are
made to direct the outcomes in pending litigation, such as in the Terry
Schiavo case. This amalgam makes it harder and harder for citizens to
have confidence in the Rule of Law.
B. Lawyer Dissatisfaction
According to many observers, the decline in public esteem for lawyers and legal institutions also correlates to dissatisfaction within the
profession-a decline in professional civility, increase in adversarialism,
decline in the role of the lawyer as counselor, decline in attorney competence, and greater competition among attorneys for clients and fees. Although there is some disagreement among researchers as to the degree of
54. Colorado's proposed Amendment 40 sought to strictly limit the term of all state appellate
judges. See STATE OF COLORADO, ANALYSIS OF THE 2006 BALLOT PROPOSALS 7-8 (2006), available at http://www.state.co.us/gov -dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/bluebook/Bluebook2006.pdf. The Amendment

would have applied retroactively, and would have "immediately removed nineteen of the state's
twenty-six appellate judges from the bench." Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation Programfor the FederalJudiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 28 (2008). The
"Jail4Judges" initiative in South Dakota would have allowed a "Special Grand Jury" to assess fines

and penalties against judges and prosecutors who violated rules established by the grand juries. See
CHRIS NELSON & KEA WARNE, SOUTH DAKOTA 2006 BALLOT QUESTIONS, available at
http://www.sdsos.gov/electionsvoteregistration/electvoterpdfs/2006SouthDakotaBallotQuestionPam
phlet.pdf; see also Kourlis & Singer, supra at n.123.
Oregon's Measure 40, proposed in 2006, would have required state appellate judges to be
elected by district, and would have established strict residency requirements for judges running for
election in a particular district. See OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, MEASURE 40 EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
(2006), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72006/military-vp/m40_es.pdf.
55.
Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target 'JudicialActivism', WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997,
at AOl (quoting then-majority whip Tom DeLay).
56.
The report of this Committee resulted in the Judicial Conference of the United States
adopting national procedures for resolution of such complaints and for public disclosure of their

outcome.
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dissatisfaction among lawyers, 57 the evidence is unavoidable. 8 In addressing problems within the profession, then U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in 1999 observed that attorneys are more than
three times as likely as non-lawyers to suffer from depression, to develop
drug dependence, to get divorced or to contemplate suicide. They suffer
from higher than average rates of stress-related diseases such as ulcers,
coronary artery disease and hypertension. 59 A RAND Institute study of
lawyers in California found them to be "'profoundly pessimistic about
the state of the legal profession and its future,' and 60that only half would
choose to become lawyers if they had it to do over.,
Many describe the conditions of contemporary legal practice as
brutal. Lawyers' income is tied to how much they work. Either voluntarily, or by compulsion, lawyers work long hours. And in a society of
instant electronic connections, business goes on around the clock.
A recent conversation I had with a young bar leader was illustrative.
His six-year-old son started making loud noises every time the lawyer
reached for his Blackberry or cell phone. When he asked his son to stop
and inquired as to why the boy was making so much noise, the boy replied that he did not want his Dad to work when he was at home. The
father confessed to me that he felt conflicted; he too wanted to spend
time with his son, but he had been bluntly instructed by his superior that
his working hours were not limited to the office. "If a client wants to
talk with you in the middle of the night, you better be available."
In a culture where the cost of legal education has increased markedly along with the number of lawyers, there has been a change in the internal culture of law firms and in their relationships with clients. To
make adequate profits, fewer resources can be devoted to training new
associates. They, instead, become a profit center. As more lawyers
compete for a limited client base, they must perpetually hustle to bring
clients in and to make sure that clients are satisfied with the results ob57.

See JOHN P. HEINZ Er AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR

271-74 (2005); NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RES. & EDUC. & AM. BAR FOUND., AFTER THE JD:
FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 7 (2004), available at

http://www.nalpfoundation.org/webmodules/articles/articlefiles/87-After JD-2004-web.pdf.
58.
See Martin E.P. Seligman etal., Why Lawyers are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33
(2001); John P. Heinz etal., Lawyers and Their Discontents: Findingsfrom a Survey of the Chicago
Bar, 74 IND. L.J. 735 (1999); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy and Ethical Member of
an Unhappy, Unhealthy and Unethical Profession, 52 VAN. L. REV. 871, 871-906 (1999).
O'Connor, supra note 49, at 386; see also RHODE, supra note 50, at 8; Michael J. Swee59.
ney, The Devastation of Depression, B. LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 11; William W. Eaton et al.,
Occupationsand Prevalence of Major DepressiveDisorder,32 J. OCC. MED. 1079, 1081 (1990).
O'Connor, supra note 49, at 386. Several highly publicized books in the 1990's advanced
60.
the theme that lawyers had lost their former ideals as statesmen, public leaders, as preservers of the
public good. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How CRISIS IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); SOL M. LINowrrz WITH
MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY (1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993).
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tained. Thus, the attorney's need for compensation becomes consonant
with satisfying the client's objectives.
In addition, many lawyers describe behavior within the profession
as brutish. All of us know lawyers who have left the profession, and
most of us have heard statements like the following: "I am tired of the
deceit. I am tired of chicanery. But most of all, I am tired of the misery
my job causes other people." Many attorneys believe that "zealously
representing their clients" means pushing all the rules of ethics and decency to the limit. Some have reached the point that they simply "don't
want to mud wrestle anymore." In a speech to law students at the University of Oklahoma, Justice O'Connor noted that a National Law Journal study reported that over 50% of the attorneys surveyed used the word
"obnoxious" to describe their colleagues.6'
Such negativity is apparent even in law schools, where students
complain of a contentious, competitive and combative environment, and
that the single most common reason for becoming a lawyer is the economic reward.
The whole adversarial system is set up to produce winners and losers,
just as the grading curve creates winners and losers-and the losers
don't get the jobs they want. It is a 62winner-take-all system, and for
some that means winning at any cost.
Sometimes I have the pleasure of taking a new law graduate out to
lunch to congratulate him or her on his or her accomplishment and to
offer encouragement in the ensuing job search. Recently, responding to
my question about what propelled her to go to law school, a new law
school graduate confided in a whisper that she had done so because she
wanted to help people. When I asked why she whispered, she replied
that she was embarrassed and did not want anyone to hear that her primary objective was not like that of her classmates-to make lots of money.
C. The combination of public distrustand professionaldissatisfaction
creates a Cycle of Cynicism
The problem with public distrust and professional dissatisfaction is
that they create a self-perpetuating Cycle of Cynicism about legal institutions and the Rule of Law. Such negative attitudes foster an expectation
61.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism,Address at the Dedication of the University of
Oklahoma's Law School Building and Library (Apr. 30, 2002), in 55 OKLA. L. REv. 197, 199
(2002). Justice O'Connor identified common, combative language that lawyers customarily use to
describe their experiences:
"I attacked every weak point in their argument"
"Her criticisms were right on target"
"I demolished his position"
"If we use that strategy, she will wipe us out"
"I shot down each of their contentions."
62.
EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note I, at 149.
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that the legal system will fail in its duty to serve society, and behavior
consonant with that expectation leads to the expected failure-first in
small ways, then in ever-larger ones.
Clients who do not trust the law and the legal system to protect
them search for aggressive lawyers to do so. Those clients may believe
that they know more about the law than do their attorneys, refuse advice
that is offered, or disparage the lawyers' advice if it points toward an
outcome that is not the client's desire. They may not pay their bills, and
they may threaten to or actually sue for malpractice if outcomes do not
meet their specifications.
Lawyers, in competition for business, fear rejecting any client, even
if the client has unreasonable expectations. In service to their clients
(and to be paid), attorneys believe that they must promise and deliver
according to the clients' expectations. Sometimes attorneys let clients
over-control; sometimes attorneys act in pre-emptive self-defense to protect against later attack if results do not satisfy the clients.63
Many attorneys at side bar or in chambers candidly admit that they
cannot control their clients or convince them to be reasonable. Some
admit that the only reason they are proceeding to trial is because their
clients want to tell their story or have their "day in court," regardless of
the merit of their claims or defenses, or that they have taken the cases on
contingent fee bases, are upside down in expenses and cannot be paid
unless they get favorable verdicts. Other lawyers feel they must impress
their clients with courtroom performances of exaggerated intensity, theatrics or contentious and unprofessional behavior.
Lawyers who are vulnerable to their clients may have difficulty
maintaining objectivity or resisting clients' demands. To reduce clients'
expectations, lawyers may project excessive unpredictability on the legal
process, lack of trustworthiness on the opposing counsel, personal animosity on the judge or lack of attention or understanding on the jury.
(Indeed, when I was a trial lawyer, I recall telling clients that going to
court was a lot like gambling in Las Vegas.) And if there is an unfavorable outcome, it is only human nature to blame the adversary, the process,
the jury or the judge. Such actions feed distrust of lawyers and the legal
system and fuel the fear that it is the whims of individuals rather than the
Rule of Law that governs society.
In his recent book, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of
Brian Z. Tamanaha 65 argues that both the public and the legal

Law,64

63. This manifests in a variety of ways, such as so-called "CYA" letters, memos to the file,
and asking other attorneys or staff to sit in on conversations to document what occurs. Attorneys in
my district candidly admit that they file at least one motion to dismiss and one motion for summary
judgment in every case, regardless of whether such is warranted, simply because they fear the prospect of a malpractice claim if they don't.
64. TAMANAHA, supra note 4.
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profession now believe that the law no longer has any societal benefit; it
is simply a tool that clients and interest groups use to accomplish selfish
purposes. This, he contends, undermines both the effect of and confidence in the Rule of Law. 66
Tamanaha's evidence is compelling. He provides a comprehensive
tracing of legal theory67 and application over the last century. He examines legal education, the role of academia, the practicing profession
and the judiciary. With regard to each, he documents trends and provides a multitude of examples that demonstrate disdain for the Rule of
Law and efforts to escape it.
Tamanaha's study also points out two ways in which lawyers have
so narrowed their perspective that they cannot see society's need for and
dependence upon the Rule of Law. The first is in the belief that an attorney's only duty is to the client. When this occurs, lawyers are more likely to bend, twist or manipulate the law and legal process to achieve the
client's objective. With such a narrow focus, the attorney can be blinded
to the impact that his or her conduct has on public confidence. Several
examples come to mind.
My court reporter tells of an attorney who complained to him after a
hearing by asking why the judge was so intent on following the rules.
The attorney was shocked by the reporter's response, "because they are
the rules." This exchange reflects an all too common view that judges
are free to, and should, ignore the rules (or the law).
Another illustration arises in the criminal context. A prosecutor and
defense attorney jointly asked for a sentence reduction for an offender
65.
Cardozo Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law. Professor Tamanaha is
also the author of ON THE RULE OF LAW (2004), A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY
(2001), and REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY (1997). He is a frequent contributor to and associate
editor of Law and Society Review.
66.
Tamanaha's definition of the Rule of Law is slightly different than that used here. He
contends, based upon historical legal theory, that law necessarily should direct itself to the public
good. I agree with his critic, Ofer Raban, that in our pluralistic society we rarely agree on what the
"public good" is. See Raban, supra note 26, at 482-83. Dr. Raban is an Assistant Professor of Law
at the University of Oregon.
67.
Building on his earlier book On the Rule of Law, Tamanaha observes that through the
close of the 19th Century the law had generally been regarded as having an immanent, or objective
quality:
"A few centuries ago ... law was widely understood to possess a necessary
content and integrity that was, in some sense, given or predetermined. Law
was the right ordering of society binding on all. Law was not entirely subject
to our individual or group whims or will. There were several versions of this.
Law was thought to consist of rules or principles immanent within the customs or culture of the society, or of God-given principles disclosed by revelation or discoverable through he application of reason, or of principles dictated
by human nature, or of the logically necessary requirement of objective legal
concepts."
TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 1; see also G. EDWARD WHITE,THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION:

PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES (3d ed. 2007) (tracing the development of the American
legal tradition through biographical commentary on jurists such as Marshall, Holmes, and Burger).
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who had been convicted of defrauding a number of victims. The law
accorded the victims the opportunity to speak at sentencing and required
the court to consider their comments in imposing sentence. Modification
of the sentence could be made only within a short, specified period following its issuance, and the period could not be extended. The period
had passed before the request for reduction, and no notice had been given
to the victims of the parties' request. At the hearing, the attorneys acknowledged that the allowed time had expired and no further extension
could be granted, but nevertheless they argued for the reduction. Their
argument was that neither the deadline nor the absence of victim input
mattered because they had agreed on the sentence ... and by the way,
because they had agreed, no one would appeal the reduction. This argument is what I call a "winky-wink" argument. It essentially is that the
law does not matter if we agree that it does not.
Similar arguments are made in civil cases as well, but in ordinary
civil litigation parties have much more freedom to craft solutions to their
problems. This is limited in some arenas, however, where settlements
must meet statutory requirements. For example, in a bankruptcy case, a
debtor-in-possession and major creditors proposed a plan of reorganization that suited them, but it did not conform to the statutory requirements
that required notice to and the consent of other creditors. They were
angry that the judge would not approve it.
Another example of the effect of this narrowing of focus occurs
when attorneys invite judges and juries to ignore the law. I call these
"invitations to activism." In civil jury trials, attorneys purposely attempt
to stir up emotional responses in jurors even though the jurors are instructed not to base their decision on "sympathy or prejudice." Or counsel argue about the "equities" in the case and try to paint one party as the
"good guy" and another as the "bad guy," thereby asking for a moral
rather than a legal assessment. Sometimes attorneys ask judges and juries to "send messages" or to correct bad laws. They make speeches in
the courtroom and on the steps to the courthouse that they hope will
make the evening news. They argue the merits of the result their client
wants rather than about how the law should apply. This happens so often
that I now routinely remind parties to administrative appeals that I will
not be evaluating the wisdom of the underlying determination, only the
process by which it was obtained. In other opinions, to avoid misunderstanding, I often begin with a paragraph describing what issues the Court
is not deciding.
The effect of a narrow focus is not limited to practicing attorneys,
however. It can become the source of uncivil comments among jurists
and arrogance among legislators. Some years ago, I was introduced to a
U.S. Senator from another state. He was an attorney and a member of
the Senate Judiciary Committee. During the conversation we discussed
how legislators determined which statutes needed revision or correction.
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I explained that the Senators of my state had asked me to send copies of
opinions in which I found a statutory ambiguity, where the statute was
inconsistent with other law or where legislative intent was unclear. The
Senator with whom I was talking was obviously puzzled. As he stated,
"Why would anyone bother with what a judge says-lobbyists will tell
me whenever a law needs revision."
A second narrowing in focus that Tamanaha points out grows out of
the size and diversity within the legal profession. We have become balkanized. During the 18th, 19th and early 20th Centuries, in the course of
their professional lives, leaders in the legal profession often performed
multiple roles, such as practicing attorney, legislator, administrator,
judge, and law professor.6 Such lawyers brought not only diverse experiences to each new role; they maintained contact and conversation with
colleagues in disciplines left behind. This allowed members of the profession to communicate values and ideas outside of a particular job or
endeavor.
In comparison, modern membership in the legal profession is more
diverse and widespread, but we are also more divided. We distinguish
ourselves by function-academics, practicing lawyers, government lawyers and the judiciary. Then within these functions, we have specialties-for academics it may be by school or area of interest, for practitioners it may be by firm and practice specialty, and among judges it may
be by type of court where one serves.6 9 In addition, there are a multitude
of national, state, local and specialty bar associations and groups, 70 each
of which has its own purpose and objectives. 7' Although lawyers may
68.
Indeed, one only has to reflect upon legal legends to recall their various roles-Jefferson,
Madison, Hamilton, Marshall, Kent, Storey, Shaw, Lincoln, Taney, Harlan, Holmes, Hand, Cardozo,
Frankfurter, Taft and Pound, to name just a few. These lawyers had the benefit of legal experience
gained from different vantage points and maintained contacts (and communication) with those active
in the differing facets of the profession.
69.
Indeed, I recall one judge who would not associate with or refer to judges on other courts
as "colleagues."
70.
National legal associations include the American Bar Association (www.abanet.org) and
the Federal Bar Association (www.fedbar.org). Prominent state groups include the Colorado Bar
Association (www.cobar.org) and the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar (www.ccdb.org). At the local
level,
groups
include
the
Arapahoe
Country
Bar
Association
(www.cobar.org/index.cfmID/20089/ARAP/Arapahoe-County),
the Denver Bar Association
(www.denbar.org), and the Boulder County Bar Association (www.boulder-bar.org). Finally, influential
specialty
groups
include
the
American
Constitution
Society
(www.americanconstitutionsociety.org), the Federalist Society (www.fed-soc.org), the American
Association for Justice (www.justice.org),
and The Faculty of Federal Advocates
(www.facultyfederaladvocates.org).
71.
For example, Judge Richard A. Posner comments on the change of the relationship of law
schools and professors to the practicing bar in his tribute to Bernard D. Meltzer. Richard A. Posner,
In Memoriam, Bernard D. Meltzer (1914-2007), 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 435 (2007). He contends
that due to the absorption of law schools into universities, they have adopted a more academic focus,
seeking to perpetuate their reputation in academic circles rather than to prepare graduates to practice
law. See id. at 436. The contemporary refrain is, "We teach you law, not how to be a lawyer". This
is one of the primary criticisms of law schools articulated by the Camegie Foundation in EDUCATING
LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 24.
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belong to a number of organizations or engage in more than one activity,
there are few who share a holistic view of the profession with all of its
component parts. The narrowing of our viewpoint as lawyers either to a
client's objectives or to a particular practical, political or personal viewpoint has the potential of blinding us to a larger perspective. We focus
on what we do, not how it contributes or detracts from the public's overall confidence in legal institutions and legal processes. Our single
minded focus thus fuels the Cycle of Cynicism.
Since the fundamental tenet of the Rule of Law is that no man is
above it and that the law applies equally to all, no one, even the government can ignore it, manipulate it or violate it without consequence. It
follows that if the law can be bought, sold, manipulated, violated or ignored by anyone, then that person is above the law. The fear that people
regularly violate the Rule of Law is at the core of the Cycle of Cynicism.
This is why the public rails at incidents of public or private corruption,
despises judges who apply their personal viewpoints rather than the law,
fears that money buys judicial outcomes, and resents outcomes based
upon manipulation of the law it calls "legal technicalities." This is why
the public disapproves of policies (and presidents) that authorize actions,
such as torture, based on what is characterized as a highly technical legal
analysis, or locate detention centers outside the United States in order to
avoid application of United States law. This is also why people laugh at
jokes in which lawyers attempt to take advantage of72the law for personal
benefit, but are ultimately held accountable under it.
If the public sees the law as simply a collection of meaningless expressions that can be violated with impunity, be manipulated or controlled by a few, or be changed outside authorized processes, they may
well conclude that the law will not protect them from anyone or anything. As a result, they may understandably reason that there is no need
to follow the law, and to the contrary, that they are entitled to violate it in
order to protect themselves and their interests. This is the mentality that
is common in groups estranged from society (e.g., gangs and criminal
populations) and in societies without legal structure. One response to
72.
This joke, or versions of it, is an old stand-by. It apparently originated sometime during
the 1960's and even became a Brad Paisley song.
A lawyer purchased a box of very rare and expensive cigars, then insured them against
loss by fire. Within a month, he had smoked the entire stockpile of the great cigars, and
without having made even the first insurance premium payment, he submitted a claim for
their loss. The insurance company denied the claim, and the lawyer sued, alleging that
the cigars were lost in a series of small fires. The court found the claim frivolous, but
nevertheless enforced the insurance contract against its drafter, the insurance company.
To avoid costs on appeal, the insurance company paid $15,000 for the cigars.
After the lawyer cashed the check, the insurance company complained to the district attorney. The district attorney charged 24 counts of arson. With his insurance claim and
his own testimony from the civil case as admissions, the attorney was convicted of intentionally burning the insured property and was sentenced to 24 months in jail and a
$24,000 fine.
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widespread lawbreaking is authoritarian control. Locke long ago identified the ultimate risk, "Without law, there is tyranny."
I do not mean to suggest that American society is about to fall off
the precipice into anarchy nor that we are about to surrender our liberties
to dictatorial control, but because American society is unique in its belief
in and dependence upon the Rule of Law, the stability of American society is particularly vulnerable to loss of public confidence in the law and
legal institutions, If we do not find ways to reverse the Cycle of Cynicism and restore confidence in legal institutions and the Rule of Law, the
cohesiveness of our society and the protection of our individual rights are
in jeopardy.
Although lawyers do not control the future, individually and collectively they can wield significant power in influencing it. Reversal of the
Cycle of Cynicism may well depend on us. The antidote to cynicism is
belief. Iflawyers do not believe in and demonstrate a commitment to the
Rule of Law and the legal institutions that implement it, there is little
reason for the public to do so.
This prompts fundamental questions about the ethos of the legal
profession: What do lawyers believe in? What are they committed to?
II. LEGAL ETHOS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
A. What is a professional ethos?
In thinking about ethos, it is first helpful to define it. Ethos is a belief or collection of beliefs, or ideas or attitudes that guide a person,
group or institution.7 3 Ethos is not a childlike belief in something magical. Ethos, instead, is a dedication or commitment to a belief or value.
Ethos is not the same as ethics. Ethics are rules for conduct; they regulate behavior.74 Ethics implement ethos. Put differently, ethos is the
"why" we do what we do; ethics is the "what" or "how" we do it.
Ethos is relatively easy to define for a cohesive group that has
formed around a set of beliefs or values. The ethos of this type of group
75
often is articulated in a "statement of belief" or a mission statement.
73.
See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (11th ed. 2003), available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com.
74.
Ethics is defined as "the principles of conduct governing an individual or a group." Id.
75.
Churches, schools and associations often have statements of belief. See, e.g., The Church
of the Nazarene: Agreed Statement of Belief (2008), http://www.nazarene.org/ministries/
administration/visitorcenter/beliefs/display.aspx; The College Board, Connecting Students to College Success, http://www.collegeboard.comaboutindex.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009); OttawaGlandorf Rotary Club, Mission Statement of the Ottawa Glandorf Rotary Club,
http://www.ogrotary.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) ("Gather and unite a group of men and women
who have a core belief in the motto "SERVICE ABOVE SELF' who are willing to contribute their
time, talent and treasure to that belief under the banner of Rotary International to serve mankind with
projects that are International, National and Local in scope and to become the premier service club in
our county.").
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The legal profession has neither because we are associated primarily by
our education and by what we do. For example, we do not meet periodically as a whole or share a common uniform, song, handshake, motto or
creed. As a consequence, identifying common beliefs or values among
lawyers is difficult.
In discerning whether we have an ethos and what it might be, it is
helpful to look at other learned professions-medicine, the clergy, and
education. In each of these, there are arguably two types of commitments or devotions. The first is to a particular beneficiary-patient, penitent, or student. The second is to a value or ideal that transcends and
benefits both the professional and the beneficiary. The transcendent value is like an umbrella-it covers, animates and gives meaning to all of
the professional's actions. In medicine, the commitment is to Health,
with the clergy it is to God, and in teaching it is to Knowledge.
By logical extension, one might expect the legal profession also to
have dual devotions-one to the client and one to a transcendent value.
The obligation to the client is generally accepted, and indeed, we seem to
perform that obligation admirably. But unfortunately, for the legal proand commonly accepted devotion
fession there is no clearly recognized
76
to a transcendent value or belief.
In searching for some articulation of a transcendent value, one
might look to the lawyers' oath or to ethical standards. But neither clearly identifies nor requires dedication to a transcendent value. The wording of the lawyer's oath varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In most
oaths, lawyers promise to do certain things, like uphold the Constitution
and to adhere to professional standards, but the oath does not state why
the lawyer should do this.77 In other words, the oath does not profess
76.
This is what, arguably, gives rise to the criticism that the legal profession is just a business. See discussion supra Part I.C.
See for example the Lawyers Oath in Colorado and in South Carolina. The oath for
77.
attorneys in Colorado reads:
I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
State of Colorado; I will maintain the respect due to Courts and judicial officers; I will employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor; I
will treat all persons whom I encounter through my practice of law with fairness, courtesy, respect and honesty; I will use my knowledge of the law for
the betterment of society and the improvement of the legal system; I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed; I will at all times faithfully and diligently adhere to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.
COLO. BAR ASS'N, COLO. ATr'Y OATH OF ADMISSION, http://www.cobar.org/index.cfml
ID/1653/CETHi/Colorado-Attomey-Oath-of-Admission/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). The
Oath for attorneys in South Carolina reads:
I am duly qualified, according to the Constitution of this State, to exercise the
duties of the office to which I have been appointed, and that I will, to the best
of my ability, discharge those duties and will preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of this State and of the United States; I will maintain the respect
and courtesy due to courts of justice, judicial officers, and those who assist
them; To my clients, I pledge faithfulness, competence, diligence, good judg-
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commitment to a transcendent value; it simply acts as a laundry list of
"should'a, ought'a and haft'as". The words state what we promise to do,
but they do not profess a commitment to any particular value. As a consequence, they are empty. They fail to give our work meaning or to inspire us to reach beyond the specifics listed.
The same is true for Codes of Professional Responsibility or Ethical
Canons. They set out standards for behavior. Arguably, they articulate
the professional commitment to the client, but they do not contain any
statement or profession of a transcendent value. They do not set forth a
rationale for why we should act in a particular way.
Law students readily recognize this. In law school, ethics is most
often taught as a required doctrinal class. In studying the ethical rules,
students use the same analytical skills that they would use for courses
such as torts and contracts.7 8 Ethics is simply the law that governs lawyering.79
This view continues among lawyers in practice. We comply with
ethical rules as minimal standards and satisfy continuing legal education
requirements for periodic ethical instruction. But if we were asked what
we as lawyers believe in or are committed to, most of us would not know
what to say.
Identification of a professional ethos might be found in traditions or
admonitions of professional associations. But unfortunately, neither reflects a clear statement of any transcendent value nor a commonly held
commitment to it. Prior to the twentieth century, there was no written
ment and prompt communication; To opposing parties and their counsel, I
pledge fairness, integrity, and civility, not only in court, but also in all written
and oral communications; I will not pursue or maintain any suit or proceeding
which appears to me to be unjust nor maintain any defenses except those I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land, but this obligation
shall not prevent me from defending a person charged with a crime; I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me only such
means as are consistent with trust and honor and the principles of professionalism, and will never seek to mislead an opposing party, the judge or jury by
a false statement of fact or law; I will respect and preserve inviolate the confidences of my clients, and will accept no compensation in connection with a
client's business except from the client or with the client's knowledge and approval; I will maintain the dignity of the legal system and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which I am charged; I will assist the defenseless or
oppressed by ensuring that justice is available to all citizens and will not delay
any person's cause for profit or malice.
RULE 402(K), SCACR.
78.
As Karl Llewellyn, a noted legal educator, long ago observed, students are taught to
"knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia .... You are to acquire the ability to think precisely, to
analyze coldly . . . to see, and see only, and manipulate the machinery of the law." KARL
LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 116 (1985).

79.
EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 24, 28 (contending that this form of instruction
misses an important dimension that is necessary for professional development-the social and moral
context for the lawyer's work).
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code of conduct for lawyers. Lawyers learned the law and their role in
society largely from mentors as they "read the law" or worked as apprentices. Despite public criticism, generally, the lawyer was expected to act
much like a statesman, relying upon his own judgments as to morality,
justice and public good.80 Like the concept of noblesse oblige,8 ' however, his obligation may have been as much the product of his socioeconomic status as of any professional objective.
When law schools were created, a more formal statement of lawyers' obligations was required. The first professional code, the 1908
Professional Canons, contained some aspirational language. It stated that
the lawyer "advances the honor of the profession and the best interests of
his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress
upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles of moral law."
As of 1969, attorneys were encouraged to "point out those factors
which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally permissible. 82 But in the early 1980s, this standard was significantly relaxed following a period of debate about the relative importance of the
attorney's obligation to clients versus his/her obligation as an officer of
the court. In 1982, the ABA rejected the Kutak Commission's proposal
that an attorney's duty of confidentiality abate in order to 1) rectify a
client's criminal or fraudulent act or 2) comply with the law. Though not
necessarily significant in substance, the rejection of these suggestions
signaled a philosophical shift more firmly toward the83interests of the
client and away from any devotion to any larger interest.
Now the Model Rules state that, "A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system
and public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice. "84 This statement hints at a transcendent value, but it does not expressly identify it. It appears to build off of the 1986 ABA Commission
on Lawyer Professionalism's statement that the profession has a "devo-

80.
See Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE
PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 66 (Susan Carle ed., 2005); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE 53 (Susan Carle ed., 2005); Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism:

Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 61-62 (Susan Carle ed., 2005); see also ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, CANON

32 (1908), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/CanonsEthics.pdf.
81.
See David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV.
717, 723-24 (1988).
82.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1969) (amended 1980).
83.
Since 1983, lawyers have been authorized to refer to moral, economic, social and political
factors that are relevant to client's situation, but are under no obligation to do so. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 2.1 (1983).

84.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble (1983).
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tion to serving both the client's interest and the public good" 85 and the
1996 report of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar that suggested that lawyers share "a common calling to promote
justice and public good. 86 The problem with the terms "public good"
and "promoting justice" is that neither have a precise meaning. Both
terms are amorphous, abstract and subject to a variety of subjective definitions. As Tamanaha points out, serving the "public good" and "promoting justice" too often is a rationalization for otherwise satisfying the
client's objectives.
Over the years, bar leaders have repeatedly called for greater professionalism, 87 but the word "professionalism" is equally vague and undefined. Specific admonishments that attorneys be more "civil" in their
dealings with each other, engage in public service such as pro bono representation, and to remember that they are "officers of the court" and
"handmaidens of the law" also fail to identify a professional ethos. They
do not articulate any belief or value to which we, as lawyers, are committed; they don't inspire us because they don't tell us why we should behave or not behave in a particular manner. They are, at best, prescriptions for good conduct-to be civil, honest and reliable, and do good
deeds without compensation. But they do not unite us in a common belief or commitment to something greater than ourselves. Therefore, we
continue in diverse directions without a common purpose. For example,
transactional lawyers reject the admonition that they act as "officers of
the court" because they do not go to court, and government lawyers contend that, as public employees by definition, whatever they do is for public good.
There is no doubt that there are many lawyers who have personal
guiding beliefs, who aspire to higher standards than those required for
licensing and who may even view the law as a calling. But such values
are not shared across the profession. Indeed, to the contrary, as a profession we seem to have only one consistently understood loyalty-to the
client. This means that we are obligated to do what our clients desire,
restricted only in that we cannot violate the law or our rules of ethics.
And by logical extension, lawyers who have no clients-law professors
and judges-arguably share no commitment with the remainder of the
85.

COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR ASS'N, "....IN
THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:"

A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionatismVStanley-CommissionReport.pdf.
86.
PROFESSIONALISM COMM., Teaching and Learning Professionalism, 1996 A.B.A. SEC.
LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR 6.
87. See, e.g., ABA CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, CANON 15 (1908), available at
http:/www.abanet'orglcpr/nupc/Canons-Ethics.pdf ("nothing... fosters popular prejudice against
lawyers as a class ... [as much as the view that it is] the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may
enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause."); see also Peter W. Meldrim, Address of the
President, 38th Conf. Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 313, 323 (1915) ("Law is a profession, not a trade, and
success in it consists in more than money getting."); COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 85,
at 3.
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profession. This helps explain the vastly different views of the role and
value of law among the different sects of the profession.
It also helps explain lawyer dissatisfaction. Absent a philosophy
that gives broad meaning and importance to the law, it is difficult for
attorneys to have a sense of professional identity, any aspirational standard to guide judgment and behavior, or to find meaning in work that
does not fully achieve a client's objectives. There is no common belief
to facilitate cooperation or collaboration, and there is no counterweight
to clients' subjective demands--other than pleasing a client or receiving
a fee, there seems to be no value in what we do.
Recognizing that we lack a transcendent professional ethos helps
explain both professional dissatisfaction and its role in the Cycle of Cynicism. A singular devotion to the interest of clients both deprives lawyers of professional purpose and eats away at public confidence in legal
institutions and the Rule of Law. Lincoln recognized more than 175
years ago that "reverence for the laws" is indispensable to preservation
of our civic liberties. 88 If lawyers-who are the most familiar with the
law-do not revere it, why should the rest of society?
B. The needfor a transcendentethos- dedication to the Rule of Law
What can act as an antidote to the Cycle of Cynicism? Like Tamanaha, I do not believe that we can return to values of yesteryear as a remedy. We no longer operate under notions of "natural law," for we have
participated in making our own law for almost 250 years. We are a pluralistic society with wide diversity in individual beliefs and values, and
in fostering social equality we have become more relativistic in our
judgments of differing views. Given such pluralism, it is not workable to
suggest that lawyers counsel clients as to the morality of their objectives.
Admonitions to lawyers to be more civil, honest and to perform public
service have not meaningfully affected the Cycle of Cynicism, and there
is no indication that more rules of professional conduct will do so. The
problems of the twenty-first century are new ones, or new versions of old
ones. They demand a contemporary allegiance that is infused with the
energy of our nation's core beliefs.
It is not workable to suggest that lawyers pledge allegiance to "the
Law" or "to legal institutions" even though we hope that the public will
have confidence in them. Reference to "the Law" in the abstract has no
meaning. And with regard to specific laws, few would agree with every
one. Indeed, many would debate not only the content of a particular law,
but also whether any law is necessary in the first place.
88. See Harrison Sheppard, American Principles & the Evolving Ethos of American Legal
Practice, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 237, 238 (1996) (citing Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuationof Our
Political Institutions: Address before the Young Men's Lyceum at Springfield, Illinois January 27,
1838, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRIrINGS 76, 80-81 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1946)).
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What is needed, I suggest, is something more profound: a profession of our dedication to a transcendent value that grounds us all as lawyers, and that both benefits society and counterbalances the subjectivity
of any client's wishes. Our ethos should reflect our core national values
and the intrinsic paradox on which our country was founded-namely,
that people enjoy maximum freedom only when they create the law and
are equally constrained by it. Our profession should articulate the value
of, and commit our efforts to, supporting and preserving the Rule of
Law.
C. CriticalConversations
One might ask what dedication to the Rule of Law would look like.
How would it play out? What effect would it have? These are all good
questions for which there are no certain answers. To address these questions, we need to have a series of thoughtful and critical conversations
that involve all members and segments of the legal profession. If we are
willing to engage in professional introspection through such conversations, we may be able to reverse the Cycle of Cynicism.
1. Profession-wide Conversations
The first and most important conversations should involve all segments of the profession-law professors, practicing attorneys, judges,
law students and legislators-because each brings a unique perspective
to the questions of what the Rule of Law is and how a commitment to it
changes our behavior.
Some lawyers may have had little exposure to the history of jurisprudence or legal tradition in law school, and most probably have had
little time or energy to devote to it since graduation It is now time to
study, reflect, and discuss. Bar associations, Inns of Court, law schools,
judicial conferences, attorney continuing legal education classes, firm
retreats and discussion groups can focus our attention, provide resources,
inspire us to reflect privately and provide opportunities for conversation.
We can invite speakers, spark debate, and challenge old ways of thinking
and acting.
There is abundant information available on the subject. As is apparent from the references in this article, legal academics have thought
and written extensively about the legal, political, historical and sociological implications of the Rule of Law. They are best equipped to offer
perspectives as to where our notions of law come from, different understandings of the nature of law, and the effects of the limitation or extension of law on society.
Practitioners add the perspective of lawyers and clients in the "real
world." How does a lawyer translate abstract notions of the Rule of Law
into concrete application? How does a belief in the Rule of Law intersect with the duty to the client? What obligation should an attorney have
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to counsel a client as to the law's limitations? How does a lawyer explain to a client that it is in the client's best interest to adhere to the law?
Judges bring a third perspective to the conversation. As many observe, they are the personification of the law and are therefore critical in
supporting the Rule of Law. They bring knowledge of the interplay between law and conflicting objectives in the courtroom, and what behaviors undermine or support confidence in the legal process. They can
address the benefits that come from focusing upon the applicable law in a
litigation context-easier narrowing of disputes, speedier and less costly
resolution of conflicts and greater predictability in outcome.
Law students offer observations both as to how they can best learn
about legal tradition and what relevance it has to the world as they see it.
Involving them in the conversation helps them form a professional identity and equips them to apply lessons from legal history to challenges of
the future. They will be the standard-bearers of the profession in the
future. It is critical that they understand the vital role that they will play
in American society.
Finally, legislators bring knowledge to both the process of making
law and the forces that motivate change in the law. Their commitment to
creating laws in a transparent fashion and to writing laws that can be
applied uniformly and are perceived to benefit society as a whole go a
long way toward inspiring confidence in the Rule of Law.
Each sector can learn from the others. If all share a commitment to
the Rule of Law, then there can be common ground upon which further
communication and trust can build. Judges might more carefully articulate the law and how it applies and might be more trusting of lawyers'
motivations. Lawyers might advise clients differently or vary their approaches in litigation and outside it. Academics, legislators and practicing attorneys might see judicial decisions in a less contentious and less
political light. From these conversations, others may grow.
2. Conversations within law schools
Educating Lawyers contends that law students form their views of
the legal profession and their professional identity during law school. It
advocates teaching doctrine and professional values in an integrated fashion.
Imagine a conversation among law faculty who have varying interests and expertise, but who are all committed to creating a curriculum
that remedies the insufficiency of civics education at primary, secondary
and undergraduate levels and produces a graduate who is conversant with
the history of legal thought and tradition as well as substantive law. Imagine a coordinated curriculum that weaves professional values into
every substantive course and demonstrates that codified ethical standards
are the natural outgrowth of professional values.
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Imagine graduates who believe that, in addition to earning an income,
being a lawyer adds value to society. Imagine that their idealism lasts
longer than their first job. Imagine that they find satisfaction in their
work, and that they can educate their clients, neighbors, friends and
children. They have the best chance of unwinding the Cycle of Cynicism.
3. Conversations among jurists
One of the greatest fears about the judiciary is that it will exercise
unbridled power. Imagine a conversation among judges who are committed to the belief that no person, even a judge, is above the law. They
might talk about how to better explain the law, demonstrate its application, or make processes more transparent, accessible and efficient. They
might try to simplify procedures and make the application of rules and
law more consistent. They might work harder to screen out their own
biases and be more "fair and impartial." They might be more hesitant to
play Solomon and "do justice" or tailor a legal outcome to match a personal predisposition. Instead, they might more rigorously follow the law,
and should it yield an outcome that they believe is unjust, they might be
both humble and courageous in saying so, but leave changes of the law to
the people who created it in the first place.
4. Conversations among lawyers and judges in litigation
All too often lawyers and judges see each other only as opponents.
Lawyers consider judges and the law to be impediments to desired outcomes and opposing counsel as enemies. Judges see lawyers as combatants who simply want to win at any cost or who act only to maximize
their revenues.
Imagine a conversation among counsel early in the case during
which they discuss what law applies to the controversy at hand. Imagine
them agreeing as to what law applies, and if so, whether the dispute is
one of interpretation of law or of a factual nature. If the lawyers do not
agree on the applicable law or upon its interpretation, imagine that they
then ask the judge to resolve this dispute, each offering his/her interpretation and research. Imagine that the judge also engages in legal research
and provides it to counsel for comment. As to the framing of legal issues, litigation would then more closely resemble an intellectual explora-
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tion, 89 with both counsel and the judge seeking to apply the 9correct law,
rather than the lawyers focusing solely on a desired outcome. 0
5. Conversations with clients 9'
As noted earlier, lawyers are often faced with clients whose objectives are not consistent with the law or whose expectations of how the
law will apply are unrealistic. That is due, in part, to human nature. On
an abstract level, as part of society at large, most of us endorse the law
because it provides order and stability. But we do not want to follow it if
it is inconsistent with our present personal interest. Thus, lawyers who
have a dual devotion to the client and the Rule of Law would be presented with a conflict, but also an opportunity. Imagine lawyers who are
able to explain this conflict as well as the way the clients' interests and
society's interest converge.
An example of this type of conversation is as follows. A client
wants to obtain investors for a business endeavor through a public or
private offering. The law requires that in doing so, he must disclose a
prior criminal conviction. The client does not want to do so for the practical reason that he fears that this might chill investor interest, and he
rationalizes this by correctly noting that the conviction was long ago, was
the result of bad legal advice and has nothing to do with either this business or his honesty and reliability. (This is a version of "the law
shouldn't apply to me.")
The lawyer who has no devotion to the Rule of Law might simply
advise the client as to the applicable law and consequences of not complying and leave it to the client to decide whether to disclose or not. But
the lawyer who also seeks to serve the Rule of Law might take a different
89. In my experience, this happens more frequently in controversies in specialty areas of the
law, for example criminal, tax, patent or bankruptcy litigation. The civility in these specialty areas
has often been attributed to the small size of the Bar and the fact that practitioners deal with each
other repeatedly. That may be so, in addition, I think it is due to uniform familiarity with the law of
the specialty and the common ground that it creates.
90. This would be something wholly different from the process described by Roscoe Pound in
1906: "The effect of our exaggerated, contentious procedure is not only to irritate parties, witnesses
and jurors in particular cases, but to give to the whole community a false notion of the purpose and
end of the law. Hence comes in large sense the modem America race to beat the law. If the law is a
mere game, neither the players who take part in it nor the public who witnesses it can be expected to
yield to its spirit when their interests are served by evading it ... Thus, the courts, instituted to
administer justice according to the law, are made agents and abettors of lawlessness." Roscoe
Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice, 29th Conf. Pt. I
Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 395, 406 (1906), reprinted in LANDMARKS OF LAW 180, 187 (Roy D. Henson
ed., 1960).
91.
These conversations also can become conversations within law firms. When new or
inexperienced attorneys have questions or seek advice from more experienced lawyers, the conversations often impart values as well as information. Imagine the difference between a conversation that
conveys the message that the new lawyer should do everything possible to satisfy the client and one
in which the new lawyer is encouraged to research the law and explain it as accurately as possible to
the client. The latter case includes an opportunity for the less experienced lawyer to develop a
dedication to the Rule of Law as well as to serve the client, as the more skilled and experienced
lawyer has already learned to do.
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approach by explaining to the client that if no disclosure is made, and the
deal works out as anticipated, then the non-disclosure will never be a
problem. But that if the business is not successful and the investors become unhappy they may sue and learn of the non-disclosure. In that
event, the law will not protect the client because the client did not adhere
to the law. Thus the law, as inconvenient as it is, ultimately protects the
client.
The difference here is not necessarily in the outcome-the client
may still decide not to disclose-but in the explanation. No moral lesson
is offered in the latter case, simply a statement and demonstration of the
effect and purpose of the Rule of Law.
Another example arises in a litigation context. The lawyer seeks to
prepare the client for the courtroom process and the potential of an adverse outcome. If the lawyer is not concerned with the Rule of Law or
the need for public confidence in legal process, she might talk only about
the people who will be making the decision. "Judge Smith likes little old
ladies and doesn't like smart alecks," or "The jury favors whoever it
thinks is the underdog." Or to get the best jury, "let's employ a jury consultant who will be able to tell us which jurors are likely to like you."
While there might be merit to these observations, the implicit message is
that outcome will turn on personal predilections of the fact-finder, rather
than application of the law.
Imagine a different conversation with the same purpose-to help
the client have reasonable expectations. Instead of the focusing on the
personal predilections or preferences of the judge or jury, the lawyer
emphasizes the law and how it must be applied. For example, "The law
requires the judge/jury to carefully consider a number of factors or circumstances, including how old the parties are and how much experience
or knowledge they have. This is because the judge/jury has to craft an
outcome that is particular to the facts of the case. Although we can expect that the judge/jury will follow the law, we can't guess exactly how
the judge/jury might evaluate each factor, so I can't guarantee an outcome." The difference here is that the client is told that the legal process
will be followed even though the outcome is uncertain. In addition, both
winner and loser can walk away from the process believing that it was
the law that was applied to the facts at hand; it was not a personal judgment as to the party's worth. This reaffirms the predictability and steadfastness of the law, rather than the capriciousness and unfairness of the
legal system.
IV. CONCLUSION

Law is the mortar that holds American society together and the paradox of the Rule of Law is at the heart of our nation's promise of liberty
and opportunity. Due to the intrinsic role law plays in American society,
the beliefs of lawyers about the law and legal institutions matter. To
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reverse the Cycle of Cynicism and to preserve the Rule of Law in the
twenty-first century, members of the legal profession must engage in a
careful reflection upon our role in society. At the core of this introspection we must decide-are we, individually and as a profession, committed to the Rule of Law? If so, how do we profess and demonstrate that
commitment? I invite you to ponder these questions and to continue this
conversation-the future of our profession and American society may
well depend on it.

THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE TENTH CIRcurr: THREE
DECADES OF (MOSTLY) HARMLESS ERROR
DAVID B. KOPEL t

Since 1977, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided many
cases involving the Second Amendment. In light of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,' it appears that the
Tenth Circuit was wrong in most of those cases. That is, the Circuit's
theory of the Second Amendment was that it only applies to a person
who is keeping or bearing arms while serving in a well-regulated militia.
Heller affirmed the Standard Model of the Second Amendment: 2 that the
Second Amendment is functionally similar to the First Amendment, and
to most of the rest of the Bill of Rights; and the right protects all lawabiding citizens, not just a small number of people in government sert Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado; Associate Policy Analyst,
Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. Author of THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY:
SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? (1992). Coauthor of the
law school casebook GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS (2002).
More information at
http://www.davekopel.org. The author appeared at the Supreme Court counsel table to assist the oral
argument on behalf of Mr. Heller in District of Columbia v. Heller. I would like to thank Stephen
Halbrook, Robert Dowlut, Michael P. O'Shea, and the commenters at the Volokh Conspiracy weblog for helpful insights on this article.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
2.
Perhaps surprisingly, what distinguishes the Second Amendment scholarship from that
relating to other constitutional rights, such as privacy or free speech, is that there appears
to be far more agreement on the general outlines of Second Amendment theory than exists in those other areas. Indeed, there is sufficient consensus on many issues that one can
properly speak of a "Standard Model" in Second Amendment theory, much as physicists
and cosmologists speak of a Standard Model" in terms of the creation and evolution of
the Universe. The picture that emerges from this scholarship is a coherent one, consistent
with both the text of the Constitution and what we know about the Framers' understanding. The purpose of the right to bear arms is twofold: to allow individuals to protect
themselves and their families, and to ensure a body of armed citizenry from which a militia could be drawn, whether that militia's role was to protect the nation, or to protect the
people from a tyrannical government.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 463, 475
(1995) (footnote omitted). In the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, there were some scholars
who disputed the Standard Model. The most famous of these was Michael Bellesiles, whose 2000
book Arming America, The Origins of a National Gun Culture, was withdrawn by its publisher after
it was demonstrated to be a fraud. See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA: THE REMARKABLE
STORY OF How AND WHY GUNS BECAME AS AMERICAN AS APPLE PIE (2006); James Lindgren &
Justin L. Heather, Counting Guns in Early America, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1777 (2002); James
Lindgren, Fall from Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195
(2002). There were non-fraudulent dissents from the Standard Model, although they had great
difficulty in explaining a coherent theory of what the Second Amendment does mean. See, e.g., H.
RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT To ARMS, OR, How THE
SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002); DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE
SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003);
Nelson Lund, Putting the Second Amendment to Sleep, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 101 (2004) (critical review
of the Uviller & Merkel and Williams books).
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vice.3 And the right is not limited to a single purpose (militia service),
but encompasses a wide variety of lawful purposes, particularly selfdefense.4 What effect does Heller have on three decades of Tenth Circuit
jurisprudence that was premised on an incorrect theory of the Second
Amendment?
In regards to Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Tenth Circuit
will have to start all over again. It is difficult to argue for the continuing
validity of cases which are founded on the incorrect premise that the
Second Amendment protects only a tiny slice of the American people.
This Article surveys the Tenth Circuit's jurisprudence on the
Second Amendment chronologically. Although most of the pre-Heller
Tenth Circuit decisions are no longer valid, many of the new cases will
come to the same ultimate result as did the Tenth Circuit's previous cases. For every federal gun control law which was addressed by the Tenth
Circuit pre-Heller,this Article explains how a post-Heller analysis might
proceed.
In particular, the Tenth Circuit can follow Heller's dicta and decide
that convicted felons are not protected by the Second Amendment, and
neither are machine guns. Some other issues, including gun bans for
certain misdemeanants, were not addressed in Heller, and so the Tenth
Circuit will have to decide those issues anew. It might be hoped that the
Tenth Circuit will undertake a more serious treatment of these unresolved issues than have some of the post-Heller district courts, whose
analyses have often been glib and shallow.
Glib and shallow is also a fair description of many of the Tenth Circuit's pre-Heller cases on the Second Amendment. Some of those cases
amounted to barely more than a judicial ipse dixit, and those cases certainly did not inspire confidence that the Circuit had treated the constitutional issues with appropriate seriousness and diligence. Pre-Heller,the
Tenth Circuit's rule for the Second Amendment was "the government
always wins."5
Perhaps one reason is that almost all the persons raising Second
Amendment claims were highly unsympathetic. This was to be expected: once the Tenth Circuit nullified the Second Amendment in 1977,
just about the only people who would dare to raise a Second Amendment
claim were lawyers offering desperate arguments for criminal defendants, or pro se citizens raising hopeless, poorly-prepared claims.

3.
Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2799.
4.
Id. at 2801.
5.
Cf United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(observing that the Warren Court's only consistent rule in merger cases was that "the government
always wins.").
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After a quarter-century of poor jurisprudence, the Tenth Circuit did
improve significantly following the 2004 publication of a concurring
opinion by Judge Kelly in the Parker case. Once Judge Kelly had
pointed out many of the flaws in the Tenth Circuit's previous cases involving the Second Amendment, most of the Tenth Circuit panels followed Judge Kelly's admonition to decide cases narrowly, and to eschew
grand pronouncements asserting that ordinary people have no Second
Amendment rights.
I. MIGHTY OAKES FROM TINY THINKING GREW

The root of the Tenth Circuit's Second Amendment failure was the
1977 decision in United States v. Oakes.6 The case grew out of a prosecution by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF).7 An
undercover BATF agent met with Ted Oakes over a period of months.
The agent bought from him a non-functioning firearm which, with some
repair work by a gunsmith, could have been restored to function as a
machine gun. Arguably, the non-functioning gun was therefore a "machine gun" under federal law.8 Since the National Firearms Act of 1934,
federal law has required that machine gun owners register their guns and
pay a federal tax. 9 Oakes had not done so, and after he was convicted at
trial in Kansas, he appealed his conviction to the Tenth Circuit.
The panel, consisting of Chief Judge Lewis, along with Judges Breitenstein and Doyle, rejected Oakes' arguments about Fourth Amendment
violations and entrapment. As for Oakes' Second Amendment claim:
The second constitutional argument that appellant advances is that
the prosecution here violated his right to bear arms guaranteed by the
second amendment. Defendant presents a long historical analysis of
the amendment's background and purpose from which he concludes
that every citizen has the absolute right to keep arms. This broad
conclusion has long been rejected. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206.10
So instead of addressing Oakes' "long historical analysis of the
amendment's background," the panel simply cited the Supreme Court's
Miller case. It is true that Miller unquestionably stands for the proposition that the right to arms is not "absolute." The case reversed and remanded a district court decision dismissing charges against a career
6.
See United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926
(1978).
7.
In 2003, the Bureau was renamed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (BATFE). Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 1111, 6 U.S.C.A. § 531 (2009).
8. 26 U.S.C.A. § 5845(b) (West 2009) ("The term 'machinegun' means any weapon which
shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot,
without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.").
9.
26 U.S.C.A. § 5861(d) (West 2009).
10.
Oakes, 564 F.2d at 387 (footnote omitted).
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criminal who possessed an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, in violation
of the National Firearms Act of 1934.'1 Presumably, if the right to arms
were "absolute," the Court would have followed the district court, and
held the National
Firearms Act's registration requirement facially un12
constitutional.
Of course most other constitutional rights are not "absolute" either.
If a party submitted a long historical brief which asserted that the right of
freedom of speech is absolute, a Circuit Court of Appeals could not dispose of the First Amendment issue simply by citing a Supreme Court
precedent showing that the right of free speech is not absolute. The Circuit Court should take the further step of examining whether the litigant
has rights which are protected by the non-absolute First Amendment.
Before Heller, there were three different readings of Miller in the
Circuit Courts.
*

That Miller stands for the proposition that the Second Amendment is a "collective right." In effect, this made the right to arms
like "collective property" in a Communist country: nominally the
right belongs to all the people but in a non-individual way. In
practice, the right belongs only to the government.
All nine Jus13
tices in Heller rejected the "collective right."'

*

The right belongs to all American citizens (with a few exceptions, such as convicted felons), and the right may be exercised
by individuals for legitimate purposes, including self-defense.
This was the
view of the Heller majority opinion written by Jus14
tice Scalia.

"

The right belongs only to individuals who are serving in a state
militia. This1 5was the view of the Heller dissent written by Justice Stevens.

The majority and dissenting opinions in Heller both argued at
length that their interpretation was supported by the Miller precedent. I
do not wish, in this Article, to argue for or against the conflicting inter11.
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 174 (1939).
12.
United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (W.D. Ark. 1939).
13.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008). See also id at 2822
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment
protects a 'collective right' or an 'individual right.' Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by
individuals. But a conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not tell
us anything about the scope of that right.").
14.
Id. at 2797 ("Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they guarantee the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.").
15.
Id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Second Amendment "protects the
right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legislature's
power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons").
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pretations of Miller. I do not criticize the Tenth Circuit for adopting an
interpretation which, ultimately, had enough plausibility to earn the support of four Supreme Court Justices. However, as the back and forth
argument in Heller demonstrated, Miller is an ambiguous case, from
which different readers may in good faith draw different conclusions.
What is not legitimate was for the Tenth Circuit to blandly cite Millerwith no discussion-as if Miller obviously had only one possible reading.
The Tenth Circuit was not the only Circuit Court in the last quarter
of the twentieth century to pretend that Miller was much clearer than it
really is. In Can the Simple Cite be Trusted?, Brannon Denning details
how several Circuits used a simple cite to mask a much more complicated precedent.' 6 Not until twenty-three years after Oakes, in United
States v. Baer, did the Tenth Circuit even attempt a serious analysis of
what the Miller precedent really meant.
Beyond the bare citation of Miller, Oakes provided a two-sentence
summary of the case:
The purpose of the second amendment as stated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Miller, supra at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, was to
preserve the effectiveness and assure the continuation of the state militia. The Court stated that the amendment must be interpreted and
applied with that purpose in view. Id
The above language is a fair paraphrase of part of the Miller opinionalthough that part of the opinion does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that only militiamen have Second Amendment rights. Justices Scalia and Stevens argued extensively about whether Miller's statement
about the state militia purpose necessarily implies a right only for militiamen.
Even if one assumes, from Miller, that the militia purpose of the
Second Amendment is the only purpose for which the right to arms exists, the assumption does not negate an individual right for all Americans. The Heller decision quoted the leading American constitutional
law scholar of the latter nineteenth century, Michigan Supreme Court
Judge Thomas Cooley, to explain the point:
"It might be supposed from the phraseology of this provision that the
right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but
this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent. The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those persons who,
under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty, and are
officered and enrolled for service when called upon. But the law
16.
Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretationsof
United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 961 (1996).
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may make provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform
military duty, or of a small number only, or it may wholly omit to
make any provision at all; and if the right were limited to those
enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty might be defeated altogether by
the action or neglect to act of the government it was meant to hold in
check. The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people,
from whom the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep and
bear arms; and they need no permission or regulation of law for the
purpose. But this enables government to have a well-regulated militia; for to bear arms implies something more than the mere keeping;
it implies the learning to handle and use them in a way that makes
those who keep them ready for their efficient use; in other words, it
implies the right to meet for voluntary7 discipline in arms, observing
in doing so the laws of public order."'
Of course Oakes did precisely what Cooley had explained was wrong,
adopting an interpretation that made the Second Amendment a practical
nullity. Justice Scalia would later observe that lower court judges who
wrote opinions similar to Oakes had "overread Miller."' 8 He also observed that "it should not be thought that the cases decided by these
judges would necessarily have come out differently under a proper interpretation of the right."' 9 As we shall see, this is true for almost all of the
Tenth Circuit's Second Amendment cases.
With a militia-only reading of Miller, the Tenth Circuit created
another problem for itself: Oakes actually was a militiaman:
He contends that, even if the second amendment is construed to guarantee the right to bear arms only to an organized militia, he comes
within the scope of the amendment. He points out that under Kans.
Const. art. VIII, § 1, the state militia includes all "able-bodied male
citizens between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five years ......
He further points out that he is a member of "Posse Comitatus,
a mi' 20
litia-type organization registered with the state of Kansas."
The Tenth Circuit responded:
To apply the amendment so as to guarantee appellant's right to keep
an unregistered firearm which has not been shown to have any con17.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2811-12 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 271 (1880)). As the Heller Court
noted, the heading for the above-quoted section of the Cooley treatise was "The Right is General."
Id. at 2811.
18.
Id. at 2815 n.24.
19.
Id.
20.
United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977). "Posse comitatus" is a legal
term referring to the authority of a sheriff to call forth the able-bodied men of his county in order to
assist him in the performance of his duties. For example, in 1977 the Pitkin County, Colorado,
sheriff used his posse comitatus power to summon armed citizens to assist in the manhunt for serial
killer Ted Bundy. Oakes apparently belonged to an organization of which named itself after a government power which it admired-as if a coin-collecting club named itself, "The Power to coin
Money and regulate the Value thereof."
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nection to the militia, merely because he is technically a member of
the Kansas
militia, would be unjustifiable in terms of either logic or
2
policy. 1

Here, the court might have been expected to supply some logical analysis
and policy arguments. But the court did not. It is not very persuasive for
a court to announce a result based on "logic" and "policy"-and then fail
to offer any logic or policy.
Similarly, as to Oakes' membership in the non-government organization, the court simply declared-with not a shred of reasoning-that
the "lack of justification" for invoking the Second Amendment was "apparent., 22 Yet whatever was so "apparent" to the panel was something
which the panel was unable or unwilling to articulate.
I am not claiming that it would have been impossible for the Tenth
Circuit to offer plausible logical or policy arguments, or to provide at
least a scintilla of support for the legal conclusion which was supposedly
so "apparent., 23 Or the panel could have said whatever else it was that
made the legal conclusion so "apparent" to the panel. However, Chief
Judge Lewis and the other judges did not deign to use any words to explain why they felt the way they did.
Judicial legitimacy depends on courts providing legal reasoning for
their decisions. A Circuit Court of Appeals decision-especially on an
issue of constitutional law-which does not even attempt to justify its
result is not really an application of the law, but is rather a form of judicial lawlessness.
Parties making legal claims to the Tenth Circuit are expected to
provide arguments and citations in support of their claims. 24 The Tenth
21.
Id.
22. Id. ("This lack of justification is even more apparent when applied to appellant's membership in 'Posse Comitatus,' an apparently nongovernmental organization. We conclude, therefore,
that this prosecution did not violate the second amendment.").
23.
It appears that the group to which Oakes belonged was a highly disreputable organization,
if it was an affiliate of the "posse comitatus" groups which were active in several states during the
1970s. These groups were not organized around the principle of helping the local sheriff (which is
what a real posse comitatus does); rather, the groups were based on white racism. See ELAINE
LANDAU, THE WHITE POWER MOVEMENT: AMERICA'S RACIST HATE GROUPS 62 (1993). This is
perhaps why Oakes was targeted for a BATF undercover sting. A well-reasoned opinion from the
Tenth Circuit (or from the district court, after further fact-finding on remand) might have discussed
the so-called "posse comitatus" group, and explained that it is not a constitutional militia, in that it is
not organized for the purpose of aiding state or local law enforcement. The opinion might have
pointed out the absence of any evidence that the group had made itself available to come to the aid
of the local sheriff-such as by telling the sheriff of its existence, and providing contact information
in case the sheriff needed help.
24.
See Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 15 F.3d 976, 977 (10th Cir. 1994) (An
"unsupported, conclusory assertion . . . is not adequate appellate argument."); Primas v. City of
Okla. City, 958 F.2d 1506, 1511 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[A party] has a duty to provide authority for any
argument that he raises."); Am. Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 415 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992) ("It
is insufficient merely to state in one's brief that one is appealing an adverse ruling below without
advancing reasoned argument as to the grounds for the appeal.").
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Circuit should have held itself to the same standard in the announcement
of its assertions of law. Instead, the reader is left with the strong suspicion that the panel just did not like the idea that people might have a
right to own guns, and that the panel was unable to think of a legal reason why, under a militia-only reading of Miller, a man who has been
statutorily declared by the Kansas state legislature to be a member of the
Kansas state militia has no Second Amendment right. Unable to provide
a legal argument, the panel resorted to bluster and ipse dixit.
Oakes had also argued that the Ninth Amendment protected his
ownership of firearms. This argument was not addressed on appeal,
since Oakes had not raised it below. 25 The Ninth Amendment argument
for a right to own firearms has some heft: Nicholas Johnson has written a
Ninth Amendment argument for handguns (not for machine guns) which
provides extensive evidence that handgun ownership for self-defense
easily passes the various Supreme Court tests for unenumerated rights. 26
However, the Tenth Circuit acted reasonably in not considering the issue,
since it was raised for the first time on appeal. In light of how irresponsibly and lawlessly the Oakes panel treated the Second Amendment, it
was just as well that they never addressed the Ninth Amendment.
Following Heller, it would be easy for the Tenth Circuit to uphold
the National Firearms Act's registration requirement for machine guns.
The Heller majority wrote:
Read in isolation, Miller's phrase "part of ordinary military equipment" could mean that only those weapons
useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that the
National Firearms Act's restrictions on machineguns
(not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional,
machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939.... We
therefore read Miller to say only that the Second
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,
such as short-barreled shotguns.
We also recognize another important limitation on the
right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have
explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those
"in common use at the time."

. . . We think that limita-

tion is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and unusual weapons."
25.
Oakes, 564 F.2d at 387.
Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed
26.
Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1992).
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It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful
in military service-M-16 rifles and the like-may be
banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely
detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said,
the conception of the militia at the time of the Second
Amendment's ratification was the body of all citizens
capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of
lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia
duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at
large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small
arms could be useful against modem-day bombers and
tanks. But the fact that modem developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and
the protected
right cannot change our interpretation of
27
the right.
One can argue with the Heller language. As the opinion itself admits, all the precedents it cites merely involve restrictions on the "carrying" of weapons, not their possession. But the opinion is what it is, and
if the opinion does not explicitly say that machine guns are not Second
Amendment arms, the opinion comes close enough so that lower federal
courts have readily cited it for the proposition that the Second Amendment does not protect machine gun ownership.28
II. ROSE: SHORT RIFLES
The Tenth Circuit's next case on the Second Amendment, United
States v. Rose,29 will also require a new analysis under Heller's "dangerous and unusual" rule, once the issue returns to the Tenth Circuit.

27. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815-17 (2008) (citations omitted).
28. United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Machine guns are not in
common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of
dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use."); United States
v. Gilbert, 286 F. App'x 383 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding a jury instruction that there is no Second
Amendment right to machine guns); Hamblen v. United States, No. 3:08-1034, slip op., 2008 WL
5136586, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2008) ("The Petitioner argues that the limitations placed on the
Second Amendment right to bear arms by the majority opinion in Heller can not square with the
Court's earlier decision in Miller. Whatever merit there is to that argument, however, this Court is
bound by the Helter opinion as written."); Mullenix v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, No. 5:07-CV-154-D, slip op., 2008 WL 2620175, at *1 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2008) ("Plaintiff is a federally-licensed firearms dealer, and alleges that the ATF arbitrarily denied him permission
to import a reproduction of a World War H-era German machinegun." The district court quoted the
Heller language to conclude that the Second Amendment does not apply to machine guns.).
29. 695 F.2d 1356 (1982). The panel consisted of Judges Holloway, Barrett, and Logan, with
the opinion written by Logan.
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At this point, it would be helpful to provide a brief explanation of
federal gun control law. The main federal gun control law is the muchamended Gun Control Act of 1968.30 It covers the sale and possession of
ordinary rifles, shotguns, and handguns. We will examine it in more
detail infra, as it appears in Tenth Circuit cases.
A much older federal gun law is the National Firearms Act of 1934.
It requires registration and the payment of a tax for the possession (as
well as sale or manufacture) of a relatively small group of firearms: machine guns, short shotguns (barrels under eighteen inches), and short
rifles (barrels under sixteen inches). 31 These guns were controlled with
registration and taxing, rather than prohibition, because, as President
Franklin Roosevelt's Attorney General Homer Cummings explained to
the U.S. House Ways & Means Committee, the administration believed
that the Second Amendment forbade an outright federal ban of machine
guns. 32 (The NFA was expanded in 1968 to include some other weapons, which will be discussed infra.)
It might be tempting for courts to assume that any firearm covered
by the National Firearms Act is a "dangerous and unusual" gun which,
pursuant to Heller, is not protected by the Second Amendment. But this
would obviously be going too far. Heller holds that handguns certainly
are protected by the Second Amendment; 33 as introduced in Congress,
the draft NFA included handguns.34 The removal of handguns from the
NFA was the compromise which ended the National Rifle Association's
opposition to the NFA, so that the bill could pass.35 Had the NFA passed
in its original form, its inclusion of handguns obviously could not (postHeller) be used to assert that handguns are not covered by the Second
Amendment.

30.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-931 (West 2009).
31.
26 U.S.C.A. § 5801 (West 2009).
32. When a Representative asked the Attorney General how the proposed NFA "escaped" the
"provision in our Constitution denying the privilege to the legislature to take away the right to carry
arms," Cummings answered:
Oh, we do not attempt to escape it. We are dealing with another power, namely the power of taxation and of regulation under the interstate commerce clause. You see, if we
made a statute absolutely forbidding any human being to have a machine gun, you might
say there is some constitutional question involved. But when you say "We will tax the
machine gun" and when you say that "the absence of a license showing payment of the
tax has been made indicates that a crime has been perpetrated" you are easily within the
law.
The Representative then stated, "In other words, it does not amount to prohibition but allows of
regulation," to which Attorney General Cummings responded, "That is the idea. We have studied
that very carefully." The National FirearmsAct of 1934: Hearingson H.R. 9066 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 6, 13, 19 (1934).
33.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817-18 (2008).
34.
The National FirearmsAct of 1934, supra note 32, at 1.
35.
To Regulate Commerce in Firearms: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1934).
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Moreover, Attorney General Cummings' own testimony indicates
that the administration believed that NFA firearms were covered by the
Second Amendment.36 His brief answer did not, however, specifically
indicate whether he thought all the NFA firearms were protected by the
Second Amendment, or whether only machine guns were.
As of 1934, machine guns, particularly the Thompson submachine
gun, 37 were notorious as gangster weapons. Sawed-off shotguns were
(and still are) used by criminals with devastating effect. With a shortened barrel (say, eleven inches) they are as concealable as a very large
handgun, but are vastly more lethal at short range.
Short-barreled rifles, though, are another story. They are not and
never have been a particular criminal problem, and they were not in the
NFA as it was introduced in Congress. They were simply added into
NFA in order to clarify that longer rifles were not covered by some ge-

neric language in the draft NFA. 38 Pre-NFA, short rifles, typically with a
barrel length of fourteen or fifteen inches, were commonly used by hunters, trappers, ranchers, and horseback riders. Their shorter length meant
less weight, so they were particularly suitable for introducing young
people to firearms safety.39
So whether short rifles are within the scope of the Second Amendment remains an open question, and the fact that they are covered by the
NFA does not, in itself, provide a negative answer. If short rifles are
within the Second Amendment, are the stringent NFA controls (which
36.
The National FirearmsAct of 1934, supra note 32, at 19.
37. A submachine gun is a smaller, more portable type of machine gun.
38. As introduced, the NFA bill provided that "the term 'firearm' means a pistol, revolver,
shotgun having a barrel less than sixteen inches in length, or any other firearm capable of being
concealed on the person, a muffler or silencer therefor, or a machine gun." The National Firearms
Act of 1934, supra note 32, at 1. Attorney General Cummings suggested changing the shotgun
barrel length to eighteen or twenty inches. Id. at 6. Because the draft NFA applied to "any other
firearm capable of being concealed on the person," there was concern that rifles might be inadvertently covered. After all, a tall person with a full-length coat can carry a large rifle concealed. So a
specific definition for short-barreled rifles was added to the NFA to prevent longer-barreled rifles
from being considered as a firearm capable of being concealed on the person. The following discussion took place between Rep. Harold Knutson (a Republican from St. Cloud, Minnesota, who served
fifteen terms in the House) and Attorney General Cummings:
Mr. Knutson. General would there be any objection, on page 1, line 4, after the word
"shotgun" to add the words "or rifle" having a barrel less than 18 inches? The reason I
ask is I happen to come from a section of the State where deer hunting is a very popular
pastime in the fall of the year and, of course, I would not like to pass any legislation to
forbid or make it impossible for our people to keep arms that would permit them to hunt
deer.
Attorney General Cummings. Well, as long as it is not mentioned at all, it would not interfere at all.
Mr. Knutson. It seems to me that an 18-inch barrel would make this provision stronger
than 16 inches, knowing what I do about firearms.
Attorney General Cummings. Well, there is no objection as far as we are concerned to
including rifles after the word "shotguns" if you desire.
Id. at 13. As enacted, the NFA covered rifles under eighteen inches. The length was changed to
sixteen inches in 1960.
E.g., JAMES J. GRANT, BOYS' SINGLE SHOT RIFLES, at vii, ix (1967).
39.
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are much more restrictive than the controls for ordinary guns) a violation
of the Second Amendment? Mr. Heller's brief asserted that the NFA
would be unconstitutional for ordinary firearms such as handguns, but
did not address the question of short rifles.4 °
Rose involved a challenge to the conviction of a man who had
shortened the barrels on two rifles, without first obtaining the requisite
permission via the registration and tax scheme.41
Rose raised a variety of technical objections, which the court re42
jected, and which did not directly implicate the Second Amendment.
Rose's Second Amendment claim was dismissed with a simple citation
to Oakes, with no discussion.4 3
Post-Heller,this part of the Rose opinion is obviously not good law.
So far, the only post-Heller case involving short rifles is an unpublished

40. Brief of Respondent at 53, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07290), availableat 2008 WL 336304.
41. United States v. Rose, 695 F.2d 1356, 1357 (1982).
42. Id. For example, the guns had a folding, collapsible stock. This means that they could be
fired from the shoulder (with the stock extended), like a rifle. Or with the stock collapsed, the guns
could be fired one-handed, like a handgun. Rose argued that the guns were therefore not "rifles"
within the meaning of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(c) (2008). Notwithstanding the
rule of lenity, the court ruled that the guns were NFA rifles, especially since, as part of the process
authorizing their importation into the United States, they had been legally classified as "carbines."
Rose, 695 F.2d at 1357. (A carbine is type of lightweight rifle, with a barrel which is shorter [but not
necessarily shorter than sixteen inches] than the barrels of heavier rifles.). Rose also claimed that he
did not know it was illegal to shorten the barrels without going through the NFA tax and registration
process. As the court pointed out, "[t]he carton, the instructions, and the firearm itself contained
warnings that modification of the firearm was unlawful." Id. at 1358.
The National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record office is where records of NFA
registrations are kept. The office is operated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (BATFE). The records are incomplete and frequently inaccurate, and an internal BATFE
training admitted, in essence, that BATFE agents routinely perjure themselves by testifying that the
records are one hundred percent complete and accurate. See 142 CONG. REc. E1461-01 (1996)
(statement of Rep. Funderburk) ("Our first and main responsibility is to make accurate entries and to
maintain accuracy of the NFRTR ....
[W]hen we testify in court, we testify that the data base is
100 percent accurate. That's what we testify to, and we will always testify to that. As you probably
well know, that may not be 100 percent true ....
So the information on the 728,000 weapons that
are in the data base has to be 100 percent accurate. Like I told you before, we testify in court and, of
course, our certifications testify to that, too, when we're not physically there to testify, that we are
100 percent accurate ....
When I first came in a year ago, our error rate was between 49 and 50
percent .... ") (quoting Thomas A. Busey, then Chief of the National Firearms Act Branch of the
BATF, in the October 18, 1995 training video). The trial court had denied Rose's motion to inspect
the records room. The Tenth Circuit found the denial proper: "Rose did not allege that he had in
fact registered the weapons, even after his counsel was specifically questioned on this point by the
trial judge at the hearing on the motion. He did not allege that the system had malfunctioned as to
him. There may be circumstances in which one who wishes to impeach the quality of a recordkeeping system must be allowed to examine the system's operation." Rose, 695 F.2d at 1358. As the
Rose court recognized, inspection of records room might well be appropriate in a future case. For a
defendant who credibly claims that he did register a NFA firearm, it is questionable whether, as a
matter of law, the absence of registration records in the BATFE records room would be sufficient to
support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt-especially given BATFE's own admission that the
records are incomplete and given that BATFE agents routinely commit pejury about the records.
43. Id. at 1359.
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Ninth Circuit decision which assumes, with no reasoning, that Heller's
language about machine guns also applies to short rifles. 44
HI. SLESARIK: THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION

Slesarik's friend was arrested for carrying a revolver in a New Mexico restaurant, in violation of a city ordinance which forbade all gun carrying.45 Slesarik, who was present in the restaurant (according to the
trial court's finding of disputed facts), was later arrested as an accessory.
In a pro se case under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, Slesarik sued
the arresting officer, the police chief, two judges, and the City of Deming
for violating his rights under the Second Amendment and under the New
Mexico Constitution. At trial, some of the counts were dismissed on
grounds of immunity: the jury ruled for Slesarik on some other counts,
but awarded him no money damages. 46 The Tenth Circuit affirmed all
aspects of the result below.47
Slesarik had allegedly carried his own gun to the police station
where his friend was being booked. Although he was not prosecuted for
the carrying at the police station, Heller would allow a prosecution in
such a situation. Heller preemptively affirms the constitutionality of
"laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings ....,48
44.
United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App'x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Under Heller, individu").
als still do not have the right to possess machineguns or short-barreled rifles ....
45.
Slesarik v. Luna County, No. 93-2161, 1993 WL 513843, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993)
(per curiam) (Seymour, Anderson, and Ebel, JJ.) (referring to ordinance 6-4-6 of the City of Deming). The trial court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional under the New Mexico Constitution's right
to arms. Id. at *2 (citing Mem. Opinion & Order at 9, Slesarik v. Luna County, R. Vol. 3, Tab 66
(quoting City of Las Vegas v. Mosberg, 485 P.2d 737, 738 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971))). The New Mexico constitutional right explicitly excludes concealed weapons. N.M. CONsT. art. IL § 6 ("No law
shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein shall be held to permit the
carrying of concealed weapons."). The arresting officer claimed that Slesarik's friend's handgun
was "partially concealed." Slesarik, 1993 WL 513843, at *1. There is a large body of state law,
much of it contradictory, about whether partially-concealed handguns are considered "concealed" or
not. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-1(1) (2008) (banning the carrying of a firearm, except with
a license, which is "concealed in whole or in part"); State v. Fluker, 311 So. 2d 863, 866 (La. 1975)
(holding that a weapon which is sufficiently exposed so as to reveal its identity is not concealed,
even if it is not in full open view); Reid v. Commonwealth, 184 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Ky. 1944) (finding that a pistol stuck in a belt was not concealed); Winston v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 141, 146
(Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("We have previously stated that a weapon is hidden from common view under
[Virginia] Code § 18.2-308(A) when it is 'hidden from all except those with an unusual or exceptional opportunity to view it."'); State v. Ogletree, 244 So. 2d 288, 291 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (determining that a partially visible gun in waistband is not "concealed"); W. M. Moldoff, Annotation,
Offense of Carrying Concealed Weapon as Affected by Manner of Carrying or Place of Concealment, 43 A.L.R.2d 492, § 5 (1955). The trial court ruled that the issue of whether the friend's handgun was "concealed" was a jury question. Slesarik, 1993 WL 513843, at *2. Many other courts
have adopted a similar approach.
46.
Slesarik, 1993 WL 513843, at *2.
47.
Id. at *4.
48.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2817 (2008). Post-Heller, the "sensitive
places" rule has been used to uphold bans on carrying a concealed handgun on an airplane (an easy
case) as well as possessing a gun in a parked car in a Post Office parking lot (a harder case). See
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IV. BRUMFIELD: UNREGISTERED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FOR USE IN CRIME

In 1968, the National Firearms Act was amended so that it also covered certain explosive devices. 49 Brumfield was convicted of possession
of nine unregistered explosive devices. 50 He had become the subject of
an undercover BATF investigation after Roosevelt City, Utah, police told
BATF that Brumfield had made comments about killing people with
explosives, about blowing up the statue of the Angel Moroni (which
adorns the Latter Day Saint temple in Salt Lake City), and had boasted
about his expertise with explosives. 5'
BATF deployed an undercover informant, who (the trial court
found) got Brumfield to supply him with car bombs, which Brumfield
was told were being re-sold to California gangs. 52 "The undercover
agents then asked Mr. Brumfield to make silencers for Uzi submachine
guns in an attempt to divert Mr. Brumfield's activities toward less dangerous activities. 5 3
At trial, Brumfield claimed that he was entrapped, and the trial
judge allowed the jury to consider the issue. The jury found that he was
not entrapped. 54
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected Brumfield's entrapment argument. 55 Brumfield also raised the Second Amendment, which the Circuit brusquely dismissed with a citation to Oakes and Rose (which the
opinion misspelled as "Ross"). Notably, the decision simply said that
Brumfield's Second Amendment claims were "without merit." The pan-

United States v. Davis, No. 05-50726, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 26934, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Sept. 10,
2008) (unpublished and unsigned decision) (finding 49 U.S.C. § 46505, which bans concealed weapons on airplanes, constitutional); United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042, slip op., 2008 WL
2622996, at *6 (E.D. La. June 30, 2008) (upholding the ban on postal parking lots as narrowly
tailored to effect public and workplace safety solely on postal property, so 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(a) is
not unconstitutional as applied). The Dorosan opinion assumes, without evidence, that the parking
lot ban does in fact advance public safety. The court's observation that the ban at issue does not
affect the right of all individuals to bear arms at home or traveling in a vehicle to and from work
through high crime areas, is presumably based on the fact that Dorosan could have parked his private
car on a public street or a private lot near the post office; if no such parking were available, then
Dorosan would have been deprived of his right to protect himself while traveling to and from work,
and the parking lot ban might have been unconstitutional "as applied." Id.
49.
See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5845(f), 5861(d), 5871 (West 2009). "'[Destructive device' means
(1) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas (A) bomb, (B) grenade, (C) rocket having a propellant
charge of more than four ounces, (D) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than
one-quarter ounce, (E) mine, or (F) similar device.
."26 U.S.C. § 5845(n. So the NFA does not
regulate an "explosive" per se, but rather regulates devices (bombs, grenades, etc.) which use explosives. Explosives qua explosives are regulated by a separate law. 18 U.S.C.A. § 847 (West 2009).
50.
United States v. Brumfield, No. 93-4033, 1994 WL 475030, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 1,
1994) (unpublished disposition) (per curiam).
51.
Id.
52.
Id. at *2.
53.
Id.
54. Id. at *1.
55.
/d.at *2.
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el did not opine that the reason Brumfield's claims were meritless was
that he was not in a state militia.56
Because Brumfield's involvement with weapons was for the purpose of what he believed to be serving as an accessory to criminal homicides, he clearly did not have a meritorious Second Amendment claim.
Just as the First Amendment protects speech in general, but does not
protect speech that is part of a violent crime (e.g., two criminals making
plans for a homicide), the Second Amendment does not protect the supplying of firearms (or explosive devices) for use in violent crimes.
In practice, the BATFE (formerly the BATF) 57 administers the National Firearms Act so that a person can lawfully possess machine guns,
but the BATFE is much more restrictive about allowing registration for
explosive devices. It is doubtful that BATFE would accept a registration
for a person to manufacture car bombs, even if the person could prove
beyond any doubt that his purposes were innocent. (E.g., he wanted to
blow up some old cars on his farm.)
Heller never addressed the issue of explosive devices, but, given the
sensibility of the Court's language on machine guns, it seems very doubtful that most explosive devices would be considered to have Second
Amendment protection. (Gunpowder, which is an "explosive" but not an
"explosive device," would obviously be included in the Second Amendment.)
Even without Heller, it might be argued that explosive devices are
not Second Amendment "arms," since Second Amendment arms are
those that can be aimed at a particular target, whereas explosive devices
kill everyone in the area.
A closer question is raised by sound reducers, which are sometimes
inaccurately called "silencers." These too are covered by the NFA, with
possession allowed if there is registration and the tax is paid. 58 Brumfield was not convicted of making unregistered silencers, although59 the
BATFE's confidential informant had tried to convince him to do so.
What about a situation where a silencer was not manufactured for
use in a violent crime? Sound reducers have many legitimate purposes.
Except in the movies, sound reducers do not really make a gun silent (so

56. Id. at *4.
57. See Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2274 (2002) (codified as
amended at 6 U.S.C.A. § 531 (West 2009)).
58. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-5802, 5841 (West 2009) (procedure for lawful registration and
payment of tax); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(24) (West 2009) (defining "silencers"); 26 U.S.C.A. §
5845(a)(7) (West 2009).
59. Brumfield, 1994 WL 475030, at *2.

916

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

that an assassin may carry out his crime undetected). 6° Rather, sound
reducers simply reduce a gun's noise by a several decibels. Because a
gunshot is very loud, the reduced sound is still quite loud.
The most obvious legitimate use of a sound reducer is reducing
noise so that it does not bother neighbors. For example, a person with an
acre or more of property might have a shooting range, and might use
sound reducers to reduce the noise that his neighbors hear.
Sound reducers are also a very useful tool in firearms training. The
noise from a gun may produce an involuntary flinch in some novice
shooters. If the novice trains with a gun that has a sound reducer, the
tendency to acquire the bad habit of flinching will be reduced, and the
novice will learn to shoot more accurately and more safely. In addition,
the noise reduction makes it easier for students to hear instructions from
the safety instructor.
For all of the above reasons, most European countries regulate
sound reducers much less stringently than does the U.S. federal government. Although European gun controls are generally more restrictive
than American ones, European countries do not put sound reducers in a
specially restrictive category reserved for very powerful weapons like
machine guns and explosive devices.
In practice, the BATFE does allow the registration of silencers under the NFA. However, the $200 tax and the burden of the months-long
registration process makes the use and possession of sound reducers in
the United States much rarer than it would otherwise be.
Heller allows bans on "dangerous and unusual" weapons. But a
sound reducer is not even a weapon, and it is "dangerous" only in the
eyes of ignorant people whose knowledge of firearms is based mainly on
James Bond and similar movies.
The NFA may be constitutional as applied to machine guns, but it is
debatable whether extremely stringent NFA rules are really constitutional
for benign accessories such as sound reducers. Arguably, a sound reducer might constitutionally be regulated the same as an ordinary firearm
under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (requiring a background check before
purchase, and simple on-the-spot registration, but not a high tax).
V. GUEST: ExTRA PUNISHMENT FOR EXERCISING CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS

Another unpublished case was United States v. Guest.61 Under the
federal sentencing guidelines, the district court had used its discretion to
60.

See generally 1 ALAN C. PAULSON, SILENCER: HISTORY AND PERFORMANCE; SPORTING

AND TACrICAL SILENCERS (1996); 2 ALAN C. PAULSON, N.R. PARKER & PETER G. KOKALIS,
SILENCER: HISTORY AND PERFORMANCE; CQB, ASSAULT RIFLE, AND SNIPER TECHNOLOGY (2002).
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enhance Guest's sentence because firearms were found at his residence,
even though the firearms had nothing to do with the crime which he
committed. He did not preserve the issue for appeal, and the Tenth Circuit decided that his raising of a Second Amendment argument on appeal
did not meet the standards for a post-conviction collateral attack under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.62
The grounds for a 2255 motion include "that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." Although the Guest court provided no citation, presumably the court was
relying on Oakes for the theory that since Guest was not in the National
Guard, he had no Second Amendment rights.
But now, a post-conviction 2255 claim about the Second Amendment from an ordinary citizen would raise a real constitutional issue.
And a claim that the defendant was punished for possessing firearms,
even though the firearms had no relation to the underlying offense,
would be meritorious.
To see why, let us examine a First Amendment analogy. The U.S.
Constitution protects only two specifically-identified technologies:
"arms" and "the press," and the Founders plainly described the two as
63
technologies of supreme importance in the preservation of a free state.
U.S. v. Guest, No. 94-6091, 1994 WL 602693 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 1994) (per curiam).
61.
62.
Id. at *2. Guest was running a large marijuana growing and distribution operation out of
his home. It is possible that the guns were in fact used to support the crime, in that the guns might
have been kept to protect the operation. However, the Tenth Circuit opinion does not indicate that
there was any such factual finding by the lower court.
See Edward Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies: How the Right to Bear Arms Affects
63.
Copyright Regulations of Speech Technologies,WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming May 2009),
availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=1 156526.
The principal (initial) drafter of both clauses, James Madison, often spoke of arms and
the press in the same breath. For example, in his notes for his floor speech on June 8,
1789 in favor of the Bill of Rights, Madison grouped together as features or flaws of the
English Declaration of Rights of 1688: "no freedom of press" as well as "arms to Protestts" only ....And writing years later, Madison spoke of both rights as vital to the Republic: "a government resting on a minority is an aristocracy, not a Republic, and could
not be safe with a numerical and physical force against it, without a standing army, and
enslaved press,and a disarmedpopulace."
Madison was not alone in drawing a connection between arms and press in the Framing
generation. As Randy Barnett and Don Kates have recounted, "James Madison, James
Monroe, Fisher Ames, Albert Gallatin, and others mentioned the right to arms in the
same breath with the freedom of religion and press, and described them all interchangeably as 'human rights,' 'private rights,' 'essential and sacred rights' which 'each individual reserves to himself."'
To the modem sensibilities, the historical connection between arms and the press may
seem odd. But, to the Framing generation, the connection would have been commonsensical. The right to bear arms and the freedom of the press presented the exact same type
of question for the Framers: can there ever be a natural right to a man-made device? In
the case of arms and presses, the Framers believed so.
Id. at *10-11.
It is also significant that five of the eight states that proposed amendments during the ratification of the Constitution offered proposals for protecting the freedom of the press...
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Just as someone can be punished for using arms in a crime, he can be
punished for using a press in a crime.
Imagine someone who owns an at-home printing press. He creates
a fake charity, designed to swindle Roman Catholics. Then, using his athome press, he prints counterfeit copies of the Denver Catholic Register,
the newspaper which is mailed to Catholic families through the Archdiocese of Denver. The counterfeit copy is identical in every respect to the
real current issue of the Denver Catholic Register-except that Archbishop Chaput's real column is replaced by a fake column in which the
Archbishop purportedly implores all Catholics to donate generously to
the fake charity.
Having previously stolen the Archdiocese's mailing list, the criminal sneaks into a post office, and substitutes the counterfeit issues of the
Denver Catholic Register for the real one. The U.S. Postal Service delivers the fake issues to Denver-area Catholics.
Later, the criminal is caught and convicted of mail fraud. Can his
possession of the printing press be used to enhance his sentence under
the Sentencing Guidelines? Certainly yes. The printing press is evidence of the criminal's use of a special skill,
and therefore can justify
64
extra points under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Now imagine another criminal, who also uses an at-home printing
press. He prints flyers which he hands out on the Pearl Street Mall in
Boulder, urging people to recycle. In the very same room in his house
where the printing press is kept, he also cultivates psychedelic mushrooms, and sells them. He is eventually caught and convicted.
Can his sentence be enhanced because he possessed the printing
press? Of course not. The possession of the press is constitutionally
protected, and the man's possession of the press had nothing to do with
his crime.
Similar reasoning would apply to the possession of arms. If the
arms are actually used in the crime (e.g., an armed robbery, the guarding
of a crack house), then an enhanced sentence is constitutional. If the
arms have no relation to the crime, then there should not, constitutionally, be any extra punishment for possessing them.
[and] the right to bear arms ....
And of these states, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North
Carolina... placed the proposals for the freedom of the press and the right to bear arms
consecutively or back-to-back-which is how eventually they came to be ordered in the
Bill of Rights in what became of the First and Second Amendments. In their state constitutions and declarations of rights, Massachusetts (1780), Pennsylvania (1776), and Vermont (1777) also listed the protections for the freedom of the press and the right to bear
arms consecutively.
Id. at *13.
64.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B 1.3 (2005) ("[D]efendant ...

skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission... of the offense.").

used a special
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VI. MARCHANT: PRIVACY OF REGISTRATION FORMS

The first Tenth Circuit Second Amendment case involving the Gun
Control Act (ordinary guns) rather than the National Firearms Act (machine guns, etc.) came in 1995.65
Because of extensive documented abuses by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms (BATF), 66 Congress in 1986 enacted the Firearms
65. United States v. Marchant, 55 F.3d 509 (10th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
66. SLJBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., THE RIGHT
TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 20-23 (2d. Sess. 1982), available at http://www.guncite.com/
joumals/senrpt/senrpt.html:
Based upon these hearings, it is apparent that enforcement tactics made possible by current federal firearms laws are constitutionally, legally, and practically reprehensible. Although Congress adopted the Gun Control Act with the primary object of limiting access
of felons and high-risk groups to firearms, the overbreadth of the law has led to neglect of
precisely this area of enforcement .... [S]ubsequent to these hearings, BATF stated that
55 percent of its gun law prosecutions overall involve persons with no record of a felony
conviction, and a third involve citizens with no prior police contact at all.
The Subcommittee received evidence that BATF has primarily devoted its firearms enforcement efforts to the apprehension, upon technical malum prohibitum charges, of inEven in cases where the coldividuals who lack all criminal intent and knowledge ....
lectors secured acquittal, or grand juries failed to indict, or prosecutors refused to file
criminal charges, agents of the Bureau have generally confiscated the entire collection of
the potential defendant upon the ground that he intended to use it in that violation of the
law. In several cases, the agents have refused to return the collection even after acquittal
by jury.

In several cases, the Bureau has sought conviction for supposed technical violations
based upon policies and interpretations of law which the Bureau had not published in the
Federal Register, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552 ....
...

The Constitution Subcommittee also received evidence that the Bureau has formulated a
requirement, of which dealers were not informed that requires a dealer to keep official
records of sales even from his private collection. BATF has gone farther than merely
failing to publish this requirement. At one point, even as it was prosecuting a dealer on
the charge (admitting that he had no criminal intent), the Director of the Bureau wrote
Senator S. . Hayakawa to indicate that there was no such legal requirement and it was
In
completely lawful for a dealer to sell from his collection without recording it ....
these and similar areas, the Bureau has violated not only the dictates of common sense,
but of 5 U.S.C. § 552, which was intended to prevent "secret lawmaking" by administrative bodies.
These practices, amply documented in hearings before this Subcommittee, leave little
doubt that the Bureau has disregarded rights guaranteed by the constitution and laws of
the United States.
It has trampled upon the second amendment by chilling exercise of the right to keep and
bear arms by law-abiding citizens.
It has offended the fourth amendment by unreasonably searching and seizing private
property.
It has ignored the Fifth Amendment by taking private property without just compensation
and by entrapping honest citizens without regard for their right to due process of law.
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Owners' Protection Act (FOPA).67 That Act strengthened federal laws
regarding use of guns in violent crimes and drug crimes, and also imposed various restrictions on BATF searches and seizures, forfeitures,
and prosecutions for technical paperwork violations.
Marchant pawned a rifle in New Mexico. To redeem a gun from a
pawnshop, the owner must go through the same process as if he were
buying a gun.68 Accordingly, when Marchant redeemed his gun, he
filled out Federal Form 4473. That form must be completed by all gun
buyers; on it, the buyer provides identifying information (such as name,
address, and date of birth), and checks boxes to indicate his eligibility to
buy a gun (that he is not a convicted felon, not under indictment, was
never dishonorably discharged from the military, etc.). The firearms
dealer fills in information about the make, model, and serial number of
the gun.69
After the sale is completed, the dealer must retain the 4473 form for
the next twenty years. 70 In effect, the gun is registered, with the registration record held by the dealer. The system is part of the compromise that
allowed the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968. Many gun control
advocates had demanded a federally-centralized gun registration system. 71 Congress rejected the idea, and instead enacted the de-centralized,
dealer-based system. The de-centralized system had the advantage of
creating records of gun sales, without the dangers (according to Second
Amendment advocates) of a centralized registry, which could be used for
gun confiscation. The Second World War was still fresh in the minds of
many congresspeople, and they were aware that the Nazis had used gun
registries created by the Weimar Republic and by other democratic nations which were later conquered by the Nazis in order to carry out gun
confiscation.72
The day after Marchant redeemed his rifle from the pawn shop in
Albuquerque, two New Mexico Probation-Parole Officers visited the
pawn shop, because they had heard that someone on probation (not Marchant) had bought a gun there. With the consent of the pawnshop owner,
... [E]xpert evidence was submitted establishing that approximately 75 percent of BATF
gun prosecutions were aimed at ordinary citizens who had neither criminal intent nor
knowledge, but were enticed by agents into unknowing technical violations....
67. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § l(a)-(b), 100 Stat. 449 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-929 (West 2009)).
68.
The requirement was imposed administratively by the BATF. 27 C.F.R. § 178.124(a)
(2002); see also Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 828-29 (1974) (upholding regulation).
69.
27 C.F.R. § 178.124 (2002).
70. 27 C.F.R. § 178.129(b) (2002).

71.

See ROBERT SHERRILL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 85-86 (1975).

72. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, Nazi FirearmsLaw and the Disarmingof the German
Jews, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 483, 485 (2000). Concern about Nazi firearms practices had led
Congress during World War I to specifically exempt firearms from the Property Requisition Act.
See Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interpretsthe Second Amendment: Declarationsby a Co-Equal
Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597, 599 (1995).
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they examined the store's 4473 forms. In the course of doing so, they
saw that Marchant had just redeemed his gun, and they knew that Marchant had been convicted of a felony.
Marchant was then prosecuted and convicted for making a false
statement in acquiring a firearm, and of being a felon in possession of a
firearm. 73 The appeal turned on the Fourth Amendment, and Marchant's
argument that his 4473 form should have been suppressed as the fruit of
an illegal search.
The 1968 GCA had allowed BATF limitless inspection of the 4473
forms retained by licensed firearms dealers.74 FOPA changed the law so
that once a year, BATF can conduct a compliance inspection to see if the
records are being properly maintained. The one-per-year-limit does not
apply if BATF has reason to believe that the particular dealer is not
maintaining records appropriately, or may be violating some other part of
federal gun law.75 In addition, BATF can inspect dealer records as often
as it wants to when it is tracing a gun. And BATF can conduct limitless
inspections in the course of bona fide criminal investigations. 76 In conjunction with a firearms trace or a criminal investigation, BATF can
share information from the 4473 forms with federal, state, or local law
enforcement.7 7
Thus, Congress crafted a system to protect firearms dealers from
administrative harassment, to protect the privacy of firearms purchasers,
and to allow legitimate records inspections for law enforcement purposes.
Accordingly, the state law enforcement officers' warrantless examination of the pawnshop records appears dubious. If the officers had a
legitimate law enforcement investigation (as they apparently did), they
should have asked BATF to take the lead in inspecting the records, and
to share the information with them. Because part of the purpose of the
GCA/FOPA records system is to protect the privacy of firearms purchasers, it is not clear that the pawnshop owner had the authority to allow the
records examination, and he violated the privacy of his customers.
However, the Tenth Circuit evaded the Fourth Amendment issue by
holding that Marchant had no standing to raise privacy claims under
GCA/FOPA. Because Marchant was a convicted felon, he had no
73.
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 922(a)(6), (g)(1) (West 2009).
74.
See Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 923(g), 82 Stat. 1213, 1223 (1968) (requiring that licensed
dealer must "make such records available for inspection at all reasonable times").
75.
Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 103(g)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 449,454 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §
923(g)(l)(A) (West 2009)); Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 103(g)(1)(B), 100 Stat. 449, 454 (1986) (codified
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 923(g)(1)(B) (West 2009)).
76.
Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 103(g)(1)(B), 100 Stat. 449, 454 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §
923(g)(1)(B) (West 2009)).
Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 103(g)(1)(D), 100 Stat. 449,455 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §
77.
923(g)(1)(D) (West 2009)).
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GCA/FOPA privacy rights.7 8 As the court detailed, the language of GCA
and FOPA and their legislative history was replete with statements of
Congress's objective of keeping guns away from criminals, including
convicted felons; Congress apparently cared about the privacy rights of
law-abiding citizens, but not of criminals.79
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion about standing, as applied to Marchant, was not unreasonable. On the other hand, the privacy rights of the
rest of the pawnshop's customers were violated, and they were the lawabiding gun owners whose privacy rights Congress had intended to protect. As a practical matter, they had no remedy for the violation of their
privacy, and under the Tenth Circuit's rule, there is no deterrent to violations of the privacy rights of the law-abiding gun owners whose 4473
forms are in the custody of licensed firearms dealers throughout the Circuit.
In Marchant, as in many other cases, the continuing erosion of the
exclusionary rule leads to an attractive result (the conviction of an actual
criminal) in the case at bar, but greatly harms the privacy rights of people
whom the court will never see.
Marchant had argued in that "Congress manifested an intent to
create a reasonable expectation of privacy in firearms records in the possession of federally licensed firearms dealers in order to protect Second
Amendment freedoms., 80 Happily, the panel did not retort that only militiamen could have Second Amendment freedoms; rather the court did
not address the Second Amendment issue, since the admissibility of the
evidence was resolved by analysis of the standing issue.
As for the ban on the possession of firearms by convicted felons,
Heller explicitly affirmed the constitutionality of the ban (at least for
felons in general, without discussion of whether the ban might be unconstitutional as applied in particular cases). 81 Lower federal courts have
readily upheld post-Hellerchallenges to the felon-in-possession law.82
78.

United States v. Marchant, 55 F.3d 509, 514-16 (10th Cir. 1995).

79.

Id.

80.
Id. at 515.
81.
"[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill .... District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008).

82.
United States v. Brunson, No. 07-4962, 2008 WL 4180057 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 2008)
(unpublished); United States v. Irish, No. 06-4082, 2008 WL 2917818 (8th Cir. July 31, 2008)
(unpublished); United States v. Gilbert, No. 07-30153, 2008 WL 2740453 (9th Cir. July 15, 2008)
(unpublished); United States v. Harden, No. 06-79-KI, 2007 WL 3312342 (D. Or. Nov. 6, 2007)

(unpublished); United States v. Robinson, No. 07-CR-202, 2008 WL 2937742 (E.D. Wis. July 23,
2008) (unpublished); Johnson v. United States, No. 4:06-CV-1363, 2008 WL 2397378 (E.D. Mo.

June 9, 2008); Industrious v. Cauley, No. 08-CV-109-HRW, 2008 WL 4525451, at *4 (E.D. Ky.
Oct. 1, 2008) (unpublished) (mistakenly treating the dissenting opinion in Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), affd sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 645
(2008), as if it had been the majority opinion).; United States v. Kilgore, No. 08-cr-66-bbc, 2008 WL
4058020 (W.D.Wis. Aug. 26, 2008) (unpublished).
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VII. WILKs: THE FEDERAL MACHINE GUN BAN

The passage of FOPA through Congress in 1985-86 had an odd
twist. The bill passed the Senate overwhelmingly. When the bill was
before the House, Speaker Tip O'Neil made Rep. Mario Biaggi the presiding officer. Biaggi was a staunch gun control advocate, and would
later leave the House after being convicted of felonies.
A proposed amendment to the bill, by Rep. Bill Hughes of New Jersey, banned the sale of machine guns manufactured after the date that
FOPA would become law. There was no debate, and Biaggi called for a
voice vote. Ignoring (in violation of House rules) members' demands for
a roll call, Biaggi declared that the amendment was adopted. So now, 18
U.S.C. 922(o) is part of the Gun Control Act, and bans citizens who are
not government employees from possessing machine guns manufactured
after May 19, 1986. 83 For machine guns manufactured before that date,
of which there are about 120,000, possession is still lawful, as long as the
tax and registration requirements of the National Firearms Act are met.
FOPA did not change the law regarding sound reducers (a/k/a "silencers"), and they may still be possessed in compliance with the NFA.
Larry Francis Wilks owned a gun store in Tulsa. He sold three
post-1986 machine guns to undercover BATFE agents, as well as two
sound reducers for which he did not comply with the NFA transfer requirements.84
On appeal, Wilks did not raise the Second Amendment. But the
court noted that "this orphan of the Bill of Rights may be something of a
brooding omnipresence here., 85 Wilks argued that the machine gun ban
was unconstitutional, because it was not a proper exercise of Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. A few months before the
Tenth Circuit heard Wilks, the Supreme Court had ruled in United States
v. Lopez that the federal "Gun Free School Zones Act" was not
a lawful
86
exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.

83.
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) states:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or
possess a machinegun.
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United States or any
department or agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency or political subdivision
thereof; or
(3)any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was lawfully possessed
before the date this subsection takes effect.
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West 2009).
84.
United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995).
85.
Id. at 1519 n.2 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364 n.46 (5th Cir. 1993),
aff'd, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
86. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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As the Tenth Circuit noted, there was no legislative history indicating that Congress was thinking about interstate commerce when the machine gun ban was passed. Or, indeed, that Congress was thinking about
anything at all:
The legislative history surrounding § 922(o) is virtually nonexistent.
The provision was a last minute floor amendment, no hearings were
conducted, and no committee report refers to it. See David T. Hardy,
The Firearms Owners' ProtectionAct: A Historicaland Legal Pers-

pective, 17 Cumb.L.Rev. 585, 670-71 (1987). The scant legislative
history merely contains a discussion of an earlier bill proposed in the
House of Representatives which "prohibited the transfer and possession of machine guns, used by racketeers and drug traffickers for intimidation, murder and protection of drugs and the proceeds of
crime." H.R.Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1330. "The only apparent explanation
for it is the statement of its sponsor, Representative Hughes, that 'I
do not know why anyone would object to the banning of machine
guns."' . . .(quoting
132 Cong.Rec. H1750 (1986)) (statement of
87
Rep. Hughes)).

The Tenth Circuit applied the three-part test which the Supreme
Court had articulated in Lopez. Under the interstate commerce clause,
according to Lopez, Congress can regulate:
(1) the channels of interstate commerce;
(2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities"; and
(3) activities which have "a substantial relation to interstate commerce ...
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate com, 88
merce.

The Wilks court decided that the machine gun ban was a proper example
of Congress's power to regulate "things in interstate commerce." First,
when enacting the Gun Control Act of 1968, which Congress amended in
1986 with FOPA, Congress had made findings about the need to regulate
interstate firearms transfers.89 Supposedly, these 1968 findings could
inure to the benefit of the 1986 machine gun ban-even though Congress
was not regulating machine gun transactions, but was instead simply
banning possession.
The Supreme Court had not allowed such relation back in Lopez,
but the Tenth Circuit distinguished the ban on possessing or carrying
87.
88.
89.

Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1519.
Id.
at 1520 (summarizing and quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59).
Id. at 1521-22.
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handguns within a thousand feet of a school. That activity was not a
commercial activity, either alone or even in the aggregate of all such
carrying. In contrast, machine guns "by their nature are 'a commodity..
'9 °
transferred across state lines for profit by business entities."
This argument makes no sense. Handguns also, "by their nature are
a commodity... transferred across state lines for profit by business entities." Yet Congress could not ban the mere carrying of handguns in certain places. The machine gun law went even further, by banning possession entirely. A machine gun is no more and no less a commodity than is
a handgun. Yet according to the Tenth Circuit, a machine gun, just by
being a machine gun, has "interstate attributes":
Section 922(o) regulates "this extensive, intricate, and definitively
national market for machineguns" by prohibiting the transfer and
possession of machineguns manufactured after May 19, 1986. As
such, § 922(o) represents Congressional regulation of an item bound
up with interstate attributes and thus differs in substantial respect
possession of a firearm within a purely
from legislation concerning
91
local school zone.

As if a thing can have interstateness in its very nature, based on how it
functions. A rocket capable of firing hundreds of miles might be considered "bound up with interstate attributes." The maximum range of a
machine gun (depending on whether it is a rifle or a handgun), is no
more than a few hundred yards. The capacity to shoot a projectile several hundred yards would only be "bound up with interstate attributes" if
the average size of a state were about a square mile or less.
Second, the ban on local possession was supposedly necessary, in
the congressional mind, to "regulate" (that is, prohibit) interstate sales.
Thus, although not explicitly stated in the language of the statute itself, it is evident that Congress prohibited the transfer and possession
of most post-1986 machineguns not merely to ban these firearms, but
90.
Id. at 1521 (quoting United States v. Hunter, 843 F. Supp. 235, 249 (E.D. Mich. 1994). In
a footnote, the Wilks court wrote:
We are mindful that in Lopez the Supreme Court refused to examine previous Congressional findings surrounding prior federal firearms legislation in determining whether §
922(q) violated the Commerce Clause because § 922(q) "represent[ed] a sharp break with
the long-standing pattern of federal firearms legislation." Lopez, 514 U.S. at __, 115 S.
Ct. at 1632. In contrast to § 922(q), we do not view § 922(o) as constituting a "sharp
break" with previous firearms legislation which regulated the interstate flow of firearms.
Rather, § 922(o) is consistent with this earlier federal legislation because it merely regulates the movement of a particular firearm in interstate commerce. We therefore believe
it is entirely appropriate to examine prior enactments and legislation in determining the
constitutionality of § 922(o).
Id. at 1521 n.4. Yet quite obviously, § 922(o) is not a law that "merely regulates the movement of a
particular firearm in interstate commerce." Id. A ban on interstate machine gun sales would be such
a law. A ban on simple intrastate possession is not the same as a ban on interstate sales.
Id. at 1521 (quoting Hunter,843 F. Supp. at 249) (citations omitted).
91.
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rather, to control
their interstate movement by proscribing transfer or
92
possession.
The "evidence" of this supposed Congressional intent was the Congressional statements involving the enactment of the 1968 GCA, plus generic
statements (having nothing to do with machine guns) that FOPA was
intended to strengthen
the GCA as a tool for fighting violent crime and
93
trafficking.
drug
But the machine gun ban had nothing to do with fighting violent
crime or drug trafficking. As BATF itself had testified to Congress, during hearings on a previous attempt to ban machine guns, the NFA was
working perfectly well. Machine guns which were properly registered
under the NFA were virtually never used in crime. 94
Nevertheless, heroic efforts to stretch the interstate commerce power were validated later in Gonzales v. Raich, where the Court's majority
ruled that a federal ban on the legal (under state law) cultivation of medical marijuana exclusively for personal use was a legitimate incident to
Congress's efforts to prohibit an interstate market in marijuana. 95 Apparently the personal cultivation of legal medical marijuana would reduce the demand for interstate illegal marijuana, thereby reducing the
market price for the illegal marijuana. And the effect on price, in turn,
medical cultivation under its
meant that Congress could control personal
96
power to regulate interstate commerce.
Wilks also argued, creatively, that the National Firearms Act definitions are unconstitutionally vague.9 7 At the least, they certainly are odd.
The NFA applies itself to "firearms." But a "firearm" for NFA purposes
is not a "firearm" in normal English usage. The NFA applies to only a
small fraction of actual firearms-namely machine guns, short shotguns,
short rifles, and a few other types. And a NFA "firearm" includes many
things which are obviously not firearms: namely certain explosive devices, such as rockets and grenades, and, of course, "silencers." The NFA's
definitions section is clear enough; a "silencer" is explicitly defined as a
NFA "firearm." 98 So the law is similar to a "National Cow Act" which
92.
Id. at 1522 (quoting Hunter, 843 F. Supp. at 248-49).
93.
Id.
94.
Armor Piercing Ammunition and the Criminal Misuse and Availability of Machineguns
and Silencers: Hearing on H.R. 641 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 117 (1984) (statement of Stephen Higgins, Dir. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) ("[It is highly unusual-and in fact, it is very, very rare" for
registered machineguns to be used in crime.).
95.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32-33 (2005).
96.
Id.
97.
Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1522.
98.
26 U.S.C.A. § 5845(a) (West 2009) ("The term 'firearm' means ... (7) any silencer (as
defined in section 921 of title 18, United States Code)"); 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(24) (West 2009)
("The terms 'firearm silencer' and 'firearm muffler' mean any device for silencing, muffling, or
diminishing the report of a portable firearm, including any combination of parts, designed or rede-
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defines a "cow" to include only Holstein cows, but also states that chickens and pianos are a type of "cow."
It is an interesting question whether a legal definition which is 1)
clear, but 2) patently false and nonsensical, could be considered void for
vagueness. But Wilks had not preserved the issue for appeal, and the
Tenth Circuit did not have to decide the issue.
VIII. BAER: MORE (BUT NOT MUCH MORE) ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT

Regarding pro se lawyering, there is a saying that a man who
may not be
represents himself has a fool for a client. 99 The observation
1
true in all cases, but it was in United States v. Baer. 00
The Tenth Circuit's 1977 decision in Oakes had announced a
Second Amendment result based on "logic" and "policy" and what was
"apparent," but had not made any logical or policy arguments, and had
not pointed out any "apparent" facts.10 For twenty-three years, the
Tenth Circuit had offered not one more word of Second Amendment
analysis. In Baer, the Circuit went further, adding an entire paragraph to
its thin corpus of Second Amendment analysis.
Baer was convicted of being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm,102 and of possessing firearms with obliterated serial numbers. 103
He argued that the felon-in-possession ban exceeded Congressional power post-Lopez, a claim which the Tenth Circuit rejected, citing its own
precedent that the ban was constitutional, because the ban only applied to
firearms which had at some point been transferred in interstate commerce.104
He also raised a Ninth Amendment claim, which was speedily dismissed with a citation to other Circuit Courts which rejected the notion
of a Ninth Amendment right to arms. 05 The dissent did not address any

signed, and intended for use in assembling or fabricating a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, and
any part intended only for use in such assembly or fabrication.").
99. The quote is often attributed, incorrectly, to Abraham Lincoln. RALPH KEYES, THE
QUOTE VERIFIER 128 (2006).

100.
235 F.3d 561 (10th Cir. 2000).
101.
United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977).
102.
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2009).
103.
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(k) (West 2009).
104. Baer, 235 F.3d at 563 (citing United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1995)).
The machine gun ban, discussed supra, is not limited to machine guns that have been transferred in
interstate commerce.
105.
Id. at 564 (citing San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11 th Cir.1997), vacated in part on other
grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (1 1th Cir. 1998); United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1041 (5th Cir.
1996)).
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of the arguments in Nicholas Johnson's 1992 Rutgers Law Journal article on the Ninth Amendment and the right to arns.106
Presumably, Baer, as a pro se litigant, had not done an excellent job
in presenting the Ninth Amendment argument. But the Tenth Circuit
went too far with its breezy rejection pronouncement against any Ninth
Amendment right to arms. If the panel did not want to write a serious
analysis of the Ninth Amendment issue, the panel simply could have
pointed out that there is no authority for the proposition that convicted
felons have a Ninth Amendment right to own guns, or that there is a
Ninth Amendment right to firearms which have obliterated serial numbers.
In future years, it would be best to understand Baer, in regards to
the Ninth Amendment, as standing for nothing more than the above two
propositions. The panel never even attempted to engage the merits of a
Ninth Amendment analysis as applied to law-abiding citizens, and Baer
should not be treated as if the panel had engaged the issue.
Baer had also raised the Second Amendment. The panel responded
with a scornful footnote:
Mr. Baer also makes the time-worn argument that his conviction violates the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court has long held
that "the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a
firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia."' Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980)
(quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83
L.Ed. 1206 (1939)). The Court in Lewis concluded that federal legislation regulating the receipt and possession of firearms by felons

"do[es] not trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties," including those guaranteed by the Second Amendment. Id. In light of
this authority, the circuits have consistently upheld the constitutionality of federal weapons regulations like section 922(g) absent evidence that they in any way affect the maintenance of a well regulated
militia. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th
Cir.1995); see also Wright, 117 F.3d at 1271-74 (upholding 18
U.S.C. § 922(o), which bars possession of machine gun, against

Second Amendment challenge); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d
1016, 1018-1020 (same); United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318,
1320 (8th Cir.1988) (upholding Switchblade Knife Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1242, against Second Amendment challenge); United States v.
Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir.1977) (upholding 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d), which bars possession of unregistered machine gun, against

106.

See generally Johnson, supranote 26.
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Second Amendment challenge).
Mr. Baer's prosecution did not vi10 7
olate the Second Amendment.
Lewis was a 1980 Supreme Court case involving a Sixth Amendment challenge to the felon in possession ban. The Second Amendment
had not been raised or briefed by any party. 08 Still, the Court did include the footnote with the above-quoted language.' ° 9 Although it is
possible to argue about what Lewis means, the Tenth Circuit's quotation
of Lewis was at least a plausible interpretation of Lewis as rejecting the
notion of a constitutionally protected right to arms. (The narrower reading of Lewis is simply that it affirms that convicted felons have no right

to arms.)
It was reasonable for the Tenth Circuit, in 2000, to update its 1977
Second Amendment analysis by citing dicta from a footnote in a 1980
U.S. Supreme Court case. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit, in its 2000
update, paid no attention at all to what the Supreme Court had written
about the Second Amendment in the text of a 1990 opinion, United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. There, the Court had explained that "the
people" was a constitutional "term of art" which had the same meaning
in the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. 1 0
It is difficult to square the Tenth Circuit's insistence that "the right
of the people to keep and bear arms" applies only to members of state
militias with the Supreme Court's rule that "the people" in the Second
Amendment are just the same as "the people" who are protected by the
First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.
It is true that ingenious arguments can be made to get around what
seems to be Verdugo's plain language." 1 But the Tenth Circuit did not
offer any such arguments about Verdugo. Rather, the Circuit acted as if
Verdugo did not exist. This was the style of the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the Second Amendment in the late twentieth century: not to refute the strongest authorities and arguments in favor of an ordinary individual right in the Second Amendment, but simply to refuse to address
them at all.

107. Baer, 235 F.3d at 564.
108. See infra note 193.
109.
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
110.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
11I. See Brief for Brady Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 26-28, District of
Columbia v. Heller,
128 S.
Ct. 2783 (2008) (No.
07-290), available at
http://www.gurapossessky.comnews/parker/documents/07-290tsacBradyCenter.pdf.
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IX. HANEY: THE MACHINE GUN BAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
POWER, AND THE FOUR-PART TEST

John Lee Haney is one of the many litigants who have made terrible
Second Amendment law by bringing poorly prepared cases. 12
John Lee Haney walked into a police station, engaged an officer in
conversation, and told him that he owned semiautomatic and fully
automatic guns. He stated that they were not licensed and that the
federal government lacks authority to require him to get a license.
Through a combination of Haney's consent and a warrant, the authorities found two fully automatic guns in Haney's car and house. Haney also had literature on how to convert a semiautomatic gun to a
fully automatic gun. Haney had converted one of the guns himself
and had3 constructed the other out of parts. He admitted possessing
1
them.
The case was preposterous. Had Haney consulted a competent attorney, he would have found that:
"

The Tenth Circuit had already rejected the idea of Second
Amendment rights for anyone outside the National Guard in
Oakes, in 1977. 14

*

The Tenth Circuit has already rejected the idea that, even postLopez, Congress cannot use the
interstate commerce power to
5
ban machine gun possession."

"

Haney's semi-automatic arms were entirely legal, and thus could
not be used to set up any kind of test case.

Addressing the Second Amendment, Judge Ebel briefly quoted from
Miller and Lewis, with no greater length nor depth of analysis than had
been used in Oakes or Baer. (Judge Ebel was on the panel in Baer.) The
opinion also quoted from Oakes itself.
There was one slightly novel (from a Tenth Circuit standpoint) iota
of analysis. Namely the assertion:
Consistent with these cases, we hold that a federal criminal
gun-control law does not violate the Second Amendment unless it
112.
See United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2001).
113.
Id.
at 1163.
114.
Perhaps Haney had drawn hope from the circuit's hint about the "brooding omnipresence"
in Wilks in 1995. United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 n.2 (1995). But in 2000-after Haney
had gotten himself arrested, but before the Tenth Circuit heard his appeal-another panel, in Baer,
had slammed the door on revising the circuit's approach to the Second Amendment. See United
States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561 (10th Cir. 2000).
115.
Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1519.
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impairs the state's ability to maintain a well-regulated militia. This is
simply1 16a straightforward reading of the text of the Second Amendment.
To say the least, Judge Ebel's interpretation is hardly a "straightforward
reading of the text." The text protects "right of the people." It takes a
rather circuitous reading to transpose "the militia" (whose importance is
extolled in the first part of the Amendment) from the opening clause of
the Amendment into the main clause of the Amendment, so that the
Amendment is somehow read "the right of state militiamen to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed."
The Heller opinion itself-with a 5-4 split in which each side argued vehemently about the text of the Second Amendmentdemonstrates the incorrectness of Judge Ebel's claim that his militia-only
reading of the Second Amendment was "simply a straightforward reading of the text." The Ebel reading was the one which four Supreme
Court Justices adopted, so it might be characterized as an intellectually
plausible reading. But it was hardly an obvious, "straightforward" reading-as shown by the fact that five Supreme Court Justices had a different reading.
Moreover, at the time that Haney was decided, there were many Supreme Court opinions which had treated the Second Amendment as a
normal (not a militia-only) individual right, usually to make a point about
something else (e.g., Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of another
right). 117 Judge Ebel adroitly avoided mention of any of these cases (including the 1990 Verdugo-Urquidezdecision) by writing, "There are two
twentieth-century Supreme Court cases discussing the Second Amendment in what appear to be holdings. ' 18 Describing the Second Amendment footnote in Lewis, a case involving the Sixth Amendment, as a
"holding" was something of a stretch. But more importantly, Judge
Ebel's careful phrasing-which limited his written opinion to consideration of a mere two of the thirty-six Supreme Court cases which mentioned the Second Amendment-indicated that he was aware of at least
some of those thirty-four other cases. The vast majority of those cases
were not only inconsistent with Haney; they also showed the patent absurdity of Judge Ebel's claim that the militia-only view was the
"straightforward reading" of the Second Amendment, for from the Early
116. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1164.
117.
See David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases, 18 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 99 (1999). This article is critiqued in David Yassky, The Sound Of Silence: The
Supreme CourtAnd the Second Amendment-A Response to ProfessorKopel, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 189 (1999). My reply is The Sounds of the Supremes: A Reply to ProfessorYassky, 18 ST.
LOuis U. PUB. L. REV. 203 (1999). For another critique, see Robert Hardaway, Elizabeth Gormley
& Bryan Taylor, The Inconvenient Militia Clause of the Second Amendment: Why the Supreme
Court Declines to Resolve the Debate Over the Right to Bear Arms, 16 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMM.
99 (2002).
118.
Haney, 264 F.3dat 1164.
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Republic to the present, opinion after opinion from the United States
Supreme Court had read the Second Amendment differently from what
Judge Ebel declared was the "straightforward reading."
Judge Ebel then proffered a string cite to five cases from other Circuits. 19 The Haney opinion does not seem to notice that two of these
opinions actually had an entirely different theory of the Second Amendment than did the Tenth Circuit. According to the Tenth Circuit, the
Second Amendment was an individual right which could only be exercised by persons in state militias. According to two of the five cited cases, the Second Amendment was not an individual right at20all, but was a
"collective right" which belonged only to the government.'
rule in
But all five cases did stand for the Tenth Circuit's operative
1 21
wins."
always
government
'The
laws:
gun
federal
to
challenges
In Oakes, the panel had been unable to offer any reason for its pronouncement that a person who was statutorily defined as a militiaman by
state law, and who belonged to a private organization which he claimed
was a militia, did not have Second Amendment rights. 22 The Haney
opinion did at least offer some argument for its claim that Haney was not
part of "the militia" protected by the Second Amendment. Oklahoma
law (like federal law) 123 classifies "the militia" into two groups: the "organized militia" is the National Guard and the State Guard.'" In Oklahoma, the "unorganized militia" is all other able-bodied adult males aged
17 to 70.125 Judge Ebel argued that Haney had not shown that his participation in the unorganized militia was "well-regulated by the State of
Oklahoma" or "that machineguns of the sort he possessed are used by the
militia,126or that his possession was connected to any sort of militia ser'
vice.
One might disagree with Haney's reasoning, but at least there was
some reasoning, making the decision much better than Oakes.
The Haney case announced a four-part test, which made it clear
that, even for persons in state militias, it would be essentially impossible
even to raise a Second Amendment claim:
As a threshold matter, he must show that (1) he is part of a state militia; (2) the militia, and his participation therein, is "well regulated"
119.
120.
185 F.3d
121.
122.
(1978).
123.
124.
125.
126.

Haney, 264 F.3d at 1165.
United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2000); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,
693 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1116 (2000).
Haney, 264 F.3d at 1165.
See United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926
10 U.S.C. § 311 (West 2009).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. Trr. 44, § 41 (West 2009).
Id. For the federal militia, the age range is 17 to 45. 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (West 2009).
Haney, 264 F.3d at 1165.
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by the state; (3) machineguns are used by that militia; and (4) his
possession of the machinegun was reasonably connected to his militia service. 127
Regarding the issue of post-Lopez congressional power to ban machine gun possession, the Haney court restated the Wilks analysis at
length. Haney also string-cited the other federal circuit decisions
upholding 18 U.S.C. 922(o).128 But Haney did not mention the Fifth
Circuit's en banc case on the issue, United States v. Kirk, in which the
ban survived only by an 8-8 vote. 129 The Third Circuit's decision in Rybar was cited, but there was no discussion of the arguments raised by
Judge Alito's dissenting opinion in that case. 130 As was the standard
practice in the Tenth Circuit on firearms issues, the panel simply refused
to acknowledge that there was anyone (other than the criminal defendants at bar) who thought that there might be the slightest constitutional
impediment to gun prohibition.
Wilks had upheld the machine gun ban because machine guns are
(supposedly) like railroads and Internet backbones: "instrumentalities of
interstate commerce." They allegedly become such instrumentalities
because by their very nature they are bought and sold across state
lines. t3 '
But Haney had not bought or sold any machine guns, not even within his own county. He had converted his own semi-automatic guns to
automatic. (If not for 922(o), he could have done so lawfully under the
National Firearms Act by paying a tax and registering them.) Haney
asserted, with no supporting argument, that the federal ban on post-1986
machine gun possession is also legitimate under the third Lopez prong:
"regulating activities that substantially affect interstate commerce., 132 It
is very difficult to see how the home conversion of a semi-automatic gun
to an automatic gun has more of an effect on interstate commerce than
does the carrying of guns in school zones. It borders on the absurd to say
that the non-commercial production of machine guns for personal use has
(in the aggregate) more of an effect on interstate commerce than does
violence against women. And the Supreme Court, in Morrison, had just
127.
Id. at 1165.
128.
Id. at 1166-71 (citing United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998), United States
v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997), amended on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (1lth Cir.
1998), United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), United States v. Rybar,
103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1996), United States v.
Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996), United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1996),
United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th
Cir. 1992)).
129.
United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997). Kirk was cited elsewhere (without
mention that it was a case about machine guns, and had drawn eight dissenters on the very issue at
bar in Haney) for a point about the standard of review. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1167.
130. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 286-94 (Alito, J., dissenting).
131.
Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1521.
132. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1170-71.
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applied Lopez to133find part of the federal Violence Against Women Act
unconstitutional.
Haney distinguished Morrison by claiming that Morrison ruled
against VAWA because violence against women is not an economic activity. 134 But if beating up a woman during the course of a robbery is not
an economic activity, then neither is changing the functioning of a gun
you already own.
Glenn Reynolds and Brannon Denning have observed that lower
federal courts have, in essence, nullified Lopez, refusing to extend it
beyond its facts, and upholding laws by using reasoning which Lopez
explicitly rejects. 135 Haney and Wilks fit with the Reynolds-Denning
paradigm, insofar as they claim that machine guns are naturally interstate, or that the aggregate effect of home conversion of one's own gun
from semi-automatic to automatic has a "substantial" effect on interstate
commerce.
Haney, however, builds extensively on the idea which had been
sketchily developed in Wilks: that the ban on personal possession (and
even personal manufacture) was necessary for Congress to regulate the
interstate market in machine guns. 136 This type of analysis was later validated by the Supreme Court in Raich.137 Even if one disagrees with the
Haney-Raich reasoning, at least it was extensive reasoning. This one
sub-section of the Haney opinion was more thorough than all of the
Tenth Circuit's analysis (including the analysis in Haney itself) of the
Second Amendment, combined, thus far.
X. GRAHAM: LICENSES FOR EXPLOSIVES DEALERS, THE STANDARD OF
REVIEW
138
Graham was convicted of selling explosives without a license.
On appeal, one of his claims was that requiring a federal license for explosives dealers 139 violated the Second Amendment.
He argued that explosives "have a common use in military training
exercises," that there is an "individual right to participate in militia training exercises and to keep and bear arms needed by a militiaman," and
that "[t]hese rights would mean little if he could not purchase or sell
these arms."

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
133.
134. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1168.
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Interpretations of Lopez, Or
135.
What If the Supreme Court Held a ConstitutionalRevolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REv.
369 (2000).
Haney, 264 F.3d at 1168-70.
136.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
137.
United States v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2002).
138.
18 U.S.C.A. § 842(a)(1) (West 2009).
139.
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Graham quickly reprised Haney, and observed that Graham was not
part of the state militia. He was part of a group called "Organization,"
which acted as an independent militia. But since Organization was not
recognized by the state, it was not a part of the "well-regulated militia,"
which was the only type of group whose members had Second Amendment rights. Indeed, even if Organization were recognized by the state,
and were highly organized, the fact that Organization was not part of the
state's National Guard meant that Organization was not part of' the
"or140
ganized" militia, and therefore was not "a well-regulated militia."
The Graham opinion added that even if the defendant had Second
Amendment rights, those rights were subject to "reasonable regulation,"
and that requiring a license for explosive dealers was a reasonable regulation.
Heller did not formally articulate a Second Amendment standard of
review, but Justice Breyer's dissent argued for a reasonableness standard,
41
and the Heller majority opinion explicitly rejected that approach.
Thus, Graham cannot be considered good law any more, on any
part of its Second Amendment analysis. However, as detailed supra, it
may be that explosives (other than gunpowder) are not Second Amendment arms, if they are not considered to be the type 42of arms commonly
used by law-abiding citizens for legitimate purposes. 1
If explosives are Second Amendment arms, dealer licensing is
probably constitutional, given Heller's explicit affirmation of laws regulating the commercial sale of arms. 143
Graham does contain one step towards an appropriate standard of
review. Besides finding that licensing law was "reasonable," the court
also stated that it was "sufficiently tailored."' 144 This is not quite the
"narrow tailoring" that the First Amendment requires for time, place, and
manner regulation, but it is a sort of back-handed acknowledgement of
that standard. First Amendment time/place/manner analysis is very useful and appropriate (one might say "well-tailored")
for analysis of many
145
gun controls under the Second Amendment.

140.
Graham,305 F.3d at 1106.
141.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (Scalia, J.). Id. at 2847
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's view cannot be correct unless it can show that the District's regulation is unreasonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms.").
142. United States v. Graham, 305 F.3d 1094 (10th Cir. 2002).
143. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 ("laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms" are not per se violations of the Second Amendment).
144. Graham, 305 F.3d at 1106.
145. See, e.g., Gary E. Barnett, Note, Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 607, 608 (2008).
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XI. LUCERO
Richard Joseph Lucero converted two semi-automatic rifles into
machine guns, and sold them to an undercover agent.146 He was convicted of violating the 1986 ban on machine guns.
He argued that he was a member of the unorganized militia, and at
trial, presented expert testimony "that machineguns have reasonable
military uses and are in fact used by the military." 147 But his argument
was hopeless in light of the recently-decided Haney, because Lucero was
not a member of the organized component of a state militia. 148
The most interesting part of the unpublished opinion was the concurrence by Judge Carlos Lucero. He had run for the Democratic nomination for United States Senate in 1990. His opponent was gun control
with hers: "I
advocate Josie Heath, and Lucero contrasted his position
149
says."
it
what
means
Amendment
Second
the
believe
The U.S. Department of Justice agreed. By the time that the Lucero
case reached the Tenth Circuit, the Attorney General had adopted the
position (held by many previous Attorneys General, but not by Janet
Reno)150 that the Second Amendment guarantees an ordinary individual
right.151 The change from the Reno to the Ashcroft position had come
after the government's brief in Lucero had been filed. Accordingly, the
of
U.S. Attorney's office moved to modify its answer, and, as a matter
1 52
Amendment.
Second
the
rebrief
to
defendant
the
allow
to
courtesy,
The two-judge majority of Tacha and Hartz refused to allow the additional briefing. Judge Lucero's concurrence said that he would have
allowed the rebriefing on the Second Amendment. He also wrote:
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, and would affirm. Even were we to accept the proposition that the defendant has
an individual right under the Second Amendment "to keep and bear
Arms" in order to serve in "[a] well regulated Militia" subject to call
146. United States v. Lucero, 43 Fed. App'x. 299, 2002 WL 1750878 (10th Cir. 2002).
147. Id. at 301.
148. Id.
149. Art Branscombe, The Perfect Primary, COLO. STATESMAN, Aug. 10, 1990, at 10. Thus,
to Lucero, unlike to the Baer panel, the "straightforward" reading of "the right of the people to keep
and bear arms" was that people have a right to own and carry guns.
150. Brief for Amici Curiae Former Senior Officials of the Department of Justice in Support of
Respondent at 2, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), available at
http://tinyurl.com/cngu6j.
151.
Memorandum to All United States' Attorneys from the Attorney General, Re: United
States v. Emerson (Nov. 9, 2001), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/emerson.htm.
The U.S. Attorney's motion to amend its brief was filed on June 24, 2002. The original
152.
brief had been filed in April 2002 (and was termed "deficient" by the Tenth Circuit, because it had
the wrong color cover, and was a day late). Appellee's Motion to Modify Argument in Its Answer
Brief, United States v. Lucero, 43 F. App'x 299, 2002 WL 1750878 (10th Cir. June 24, 2002). Since
the Ashcroft memorandum had been distributed in November 2001, the New Mexico U.S. Attorney's office did not appear to have a good excuse for having filed, half a year later, a brief that
violated Department of Justice policy.

20091 THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT

937

by a "free State," I am not persuaded that the semi-automatic and fully automatic "machineguns" which defendant sold to federal agents,
and which have been outlawed by federal legislation, are the type of
arms subject to Second Amendment protection. For that reason I
would affirm the judgment of the district court. 153

The above paragraph is, of course, not a detailed analysis of the issues,
but detailed analysis is generally not expected from concurrences in unpublished opinions.
Judge Lucero's conclusion that machine guns are not part of the
Second Amendment right appears to have been vindicated by Heller.I5
As to the semi-automatics that were involved in the particular case,
Judge Lucero was not "persuaded" that they were protected by the
Second Amendment. Presumably, in a post-Heller case, he would have
an open mind to a full exposition on the merits of whether such guns are
the type "typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.'

55

XII. BAYLES: GUN POSSESSION BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO A PROTECTIVE
ORDER
In 1994, Congress amended the Gun Control Act to prohibit gun

56
possession by persons subject to domestic violence protective orders.'

In 1999, a Utah trial court issued a protective order against Bayles,
ordering him to stay away from his ex-wife and her new husband.157 The
order was a standard boilerplate form. The Utah judge did not check the
box on
the form which would have prohibited Bayles from owning
58
guns.1

153. Lucero, 43 F. App'x at 301-02 (Lucero, J., concurring).
154. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008).
155.
Id. at 2815.
156.
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8) (West 2009):
It shall be unlawful for any person...
who is subject to a court order that-(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person
received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of
such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that
would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child;
and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause
bodily injury...
157.
United States v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2002).
158.
Id. at 1304-05.
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Bayles was a gun collector. Federal agents launched an undercover
investigation, which led to his conviction for violation of the federal
law. 159
The Tenth Circuit speedily disposed of his Second Amendment
challenge, citing Haney and Baer, and pointing out that Bayles was not a
member of the militia, and had not satisfied any of the four parts of the
Haney test.1 60 The Bayles court acknowledged that a federal district
court in Texas had recently found that the federal ban on subjects of a
restraining order violated the Second Amendment, as applied to a particular defendant. But, as the Bayles court noted, the Fifth Circuit's dispo6
sition of the appeal had been to affirm the validity of the federal ban.' 1
(The Tenth Circuit delicately avoided mentioning that the Fifth Circuit
Amendment is an ordinary individual right, not
had held that the Second
162
a militia-only right.)

Unlike the gun zone statute in Lopez, or the machine gun ban in 18
U.S.C. § 922(o), the protective order ban had an explicit jurisdictional
component: the gun must have been moved in interstate commerce.
(Presumably, then, the ban would not apply to the possession of a gun
that never left the state of its manufacture.) The Tenth Circuit, like other
Circuits, 163 ruled that this was a sufficient basis for use of the interstate

commerce power.' 64

So if a gun were manufactured in Massachusetts in 1922, and sold
in Utah in 1923, and never left Utah thereafter, its possession within
Utah in 1999 could still be prohibited under the congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce. This might be considered the Herpes
Theory of Interstate Commerce; one act of interstate commerce will attach to an object for the rest of the object's life, no matter how long.
The Tenth Circuit also reversed the district court's downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines, based on the fact (which was
159. Id. at 1305-06.
160. Id. at 1307; see also United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2000).
Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1307 (discussing United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 610
161.
(N.D.Tex.1999)); see also United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 210, 265 (5th Cir. 2001).
162.
Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1307.
Id. at 1308 (citing United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 723 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Unlike the
163.
statute at issue in Lopez, Section 922(g) expressly requires the government to prove that the firearm
was ship[ped] or transport[ed] in interstate or foreign commerce; was possess[ed] in or affect[ed]
commerce; or is received after having been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."); Napier, 233 F.3d at 402 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Section 922(g)(8) ... does contain a jurisdictional element that establishes that it was enacted in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce in firearms and ammunition."); United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 514-15 (9th
Cir. 2000) ("[Elvery Court of Appeals that has considered this question has concluded that §
922(g)(8) is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause."); United States v.
Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that 922(g)(8) "contains a jurisdictional element
that brings it within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause")).
Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1308. The Tenth Circuit had used the same approach for the federal
164.
ban on gun possession by convicted felons. See United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 586 (10th
Cir. 2000).
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disputed, but which the district court had found in Bayles' favor) that he
did not know he was prohibited under federal law. As the district court
had noted, one very important fact was that the state restraining order
which Bayles received165had a box to prohibit firearms possession, and that
box was not checked.
The Tenth Circuit cited cases from sister circuits holding that ignorance of the law was not a defense to conviction for the crime itself. As
the Tenth Circuit admitted, none of these cases addressed whether ignorance could be a justification for a downward departure in sentencing.
But these cases were enough for the Tenth Circuit to find the downward
departure invalid as a matter of law. Appropriately, one of the cited cases was United States v. Kafka. 166 The very fact that there were so many
cases involving the restraining order statute in which the defendant had
no idea that he was banned from owning guns, the Tenth Circuit argued,
proved that the case of the ignorant Bayles was not outside the "heartland" of cases involving the statute; hence, he did not qualify for a
downward departure. 67 Post-Heller,mistake may be a viable defense in
some cases, as a district court in Pennsylvania held, in a case involving
man who
had very good reason to believe that he was not a convicted
168
felon.

165. Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1304-06, 1309-13.
166. Id. at 1311 (citing United States v. Kafka, 222 F.3d 1129, 1131-33 (9th Cir. 2000)).
167. Bayles, 310 F.3d at 1304-06, 1309-13. The opinion acknowledged that a downward
departure might be legitimate if a defendant had been actually misled by a federal district judge or
by his lawyer about what the law required. But Bayles' lawyer had told him, in effect, that he was in
a gray zone, and it would be prudent to get rid of his guns, and Bayles had in fact gotten rid of most
of his guns.
168. See United States v. Kitsch, No. 03-594-01, slip op., 2008 WL 2971548, at *1, *3 to *7
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2008). In Kitsch, the defendant was working as an informant for law enforcement
officials in New Jersey.
As a means of helping the narcotics officer with whom he was working.... Kitsch set a
small, smoky fire on the windowsill of the barn and then promptly called the fire department ....
As a result of the fire, Kitsch was charged with third-degree arson, a felony
under both New Jersey and federal law. He pled guilty to the state offense after meeting
with law enforcement officials who told him they would set aside the conviction and
Kitsch could live as though the event had never happened. Although he served a thirtyday custodial sentence on Sundays, Kitsch avers that he truly and reasonably believed
that his conviction had either been set aside or expunged.
Thus, "in order to convict Kitsch, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knew or was willfully blind to the fact that he had a prior felony conviction that had not been set
aside or expunged." Among the rationales for the district court's conclusion was the Second
Amendment:
A statute that imposes criminal penalties for the exercise of an enumerated constitutional
right despite defendant's reasonable belief in good faith that he has complied with the law
must, at the very least, raise constitutional doubts. Post-Heller,the Government's desired
construction of Section 922(g)(1) imposes just such a burden on defendants who, for
whatever reason, reasonably believe that they are not felons within the statutory definition. Faced with a statute that raises this sort of doubt, it is "incumbent upon us to read
the statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress."
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As for the constitutionality of the gun ban for targets of a protective
order, it has been upheld in one post-Heller case. That court did suggest
the ban would be unconstitutional if applied (as the federal statute allows) in a situation where the protective order was issued without a finding that the defendant had used, attempted, or threatened to use violence. 169 Lower courts have also upheld the federal ban on gun
posses170
sion by persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors.
XLI. WYNNE: ANOTHER RESTRAINING ORDER

Having thoroughly discussed the restraining order issue in Bayles,
the Tenth Circuit did not publish its opinion in United States v. Wynne,
17
another case involving the same subsection of the Gun Control Act.
Wynne's Second Amendment argument was quickly rejected with
citations to Bayles and Baer (misspelled as "Baur"),
pointing out that
72
Haney.1
in
test
four-part
the
satisfied
not
Wynne had
A protective order against Wynne was issued in 1994. In 1997, the
order was1 73
revised to reflect the new address of the protected person, Lisa
Foreman.
The federal law applies only to restraining orders issued after the
subject had notice and an opportunity to appear. 74 Wynne had notice
and opportunity for the 1994 order but not for the 1997 order. His argument to the Tenth Circuit was that the 1997 order replaced the 1994 order, and therefore there was no longer any valid (for purposes of the Gun

See also State v. Williams, 148 P.3d 993, 995-96 (Wash. 2006) (writing that strict liability readings
of gun control statutes are strongly disfavored under the Second Amendment and the Washington
state constitutional right to arms).
169.
United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020-26 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (indicating that
Heller stated that bans on felons and the mentally ill are constitutional; the Heller language should
be understood as providing examples (not an exclusive list) of the type of people who can be prohibited: namely, people who have been proven to be dangerous; persons subject to a domestic violence order based on particularized finding of violence can be prohibited).
170. United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163-65 (D. Me. 2008) (suggesting that the
federal statute on domestic violence, prohibiting gun possession by a person who has been convicted
of "the use or attempted use of physical force" in domestic violence, is actually a closer fit for identifying dangerously violent persons who might misuse guns than is the federal ban on gun possession
by convicted felons, since many felons are non-violent); see also United States v. White, No. 070036 1-WS, slip op., 2008 WL 3211298, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2008).
171.
United States v. Wynne, No. 01-6386, slip op., 2003 WL 42508, at *1 (10th Cir. 2003)
(not selected for publication).
172.
Id. at *2.
173.
Id. at * 1, 4-6.
174.
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(8) (West 2009):
(A) [the order] was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice,
and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; (B) [the order] restrains the
person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner... ; and (C) [the order] by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force ....
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Control
Act) restraining order which would prohibit him from having
175
guns.

The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the 1994 order
was still in effect, and that whatever had happened in 1997 was just
an
76
attempted technical change of the 1994 order, and not a new order.
XIV. RHODES

Jimmy Eugene Rhodes ran a methamphetamine lab, and was caught
in possession of stolen firearms. 177 His Second Amendment challenge to
the federal ban on gun possession by convicted felons was rejected with
a short citation of Baer, and the observation that three-judge panels cannot overrule previous panels. Notably, the Rhodes opinion simply cited
Baer for the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession
statute, and did
178
not discuss Rhodes' non-membership in the militia.
XV. PARKER

Ever since the early 1980s, that "brooding omnipresence' ' 179 of the
Second Amendment had become more and more powerful. In 1982, the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution investigated the Second
Amendment, and issued a lengthy report in which all the Democrats and
Republicans on the Subcommittee agreed that the Second Amendment is
a normal individual right. 80 In 1986, Congress passed the Firearms
Owners' Protection Act (FOPA) by huge bipartisan majorities in both
houses, 181 and FOPA declared the Second Amendment to be an individual right of all Americans. 182

175.
Wynne, 2003 WL 42508, at *4-5.
176. Id. at *5-6.
177. United States v. Rhodes, No. 02-6280, 62 F. App'x. 869, 870-72, 2003 WL 1565166, at
*1-2 (10th Cir. Mar. 27, 2003) (unpublished).
178. Id. at 875-76.
179. United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 (10th Cir. 1995).
180.
SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE,
97TH CONG., 2D SESSION, THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (Comm. Print 1982), available at

http://www.guncite.com/joumals/senrpt/senrpt.html.
181.
FOPA passed the Senate 79-15, with thirty Democrats in favor and thirteen opposed.
Among the Democratic senators voting in favor were Joe Biden and Al Gore. FOPA passed the
House 292-130, with Democrats voting 131 in favor and 115 opposed. The lead House sponsor,
Harold Volkmer, was a Democrat. 131 CONG. REC. DOOOOO-02 (1985), 1985 WL 714108.
182.
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS--The Congress finds that-(1) the rights of citizens-(A) to keep and bear arms under the second amendment to the United States Constitution;
(B) to security against illegal and unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth
amendment;
(C) against uncompensated taking of property, double jeopardy, and assurance of due
process of law under the fifth amendment; and
(D) against unconstitutional exercise of authority under the ninth and tenth amendments;
require additional legislation to correct existing firearms statutes and enforcement policies; and
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A 1983 article by Don Kates in the Michigan Law Review 183 began
what eventually became a flood of law review articles on the Second
Amendment. The most eminent Professors of Constitutional Law- 86
185
1
including Sanford Levinson, 84 Akhil Amar, William Van Alstyne,1
and even Larry Tribe' 87 -wrote articles and treatises affirming the Standard Model.
The American public demonstrated its belief in the continuing importance of the right to keep and bear arms. In recent decades, twenty
states added or strengthened right to arms provisions in the state constitutions, always doing88so by enormous majorities--even in liberal states
such as Wisconsin. 1
And if, as Mr. Dooley said, the courts follow the election returns,
the Democrats lost the House of Representatives in 1994,189 and Al Gore
lost the Presidency in 2000 because of public backlash at gun control-at
t90
least according to President Clinton's analysis of those elections.
Even if the judges on the Circuit were not paying attention to state
constitutional law developments all over the nation, or to the newspapers,
or the law reviews, or to the Senate subcommittee on the Constitution,
the judges were surely reading the briefs filed in the Tenth Circuit by the
U.S. Department of Justice. And since 2001 those briefs were politely
but relentlessly telling the Tenth Circuit that the Circuit was wrong, and
the Second Amendment was a meaningful right. (Of course those briefs
(2) additional legislation is required to reaffirm the intent of the Congress, as expressed in
section 101 of the Gun Control Act of 1968, that "it is not the purpose of this title to place
any undue or unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of hunting, trapshooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other lawful activity, and
that this title is not intended to discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of
firearms by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."
Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1(b) (100 Stat. 449) (1986).
183. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the OriginalMeaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1983).
184.
Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
185.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J 1131 (1991); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE L.J 1193
(1992).
186.
William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the PersonalRight to Arms, 43 DUKE
L.J. 1236 (1994).
187.
1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894-903 (3d ed. 2000).
188.
Since 1963, the people of Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin chose, either through their legislature
or through a direct vote, to add a right to arms to their state constitution, to re-adopt the right to
arms, or to strengthen an existing right. In every state where the people had the opportunity to vote
directly, they voted for the right to arms by overwhelming margins. For example, in 1998 Wisconsin adopted a guarantee by a vote of 1,205,873 to 425,052; in 1986, West Virginia adopted its guarantee by a vote of 342,963 to 67,168.
189.
See Alex Machaskee et al, Editorial, A Conversation with PresidentClinton, THE PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 14, 1995, at lIB ("The NRA is the reason the Republicans control the
House.").
190.

BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 629-30 (2004).
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also argued that the various federal laws about prohibited persons who
should not have guns were still valid.)
But if all you knew about the Second Amendment was what you
had read in published Tenth Circuit opinions since Oakes was decided in
1977, you would think that nothing had changed since then. Indeed, you
would think that nothing of importance had ever been said or written
about the Second Amendment, other than the Supreme Court's 1939
Miller decision.
The one, and only one, post-1977 development you would know
about would be that in a 1980 case involving the Sixth Amendment, Justice Blackmun had written a two-sentence footnote which seemed compatible with the militiamen-only reading of Miller.19t You would have
seen Tenth Circuit citations to this favorite footnote'92--coming from
a
93
case in which neither party had mentioned the Second Amendment. 1
If all you knew were what the Tenth Circuit told you, you would not
know about the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court case of Verdugo-Urquidez in
which the briefing-and the Ninth Circuit opinion which was being reviewed--did include the Second Amendment. In that case, the Court
explained that "the people" was a "term of art" which had the same
meaning in the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. 194
Nor would you know about Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in
Printz, in which he argued that Miller did not stand for a militia-only
right to arms, and neither did anything else in the Court's prior decisions
stand for the principle that the right is militia-only. t95 The concurrence
also made it rather clear that Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Story
that the right
to keep and bear arms is "the palladium of the liberties of a
196
republic."'
But back in the hermetically sealed world of the Tenth Circuit, the
only news about the Second Amendment was that the cites to antiStandard Model decisions from sister circuits got updated every so often.
You would know that the Fifth Circuit had decided a gun control case

191.
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
192. United States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 563 (10th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir. 2001).
193. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2816 n.25 (2008) (stating that the Lewis
court suggested that "[n]o Second Amendment claim was raised or briefed by any party. In the
course of rejecting the asserted challenge, the Court commented gratuitously, in a footnote ....It is
inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill
of Rights upon such a footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not argued.").
194. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
195.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.1(1997) (Thomas, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 939.
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called United States v. Emerson in 2001,197 but you would not know that
the Fifth Circuit had adopted the Standard Model.
Indeed, in the quarter-century of published opinions after Oakes,
there was little to suggest that anyone other than felons thought that the
Second1 98Amendment protects Americans who are not in the National
Guard.

In short, the Tenth Circuit's quarter-century record on the Second
Amendment was one of arrogance and timidity: arrogance in the tone
and scope of its pronouncements on the Second Amendment, and timidity about addressing any of the growing body of law and scholarship
which made it more and more clear that the Tenth Circuit's Potemkin
Village version of the militia-only Second Amendment was a sham.
Finally, in United States v. Parker, some glasnost began in the
Tenth Circuit. 199 The two judge majority opinion actually acknowledged
an authority
which did not support the Tenth Circuit's militia-only
2°
view.

More importantly, Judge Kelly penned a concurring opinion which
described the last quarter-century for what it had been: judicial overreaching to trash an important constitutional right, in case after case
which easily could, and should, have been decided on much narrower
grounds.2 ° '
Dale Parker was a civilian employee at the U.S. Army's Dugway
Proving Ground, in Utah.2 °2 Like every other state in the Tenth Circuit,
Utah has a "shall issue" system for licensing the carrying of concealed
handguns. A law-abiding adult can obtain a permit to carry a concealed
handgun for lawful protection, if the adult passes a background check
and a safety class.20 3 Utah is the only state in the Tenth Circuit which
197.
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
198. Judges Anderson and Baldock (joined by a district judge sitting by designation), in Wilks,
had referred to the Second Amendment as "a brooding omnipresence" and "an orphan of the Bill of
Rights." United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995). In the unpublished Lucero case, Judge Lucero had acknowledged the possibility that the Second Amendment could be interpreted as an individual right. United States v. Lucero, 43 F. App'x. 299, 301-02, 2002 WL 1750878,
at *2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2002) (Lucero, J., concurring) (unpublished). The 2003 unpublished opinion in Rhodes had said that a three-judge panel could not overrule OakeslBaer/Haney on the
Second Amendment; the statement contained the implicit recognition that a different result on the
Second Amendment was at least theoretically possible. United States v. Rhodes, 62 F. App'x. 869,
875-76, 2003 WL 1565166, at *6 (10th Cir. March 27, 2003) (unpublished). The Tenth Circuit had
also noted that Slesarik, a pro se civil plaintiff in New Mexico, had raised a Second Amendment
claim as part of his Section 1983 suit, although the case was decided only with reference to the New
Mexico Constitution right to arms. Slesarik v. Luna County, 13 F.3d 406 (Table), 1993 WL 513843,
at *1-2 (10th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993) (unpublished).
199.
362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
200.
Id. at 1283.
201.
Id. at 1285-88 (Kelly, J., concurring).
202.
Id. at 1280.
203.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-5-704 to -706 (LexisNexis 2009).
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requires such a permit for someone who wants to carry a protective gun
in his car. 20
Inside the Dugway Proving Ground, a random search found a revolver in Parker's pick-up truck. He said that he had forgotten that it
was in the truck. He did not have a Utah carry permit, and was prosecuted under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA). 20 5 The ACA authorizes
federal prosecutions for state law crimes that take place on federal property within a state. 2°6 On appeal, Parker raised the Second and Tenth
Amendments.
The majority opinion written by Judge Briscoe and joined by Judge
McWilliams reprised the Circuit's familiar summaries of Miller and
Lewis. No new analysis of Miller was added, although the description of
the case added some detail; the description of Lewis added an additional
sentence of analysis (that the Supreme Court had used rational
basis to
20 7
felon.)
convicted
a
by
possession
firearms
on
ban
a
review
Then, glasnost: a tacit, indirect admission that Miller itself might be
ambiguous:
Miller has been interpreted [!] by this court and other courts to hold
that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual the
right to keep and transport a firearm where there is no evidence that
possession of that firearm was20 related
to the preservation or efficien8
cy of a well-regulated militia.
Then came cites to Lewis, to the Tenth Circuit's Oakes, and to three
sister circuit cases.20 9 Each of the sister circuit cites included a parenthetical which acknowledged that the anti-individual interpretation of
Miller was actually an interpretation, not a straightforward application.210

204.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505(1) (LexisNexis 2009) ("Unless otherwise authorized by
law, a person may not carry a loaded firearm: (a) in or on a vehicle; (b) on any public street; or (c) in
a posted prohibited area.").
205.

Parker,362 F.3d at 1280-81.

206.

18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (West 2009).

207.

Parker,362 F.3d at 1282.

208.
Id. (exclamation point added).
209.
Id. at 1282-83.
210.
Id. at 1282:
[S]ee also Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (referring to Miller's
implicit rejection of traditional individual rights position); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d
120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Since [Miller], the lower federal courts have uniformly held
that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right."); United
States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (interpreting Miller to stand for rule
that, absent reasonable relationship to preservation of well-regulated militia, there is no
fundamental right to possess fireari); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th
Cir. 1977) (analyzing Miller and concluding that "ltlo apply the amendment so as to
guarantee appellant's right to keep an unregistered firearm which has not been shown to

have any connection to the militia, merely because he is technically a member of the
Kansas militia, would be unjustifiable in terms of either logic or policy") ....
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Then-then it came. The citation signal that must not be used. The
citation signal that never had been used in a quarter century of Second
Amendment cases: but see.
Apparently there was somebody who disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Second Amendment and Miller. And that
someone was not a convicted felon who thought that the Second
Amendment guaranteed his absolute right to manufacture unregistered
explosives for gangs and not pay taxes on the machine guns he kept at
his meth lab so they would be handy when he went to stalk his ex-wife in
violation of a protective order.
but see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 226 (5th Cir. 2001)

(reading Miller as indecisive
and, at best, supporting an individual's
211
right to bear arms).
At that point, the glasnost had gone far enough. The opinion returned to
familiar ground, the four part militia test from Haney. Parker never
claimed to be in the Utah militia, or that his revolver was connected to
militia service, so he had no Second Amendment rights.212
As for Parker's argument that the Tenth Circuit should follow
Emerson, the panel explained that it could not deviate from Tenth Circuit
precedent. And besides, most of the other Circuits still adhered to the
anti-individual version of the Second Amendment.1 3
Moreover, even if Emerson's interpretation of Miller were correct
(that the case turned on whether a short shotgun was a weapon suitable
for the militia, and not on whether Miller was a member of the militia),
Parker would still lose, since his gun was not a military type gun. "To
the contrary, at trial, Officer Michael Palhegyi, who was part of the military police unit that took Parker into custody, testified that Parker's firearm was 'not considered a military grade weapon' and, instead,
more
214
commonly was used for personal defense or target practice.,
Heller, of course, viewed Miller differently, as standing only for the
permissibility of bans on the types of weapons not typically possessed
for legitimate purposes by law-abiding citizens. 21 5 The specific gun
211.
Id.at 1283.
212.
Id.
213.
Id. at 1284. The listing of cases from the other Circuits separated the militia-only cases
(including those of the Tenth Circuit) from the collective right cases. This was the first recognition
that militia-only and collective right were two entirely different theories. Some previous Tenth
Circuit opinions had failed to recognize that the two theories are incompatible. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20. What they have in common is that they both negate the Second Amendment as a right for all (collective right) or for more than ninety-nine percent (militia-only) of the
American population.
214.
Parker,362 F.3d at 1284.
215.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815-16 (2008) ("We therefore read
Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as shorl-barreled shotguns.").
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which Mr. Heller wanted to register in D.C. was a revolver, and the Heller Court found his gun to be protected by the Second Amendment.
Even under the military-arms reading of Miller, a revolver might well be
protected; although it is not currently used by the U.S. military, it has
been in the past. The Miller language, about the type of gun, did not ask
whether the gun was current equipment for the U.S. standing army; the
question was whether the gun could be of use to the militia using "arms
21 6
supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.,
(A revolver has been "in common use" in the United States ever since its
invention in the 1830s.)217
Judge Kelly joined in the Parkeropinion, except for the part involving the Second Amendment. He explained that the case could be decided
on much simpler grounds: "I would affirm the conviction by simply noting that the obvious purpose of this prosecution-restricting concealed
weapons on a military base to identified military personnel-is a reason21 8
able restriction and thus does not contravene the Second Amendment.,
Judge Kelly then surveyed the record of Tenth Circuit panels which
had made sweeping pronouncements against Second Amendment rights,
"[a]lthough not required by the cases before them" and in violation of
"the universal admonition to decide constitutional issues narrowly."
First came Oakes. Then in Baer, a case involving a convicted felon with
machine guns, the panel claimed that only militia members had Second
Amendment rights. The opinion ignored a much easier rationale for the
desired result of upholding Baer's conviction: "Regardless of the fact
that a machine gun might be useful in a well regulated militia, it is apparent that a felon would not be." Haney, another machine gun case, had
introduced the four-part test, which Judge Kelly characterized as "clearly
dicta." "The court (without any record support) speculated that a
'well-regulated' militia is one actively maintained and trained by the
state. Haney, 264 F.3d at 1165-66. ' '2l9
Judge Kelly observed that "Our subsequent cases have applied this
test, though not needed in the context of restrictedpersons
or devices, to
220
conclude that no Second Amendment violation occurred.,
As for Graham, "if one had a wild imagination," Judge Kelly observed, the licensing requirement for explosive dealers "could be viewed
as involving a restriction on a weapon ....

The court correctly noted

that even assuming a defense was stated, Second Amendment rights are
subject to reasonable governmental restrictions." Unfortunately, the
Graham court had used, as an alternative basis for the decision, the Ha216.

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).

217.

See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA 203, 242 (2006).

218.
219.
220.

Parker,362 F.3d at 1285 (Kelly, J., concurring).
Id. at 1286-87.
Id. at 1287 (emphasis added).
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ney test, which was "totally unnecessary to the holding." In Bayles (prohibiting gun possession following a protective order), the panel's application of the Haney test (that Bayles was not in a militia, etc.) were presented "gratuitously." "[T]he bottom line was that the statute was a reasonable restriction that did not infringe Second Amendment rights. Regardless of the Haney test, defendant was a restricted person and could
not possess a weapon. ' 1
In short,
All of these cases involved uniform, federal restrictions on various
types of firearms or uniform, federal restrictions on the persons possessing such firearms. Whether the Second Amendment right is an
individual right or a collective right has not been decided by the Supreme Court-Miller did not define this aspect of the Second
222
Amendment right, and we need not reach the issue here.
Like this court, the Fifth Circuit recognized reasonable restrictions on
the Second Amendment right are constitutional. This case also can
be decided on that narrow basis-there is no need to dilute prematurely what many consider to be one of the most important amend223
ments to the United States Constitution.
Judge Kelly's concurring opinion was vindicated in Heller: bans on
particularly dangerous arms and particularly dangerous people are consistent with the Second Amendment. The previous Tenth Circuit panels
had asserted that only militiamen have Second Amendment rights; even
those militiamen's rights were so narrowly circumscribed (according to
the previous panels) that it was hard to imagine why the Founders would
have bothered to waste a whole Amendment on such a miniscule "right."
Judge Kelly's opinion apparently was persuasive to several of his
colleagues. Previously, Judges Anderson, Briscoe, Murphy, Lucero, and
Murphy had written on or joined in opinions which "gratuitously" declared the Second Amendment to be inapplicable to almost the entire
American public. Post-Parker,each of these judges wrote or joined opinions which rejected Second Amendment claims being raised by particular litigants, but did so on narrow grounds, without denigrating the
Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens.

221.
Id. at 1287.
222.
Id. at 1288. Judge Kelly also discussed of Justice Thomas's concurrence in Printz, and
the split of Emerson (5th Circuit, Standard Model) vs. Silveira (9th Circuit, "collective right"). Id.
(citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002);
Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003)). Emerson
and Silveira are virtually alone as pre-Heller Circuit Court of Appeal decisions involving in-depth
analysis of the original meaning of the Second Amendment and of Supreme Court precedent.
223.
Id.
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XVI. EASTERLING: AFFIRMING THE FELON BAN WHILE RESPECTING THE
SECOND AMENDMENT
Easterling was convicted of possessing a firearm after having been
previously convicted of a felony; he was sentenced to 235 months in
prison. 224 He argued that the federal felon in possession statute is unconstitutional because it amends the Second Amendment but did not go
through the ratification process for an amendment. The Tenth Circuit
disagreed, with a cite to Baer.
Notably, Judge Briscoe's opinion, joined by Judges Lucero and
Murphy, simply cited the holding in Baer (that the felon in possession
ban is constitutional), without repeating or adverting to Baer's verbiage
about only the militia having Second Amendment rights. 225 This was the
type of6 approach that Judge Kelly had urged in his Parker concur22
rence.
XVII. CARPENTER: A RETURN TO GRATUITOUS DENIGRATION
Carpenter was convicted of possessing a firearm in Wyoming in
furtherance of his distribution of methamphetamine.22 7 His Second
claim was rejected since he had not preserved it for apAmendment
peal. 228
The case could have ended there, but Carpenter was written by
Judge Ebel, the Tenth Circuit's staunchest foe of Second Amendment
rights, and the author of the four-part Haney test. So in a footnote, Judge
Ebel, joined by Judges McKay and Henry, wrote that "we repeatedly
have held that to prevail on a Second Amendment challenge, a party
must show that possession of a firearm is in connection with participation in a 'well-regulated' 'state' 'militia.' '229 But "Mr. Carpenter claims
only that the firearm was for 'protection of my family, home and property'; thus, he could not prevail on a Second Amendment claim even if not
waived. 2 30
of family,
Heller, of course, decided just the opposite. Protection
231
home, and property is the core of the Second Amendment.

224. United States v. Easterling, No. 04-6341, 137 F. App'x. 143, 144, 2005 WL 1499755, at
*I (10th Cir. June 24, 2005) (unpublished).
225. Id. at 147.
226. Parker,362 F.3d at 1287 (Kelly, J., concurring).
227. United States v. Carpenter, No. 05-8010, 163 F. App'x. 707, 708-09, 2006 WL 122476
(10th Cir. Jan. 18, 2006) (unpublished).
228.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 711 n.l (quoting Parker, 362 F.3d at 1283).
229.
230.
Id.
231.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (explaining that citizens can constitutionally own firearms for "the core lawful purpose of self-defense").
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XVHI. BASTIBLE: TREATING THE RIGHT TO ARMS AS A NORMAL RIGHT
Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co. was a factually complex tort case
brought by employees of a contractor at a Weyerhaeuser paper mill in
Valiant, Oklahoma. 232 The suit involved the right to arms under the Oklahoma Constitution, not under the Second Amendment. It is worth
some attention, however, as an illustration of how the Tenth Circuit was
able to address a right to arms case in a manner which treated the right to
arms as a normal right.
In October 2002, the mill's security staff obtained the assistance of
the local sheriff to use trained detection dogs for mass, warrantless
searches of employee cars in the company parking lot which was open to
the public, and which was used by customers of a nearby Wal-Mart and
golf course. Although the sheriff had been told that the searches would
be only for drugs, Weyerhaeuser used the dogs to also search for guns.
A dozen employees had guns in their cars, and there was no dispute that
the guns were owned for lawful purposes, such as for going hunting after
work, or for protection while traveling to and from work. (One employee had driven his father's car to work that day, and did not know it
contained a gun.) All the employees were fired for violating company
policy, and they then sued.233
The case involved a variety of tort and employment law issues, plus
state action issues related to the sheriff.
At the time, an Oklahoma statute gave employers unlimited power
to ban guns on company property.2 34 But the public reaction to Weyerhaeuser's actions was near-universal outrage. The automobile searches
had been conducted at the beginning of hunting season.235 If the automobile searches were not an attempt to find a pretext to fire as many
employees as possible, the company did a good job of conveying a contrary impression. The Oklahoma legislature promptly passed-by a vote
of 92-4 in the House and 41-0 in the Senate-a statute prohibiting
em236
ployer bans of guns in employee cars in company parking lots.

232.
233.
234.

437 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1001-03.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.22 (2001), amended by OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.22(B)

(2004).
235.
Amy Haimerl &
CNNMoNEY.coM,
June

Malika
27,

Zouhali-Worrall, The right to bear guns at work,
2008,
http:/Imoney.cnn.com/2008/O6/05/smallbusiness/

guns -at work.fsb/.
236.
2004 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 39 (H.B. 2122 West). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1290.22(B) (West 2009) ("No person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity shall be
permitted to establish any policy or rule that has the effect of prohibiting any person, except a convicted felon, from transporting and storing firearms in a locked vehicle on any property set aside for
any vehicle."). The voting record is available via Oklahoma Legislative Service Bureau Bill Tracking Reports Website, http://webserverl.lsb.state.ok.usWebBillStatus/main.html (click on "Basic
Search Form" on the left side of the screen; on the "Basic Search Form" enter "HB 2122" in the
"Measure Number(s)" box and under the "Session" box scroll down to "2004 Regular Session" and
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Oklahoma-even in comparison to its neighbors of Kansas, Arkansas, Texas, Colorado, and New Mexico-has a very strong culture of gun
rights and hunting. Oklahoma also has a very strong tradition of suspicion of corporations, as exemplified by a state constitution which contains more restrictions on corporate power than any other American state
constitution.2 37 Could anything provoke a greater backlash by the people
of Oklahoma than a big business firing employees under a pretext because the employees were going hunting after work? Perhaps the only
way that Weyerhaeuser, which ended up with only four defenders in the
state legislature, could have made itself even more unpopular would have
been if the corporation had defiled the grave of Will Rogers.
But for the Tenth Circuit, the issue was whether Weyerhaeuser had
acted legally, under the law as it existed before the changes made by the
Oklahoma legislature. That law had provided:
"Nothing contained in any provision of the Oklahoma Self-Defense
Act... shall be construed to limit, restrict or prohibit in any manner
the existing rights of any person, property owner, tenant, employer,
propor business entity to control the possession of weapons on2 3any
8
erty owned or controlled by the person or business entity."
Weyerhaeuser's use of the statute to fire employees for hunting
guns locked in cars in an employee parking lot was (obviously) a gross
violation of the social consensus about how a corporation should behave,
but the parking lot ban was within the literal ambit of the statute.
The Plaintiffs argued that the pre-amendment law "provides no support for Weyco's firearms policy because the statute, by its terms, only
protects the 'existing rights.., to control the possession of weapons' on
its property, and Weyco had no 'existing right' to do something which
interferes with the fundamental and preeminent right to bear arms.

2 39

The Bastible court disagreed. First of all, the Oklahoma state constitution explicitly authorized limits on the carrying of arms. 2 ° Second,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court had ruled that some regulation of the right
to arms was permissible. 24 1 Thus, the statute allowing businesses to ban

click "Retrieve"). In 2009, the Tenth Circuit rejected a lawsuit challenging the validity of the parking lot reforms. See discussion infra Part XVIii.
Article 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution contains forty-eight sections (a few of which have
237.
been repealed) imposing limits on corporate power, and providing for strong government regulation
of corporate activity. OKLA. CoNsT. art. 9 §§ 1-48.
238.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1290.22 (West 2009).
239.
Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 437 F.3d 999, 1006 (10th Cir. 2006).
Id. (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 26 (stating that "nothing herein contained shall pre240.
vent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons.")).
241.
Id. (quoting State ex rel. Okla. State Bureau of Investigation v. Warren, 975 P.2d 900, 902
(Okla. 1998)).
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guns on business property was, in the Tenth Circuit's view, a "reasonable
regulation. 242
Under Oklahoma law, an at-will employee may prevail in a wrongful discharge suit if he was fired for "performing an act consistent with a
clear and compelling public policy." 243 As the Tenth Circuit noted, "The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has, however, cautioned that this 'unique tort'
applies 'to only a narrow class of cases and must be tightly circumscribed.'"24

The plaintiffs argued that the firing violated the clear and compelling public policy of "the right to keep arms espoused by the Oklahoma
Constitution., 245 The Tenth Circuit, admitting that there was no direct
Oklahoma precedent, decided
we are confident that those courts would not embrace that view. As
indicated, both the Oklahoma Constitution and the Oklahoma courts
recognize that the right to bear arms is not unlimited, and, indeed,
may be regulated. We agree with the district court that "[g]iven the
finding by [the Oklahoma Supreme] Court that the right to keep arms
is not unfettered, establishing a wrongful discharge tort for exercising
a statutorily
sanctioned restriction on the right would be counterintui,2 6
tive." 4
XlX. HUGGINS: REJECTING AN ABSURD SECOND AMENDMENT CLAIM

WITHOUT REJECTING THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Paul Huggins was an obvious nut who brought pro se suits against a
church, two pastors, and Safeway. 247 His complaints raised, inter alia,
Second Amendment claims, although they were no more coherent than
the rest of his pleadings. For example:
Mr. Huggins's complaint alleges that, while he was paying for gas at
a Safeway store, a Safeway employee allowed other customers to
have access to personal information on his credit card. According to
Mr. Huggins, the employee "stated directly to me that I, am Penetration against you and I, am Penetration against all Black People" and
told him that he was not allowed to come back into the store. Rec.
doc. 3, at 2. Mr. Huggins asserts that this conduct violated his248First
and Second Amendment rights and his right to equal protection.

242.
Id.
243.
Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24,29 (Okla. 1989).
244.
Bastible, 437 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Clinton v. State ex rel. Logan County Election Bd., 29
P.3d 543, 545 (Okla. 2001)).
245.
Id.
246. Id. at 1008.
247.
Huggins v. Safeway, No. 06-1423, 210 F. App'x. 819, 2007 WL 4214 (10th Cir. Jan. 2,
2007) (unpublished); Huggins v. Hilton, No. 05-1466, 180 F. App'x. 814, 2006 WL 1389086 (10th
Cir. May 18, 2006) (per curiam).
248.
Huggins v. Safeway, 210 F. App'x. at 820.
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In two separate cases, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In
contrast to how the Tenth Circuit had treated some extremely weak
Second Amendment claims in the past, the panels did not use the Huggins cases as an opportunity to announce a broad declaration against
Second Amendment rights.
XX. ARLEDGE: CONTINUING TO FOLLOW JUDGE KELLY'S NEW
APPROACH

Arledge was convicted of possessing a gun and ammunition while
he was subject to a protective order.249 He appealed pro se, after his appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief 250 stating that there were
no arguable issues for appeal.
In a decision written by Judge O'Brien, and joined by Judges Kelly
and Tymkovich, the Tenth Circuit rejected Arledge's Second Amendment claim. The panel cited Tenth Circuit precedent in a manner consistent with Judge Kelly's approach in Parker: as affirming the particular
gun control, and without gratuitous attacks on the Second Amendment
rights of the law-abiding:
Arledge argues his conviction under § 922(g)(8) violates the Second
Amendment. As both Arledge's counsel and the government correctly note, § 922(g)(8) does not violate the Second Amendment. United
States v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 1302, 1306-07 (10th Cir. 2002); see also

United States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 2000) (concludof a fireing defendant's § 922(g)(1) conviction (felon-in-possession
2 51
arm) did not violate the Second Amendment).
After Parker,the Tenth Circuit had handed down five decisions in
cases involving the right to arms. (Four under the Second Amendment,
and one under the Oklahoma Constitution.) In four of the five cases, the
Circuit panel had followed the approach urged by Judge Kelly in the
Parker case: the panels had decided whether the right to arms had been
violated in the particular case. The panels did not propound broad decisions asserting that the right to arms was a nullity. Only one decision,
written by Judge Ebel, had reverted to the pre-glasnost style, and had
used a criminal's obviously frivolous Second Amendment claim as an
excuse to declare that there were, in effect, no Second Amendment rights
for anyone.

249. United States v. Arledge, No. 04-5161, 220 F. App'x. 864, 865-66, 2007 WL 987398
(10th Cir. Apr. 4, 2007) (unpublished).
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (holding that appointed criminal defense
250.
counsel may withdraw after trial if the counsel files a brief showing that there is nothing in the
record which might support a non-frivolous appeal).
251. Arledge, 220 F. App'x. at 869.
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Perhaps if the Supreme Court had not granted certiorari in Heller,
the Tenth Circuit might eventually have taken a Second Amendment case
en banc; confined Oakes, Haney, and similar cases to their facts; and
followed the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit in acknowledging that
ordinary law-abiding Americans do have Second Amendment rights.
XXI. COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY: USING THE SECOND
AMENDMENT TO PROTECT THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

The first post-Heller case in the Tenth Circuit to involve the Second
Amendment was Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, a First
Amendment challenge to a state law which gave Colorado residents
scholarships to in-state private universities, but which excluded "pervasively sectarian" universities 2
The State argued that its funding decisions, even those that discriminate on the basis of religion, are subject only to rational basis review.
The Court rejected this argument, and cited, inter alia, the Heller decision:
That First Amendment challenges to selective funding would be subject only to rational basis scrutiny seems especially unlikely after
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, [](2008). There the court noted that ra-

tional basis scrutiny had been applied only to "constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws." In contrast, the Court said that "[o]bviously the same test could not be used
to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific,
enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against
double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear
arms. If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear
arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws,
and would have no effect." Id. (internal citation omitted). The same
253
goes, we assume, for the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
The Second Amendment was, finally, no longer the "orphan of the Bill
of Rights. 2 54 Now, it is a real member of the constitutional familyindeed, such a strong member that teachings about the Second Amendment could be used to defeat efforts to prevent careful judicial scrutiny of
alleged infringements of First Amendment rights.

252.
534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
253.
Id. at 1255, n.2.
254.
United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1519, n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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XXII. RAMSEY WINCH V. HENRY: THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS LIKE THE
RIGHT TO PETITION

The Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co. case, discussed supra, observed
that the Oklahoma legislature had (subsequent to the events involved in
the case) enacted reforms to forbid employers from firing employees for
storing lawfully-owned guns in the employees' locked cars in a company
parking lot. Several corporations filed a suit in federal district court in
Oklahoma against the new law-although several of the plaintiffs
dropped out after the National Rifle Association announced a boycott of
Conoco, which was one of the plaintiffs.
The heart of the lawsuit was the claim that the Oklahoma law was
preempted by the federal Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA),
which has a general requirement that employers maintain a safe
workplace. Plaintiffs also raised various constitutional claims. They
won on the OSHA claim in district court, but the Tenth Circuit unanimously reversed. 55
The OSHA claim failed because the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration had never promulgated any regulation against guns in the
workplace (let alone in parking lots). 256 Indeed, OHS Administration
itself had written to the Tenth Circuit to affirm that the OSHA statute and
regulations did nothing to preempt the Oklahoma law. 7
The Tenth Circuit rejected the claim that the parking lot law was a
"taking" of the corporations' property. Rather, corporations were simply
required not to interfere with citizens' exercise of their own rights. The
case was similar to PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.25 8 There, the
U.S. Supreme Court had upheld a California statute which prevented
shopping center owners from prohibiting the circulation of petitions in
the shopping center. "As in PruneYard, Plaintiffs have not suffered an
unconstitutional infringement of their property rights, but rather are required by the Amendments to recognize a state-protected right of their
employees (noting that the state may exercise its police power to adopt
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution). As such, we conclude that Plaintiffs have not suffered a
per se taking. ,,259
Nor was there a regulatory taking, because the corporations suffered
no economic loss, and no diminution of their investment-based expectations. Besides, even if there had been some economic effect, regulations
generally do not constitute takings when the regulations are "laws meant
255.
Ramsey Winch v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009). The opinion was written by
Judge Baldock, and joined by Judges Henry and McConnell.
256. Id. at 1204-08.
257. Id. at 1207 n. 9.
258. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
259. Ramsey Winch, 555 F.3d at 1209 (citation omitted).
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to support the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the entire
community." 2 6
Finally, there was the claim that the parking lot law was a due
process violation because it was irrational. The Tenth Circuit disagreed:
One professed purpose of the Amendments is the protection of the
broader Oklahoma community. We need not decide the long-running
debate as to whether allowing individuals to carry firearms enhances
or diminishes the overall safety of the community. The very fact that
this question is so hotly debated, however,
261is evidence enough that a
rational basis exists for the Amendments.
In addition, the parking lot law was rational because it was an effort
to expand the protection of Second Amendment rights. One could argue
that parking lot reforms "are simply meant to expand (or secure) the
Second Amendment right to bear arms. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81,
100 S. Ct. 2035 (noting that the state may exercise its police power to
adopt individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution). Because we cannot say the Amendments have no
reasonably
conceivable rational basis, Plaintiffs' due process claim must
62
2

fail."

As in Colorado Christian University, the Second Amendment's appearance in Ramsey Winch was brief, but it did show that the Second
Amendment is now a normal part of constitutional law, and that cases
involving other rights, such as the right to petition, may be useful in
Second Amendment analysis.
CONCLUSION

From 1977 until 2004, the Tenth Circuit's record of Second
Amendment cases was a disgrace to the rule of law.
It was not a disgrace for wrong results. Almost all the decisions involved restrictions on narrow classes of especially dangerous weapons,
or the prohibition of gun ownership for people who had proven themselves to be dangerous. Most of these results are presumptively valid
under Heller, and most of the rest are in no worse than a gray zone of
validity. Even pre-Heller, almost all the decisions could, as Judge Kelly
observed in Parker,have been written on the narrow grounds of upholding legitimate, narrowly tailored restrictions on the Second Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit's jurisprudence was not a disgrace because it
adopted a militia-only theory of the Second Amendment. Personally, I
think that militia-only theory is much weaker than the Standard Model of
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1211.
Id.
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the Second Amendment. But as Justice Stevens's dissent in Heller demonstrated, there was surely some authority which could be read as supporting the militia-only interpretation. The militia-only interpretation
was, whatever its flaws, at least intellectually coherent at a surface level,
and was thus far superior to the oxymoronic "collective right" embraced
by some other circuits.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's militia-only version of the Second
Amendment was based almost entirely on the major Supreme Court
precedent, United States v. Miller. Today, we know that Miller was the
product of a collusive, dishonest conspiracy organized by a U.S. Attorney, and that the federal district judge and the defense counsel were willing participants in his unethical scheme.263 But the Tenth Circuit did not
know that. The Miller opinion is (perhaps deliberately) oblique and vague. When the decision is analyzed in careful detail, there are portions
which support the interpretation of Justice Scalia and the Standard Model, and there are portions which can support the interpretation of Justice
Stevens and the Oakes line of cases. The Tenth Circuit's jurisprudence
cannot be called a disgrace because it ultimately ended up on the "4" side
of a 5-4 Supreme Court decision. 264 Although militia-only was a weaker
theory, it was not a preposterous theory, or a theory bereft of any intellectual support.
The reason that the Tenth Circuit's Second Amendment cases were
a disgrace is that they barely had any reasoning. If you take everything
that the Tenth Circuit wrote about the Second Amendment in Oakes
(1977) and the twenty-five years of cases thereafter, the whole thing
combined would not add up to a mediocre student Note in a secondary
journal at an unaccredited law school.
Even the lowliest of student Notes must at least attempt to address
the most important arguments on the other side. Especially when those
contrary arguments come from the U.S. Supreme Court's explication of
the very text that is at issue. Or from enactments of the Congress of the
United States. Or from the Yale Law Journal, the Michigan Law Review,
or Larry Tribe, Akhil Amar, or Sanford Levinson. A mediocre student
Note would not address all these sources, but it would address at least a
couple. The Tenth Circuit spent a quarter century pretending there were
no serious contrary authorities.
Nobody forced the Tenth Circuit to propound a grand theory of the
Second Amendment without being able to make a serious intellectual
defense of the theory. As Judge Kelly pointed out, almost all the Second
Amendment cases that came to the Tenth Circuit could have been han263. See Brian L. Frye, The PeculiarStory of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
48, 56 (2008) (cited in Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2814 (2008)).
264. The collective right, on the other hand, got zero votes from nine Justices. See supra text
accompanying note 13.
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died simply by addressing whether they involved legitimate restrictions
on the right. It was a deliberate choice of the Tenth Circuit to reach out
in Oakes, and to, in effect, declare that an entire Amendment to the Bill
of Rights was a nullity, insofar as its protection of 99.9% of the American people.
It was the choice of the Tenth Circuit to continue to declare its
Second Amendment decisions in the sweeping, nullificationist terms of
Oakes. If the Circuit were determined to proceed on such a broad front,
then the Circuit owed the American people a real justification of its actions. Not the pompous ipse dixit of Haney, Oakes, and the other cases,
but a serious explanation. An explanation which addressed the best arguments on the other side.
That the Tenth Circuit never did so perhaps reflected a lack of intellectual self-confidence. The Tenth Circuit is a good example of Sanford
Levinson's observation that some elements of the legal elite refused to
intellectually engage with the Second Amendment because of "amixture
of sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of guns and the perhaps subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even 'winning,'
interpretations of the Second Amendment would present real hurdles to
those of us supporting prohibitory regulation. 26 5
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit took the post-Lopez challenges on interstate commerce grounds seriously. A reader may agree or disagree
with those decisions (and I tend to disagree) but those decisions are detailed, and replete with lengthy, intricate arguments, and sophisticated
doctrinal analysis. They read like legitimate appellate opinions. They
read like legal opinions. "Because I said so" is not a legitimate jurisprudential tool. Legal reasoning is supposed to include reasoning.
Why was the Tenth Circuit's approach to the Second Amendment
so lawless?
One might speculate that none of the Second Amendment litigants
were very attractive. The best of the bunch was Parker, who was a lawabiding, decent man who just forgot to take a handgun out of his truck
one day. As for the rest, the cream of the crop was Haney, an otherwise
law-abiding man whose version of the Second Amendment was closer to
what might be found in a Robert Heinlein science fiction novel than in
American legal practice. After Haney, we descend into a group of meth
dealers, stalkers, convicted felons, explosives dealers for gangsters, and
other miscreants. Not a very attractive bunch.
But courts, including the Tenth Circuit, routinely understand that
the courts must deal with the scurrilous characters in a way that protects
the rights of the good people. When the courts protect the speech rights
265.

Levinson, supra note 183, at 642.
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of Nazis, the free speech of thoughtful but unpopular minorities is protected. When courts require a retrial of a patently guilty criminal because the jury instructions were defective, the right of the mistakenlyaccused to accurate jury instructions is protected. And so on.
Thus, the unattractive nature of the Second Amendment claimants
in the Tenth Circuit cannot be the full explanation of why the Circuit's
treatment of the Second Amendment was so atrocious. It is hard to escape the inference that many judges on the Circuit were viscerally hostile
to gun ownership. The Tenth Circuit's first case on the Second Amendment, Oakes, involved a member of a racist, anti-Jewish organization;
another case involved an anti-Mormon bigot. Sadly, the three decades of
Tenth Circuit cases involving the Second Amendment appear to have
involved not only some bigoted defendants, but an unfortunate number
of bigoted judges.266

266.
Cf. Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society, 8 CONST. COMM. 395, 399400 (1991) (observing that in the world of the legal elite, expressions of bigotry against gun owners
are treated as conventional wisdom, whereas similar bigotry expressed against a racial group would
be considered highly offensive); Michael Lerner, Respectable Bigotry, 38 AM. SCHOLAR 606 (1969).

BACK TO BASICS: HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES AND
LONG-TERM EXECUTIVE DETENTION
MARC D. FALKOFF t

This article addresses a straightforward question: What should habeas corpus hearings look like for prisoners who challenge long-term
detention decisions made solely in the executive branch? Prior to 9/11,
we had little reason to ponder the procedural nuts and bolts of such hearings, since they existed only in the hypothetical. Indeed, before the
"Global War on Terror" began, habeas litigation in contemporary American courts dealt almost exclusively with collateral challenges to criminal
convictions, where detention was premised on an underlying judicial
determination of guilt.' For this kind of habeas proceeding, the applicability of statutory and judicially-crafted rules was clear.2
But events have conspired to make grappling with the issue of
"common law" habeas procedures unavoidable. Over the past seven
years, the United States has detained, without charge or trial, both citizens 3 and non-citizens4 on suspicion of involvement with terrorism. In a
t
Assistant Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.D., Columbia Law
School; Ph.D., Brandeis University; M.A., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania. Since July 2004, I have represented more than a dozen Yemeni nationals being detained by the United States military at the Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base. I appreciate the advice and
assistance of Jon Connolly, Robert Knowles, Aaron Galloway, and John Castlen. Special thanks to
Judge Carlos F. Lucero, who arranged for me to present an early version of this piece at the Tenth
Circuit Bench and Bar Conference in September 2008.
1. From 2003 to 2007, the federal courts handled roughly 22,000 to 24,000 habeas petitions
annually, JAMES C. DUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 149 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/contents.htm.
Of these, about eighty percent were
state-prisoner applications. See id. at 146. See also NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL
REPORT HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 9-10 (2007), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf (noting that each year since 1996, "more than
18,000 cases, or one out of every 14 civil cases filed in federal district courts, are filed by state
prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief.").
2. The applicability of the rules is clear, but their substance remains controversial. Federal
habeas challenges to the constitutionality of state-court criminal convictions are governed principally
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,
1217-1227 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA] (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2244, 2253-2255
and §§ 2261-2266 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 2008 amendments)), legislation which has been
described in the leading treatise on habeas as a "not well thought-out form of habeas corpus bashing." Anthony G. Amsterdam, Forward to 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN'S FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE v, vi (5th ed. 2005).

3.
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (discussing habeas case of United
States citizen detained without charge as an "enemy combatant"); Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d
213, 217 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (same, for an alien lawfully residing in the United States).
4. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (June 12, 2008) (discussing habeas cases
of non-citizens detained without charge at GuantAnamo Bay); Maqalah v. Gates, Civ. No. 06-1669 at
2 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 2009) (ordering government to produce information about nationalities of noncitizens detained without charge at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan).
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series of thunderclap rulings, the Supreme Court has held that these detainees are entitled to seek the writ, 5 notwithstanding congressional attempts to strip the federal courts of their habeas jurisdiction.6 For the
first time in the modern era, therefore, the federal courts must rule on the
legality of non-criminal executive detentions, and they must fashion procedures that provide due process of law without risking national security.
To be sure, contemporary jurists are familiar with the statutory procedures deployed daily by federal district court judges in habeas actions
filed by state and federal prisoners. But the issues raised in the executive-detention context are entirely distinct from those that arise in collateral challenges to criminal convictions. Most fundamentally, executivedetention habeas proceedings implicate the relative competence of the
judicial and executive branches to oversee detentions, while challenges
to criminal convictions (most of which are filed by state prisoners) raise
concerns primarily about comity and federalism. Accordingly, procedures that are appropriate for one type of habeas proceeding may not be
appropriate for the other.
The question of which procedures should be available to a court in a
common-law habeas hearing has immediate importance for the more
than two hundred non-citizens who remain detained at Guantdnamo Bay
and who have not yet had their "day in court." But establishing an appropriate framework for executive-detention habeas proceedings is
equally critical for citizen detainees as well; indeed, the United States has
held at least one lawful resident without charge or trial for more than six
years. 7 Because their right to a habeas hearing is now firmly established
at a minimum as a constitutional mandate,8 district court judges entertaining their petitions must determine such fundamental questions as
whether these prisoners have the right to an evidentiary hearing, to discovery, and to disclosure of exculpatory information in the military's
possession. Should hearsay be admitted in the habeas hearings? Who
has the burden of establishing the legality of the detention? Under what
standard of proof should the district courts operate? These questions and
more must be addressed in short order in pending litigation, and they will
5.
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (stating that "due process demands that a citizen held in the
United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis
for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker"); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480-81 (2004)
(holding that federal courts have statutory jurisdiction to hear Guantdnamo detainees' habeas cases);
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240 (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction over Guantdnamo
detainees' habeas actions because Congress's attempt to strip such jurisdiction was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ).
6.
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-48, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (e) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 2008 amendments); Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)(1) & (2) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 2008 amendments)).
7.
See Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 217.
8.
See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274 (holding that "MCA § 7 thus effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ").
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inevitably recur as more and more detentions in new contexts are challenged in the courts. 9
In this article, I offer historical, doctrinal, and policy justifications
for robust and flexible habeas procedures in the context of challenges to
executive detentions. Acknowledging that the historical record is incomplete, 0 in the first part of the article I canvas English and American
case law to tell the story of the evolution of habeas as the Great Writ of
Liberty, paying particular attention in the English context to the "information-forcing" procedures-most importantly, the requirement of a
"return" to the writ-that developed over the centuries to effectuate the
writ's office as protector of individual liberty. I show that the story of
habeas is one of dialectical movement, with the courts and executive
locked in a struggle to determine the metes and bounds of the habeas
right. Moving to the American context, this account reveals that the
Framers incorporated into our Constitution a dynamic common-law writ
whose procedures had never firmly been set, and that the Framers understood
that habeas corpus at its core was a flexible and evolving reme11
dy.
In the second part, I discuss much of the War on Terror litigation
since 9/11, focusing on the Guantdnamo habeas actions, congressional
attempts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions
from "enemy combatants," and the Supreme Court's repeated rebukes to
the Bush administration's argument that the habeas right either does not
extend to war-time detainees or else is severely restricted for them. I
suggest that these cases reveal in microcosm the same dialectical move9.
The most obvious "next battle" involves more than six hundred detainees held by the
United States at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan on suspicion of association with al Qaeda or the
Taliban. Whether those men are entitled to apply for the writ of habeas corpus is an open question
that is only now being litigated in the district courts. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-CV-1669,
2009 WL 863657, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009) (holding that "the Suspension Clause extends to, and
hence habeas corpus review is available" for several prisoners held by the U.S. military at Bagram);
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275 ("Practical considerations and exigent circumstances inform the
definition and reach of the law's writs, including habeas corpus.").
10. Scholars have recently called attention to the shortcomings of the historical record concerning habeas, including in the American context the paucity of eighteenth-century law reports on
habeas matters. E.g., Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Texts,
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REv. 575, 713 (2008) (criticizing historians' reliance on printed law reports rather than archival materials that might "significantly complicate and deepen our understanding of how English jurists thought about and used the 'Great Writ' in
the generations before the framing of the Constitution"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer,
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029,
2096 (2007) (noting that "efforts to reconstruct historical practice with respect to most kinds of
habeas proceedings found quickly, for surviving records are fragmentary and practices were not
consistent and shifted over time"). See also Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251 ("[Mlost reports of
18th-century habeas proceedings were not printed.") (citing Halliday & White, 94 Va. L. Rev. at
714-15).
11.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) ("No
one would now suggest that this Court be imprisoned by every particular of habeas corpus as it
existed in the late 18th and 19th centuries."); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (noting that,
"at the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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ment discussed in the first part, with the courts cautiously but determinedly enlarging their supervisory power over executive decisions concerning deprivations of liberty.
In the last part of the article, I take these lessons from history to
make sense of pre-9/11 doctrine on the procedural requisites for a fair
habeas hearing. I then propose a set of flexible but muscular principles
to be applied to executive-detention habeas proceedings, respecting both
the historical office of the writ and potential concerns for protecting national security. Finally, I briefly review the habeas procedures which the
district courts have just begun to formulate. I offer an analysis of those
procedures as largely appropriate, but conclude that they are insufficiently protective both of the rights of persons detained on suspicion of involvement with terrorism, and also of the right of the American public to
information about the purported reasons for these detentions.
I. HABEAS CORPUS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE

Although the legal and political issues raised by the habeas corpus
authority of federal courts are familiar to most lawyers and legal scholars
in the context of federal review of state convictions, in this article I am
primarily interested in the use of habeas corpus to challenge executive
detentions. Historically, such challenges represented the "core" circumstances in which the habeas right has operated.' 2 In this part, I review
how the habeas right developed, paying particular attention to the ways
in which the courts enhanced their authority over the executive through
deployment of procedural devices that force information out of the secret
and into the public realm. In particular, I focus on the courts' growing
insistence that the executive provide the court with a specific, factual
"return" justifying the legality of the challenged detention.
The lesson from this part is two-fold. First, habeas procedures have
grown increasingly robust over time, as the executive and judicial
branches have battled for supremacy over detention decisions. Second,
in practice, habeas procedures have never been stable or rigid, something
of which the Framers would have been aware at the time of incorporating
the protections of the writ into Article I of the Constitution.
A. The Common-Law Backgroundof Habeas Corpus
Modern federal judges are most familiar with "habeas corpus" as a
method for bringing constitutional challenges to presumptively valid
state or federal court convictions. 3 As discussed more fully below, 4 a
See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 ("At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served
12.
as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.").
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) & (b) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 2008 amendments) (go13.
verning challenges to state convictions); id. § 2255(a)-(d) (West, Westlaw through April 1996
amendments) (governing challenges to federal convictions).

2009]

HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES

thick accretion of case law and statutory provisions has developed for
this use of habeas as a post-conviction remedy, which is a function that
did not exist in any significant manner until passage of the Reconstruction-era Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.' 5 In the twentieth century, the
common understanding of habeas as a collateral process-and, some
would say, as a second bite at the apple for criminal defendants-became
firmly entrenched for the simple reason that extrajudicial executive detentions were rare to nonexistent. Until recently, few have contemplated
the core historical functions of the writ, largely because our government
has never had a6 policy of imprisoning persons without providing due
process of law.'
The situation changed, of course, with the attacks of 9/11 and the
federal government's response, which included a policy of detaining
suspected "enemy combatants" in sites like Guantdnamo, where the executive branch refused to acknowledge either the binding force of the
Geneva Conventions or an oversight role for the courts. 17 When prisoners at Guantdnamo filed habeas corpus petitions, jurists and scholars began to recognize that they must reeducate themselves about the Great
Writ of Liberty-a project which is still playing itself outI 8-and to recover from the mists of history something about the origins of habeas
corpus and its functioning at the common law. 19
14. See discussion infra Part I.C.3.
15.
14 Stat. 385 (1867). Many scholars have assumed that the Suspension Clause, U.S.
CONST., art. L cl. 9, protected only federal and not state prisoners, but habeas scholar Eric M.
Freedman has convincingly argued to the contrary. Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part : Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the
Illusory Prohibitionon the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpusfor State Prisonersin the JudiciaryAct
of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REv. 531,536-38 (2000).
16.
There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of NoncriminalHabeas Corpus and the 1996 ImmigrationActs, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2516-20 (1998).
17.
See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales and William J. Haynes
II, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan.22, 2002), in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 81, 81 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds.,
2005); Alberto R. Gonzales, Memorandum for the President, Decision Re Application of the Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002),
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra, at 118-121. The Supreme Court subsequently held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the detainees at GuantAnamo were entitled to at least the protections of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 548 U.S. 557, 629-32 (2006).
18.
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244-51 (2008) (concluding that the
historical record is too spotty to draw firm conclusions); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473-75
(2004).
19.
Though I do not mean to imply that the common law roots of habeas are irrelevant to
understanding habeas in the context of collateral challenges to criminal convictions, it is in many
ways true that "the modem doctrine of federal habeas as a post-conviction remedy bears little likeness to its common law function." Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal
Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1995); see also OFFICE OF
LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Report to the Attorney General: FederalHabeas Corpus
Review of State Judgments, REPORT No. 7, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, at i (1988) ("IT]he

contemporary 'writ of habeas corpus' by which the lower federal courts review state judgments is
not the Great Writ of the Constitution and the common law. Rather, it is a purely statutory remedy
that is fundamentally different from the traditional habeas corpus remedy whose suspension is prohibited by the Constitution.").
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Stated simply, habeas corpus is the legal process by which a prisoner contests the legality of his detention. Its roots lie in the Magna Carta
and its promise in 1215 that "no free man shall be seized or imprisoned.
. . except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the
land., 20 Although "habeas corpus" is not itself to be found in that document, as has sometimes been assumed, 2' over time it grew into the primary procedural device for effectuating the Magna Carta's proscription
on extrajudicial detention. 22 Habeas corpus-which, roughly translated
from the Latin, means "you shall have the body"-has thus historically
not been a substantive "right" that someone possesses so much as it has
been an evolving set of procedures through which the right to be free
from illegal detention may be vindicated.23
What we have come to know as the "Great Writ of Liberty" is derived from one of a series of "writs of habeas corpus" that were used as
management devices in the English courts in the medieval period. Indeed, the origins of the writ are decidedly "humble. 24 As originally
conceived, a writ of habeas corpus entailed little more than a command
to have a person brought physically before the court for a particular purpose.25 In their early history, the various habeas writs thus served as
20.
MAGNA CARTA, cl. 39 (England 1215) ("Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonatur, aut
dissesiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super
eum mittemus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terrae."), photographof original document available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/features documents/magnacarta/
images/magnascarta.jpg (last visited Mar. 7, 2009), Latin transcript available at
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/magnacarta.htrl (last Mar. 7, 2009), and English translation available at http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/magnacarta.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). Albert V.
Dicey observes that the Magna Carta did not "confer" individual rights, but rather recognized them
as the basis for the law of the unwritten English constitution. ALBERT V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 206-07 (10th ed. 1958) (1885).
21.
See, e.g., Stander v. Kelley, 246 A.2d 649, 652 (Pa. 1969) (Musmanno, J., dissenting)
("[Diating as far back as Magna Charta, Habeas Corpus has always been the mightiest oak in the
whole domain of individual rights."); DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA
CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER AND LIBERTY 5 (1966) (noting that while habeas corpus is often

thought to spring from Magna Carta, in fact "the two were unrelated in origin"); J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 537 (3d ed. 1990) (noting that the Magna Carta pro-

vided no remedy for the violation of rights). Before the sixteenth century, several other writs were
generally used to effectuate the Magna Carta's proscription on extralegal detention. See, e.g., 1 W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 95-97 (1903) (describing writ de homine replegiando,
writ of mainprize, and writ de odio et atia). Cf R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 3

(1976) (noting that "[tihese medieval writs really differed in a fundamental way from habeas corpus"
in that they "were not remedies of general application but special procedures for special situations").
22.
It is thus an overstatement to contend that there is "little relationship between Magna
Carta and Habeas Corpus." Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The HistoricalDebate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 375, 377 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
23.
See DICEY, supra note 20, at 220-21 ("There is no difficulty, and there is often very little
gain, in declaring the existence of a right to personal freedom. The true difficulty is to secure its
enforcement. The Habeas Corpus Acts have achieved this end, and have therefore done for the
liberty of Englishmen more than could have been achieved by any declaration of rights.").
24.

WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 12 (1980).

25.
In his Commentaries, Blackstone cataloged a number of these distinct writs, including ad
respondendum (for removing a prisoner from confinement to answer a complaint brought against
him), ad satisfaciendum (for bringing a prisoner to a superior court for execution of a judgment), ad
prosequendum (for bringing a prisoner to be prosecuted), ad testificandum (for bringing a prisoner to
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little more than "interlocutory process" and ancillary court procedure.2 6
From medieval times through the thirteenth century, there was little
about habeas corpus that we would identify as a means of securing liberty or of providing a safeguard against arbitrary detention.27
Crucially, these early forms of the writ of habeas corpus-as demands to produce a person before the court-were not coupled with similar demands to explain the reason for a prisoner's detention. It was not
until the fourteenth century that the English courts fashioned a writ
whose purpose was to question the cause of a prisoner's custody.28 But
quickly after-by the middle of the century at the latest-the courts were
coupling this newly minted show-cause writ with habeas corpus, and
doing so with sufficient frequency that a distinct type of habeas writ
arose, which was denominated the writ of habeas corpus cum causa.2 9
Only with cum causa had the courts established a procedure that began to
resemble the modem writ,30 requiring not only production of the body of
the prisoner (who was being detained either by the state or by a private
party) but also the reason for his detention.3 '
The importance of this functional pairing should not be discounted.
By requiring both the presence of the prisoner and an articulation of the
cause for his detention, the writ of habeas corpus cum causa provided
the courts with a powerful tool for controlling the authority of the state
and private parties to coerce persons to acquiesce to demands, whether
legal or not, via their detention powers. Nonetheless, this power remained largely dormant, and for nearly a century and a half it was exercised by the various English courts-including the common law courts,
Chancery, the ecclesiastical courts, and Admiralty-to do no more than

testify), and ad deliberandum (for bringing a prisoner into the proper jurisdiction for trial).

3

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129-30 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et

al. eds., The Legal Classics Library 1983) (1768). See also HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 97 ("In
Edward I.'s reign the writ [of habeas corpus) was in existence; but it belonged to the law of procedure.").
26.
SHARPE, supra note 21, at 1-2.
27.
See id. at 2 ("The words 'habeas corpus' at this early stage were not connected with the
idea of liberty, and the process involved an element of the concept of due process of law only in so
far as it mirrored the refusal of the courts to decide a matter without having the defendant present.").
28.
See DUKER, supra note 24, at 25 (discussing several cases in the first half of the fourteenth century in which the King's Bench issued this new type of writ that demanded the cause for
the detention of a prisoner).
29. See Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa: The Emergence of the Modem Writ-,
18 CAN. B. REv. 10, 13 (1940) [hereinafter Cohen, Cum Causa 1]; Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus
Cum Causa: The Emergence of the Modem Writ-Il, 18 CAN. B. REV. 172, 176 (1940).
30.
See Cohen, Cum Causa 1, supra note 29, at 13 (seeing in the history of cum causa the
"emergence of the modem writ").
31.
This pairing was initially made by courts issuing a writ of habeas corpus after a prisoner
petitioned for an audita querela (seeking relief against the consequences of an adverse judgment) or
for certiorari(asking a court to assume jurisdiction from another court). See SHARPE, supra note 21,
at 23.
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remove cases from one court to another in a protracted battle over their
32
respective jurisdictions.
Still, the courts' reliance on cum causa as a procedural tool for protecting their prerogatives as against other courts made habeas a familiar
tool. While their battles might seem trivial now, by the late sixteenth
century the courts' resistance to encroachment on their jurisdiction extended to executive agencies as well. In particular, the courts used the
habeas writ to protect their jurisdiction from infringement by the Privy
Council, whose detention practices were deemed increasingly unlawful
by the courts.33
Nonetheless, the deployment of habeas against the executive and
the perceived abuses of the Privy Council was incremental and characterized by fits and starts. For example, in Helyard's Case in 1586, the
Court of Common Pleas held insufficient a "return" to the writ-that is, a
response to the court's order to produce the prisoner-stating only that
the prisoner had been committed by the authority of the principal military secretary of the monarch's household, without providing any more
explanation for the cause of the detention. 34 Just one year later, in Howel's Case, a similar return was made without showing cause of the detention beyond the fact that a member of the Privy Council had ordered
it; although that return was deemed insufficient, an amended return stating no more than that the entire Privy Council had ordered the detention
was deemed adequate.35
By this point in the history of the writ of habeas corpus, the writ
cum causa had given rise to the writ ad subjiciendum, developed by the
King's Bench "chiefly to protect subjects against unconstitutional imprisonment by privy councillors and officers of state., 36 This form of the
writ is the direct descendant of what we now colloquially call "habeas
corpus." In his Commentaries, Blackstone described the ad subjiciendum as "the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confine32. See DUKER, supra note 24, at 26 (by the end of the fourteenth century, "the politics of the
bench became more transparent ... and the development of the writ of habeas corpus was largely
attributable to the superior courts' desire to extend and secure their jurisdiction"); see generally id. at
33-40 (detailing the jurisdictional battles); SHARPE, supra note 21, at 4-7 (same); HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 21, at 97-98 (same).
DUKER, supra note 24, at 41. The Privy Council consisted of great officers of the state
33.
and advisers to the monarch, and it was "through the Council that the royal authority was exercised."
HOLDsWORTH, supra note 21, at 265.

74 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.P. 1586); see also Peter's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 628 (C.P. 1586) (return
34.
insufficient where no cause shown beyond statement that the prisoner was being held by order of a
member of the Privy Council); cf Searche's Case, 74 E.R. 65 (1586) (issuing writ notwithstanding a
letter patent from the Queen authorizing arrest).
74 Eng. Rep. 66 (C.P. 1588). See also SHARPE, supra note 21, at 7 (collecting cases in
35.
which prisoners of state were discharged on habeas corpus); id. at 8 (noting that in sixteenth-century
cases the idea evolved that habeas corpus "was not precluded simply because an executive commital
was involved," and that there was, "nascent, the idea of the writ requiring substantive legal justification for the imprisonment in all cases").
36.

J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCrION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 126 (2d ed. 1979).
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ment," and explained that it "directed to the person detaining another,
and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner with the day
and cause of his caption and detention.... to do, submit to, and receive,
whatsoever
the judge or court awarding such writ shall consider in that
37
behalf."
By the latter part of the sixteenth century, therefore, it appeared that
the common law courts had firmly established that habeas was a tool that
could be deployed against the executive and that as a general matter a
return would be inadequate where it did not show cause for the detention.
Indeed, in 1592, the judges of the King's Bench, Common Pleas and the
Exchequer Court assembled to discuss their dissatisfaction with the detention abuses of the Privy Council. At this assembly, they issued a resolution affirming that their practice was to order the release of prisoners
who were detained by the monarch's councilors when the return to a writ
of habeas corpus showed no legal cause for the imprisonment, and issued
a resolution stating their intent to continue doing so. 3 8 Interestingly, the
judges indicated their concern that, as a practical matter, this custom had
led to the reincarceration-sometimes in secret prisons-of the men who
had been ordered released.
While the Resolution of 1592 is an important milestone in the cabining of executive power via the writ of habeas corpus, the judges also
stated in their resolution that a "general" return-one that did not specify
the cause of the detention-would be deemed sufficient when authorized
by special order of the Queen or by the entire Privy Council. Thus, in
Addis's Case in 1610, a challenge to the adequacy of a return that stated
only that the prisoner was being held "for certain matters concerning the
King," was said to be the first time that exception had been taken to the
generality of such a return.39 Similarly, Lord.Coke held in three separate
cases in 1614 and 1615 that, regardless of the generality of the return, a
prisoner
was not bailable if he were committed by the full Privy Coun4°
cil.
The power of the state to detain persons without giving an accounting for the legal cause of the detention was politically controversialengendering two unsuccessful attempts by Parliament to rectify the situational-and eventually led to a constitutional crisis during the reign of
Charles I. The spark for the controversy was the famous Darnel's Case
37.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 13 1. See also EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 53 (1628) (by the writ of habeas corpus, "it manifestly
appeareth, that no man ought to be imprisoned but for some certain cause ....and that cause must
be shewed: for otherwise how can the Court take order therein according to Law").
38. Resolution, 1 And. 297 (1592); see also DUKER, supra note 24, at 84 n.336 (discussing
Resolution of 1592).
39. Cro. Jac. 219 (1610). See SHARPE, supra note 21, at 8.
40. Les Bruer's Case, I Rolle 134, 134 (1614); Ruswell's Case, 1 Rolle 192, 192 (1615);
Salkingstowe's Case, 1 Rolle 219, 219 (1615).
41.
See SHARPE,supra note 21, at 9 (noting the defeat of such bills in 1593 and 1621).
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in 1627, also known as the Five Knights' Case.42 Charles I had ordered a
forced loan from his subjects in order to raise revenue without Parliament's sanction. His agents detained persons who refused to make the
loans, including five knights. Probably seeking to test the legality of the
King's scheme, they sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that their
detention was illegal.4 3 The return made by the Executive stated only
that the men were being detained "per speciale mandatum domini regis,"
or by special order of the King.
Was this general return adequate justification for the detention, or
could the court order the prisoners bailed? Counsel for the prisoners
argued, as per Magna Carta, that no detention was legal except "per legem terre," or by the law of the land. In response, the Attorney General
noted that Magna Carta did not define "legem terre" and that the law of
the land was that the King could detain his subjects without giving an
accounting of why to the courts. Relying on the Resolution of 1592 and
recent cases, the court accepted the Attorney General's argument, ruling
that the general return by the Executive was sufficient and that the prisoners could not be bailed. 44
The fall-out from Darnel's Case was swift. In 1627, Parliament
passed the Petition of Right, a declaration of grievances against Charles I
that included the complaint that subjects had been imprisoned "without
any cause showed," and that when "they were brought before your justices by your Majesty's writs of habeas corpus, . . . and their keepers
[were] commanded to certify the causes of their detainer, no cause was
certified, but that they were detained by your Majesty's special command, signified by the lords of your Privy Council, and yet were returned
back to several prisons, without being charged with anything to which
they might make answer according to the law. 'AS Even after the Petition
of Right was passed, however, Charles I refused to honor it, continuing
to offer only general returns46 and denying that the Petition had the force
of law.47
For the most part, the courts did all they could to avoid confronting
the executive on its refusal to abide by the Petition of Right. The passivity of the courts eventually led Parliament, when it reconvened, to
pass the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640, specifically providing that anyone

3 St. Tr. 1, 31 (1627) (Doderidge, J.) (calling the case "the greatest cause that I ever knew
42.
in this court").
43.
SHARPE, supra note 21, at 9.
Id.
44.
3 Car. I c.1 (1627).
45.
See, e.g., Six Members' Case, 3 St. Tr. 235, 240 (1629) (return states only that detention
46.
of members of Parliament was for "notable contempts" and "stirring up sedition against us," without
stating a charge on which they could be tried); Ship Money Case, 3 St. Tr. 825, 1237 (1637).
47.
Six Members' Case, 3 St. Tr. at 281-82 (1629).
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imprisoned by order of the King or his Privy Council must be brought
48
without delay to the court along with the cause of his imprisonment.
It soon became clear, however, that there were procedural defects in
this first Habeas Corpus Act and that it was not completely effective. It
was a matter of dispute, for example, whether the writ could be awarded
while the courts were in vacation, leading to lengthy detentions. There
were also a number of abuses, including the movement of prisoners from
jail to jail to avoid the writ, or transportation to Scotland or other areas
where the writ would not reach.49 Indeed, without a muscular writ, it
was possible that a prisoner could be secreted and his detention never
come to the attention of the public; as Blackstone observed, "confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings
are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a
more dangerous engine of arbitrary government. 5 0
Parliament sought to remedy the procedural defects through passage
of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 51 a piecemeal statute designed to
make the writ an effectual remedy and to fortify the courts to discourage
their "pitiful evasions. 52 Hailed by Blackstone as the "second Magna
Carta," this Act codified the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as the law's primary safeguard against illegal detentions.53 Although by its terms the Act applied only to criminal matters, the Act's
procedures were utilized in non-criminal detentions
that were challeng54
ing executive detentions via the common-law writ.
Thus, by the latter part of the seventeenth century, the writ of habeas corpus---either as a common law or statutory writ-was indisputably available to Englishmen to contest the legality of all executive detentions by, primarily, forcing the state to make the prisoner available in
person in the court and by obliging the state to articulate a legal basis for
the detention. By the colonial American era, habeas corpus had fundamentally realigned the relation of the judiciary towards the executive,
48.

16 Car. I c.10 (1640).

49.

In addition, like Charles I, Oliver Cromwell refused during the Protectorate to answer

writs of habeas corpus with the particular cause of a return. See, e.g., Lilbume's Case, 5 St. Tr. 371,
371 (1653) (no return made on grounds that the prisoner had been committed "for the peace of the
nation"); see generally DUKER, supra note 24, at 48-52 (discussing habeas cases decided during the

Interregnum).
50.

BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 185; see also id. at 137-38 ("A remedy the more neces-

sary, because the oppression does not always arise from the ill-nature, but sometimes from the mere
inattention, of government. For it frequently happens in foreign countries ... that persons apprehended upon suspicion have suffered a long imprisonment, merely because they were forgotten.").
51.
310 Car. 2 c.2 (1679).
52. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 134.
53.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 117-18.
54. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 137-38. The protections of the writ of habeas corpus
were not extended by statute to noncriminal detainees in England until the Habeas Corpus Act of
1816, 56 Geo. 3 c.100. The procedural protections of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 were, however, in practice extended by judges to prisoners in non-criminal cases. See DICEY, supra note 20, at
219 n.2.
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putting it on a more even footing by providing a veto for an administrative action of the government that it believed not to be authorized by
law.55
B. Judicial Inquiry at the Common Law
We have seen the growing importance at the common law of the
courts' requirement that the executive provide a meaningful "return" to
the writ. But having received the executive's explanation for the legality
of the detention, how were the petitioner and court to proceed next? Was
the petitioner allowed to contest the factual allegations lodged in the return? Were the courts empowered to look behind the return to determine
whether the allegations were true?
Although it was a maxim in the eighteenth century that the courts
were strictly bound by the four comers of the return and prisoners could
not contest facts alleged in the return, 56 such pronouncements were overbroad and misleading. Most fundamentally, they failed to account for
the distinction in habeas practice between criminal and non-criminal
executive detentions. Only in the former category of cases were petitioners prevented from "traversing" the return; in contrast, when a petitioner was held in non-criminal detention, historical practice consistently
allowed the prisoner to contest the facts justifying his detention. 7
While courts generally did not allow criminal detainees-who had
already received a trial and a jury verdict-to contradict the facts stated
in the return, they commonly exercised independent review over the factual assertions of prisoners in cases of executive and other non-criminal
detention that lacked the safeguards of a jury trial.58 The courts, in short,
would consider additional evidence and seek to ensure that individuals
challenging executive detention received meaningful review of their
claims.

55. See DICEY, supra note 20, at 222.
56.
See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 21, at 120; SHARPE, supra note 21, at 61-68; Marc M.
Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,70
TUL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1995).

57.
The distinction between the criminal and non-criminal habeas contexts was recognized by
D.H. Oaks in his Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus,64 MICH. L. REv. 451,454 n.20
(1966) ("[Wlith respect to imprisonments other than for criminal matters, however, the exceptions to
the rule against controverting the return were 'governed by a principle sufficiently comprehensive to
include.., most cases' so that it was impossible to specify those [non-criminal] cases in which it
could not [be controverted].") (quoting R.C. HuRD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL
LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 270-71 (1858) (modifications in original)).
58.
Hafetz, supra note 16, at 2535-36. This review extended even to cases of criminal confinement, where courts entertained habeas petitions of detainees seeking bail before trial. See, e.g.,
Crisp's Case, 94 Eng. Rep. 495, 495 (K.B. 1733) (in considering return of commitment on allegation
of highway robbery, examining affidavits "containing very strong circumstances to shew that the
prisoner did not commit the fact" and entering nisi order to bail); Barney's Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 683,
683 (K.B. 1701) (granting bail for woman indicted for killing her husband after allowing her to
introduce affidavits of fact showing malicious prosecution).
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There is, however, some evidence from the eighteenth century that,
as a doctrinal matter at English law, petitioners could not traverse the
return. In 1758, jurists debated a new habeas corpus bill that would have
codified common-law practice by extending the procedural reforms
available in criminal cases under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 to noncriminal cases, including explicitly permitting the habeas petitioner to
controvert facts stated in the return. 59 During the debate, Justice John
Eardley Wilmot and Chief Baron Parker contended that habeas judges
were constrained by the
return and were not at liberty to try the facts
60
contained in the return.
The views of Wilmot and Parker were, however, rejected by half of
the common-law judges debating the 1758 bill, and eventually the protections were written into the statute. 6' The champion of this position
was Justice Michael Foster, who forcefully argued that, in non-jury executive detention cases, the denial of an opportunity to controvert facts
would effectively be denial of an opportunity to contest the deprivation
of one's liberty. In such circumstances, a prisoner would be "absolutely
without remedy" because "[a]n inadequate ineffectual remedy is no remedy; it is a rope thrown to a drowning man, which cannot reach him, or
will not bear his weight. 6 2 While Foster conceded that the "general
rule" was that a prisoner could not traverse the return and would have a
remedy only in a damages action for the filing of a false return, he noted
that the case law was rife with principled exceptions to the general rule,
where the courts allowed a traverse and read affidavits on both sides.
"[T]he principle, as I take it, was, that though in common cases the return
is conclusive in point of fact, yet these special cases, as they come not
within the general reason of the law, are not within the general rule. The
parties are without remedy, if they are not to controvert the truth of the

59.
See Hafetz, supra note 16, at 2531.
60.
"That in no cases whatsoever the judges are so bound by the facts set forth in the retun to
the writ of habeas corpus, that they cannot discharge the person brought up before them, if it should
appear most manifestly to the judges, by the clearest and most undoubted proof, that such return is
false in fact, and that the person so brought up is restrained of his liberty by the most unwarrantable
means, and in direct violation of law and justice; but by the clearest and most undoubted proof he
understands the verdict of a jury... in an actionfor a false return." Letter, Chief Baron Parker to
Justice Foster, n.d. (reprinted in MICHAEL DODSON, THE LIFE OF SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, KNT 58

(1811) (italics in reprinted letter). See also Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 107 Eng. Rep.
29, 60 (H.L. 1758); HOLDSWORTH, supranote 21, at 120.
61.
See James Oldham & Michael J. Wishnie, The Historical Scope of Habeas Corpus and
INS v. St. Cyr, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 485, 489-95 (2002) (noting that six of the twelve common law
judges disagreed with Wilmot and Parker's views, and that after the failure of the 1758 bill, an
alternative was drafted by the judges which expressly permitted judicial examination into the truth of
the facts alleged in the return); SHARPE, supra note 21, at 66 ("[T]here was nothing like unanimity in
favour of Wilmot's formulation of the common law rule. In fact, there would seem to have been a
preponderance of judicial opinion which favoured a more liberal construction."); Oaks, supra note
57, at 454 n.20 (prisoners detained without charge contested the facts in the return in "most" cases).
62. Letter from Justice Michael Foster to Chief Baron Parker (May 24, 1758), reprinted in
DODSON, supranote 60, at 60.
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return in a summary way; and therefore they shall do it. ' ' 63 Foster's
statement seems to suggest that in practice the rule against traversing the
return applied only for a limited class of factual questions-namely,
questions of ultimate fact raised on the pleadings and most appropriately
to be settled at trial. 64
The courts, moreover, were sufficiently flexible as to be able to deploy a host of procedural tools for inquiring into the factual justification
for the prisoner's detention.65 By the eighteenth century, courts treated
the rule against controverting the truth of the return as essentially a procedural hurdle, and they proceeded to review additional evidence submitted by the prisoner if (1) the return was deemed insufficient; (2) prior to
the entry of a return, the court issued a show-cause order; (3) the petitioner "confessed" to the facts contained in the return, which then permitted the introduction of additional factual allegations; or (4) the evidence
pertained to jurisdictional facts, which often extended to the very core of
the case and effectively vitiated the rule altogether. 66 The common law
courts therefore had an entire toolbox at their disposal to assure that habeas litigants who were not detained as a result of criminal process were
assured similar fundamental due process rights to what they would have
received in a criminal proceeding.
First, the common law courts would not hesitate to inquire into the
facts behind the return if the courts believed the allegations in the return
to be evasive or false. In Leonard Watson's Case, for example, where
the petitioner's name and certain other information were either missing
or incorrect in the return, the court held that the jailer might amend the
return to correct what were presumed to be innocent (albeit negligent)
and immaterial mistakes. The court also stated, however, that "had the
return been intentionally false, the gaoler would not have been protected
by the immateriality, nor by the circumstance that the prisoner had not
been injured by the falsehood.' ,,67 And in R. v. Viner, the court held that
63. Id. at 62; see also Goldswain's Case, (1778) 96 Eng. Rep. 711, 712 (K.B.) ("[The court]
declared, that they could not wilfully [sic] shut their eyes against such facts as appeared on the
affidavits, but which were not noticed on the return. They were inclined to think it their duty immediately to discharge the party.").
64. See SHARPE, supranote 21, at 62.
65.
"[C]ourts have never really been prevented by the common law rule from reviewing facts
essential to the jurisdiction or authority underlying the order for detention." SHARPE, supra note 21,
at 70. See also Gerald Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 961, 986 (1998) (though "[o]ne of the maxims of eighteenth-century habeas corpus
practice had been that the petitioner could not controvert the facts stated in the return," that "general
statement papered over exceptions").
66. See generally Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2024, Boumediene v. Bush, Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196 (Aug. 24, 2007); SHARPE, supra note 21, at 61-68.
67.
Leonard Watson's Case, (1839) 112 Eng. Rep. 1389, 1390 (KB.). See also R. v. Winton,
101 Eng. Rep. 51, 52 (K.B. 1792) ("The courts always look with a watchful eye at the returns to
writs of habeas corpus. The liberty of the subject so essentially depends on a ready compliance with
the requisitions of this writ that we are jealous whenever an attempt is made to deviate from the
usual form of the return.") (Grose, J.).
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the return was "traversible" when three affidavits were filed contesting
in the return that the petitioner was not in Viner's custothe 6 allegation
8
dy.
Second, the courts would commonly develop facts and allow a petitioner to controvert factual allegations from his or her custodian by requiring the custodian, before the filing of his return, to show cause why
the writ should not issue. For example, in R. v. Dawes, Lord Mansfield
and the other members of the court "went minutely through the affidavits
on both sides" on an order to show cause for the discharge of an impressed sailor, ultimately finding that the impressment was valid. 69 In a
parallel case, the court considered the allegations of a man who claimed
he had been illegally conscripted into military service by force. On a
rule nisi, the lawyers argued "upon the fact only," and the court, having
taken "time ...to look into the affidavits," ordered the petitioner's discharge.7 °
The show-cause procedure was commonly used in private detentions as well. In R. v. Turlington, a habeas petition was filed against "the
keeper of a private mad-house," by a woman who was detained there at
the behest of her husband. After no return was made, the Court issued a
rule nisi, thinking "it fit to have a previous inspection of her, by proper
persons, physicians and relations; and then to proceed, as the truth should
come out upon such inspection., 7 1 Similarly, in the infamous Case of the
Hottentot Venus, the court issued a rule nisi where a
female native of South Africa, remarkable for the formation of her
person, was exhibited in London in the course of the autumn of this
year under the name of the Hottentot Venus .. . by certain persons
who had the apparent custody of her, and who received money for
such exhibition .... [As there were] some apparent indications of
reluctance on her part during her exhibition, there was reason to believe, and affidavits were accordingly laid before the Court to that effect .... that she had been clandestinely inveigled from the Cape of
and since
Good Hope .... and that she was brought to this country
72
kept in custody and exhibited here against her consent.
These and numerous other examples demonstrate that courts employed
the rule nisi procedure on habeas to consider new facts in determining
whether the prisoner was lawfully detained.

84 Eng. Rep. 829, 829 (K.B. 1675). See also R. v. Strudwick, 94 Eng. Rep. 271, 271
68.
(K.B. 1744) (in response to a return that a prisoner was too sick to be produced in court, the court
considered affidavits from both sides attesting to the prisoner's state of health).
69.
97 Eng. Rep. 486, 486 (K.B. 1758).
70.
R. v. Kessel, 97 Eng. Rep. 486, 486 (K.B. 1758).
Id. According to the reporter, the petitioner "appeared to be absolutely free from the least
71.
appearance of insanity." Id.
104 Eng. Rep. 344, 344 (K.B. 1810).
72.
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Third, the courts would permit a habeas petitioner to bring new
facts before the court by allowing the petitioner to "confess and avoid the
retum"--or admit the allegations in the return and then file a special
pleading to matters that did not explicitly contradict the return, including
additional facts not contained in the return. The best-known example of
this procedure occurred in Goldswain's Case, in which a bargeman was
contesting his impressment.73 The court rejected the contention that it
must defer to the Admiralty's statement of the factual and legal basis for
detention, stating that the court was "not concluded by the return but the
petitioner may plead to it any special matter necessary to regain his liberty."'74 In a marginal comment, the court further noted that although it
seems that no one can controvert the truth of the return to a habeas
corpus, or plead or suggest any matter repugnant to it; yet he may
confess and avoid such return, by admitting the truth of the matters
contained in it, and suggesting others not repugnant, which take off
the effect of them. Also, the Court will sometimes examine, by affidavit, the circumstances of a fact, on which
a prisoner brought before
75
them by habeas corpus has been indicted.
The court then decided, on the basis of the additional factual evidence in
the petitioner's special pleading submitted in response to the return, that
he had been subject to protection by the Navy-Board and ordered his
discharge.76 Confessing and avoiding the return, therefore, provided an
important opportunity for the courts to supplement the information that
was provided in the return and to ensure there was adequate factual basis
for executive and other non-criminal detentions.
Fourth, the common law courts would frequently decide jurisdictional questions by relying on extrinsic evidence that the detention in
question was beyond the custodian's authority. This was particularly the
case with respect to non-criminal detentions, where there had been no
underlying (and there would be no forthcoming) jury decision that might
be undermined by the court's resolution of facts on affidavit in a habeas
proceeding.77

73. 96Eng. Rep. 711,711 (K.B. 1778).
74. Id. at 712.
75. Id. at 712 n.4 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 713. See also Gardener's Case, 78 Eng. Rep. 1048, 1048 (K.B. 1601) (petitioner,
who was convicted and imprisoned for carrying a handgun, on the return confessed to all of its
allegations but further noted that he was a sheriff's officer and therefore entitled to carry a handgun,
which plea being confessed, he was discharged).
77. As Justice Abbot stated in Ex parte Beeching, "'[tihere is a very good reason for not
permitting the truth of a return to be traversed where the person is charged with a crime, for that
would be trying him upon affidavits,' and thus usurping the role of the jury." Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 66, at 24 (citing 107 Eng. Rep. 1010, 1010 (K.B. 1825)). The court in Beeching
held, however, "that such reservations did not apply to the committing authority's jurisdiction,
including the manner of arrest." Id.
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Moreover, jurisdictional questions would often go to the heart of the
legality of the detention. For example, where the legality of detention
turned on a factual requirement such as enemy alien status, courts conducted an independent inquiry into the underlying facts, including evidence submitted by the prisoner, regardless of the return. 7 8 Thus, in R. v.

Schiever, a Swedish prisoner challenged his detention on the grounds
that, although he was taken into custody on an enemy ship, he had been
forced into service and was not an enemy combatant; indeed, Schiever
swore "that his intention still is (could he obtain his liberty) to enter as a
mariner into the English merchants service: and that he would not nor
should have served on board the said privateer, had he not been forced
thereto and detained.,,79 Although the court ultimately determined that
he was legitimately a prisoner of war, it considered a good deal of eviand another
dence beyond the return, including affidavits from Schiever
80
person who had been captured in like manner on the ship.
Collectively, these cases provide compelling evidence that in habeas
matters the English courts would not be bound by rigid rules preventing
them from reaching the heart of a challenge to executive detention. One
way or the other, the court would compel the executive to turn over factual information and then test the government's allegations against facts
developed by the petitioner. The heart of these common law protections
was eventually codified in the Habeas Corpus of Act of 1816, which
to habeas applicants who were being held
extended statutory protection
81
detention.
in non-criminal
C. Habeas Corpus in the American ConstitutionalSystem
From the seventeenth century on, these English battles over the
meaning of habeas and the depth and breadth of its procedures were followed in the American colonies. The degree to which the common-law
and statutory protections of the writ were available (as a matter of principle and of practice) to the colonists differed over time and from location to location. But by the time of the framing of the Constitution, it is
manifest that the writ that was enshrined in the Suspension Clause 82 was
78.
See SHARPE, supra note 21, at 115-16 (habeas court will investigate whether detainee "is
in fact and in law" an enemy alien or a prisoner of war).
79.
97 Eng. Rep. 551, 551 (K.B. 1759).
80. Id. at 551-52. Accord Case of Three Spanish Sailors, 96 Eng. Rep. 775, 775 (K.B. 1779)
(reviewing affidavits of detained sailors and holding that "these men, upon their own shewing, are
alien enemies and prisoners of war").
81.
See An Act for More Effectually Securing the Liberty of the Subject, 56 Geo. 3, c. 100, §
3 (1816) (Eng.) ("In all cases provided for by this Act, although the return to any writ of habeas
corpus shall be good and sufficient in law, it shall be lawful for the justice or baron, before whom
such writ may be returnable, to proceed to examine into the truth of the facts set forth in such return
by affidavit... and to do therein as to justice shall appertain; and ... it shall be lawful for the said
court to proceed to examine into the truth of the facts set forth in the return, in a summary way by
affidavit...."). See also Beeching, 107 Eng. Rep. at 1010.
82. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

978

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

not a particular set of procedures, but rather a fundamental principle of
access to the courts to allow for challenges to arbitrary exertions of executive authority.
1. The Writ in the Colonies
Habeas corpus was available in the American colonies, but settlers
were entitled under English law only to the common law protections of
the writ, and not to those of the English habeas statutes. The distinction
is important, because the colonists felt keenly this infringement of their
rights as English subjects. By the time of the drafting of the Constitution, the Suspension Clause was thus undoubtedly understood to protect
habeas as a principle rather than as a limited set of procedures.
As an initial matter, whether English law applied at all in the colonies was a matter of some theoretical dispute. Coke and Blackstone, for
example, thought that no English law per se applied in the colonies, since
they were "no part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent)
dominions. 83 Looking back from the vantage of the eighteenth century,
however, Joseph Story suggested that Coke and Blackstone had their
analysis wrong, and that the colonists had been formally entitled to the
protections of English law. Because the charters of each colony expressly declared that "no laws [could] be made repugnant to those of England," and that they "shall be consonant with and conformable thereto,"
Story concluded that "either expressly or by necessary implication it is
provided that the laws of England so far as applicable shall be in force
there." 84 The colonists themselves had an even more straightforward
understanding of their rights under the English law. Since the English
settlers and their descendants had conquered the North American territory from the Native Americans, indigenous law was abolished and English law-their birthright-had been carried to the colonies.85
83. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 105. In 1607, the year of the founding of Virginia, the
first British colony in America, Lord Coke discussed the status of English law in territories that were
newly conquered and in possession of the Crown. In the Case of Robert Calvin, Coke explained
that, for the conquest of a Christian kingdom, the established laws of the land would remain in effect
unless and until the monarch chose to extend the laws of England to the conquered territory. 77 Eng.
Rep. 377, 398 (K.B. 1607). For the conquest of an "infidel" kingdom, indigenous laws were instantly dissolved, leaving the monarch and his delegates to adjudicate any matters by a standard of "natural equity." Blankard v. Galdy, 91 Eng. Rep. 356, 357 (K.B. 1693) ("[ln such cases where the laws
are rejected or silent, the conquered country shall be governed according to the rule of natural equity."). In reviewing the legal status of the American colonies, Blackstone adopted Coke's analysis,
and concluded that neither the statutory nor the common law of England were available to the colonists per se.
84.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 156
(1833). Story also had an alternative explanation for the availability of the writ in the colonies-that
the North American territory had been acquired by "discovery" rather than having been "conquered." Id. § 152. In that situation, the laws of England would be in force. See, e.g., Blankard,91
Eng. Rep. at 357 ("In case of an uninhabited country newly found out by English subjects, all laws
in force in England are in force there."). That said, the consensus in the seventeenth century was
that the colonies were conquerors over an infidel kingdom. See DUKER, supranote 24, at 96-97.
85.
See Blankard,91 Eng. Rep. at 357; DUKER, supranote 24, at 97.
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In practice, it was clear that the colonists were protected by the
common law and that they were subject to legislation directed to them.
As a general matter, however, they were not protected by English statutory law. As explained in 1720 by a Mr. West, Counsel of the Board of
Trade, the common law of England "is the Common Law of the Plantations, and all statutes in affirmance of the Common Law passed in England antecedent to the settlement of the colony, are in force in that colony, unless there is some private Act to the contrary; though no statutes
made since those settlements
are there in force unless the colonists are
86
particularly mentioned.,
Habeas rights under the English statute were accordingly not respected in the colonies, leading to real discontent among the settlers. For
example, the denial of statutory habeas rights led Cotton Mather, one of
the foremost intellectuals in late seventeenth-century Massachusetts, to
complain that the colonists were little more than slaves because they
lacked the writ's statutory protections. In 1689, he sought the peaceful
ouster of Governor Edmund Andros (an autocrat who had been installed
to rule over the northern colonies by the now-deposed James II), complaining that during Andros's rule the writ had not been honored:
It was now plainly affirmed, both by some in open Council and by
the same in private convers[ation], that the people in New-England
were all Slaves, and the only difference between them and Slaves is
their not being bought and sold, and it was a maxim delivered in open
Court unto us by one of the Council that we must think the Priviledges of Englishmen would follow us to the end of the World; Accordingly we have been treated with multiplied contradictions to
[the] Magna Charta, the rights of which we laid claim unto ...
People [have] been fined most unrighteously; and some not of the
meanest Quality have been kept in long and close Imprisonment
without any the least Information
appearing against them, or an Ha87
them.
unto
allowed
beas Corpus
Indeed, even when the colonists tried to pass their own habeas acts,
to guarantee them access to the statutory protections of the English writ,
the Privy Council would disallow them. For example, in 1692, several
years after the Andros affair, Massachusetts passed an act modeled on
the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. Three years later the act was
struck down by the Privy Council on the grounds that, under the Massa86.

Letter from Mr. West to Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, in GEORGE

CHALMERS, OPINIONS OF EMINENT LAWYERS ON VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE,
CHIEFLY CONCERNING THE COLONIES FISHERIES AND COMMERCE OF GREAT BRITAIN 206 (1858).

Likewise, sitting as a Justice, Joseph Story explained that at the very least, "we take it to be a clear
principle that the common law in force at the emigration of our ancestors is deemed the birthright of
the colonies, unless so far as it is inapplicable to their situation or repugnant to their other rights and
privileges." Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 333 (1815) (emphasis added).
87. BOSTON DECLARATION OF GRIEVANCES § 6 (Apr. 18, 1689), available at
http://tinyur.com/cd4jml (emphasis omitted).
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chusetts statute, "the writt of Habeas Corpus is required to be granted in
like manner as is appointed by the Statute 31 Car. 11. in England., which
priviledge has not as yet been granted to any of His Majtys Plantations,
[and] It was not thought fitt in His Majtys absence that the
88 said Act
should continue in force and therefore the same is repealed."
Although some form of the writ of habeas corpus was clearly available in the colonies (Samuel Sewall, for example, describes the issuance
of a habeas corpus in Massachusetts in 1705, well after the Massachusetts Habeas Corpus Act was repealed by the Privy Council),89 it rested
on the common law, without the protections of the return guaranteed to
the colonists. 90 The colonists, in short, were well aware of the functions
of the writ and of the degree to which the fullness of its protections had
been denied them.
2. The Writ from the Early Republic to the Civil War
After an initial flurry of colonial habeas legislation was repealed by
the Privy Council or other officers of the Crown, habeas corpus acts were
not passed in the New World until after Independence. But in the early
days of the Republic, the protections of the English statutory writ were
quickly written into the statutes or constitutions of each of the separate
states. 91 By 1833, as Joseph Story noted in his Commentaries, the Eng88.
A.H. Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 AM. HIST. REv. 18, 21 (1902) (quoting
1 Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay 99), availableat http://tinyurl.com/crtvpv
(last visited Mar. 7, 2009). The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 was officially titled "An Act for the
better securing the liberty of the subject and for the prevention of imprisonments beyond the seas,"
explicitly extending its protections beyond the territorial bounds of England (to Wales, Berwick on
Tweed, and the Isles of Guernsey and Jersey), but not by its terms to the American colonies. A
habeas provision in New York's Charter of Liberties was similarly challenged before the committee
of trade and plantations in 1684; noting that the Charter stated that the "Inhabitants of New York
shall be governed by and according to the Laws of England," the committee "observed that This
Privilege is not granted to any of His Majtys Plantations where the Act of habeas corpus and all such
other Bills do not take Place." Id. at 21 (quoting 3 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE COLONIAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK 357).

89.
Id. at 22 (quoting 6 MASS. HISTORICAL SOCIETY COLLECTIONS, SERIES 5, 147). Carpenter has collected similar accounts from seventeenth and eighteenth century New Hampshire, New
York, and Virginia, concluding that "the rights of the colonists as regards the writ of habeas corpus
rested upon the common law." Id. at 26. Carpenter describes, among other things, "bystanders
hissing the court" after an insufficient return was made to a writ of habeas corpus, "which clearly
shows the common ideas regarding the rights of habeas corpus" and that there was "nothing to
indicate that the issuance of the writ was anything extraordinary." Id. at 22.
Carpenter notes, however, that South Carolina, unique among the colonies, may have in
90.
practice been protected by the English habeas statute. Id. at 23. As William F. Duker has described
in detail, understanding the reach of English law-and in particular of the writ of habeas corpus in
its common-law and statutory forms-requires a colony-by-colony review. See DUKER, supra note
24, at 98-116.
See, e.g., MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 2, ch. 6, art. VII, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND
91.
STATE CONSTrTUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1910 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONsrrrtITIONS] (stating
that the "privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this Commonwealth
in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample manner"); N.H. CONST. OF 1784, reprintedin 4
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2469 (stating that the "privilege and benefit of the
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lish Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 had been, "in substance, incorporated
into the jurisprudence of every state in the Union; and the right to it ha[d]
been secured in most, if not in all, of the state constitutions by a provision, similar to that existing in the constitution of the United States. 92
The history of the writ as a protection against the executive branch
was, as Judge Robertson has recently observed, known to "[e]very member of the Constitutional Convention that convened in Philadelphia 110
years after the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 ... English history was their
history, after all, so they knew that the Great Writ had been forged on the
anvil of struggle between King and Parliament over nearly a century. 9 3
Indeed, the inclusion of the writ of habeas corpus in the United States
Constitution was thoroughly uncontroversial. The first proposal for its
inclusion was made on August 20, 1787, by Charles Pinkney, who
sought to insure that the "privileges and benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and
ample manner: and shall not be suspended by the Legislature except
upon the most urgent and pressing occasions and for a limited time not
exceeding __ months. 94 According to James Madison, all substantive
discussion of the writ took place one week later at the end of the Convention, on August 28, 1787. 9' Nowhere in the historical record is there any
dispute about the fundamental importance of the writ, nor is there any
suggestion but that it should be given the widest possible scope.
The only substantive discussions among the Framers involved
whether it was necessary to provide for the suspension of the writ since,
as James Wilson stated, judges already had adequate power "in most
important cases" to keep a petitioner in prison. 96 Indeed, John Rutledge
wanted to declare habeas corpus "inviolable" and he "did not conceive
that a suspension could ever be necessary at the same time through all
the States., 97 With some minor modifications to the language of Pinkney's original proposal, the habeas provision came out of committee of
style and was passed as, "The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended; unless where in cases of Rebellion or invasion
the public safety may require it."'98 After ratification of the Constitution,

habeas corpus, shall be enjoyed in this state, in the most free, easy, cheap, expeditious, and ample
manner"); 2 LAWs OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COMPRISING THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE ACTS

OF THE LEGISLATURE SINCE THE REVOLUTION 76 (1789) (guaranteeing "speedy [habeas] relief of all
persons imprisoned for any such criminal, or supposed criminal matters").
92.
3 STORY, supra note 84, § 1335.
93.
James Robertson, Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?,55 BuFF. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (2008).
94.

JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 485-86

(Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1920).
95.
Id. at 540-41.
96.
Id. at 541.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. The "where" in this version was changed to "when" in the final draft of the Constitution.
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the first Congress also granted the federal courts jurisdiction to issue the
writ of habeas corpus in section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.99
The writ was issued twice by the Supreme Court in the decade following the passage of the Judiciary Act, in United States v. Hamilton1°°
and Ex parte Burford.'0 At issue in Burford was the refusal of a detainee's custodian to provide an adequate return to the writ. John Atkins
Burford, a shopkeeper who, apparently, was held in little regard in his
community in the District of Columbia, filed in federal court a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus after he was detained on the order of a justice
of the peace. The return to the writ, sent by the justice of the peace,
failed to articulate any legal reason for detaining Burford:
Forasmuch as we are given to understand, from the information, testimony and complaint of many credible persons, that John A. Burford, of the said county, shop-keeper, is not of good name and fame,
nor of honest conversation, but an evil doer and disturber of the
peace of the United States, so that murder, homicide, strifes, discords, and other grievances and damages, amongst the citizens of the
United States, concerning their bodies and property, are likely to
arise thereby, Therefore, on the behalf of the United States, we command you, and every of you, that you omit not, by reason of any liberty within the county aforesaid, but that you attach, or one of you
do attach, the body of the aforesaid John A. Burford, so that you have
him before us, or other justices of the said county, as soon as he can
be taken, to find and offer sufficient surety and mainprize for his
good behaviour towards the said United States, and the citizens theto the form of the statute in such case made and proreof, according
1 02
vided.

Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the insufficiency of the return
in Burford, noting that it did "not allege that witnesses were examined in
his presence, or any other matter whatever, which can be the ground of
[the respondents'] order to find sureties [in the sum of 4,000 dollars, for
his good behaviour for life]" and that there "ought to have been a conviction of his being a person of ill fame," with "the fact ...

established by

testimony, and the names of the witnesses stated."'' 0 3 Accordingly, Marshall held that "the warrant of commitment was illegal, for want of stat-

99. Section 14 of the Act states, in pertinent part, that "either of the justices of the supreme
court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment-Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in
no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the
authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
100. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17, 18 (1795).
101.
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 453 (1806).
102.
Id. at 450-5 1.
103.
Id. at 452.
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ing some good cause certain, supported by oath." 1° 4 Although expressing
some hesitation about the jurisdiction of the Court, 10 5 the Chief Justice
ordered the writ to issue on the authority
of Hamilton, which had been
°6
the first habeas case before the Court.'
The substantive protections of habeas corpus continued to be given
an expansive construction in the court decisions of the early republic.
Reviewing the history of the writ's English origins in Ex parte Watkins,
for example, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the breadth of its protections and the depth of its roots in the common law and English statutory
law. Defining the broad reach of the writ, Marshall measured the Constitution's habeas protections against the English statutory and common
law:
The English judges, being originally under the influence of the
crown, neglected to issue this writ where the government entertained
suspicions which could not be sustained by evidence; and the writ
when issued was sometimes disregarded or evaded, and great individual oppression was suffered in consequence of delays in bringing
prisoners to trial. To remedy this evil the celebrated habeas corpus
act of the 31st of Charles II. was enacted, for the purpose of securing
the benefits for which the writ was given. This statute may be referred to as describing the cases in which relief is, in England, afforded by this0 7writ to a person detained in custody. It enforces the
common law.1

In Watkins, Chief Justice Marshall thus suggests that the meaning of
constitutional habeas corpus was to be found in the common law, but that
equally important was the English statutory law that effectuated the purpose of the common-law writ. Watkins thus makes clear that something
more than just the common law writ was enshrined in the Constitution's
Suspension Clause.

104. Id. at 453. Cf Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (1669) (releasing the prisoner
from custody "because the cause retorn'd of his imprisonment is too general," and there was no way
to tell "whether the evidence given [before the lower court] were full and manifest, or doubtful, lame
and dark, or indeed evidence at all material to the issue, because it is not retom'd what evidence in
particular, as it was delivered, was given").
105.
Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 449.
106. Id. at 449, 453. The jurisdictional issue was eventually addressed by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte Bollman, where he held (in reasoning that would be much critiqued over the next
two hundred years) that the courts had no authority to issue the writ absent the statutory grant of
jurisdiction by Congress in section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807)
("[T]he power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written
law.").
107. Ex ParteWatkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-02 (1830); see also 3 STORY, supra note 84, §
1335 ("In England, however, the benefit of it was often eluded prior to the reign of Charles the
Second; and especially during the reign of Charles the First. These pitiful evasions gave rise to the
famous Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Car. 2, c. 2, which has been frequently considered, as another
magna charta in that kingdom; and has reduced the general method of proceedings on these writs to
the true standard of law and liberty.").
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It is unsurprising, therefore, that the courts, in early republic and antebellum habeas cases, insisted as a matter of course that petitioners
could controvert the returns, and that the federal courts could determine
the truth of factual allegations made to justify the legality of the challenged detentions.
For example, in Ex parte Bollman, Chief Justice Marshall refused to
defer to a magistrate's factual finding that the detention of a pretrial detainee for treason was justified, and instead held five days of factual
hearings on the matter. During that time the Court "fully examined and
attentively considered" the relevant evidence and ordered the petitioner
released.10 8 And in United States v. Green, Justice Story made it clear
that he felt it was the court's duty on habeas to determine the facts underlying the justification for detention. Green was a civil habeas matter in
which a father sought to release his minor son from the custody of a third
party. "In cases of this nature," Story wrote, "the court will look into all
the facts stated in the return, and ascertain if they contain a satisfactory
statement, upon which the party ought to be discharged."' 0 9
Chancellor Kent expressed similar sentiments several years earlier
in a New York habeas case in which the petitioner complained that he
had been taken into military custody and held without charge." 0 The
military commander to whom the writ was directed filed a return stating
simply that the petitioner was not in his custody. Chancellor Kent
thought the return deceptive-"insufficient and bad upon the face of
it"--and refused the invitation to accept at face value what was "evidently an evasive return." ' The prisoner, Kent observed, might not be in the
commander's custody, but to all appearances he was in the commander's
control. He noted a King's Bench precedent in which that court had "observed 'that the courts always looked with a watchful eye at the returns
to writs of habeas corpus; that the liberty of the subject essentially depended on a ready compliance with the requisitions of the writ, and the
courts were jealous whenever an attempt was made to deviate from the
usual form of the return, that the party had not the person in his possession, custody or power, and that it had not been adopted in that case, but
an equivocal one substituted, and the words 'power and possession'
omitted.'" 12

108.
Ex ParteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125, 136 (1807).
109.
26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824). Story refused to accept the defendant's return at face
value, noting that the court would "not discharge the defendant, simply because he declares, that the
infant is not 'in his power, possession, control, or custody,' if the conscience of the court is not
satisfied, that all the material facts are fully disclosed. That would be to listen to mere forms against
the claims of substantial justice, and the rights of personal liberty in the citizen." Id.
110. In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
111.
Id. at 331.
112.
Id. at 331-32 (quoting The King v. Winton, 5 Term. R. 89).
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Other examples of the federal courts diving to the heart of factual
disputes in habeas cases include the 1833 case of Ex parte Randolph, in
which Chief Justice Marshall, after receiving supplementary exhibits and
records, issued the writ to a man who had been taken into custody at the
order of the solicitor of the treasury;' 1 3 and the 1843 case of Ex parte
Smith, in which the court granted the writ to Mormon leader Joseph
Smith, who submitted alibi evidence controverting the Missouri government's allegation in the factual return that Smith was an accessory before
the fact to an assault with intent to kill. 114
From its earliest history, therefore, the writ in America has been understood, in Blackstone's terms, as the bulwark of our liberty precisely
because it undermines arbitrary exercises of executive authority by forcing information out of secret and into the public consciousness, via the
factual return and judicial inquiry into its adequacy.
3. The Writ from the Civil War to the AEDPA Era
As a practical matter, the writ with which most jurists are familiar
today-as a challenge to state court criminal convictions in federal
court-derives from the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which amended
section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and granted the federal courts
significant supervisory power over the state courts.t15
Although devised primarily to assure that African-Americans in the
South would "get fair and impartial justice at the hands of local tribunals,"" 6 the breadth of the 1867 Act is stunning. It grants authority to the
federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus in "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."' 1 7 As the Supreme
Court noted in Ex parte McCardle, which was the first case to reach the
Court under the new Act, Congress had brought within the federal
courts' authority "every possible case of privation of liberty contrary to
the National .. .laws"-a jurisdiction it would be "impossible to widen."'" 8 And in Ex parte Royall, the Court similarly noted that the Act
113.
20 F. Cas. 242, 253, 257 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (opinion of Marshall, J., sitting as Circuit
Justice). Also of interest in Randolph is Judge Barbour's comfort with extending the reach of the
writ to the civil commitment context, explaining that the writ protected by the Suspension Clause is
not limited in scope to what was available just at English common law or even by the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679. See id. at 252-53 (opinion of Barbour, J.).
114.
22 F. Cas. 373, 376, 380 (C.C.D. fll. 1843). Indeed, to the extent the common-law limitation barring petitioners from controverting the return was ever enforced, by the antebellum period it
was exceedingly week. See Arkin, supra note 56,at 22-23 (noting that "the traditional common-law
limitation that prevented a federal habeas court from accepting evidence to contradict a facially
sufficient return had weakened significantly" in antebellum America).
115.
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§
2241-43, 2254(a) (West 2009)).
116.
H.R. REP. NO. 730, at 5 (1884).
117.
Id. (emphasis added).
118.
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 326 (1867).
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conferred 19judicial power "in language as broad as could well be employed."'
The realignment of federal and state relations in the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867 and the Reconstruction Amendments is a well-rehearsed
story. But what goes unremarked is that the 1867 Act codified precise
methods for adjudicating whether the writ should issue and the prisoner
be released. These procedures were designed to respect the underlying
due process principles of habeas that had themselves been codified in
England in the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1679 and 1816, thereby setting a
baseline for the process that Congress deemed essential to determining
the legality of a detention. 220 These skeletal procedures have been retained by statute to this day.1 1
Encomiums to the postbellum, muscular writ abound in the caselaw,122 and the history of the writ in the United States from the early
twentieth century through the Warren Court years was one that largely
expanded federal court protections for state prisoners, albeit in fits and
starts. 123 The high-water mark for a robust, muscular writ was Fay v.
Noia, in which Justice Brennan enthused that habeas was "perhaps the
most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal re-

119.
117 U.S. 241, 247 (1886).
120. The Act requires that the writ be directed to the person detaining the petitioner, and that
this custodian "make return of said writ and bring the party before the judge who granted the writ,
and certify the true cause of the detention of such person within three days thereafter." Act of Feb.
5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1. Upon the return of the writ, "a day shall be set for the hearing of the cause, not
exceeding five days thereafter, unless the party petitioning shall request a longer time." Id. At the
hearing, the petitioner "may deny any of the material facts set forth in the return, or may allege any
fact to show that the detention is in contravention of the constitution or laws of the United States,
which allegations or denials shall be made on oath." Id. The return and traverses may be amended,
"that thereby the material facts may be ascertained," with the court "hearing testimony and the
arguments of the parties interested." Id.
121.
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2243 (West 2009).
122.
In Ex part Yerger, for example, the Supreme Court "esteemed" the writ as "the best and
only sufficient defence of personal freedom." 75 U.S. 85, 95 (1869). See also Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 500 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., for the Court) (habeas statute gives federal courts
"the final say" on federal constitutional issues); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963) (federal
authority to issue the writ "is not defeated by anything that may occur in the state court proceedings"), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992).
123.
One of the chief restrictions on federal courts providing habeas relief, for example, was
the "exhaustion" doctrine that the Supreme Court adopted in 1886 in Ex pare Royal!, requiring state
prisoners to take advantage of all state-court corrective processes before they would be allowed to
proceed on habeas in federal court. 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886). In Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,
334 (1915), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923) (Holmes, J.), the res judicata effect of
the exhaustion doctrine was limited to state processes that were "full and fair." What the content of
"full and fair" would be, however, was not easy to discern. The facts of Frank and Moore are universally acknowledged to be almost identical-involving trials affected by threats of mob violence
-but the Court granted habeas relief in only the former. And by 1953, in Brown v. Allen, the Court
had adopted a de novo standard for reviewing not only legal claims but also mixed questions of fact
and law. Brown, 344 U.S. at 458 (federal courts may consider previous state court judgments on
federal issues, but cannot defer to those judgments).
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straint or confinement,"'
' 25
tain it unimpaired."'

24

and that "there is no higher duty than to main-

But, true to the dictates of the federalist counterrevolution, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts began to lay significant obstacles to stateprisoners' attempts to gain habeas relief and, indeed, habeas hearings in
the first place. The federal courts were precluded on habeas, for example, from reviewing alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment.126 A
"total exhaustion" rule was adopted in order to assure that all federal
habeas applicants brought only a single, unitary habeas case to the federal courts. 27 And, perhaps most significant for state-prisoner habeas petitioners, the Court adopted a rigorous procedural default doctrine that
precluded the federal courts from entertaining on habeas any constitu128
tional claims that had not been properly preserved in the state courts.
The procedural thicket that state prisoners must pass through in order to have their habeas claims adjudicated grew yet more tangled with
the passage in 1996 of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act ("AEDPA"), t2 9 which not only codified the Court's exhaustion and
procedural default rules, but also introduced a short limitations period for
bringing habeas claims1 30 and set a very 31
high bar for federal-court deference to state court legal determinations.
Several points about habeas for state prisoners are in order. These
are the cases with which the federal judiciary is most familiar. The federal courts review thousands of such petitions from state prisoners every
year, finding a constitutional violation meriting issuance of the writ in
less than one percent of the cases filed.1 32 Federal judges find the cases
124.
372 U.S. at 400 (internal quotation omitted).
125.
Id.
126.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
127.
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
731 (1991) ("This exhaustion requirement is... grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of [a] state
prisoner's federal rights.").
128.
See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). In Coleman, a prisoner who had
been sentenced to death had his notice of appeal filed one day late by his attorney. The state court
refused to hear his claim, declaring it defaulted. The Supreme Court held that the federal courts
were precluded by procedural-default doctrine from hearing the claim with Justice O'Connor stating
in the opinion's opening sentence that this was "a case about Federalism." 501 U.S. at 726.
129.
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified in scattered sections of
Title 28 in the U.S. Code.).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitations period ordinarily begins to run on "the date on
which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review." Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
131.
Under AEDPA, the federal court is precluded from granting habeas relief for a state
prisoner unless the state court's previous adjudication of his claim "(1) resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding." Id. § 2254(d).
132.
See KING, supra note 1,at 58-59 n.109 (noting that in the years after the passages of
AEDPA, the writ has been granted in only .35 percent of cases).
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tedious. Not only are there proportionately few worthy claims, but
judges feel compelled to avoid reaching merits determinations on any
claims until they have addressed time bars, exhaustion, and procedural
defaults. Federal judges are also aware of comity and federalism concerns, as they are being asked to find that the state courts failed to comprehend or to respect the dictates of the federal Constitution. In short,
the "habeas" with which most of us have grown familiar for decades is a
process in which the federal judge has been primed to be deferential.
It is therefore important to contextualize the office of the writ in the
executive detention context and to remember, as the Supreme Court observed in INS v. St. Cyr, that at "its historical core, the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest."' 33 Stated differently, we must be careful not to allow the deferential
stance that federal courts have adopted (for comity reasons) in the stateprisoner habeas context to color our judgment about the degree of deference that the federal courts should adopt (for separation-of-powers reasons) in the executive-detention context.
To be sure, conventional scholarship suggests that in the war context, decisions about detention are properly located in the political
branches, because if executive action is unfaithful to constitutional principles (or if Congress authorizes unjust detention) the political process
will force correction. The problem with such an approach is that the
facts about detention may not be available to the public for deliberation.
For this reason, habeas procedures-and in particular the requirement of
the factual return and an opportunity to contest its assertions via discovery and examination at a hearing before a neutral magistrate-must be
robust.
II. WAR ON TERROR CASES AND LEGISLATION

Prior to 9/11, the federal courts had never held that the privilege of
habeas corpus extended to non-citizens held outside of the sovereign
territory of the United States. Had the Bush administration provided its
War on Terror detainees with some substantial process to determine
whether their detention was legal-and to determine whether, for example, they had actually been captured on a battlefield fighting U.S.
troops-it seems likely that the Supreme Court would have avoided answering such a question altogether. But, as discussed below, the administration failed to provide a fair administrative process for its detainees,
compelling the courts to provide one themselves.
133.
533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). See also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380, n.13 (1977); id
at 385-86 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that "the traditional Great Writ was largely a remedy
against executive detention"); Brown, 344 U.S. at 533 (Jackson, J., concurring in result) ("The
historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial

trial.").
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A. The Guantdnamo LitigationGenerally
The story of Guantdnamo is the story of a failure of process. Guantdnamo Bay opened as a detention center in the War on Terror in January
2002. Most of the nearly 775 prisoners who have been held there over
the years were first taken into custody in or around Afghanistan in the
weeks following United States bombing of Taliban and al Qaeda strongholds in the country. Although Bush administration officials repeatedly
stated that the men were "picked up on the battlefield trying to kill
Americans,"'134 the military's own documents reveal that fully eighty-six
percent of the detainees were in fact taken into custody by Pakistani rather than American security forces, at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border
rather than on anything resembling an actual battlefield.1 35 These men
were eventually turned over to the American military as suspected associates of al Qaeda or the Taliban and were held at the Bagram or Kandahar Air Force bases before being sent to Guantd.namo.
Our military made mistakes about who many of these men were and
about what they were doing in Afghanistan. It should not be surprising
that errors were made, since the American military failed to follow international law and Army regulations when it chose not to hold field hearings after the capture of these men, all of whom were wearing civilian
clothing when taken into custody.
There are two reasons that a person caught near a battlefield would
be wearing civilian clothes. One is that the person is an enemy soldier
disguised as a civilian, and the other is that the person actually is a civilian. How does one tell the difference? Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Conventions and section 190-8 of the U.S. Army Regulations provide the
answer, requiring that a status hearing be held when the privileged status
of a captured person is unclear. 136 During the First Gulf War, the United
134.
See, e.g., Interview with President George W. Bush, in the East Room (June 20, 2005),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050620-19.htm
("These are people picked up off the battlefield in Afghanistan. They weren't wearing uniforms...
but they were there to kill."); Press Briefing by White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan (June
21, 2005), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibrary/news/2005/06/mil-050621usia02.htm ("These detainees are dangerous enemy combatants .... They were picked up on the
battlefield, fighting American forces, trying to kill American forces."); Interview by Wolf Blitzer
with Vice President Cheney in the Vice President's Ceremonial Office (June 23, 2005), availableat
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050623-8.html
('The people
that are there are people we picked up on the battlefield, primarily in Afghanistan. They're terrorists. They're bomb makers. They're facilitators of terror. They're members of Al Qaeda and the
Taliban....").
135.
MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A
PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 2,

http://law.shu.edu/aaafinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
136.
Article 5 of the Geneva Conventions requires a "competent tribunal" to "determine the
status of any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a
belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed forces, and who asserts that
he or she is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature
exists." Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5(2), Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. See also U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of
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States held 1,196 of these Article 5 hearings, and as a result we determined that we had picked up innocent civilians in 886 instances, meaning that our error rate was almost exactly seventy-five percent.13 ' During
the Afghan conflict, not a single Article 5 hearing was held.
Why were these captured men brought to Guantdnamo? There
seem to be only two plausible reasons. First, the naval station is a secure
and heavily guarded location, far from both the battlefield in Afghanistan
and from any (American) civilian centers, making an attack on the prison
housing these detainees thoroughly unlikely 38 Second, and doubtless
most important, the Bush administration posited that the federal courts
would have no jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by prisoners
held there since the detainees are
not citizens and Guantdnamo is not
1 39
sovereign United States territory.
Lawyers were not allowed to visit Guantdnamo, and even the International Committee of the Red Cross was given only limited access to
the prisoners there. Nonetheless, not long after its opening as a detention
center, public interest lawyers and a private law firm filed the first habeas petitions for several prisoners. Although the lower federal courts
determined that they had no jurisdiction to hear habeas actions brought
by non-citizens held in non-sovereign U.S. territory,140 in June 2004, the
Supreme Court ruled that the courts did have jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute to hear the claims. 141

War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, para. 1-6 (1 Oct. 1997), available
at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdfrl90O8.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
137.
Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, at 578 (Apr. 1992), available
at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf.
138.
See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 142-43 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006) ("No
location was perfect, but the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, seemed to fit the bill ...
. Gitmo was well-defended, militarily secure, and far from any civilians. The first Bush and Clinton
administrations had used Gitmo to hold Haitian refugees who sought to enter the United States
illegally.").
139.
This is not mere conjecture. An Office of Legal Counsel memorandum has recently been
released in which precisely this question was addressed. See Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin
and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'ys Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
William J. Haynes, H, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., Re: Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over
Aliens Held in GuantanamoBay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001), in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 17 at 29.
For discussion of the "sovereignty" status of Guantinamo, see Michael J. Strauss, The Leasing of
Guantdnamo Bay (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript on file with author); Elizabeth A. Wilson, The
War on Terrorismand "The Water's Edge": Sovereignty, "TerritorialJurisdiction," and the Reach
of the U.S. Constitution in the Guantdnamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165, 166
(2006).
140. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2002); Al Odah v. United States,
321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
141.
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473. Although footnote 15 of the Rasul opinion suggested that the
Court may have reached the constitutional rights of the prisoners, the Court subsequently stated in
Boumediene v. Bush that it had not. See id. at 484 n.15 (noting that the petitioners' "allegationsthat, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States,
they have been held in executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the longterm, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without
being charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitu-
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In the aftermath of Rasul, lawyers filed habeas petitions for those
prisoners whose names were known. Immediately, the Bush administration asked the federal courts to dismiss them all, arguing that even
though the courts might have statutory jurisdiction over the case, as per
Rasul, nonetheless the prisoners did not have any constitutional rights,
because they were non-citizen "enemy combatants" held outside of "sovereign" U.S. territory. Their detention was therefore, according to the
government, per se legal.
The judge before whom the Guantdnamo habeas cases were consolidated denied the government's motion to dismiss, holding that the prisoners were entitled to fundamental protections of the Constitutionto
including due process of law-and that they therefore were entitled 142
habeas hearings to determine whether those rights had been infringed.
In particular, the judge found that the Guantdinamo detainees were protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and that the administrative review panels that were convened by the military in the aftermath of Rasul-called Combatant Status Review Tribunals, or
CSRTs-violated due process by denying the petitioners access to counsel, preventing them from seeing the government's evidence, and allowing the introduction into evidence of statements procured by torture. 143
The government's contention had been that a Guantdnamo prisoner
could be held in prison for life based solely on a CSRT panel's determination that the prisoner was an "enemy combatant." 144 Under the
CSRT's rules, the prisoner was presumed guilty, having already "been
determined to be an enemy combatant through multiple levels of review
by officers of the Department of Defense. 14 5 The prisoner was not entitled to the assistance of a lawyer and could instead rely only on a "pertion"'); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008) ("The constitutional issue... was not
reached in Rasul.").
142.
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 477 (D.D.C. 2005).
143.
Id. at 468.
144. The term "enemy combatant" has a sparse legal pedigree and is unknown to international
law. See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950) (referring to "enemy aliens"
without any discussion or analysis of the term); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (distinguishing unlawful from lawful combatants, and noting that the definition of "unlawful combatant" could
include "an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose
of waging war by destruction of life or property"). The Bush Administration itself has made the
definition a moving target. As Justice O'Connor explained in Hamdi in 2004, the government "has
never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such," and
therefore the "permissible bounds of the category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent
cases are presented to them." 542 U.S. at 516, 522 n. I. See also Peter Jan Honigsberg, Chasing
'Enemy Combatants' and Circumventing InternationalLaw: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 1, 55 (2007); Marc D. Falkoff, Litigation and Delay at Guantdnamo
Bay, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 393, 397 n.15 (2007).
145.
Paul Wolfowitz, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal at 1 (July 7,
2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; see also Defense Department Background Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.dod.miltranscripts/2004/tr20040707-0981.html. New rules, differing in no material
respect in relation to the issues discussed in the accompanying text, were promulgated following
Congress's passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.

992

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

sonal representative" from the military-a person who by regulation may
not be a lawyer, with whom the prisoner may not share a confidential
relationship, and who must report any inculpatory statements from the
prisoner to the tribunal. 146 The prisoner was not allowed to see any of
the classified evidence against him. Having never seen the witness
statements, of course, the prisoner could not seek to controvert them on
the grounds that they are untrustworthy hearsay-or even that they were
derived from abuse or torture.
The government was allowed to appeal Judge Green's order on an
interlocutory basis and, while the appeal was pending, Congress passed
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA"), which purported to withdraw the power of the federal courts to hear habeas petitions from Guanttnamo detainees.1 47
Passage of the DTA set the stage for the first return of the Guantdnamo cases to the Supreme Court. This time, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
the Court held that Congress's jurisdiction-stripping statute was not
meant to apply to Guantinamo prisoners who had already filed habeas
petitions. 48 Providing a rather strained reading of the DTA's "effective
date" provisions, the Court seemed to go out of its way to protect the
habeas right, refusing to infer that Congress would take so momentous a
step as to retroactively strip this statutory right from the Guantdnamo
petitioners absent clearer indication of its intent.
In the waning days of Republican control, Congress responded by
passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA"), 4 9this time
clarifying that it intended the habeas right to be stripped from Guantdnamo prisoners retroactively. 150 In short order, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the habeas cases on its docket for lack of jurisdiction.
The Guantdnamo prisoners sought certiorari from the Supreme
Court, but were initially denied the opportunity to return one last time.
146. See Gordon England, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures
for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Encl. 1 I C3 (July 14,
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d2006O8O9CSRTProcedures.pdf
(personal representative "shall not be a judge advocate"); id. at Encl. 3 CI (personal representative
"shall explain to the detainee that no confidential relationship exists or may be formed between"
them); id. at Encl. 3 D (personal representative directed to tell prisoner, "None of the information
you provide me shall be held in confidence and I may be obligated to divulge it at the hearing").
147.
See Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
provide that "no court, justice or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider.., an application
for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantnamo Bay, Cuba").
148.
548 U.S. 557, 584 & n. 15 (2006).
149.
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
150.
Section 7(b) provides that the effective date of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions will be
"the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since September 11,
2001." Id. at 2636.
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In a "statement" respecting the denial of certiorari,Justices Stevens and
Kennedy explained that, although the case was of profound importance,
Congress had provided an alternative remedy to habeas corpus-direct
review in the court of appeals, limited to the sole question of whether the
military had followed its own procedures when it determined that the
Guantdnamo detainees were "enemy combatants."'' 51 Borrowing a doctrine from state-prisoner habeas cases, the Court told the Guantdnamo
petitioners to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking further intervention from the federal courts.
The habeas petitioners, however, sought reconsideration of the
denial of certiorari after Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham-who
had sat on several of these CSRT tribunals-drafted a declaration exposing the fundamentally unfair nature of those proceedings. Abraham explained, among other things, that even when a tribunal reached a determination that a prisoner was not an enemy combatant, the panel was often commanded by superiors to perform a "do-over." The Supreme
Court granted the prisoners' reconsideration motion and reversed its
denial of certiorari,52 agreeing to hear the case of Boumediene v. Bush.
In Boumediene, which is discussed in more detail below, Justice
Kennedy held for the Court that, by passing the MCA, Congress had
unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus 153-something
the Suspension Clause allows Congress to do only "when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. ' 154 Justice Kennedy concluded, in short, that the Guantinamo detainees were protected
by the Suspension Clause and had a constitutional right to the fundamental protections of the writ of habeas corpus.
B. Hamdi and Boumediene on Habeas Corpus Procedures
Two Supreme Court cases in recent years have discussed the general principles to be used by the courts when dealing with habeas petitions
from men held in wartime executive-detention. The first, Hamdi 1v.
55
Rumsfeld, directly addressed the habeas procedural rights of a citizen,
and the second, Boumediene v. Bush, discussed the same issues for noncitizens. 156 Subsequent cases in the lower federal courts have sought,
with greater or lesser success, to glean from these decisions guidance on
developing actual procedures to utilize during habeas hearings.
In Hamdi, five Justices held that the detention of a U.S. citizen who
fought against the United States in Afghanistan could be detained for the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1479 (2007).
Id. at 3078.
Id. at 2229, 2240.
U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 9.
542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
128 S. Ct. at 2241.
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duration of the conflict, consistent with the "necessary and appropriate
force" that Congress authorized the President to exercise via the Authorization for Use of Military Force. 157 Justice O'Connor went on to address
the question of "what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who
disputes his enemy-combatant status,"5 though
on this topic she was writ8
ing for only a plurality of the Justices.1
Noting that the Court had jurisdiction to hear Hamdi's claims pursuant to the federal habeas statute, Justice O'Connor stated that "all agree
that [28 U.S.C.] § 2241 and its companion provisions provide at least a
skeletal outline of the procedures to be afforded a petitioner in federal
habeas review," and that, "[m]ost notably, § 2243 provides that 'the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return
or allege any other material facts,' and § 2246 allows the taking of evidence in habeas proceedings by deposition, affidavit, or interrogatories. ,,159 Justice O'Connor read the habeas statute, in other words, as
ensuring that "habeas petitioners would have some opportunity to present
and rebut facts and that the courts in cases like this retain some ability to
vary the ways in which they do so as mandated by due process."' 6 °
She recognized, however, that precisely what process was due to a
citizen accused of being an "enemy combatant" during time of conflict
was a more difficult question. Again, writing only for a plurality, she
took seriously the government's argument that separation of powers concerns warranted deference to the executive branch and that these same
concerns meant that an assumption of the accuracy of the government's
evidence was appropriate.'16 At the same time, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that citizens were entitled to a fair process for determining
whether their detention was legal.
Justice O'Connor saw a way to resolve the tension between these
competing values by invoking Mathews v. Eldridge162 and its balancing
test. "Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing 'the private interest that will be affected by the
official action' against the Government's asserted interest, 'including the
function involved' and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process."' 63 The court's role, Justice O'Connor explained,
was to engage in a "judicious balancing of these concerns, through an
analysis of 'the risk of an erroneous deprivation' of the private interest if

157.
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001), note following 50 U.S.C. §1541 (2000 ed., Supp. V).
158.
542 U.S. at 524.
159.
Id. at 525.
160. Id. at 526.
161.
Id. at 527.
162.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
163.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.

2009]

HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES

the process were reduced and the ''probable
value, if any, of additional or
64
substitute procedural safeguards. "
Accordingly, Justice O'Connor stated that a "citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to
rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker," which she declared
were "essential constitutional promises" that
"may not be eroded."'' 65 Beyond that, she offered few specifics of what
procedures must be in place at a habeas hearing, noting only that, in the
view of the plurality, "the exigencies of the circumstances may demand
that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may
be tailored to alleviate their uncommon' 66potential to burden the Executive
at a time of ongoing military conflict."'
Thus, according to the Hamdi plurality, "hearsay may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in
such a proceeding," and "the Constitution would not be offended by a
presumption in favor of the Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal
were provided."' 167 The Hamdi plurality also envisioned a constitutionally acceptable burden-shifting scheme, whereby "once the Government
puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy
combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evi' 68
dence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria."'
The plurality even suggested that an "appropriately authorized and properly constituted
military tribunal" might suffice to provide the process
1 69
due.
The Hamdi plurality's adoption of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test has struck many scholars as extraordinary, not only because Mathews was an administrative law case concerning social security benefits
rather than liberty interests,170 but also because the Court in Medina v.
Californiahad held more than a decade earlier that the Mathews balanc-

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 533-34 (emphasis added).
Id. at 534.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 442. See Tung Yin, ProceduralDue Process to Determine "Enemy Combatant"

Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 398-99, 400 (2006) (arguing that Mathews

balancing is the wrong approach for assessing the level of process due to detainees held in the war
on terrorism, "since the clash of individual and national security interests allows the judicial decisionmaker to reach any plausible outcome"). See also Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standardsof Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1418
(2008) (proposing alternative balancing test derived from the law of "targeting").
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ing test was an inappropriate framework for assessing the adequacy of
1 71
due process rules in the criminal context.
Discussion of due process and acceptable habeas procedures must,
of course, be addressed by any federal judge deciding what habeas hearings in her courtroom will look like. But the ruminations on hearsay and
burdens in Hamdi were issued by only a plurality of the Court, and thus
provide no definitive guidance for trial-line habeas judges. 172 Indeed,
Justice Souter emphatically refused to endorse the constricted procedures
proposed by Justice O'Connor's plurality, noting that it "should go without saying" that
in joining with the plurality to produce a judgment, I do not adopt the
plurality's resolution of constitutional issues that I would not reach.
It is not that I could disagree with the plurality's determinations...
that someone in Hamdi's position is entitled at a minimum to notice
of the Government's claimed factual basis for holding him, and to a
fair chance to rebut it before a neutral decisionmaker; nor, of course,
could I disagree with the plurality's affirmation of Hamdi's right to
counsel. On the other hand, I do not mean to imply agreement that
the Government could claim an evidentiary presumption casting the
burden of rebuttal on Hamdi, or that an opportunity to litigate before
a military
tribunal might obviate or truncate enquiry by a court on
73
habeas. 1
In addition, it is important to recognize that the plurality's prescriptions were couched in conditional terms and were drafted in the context
of a detainee who was assertedly picked up on an actual battlefield fighting the troops of United States allies. 74 In the end, therefore, Hamdi
provides relatively little guidance about what an adequate set of habeas
procedures in the non-criminal detention context might look like for
prisoners whose connection to a battlefield is far more attenuated.
The Boumediene decision from June 2008 should likewise give
pause to those who are tempted to rely too heavily on the Hamdi plurality. Most importantly, in Boumediene Justice Kennedy flatly rejected the
government's argument that the Hamdi plurality's discussion of habeas

171.
505 U.S. 437 (1992).
172.
The Hamdi plurality opinion is binding only to the degree to which Justice Souter concurred with the plurality opinion. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Justice
Souter's concurrence was, in turn, of limited scope. He explained that "the need to give practical
effect to the conclusions of eight Members of the Court rejecting the Government's position calls for
me to join with the plurality in ordering remand on terms closest to those I would impose." 542 U.S.
at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (Rutledge,
J., concurring in result)).
173.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553-54 (citations omitted); see also Rapanos v. United States, 547
U.S. 715, 810 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the practice and practical effect of plurality
and concurring opinions which espouse differing tests).
174.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512-13.
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procedures was binding precedent. 75 Although he refused to provide a
"comprehensive summary" of the requisites for a fair habeas hearing, he
did offer some further observations about procedures.
Justice Kennedy began by noting that it was "uncontroversial" that
"the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to 'the erroneous
application or interpretation' of relevant law" and that the "habeas court
must have the power to order the conditional release of an individual
unlawfully detained."'176 But beyond that, Justice Kennedy
added, "de' 77
pending on the circumstances, more may be required."'
To determine what more might be needed, Justice Kennedy noted
that habeas was at common-law "an adaptable remedy" whose "precise
application and scope changed depending on the circumstances."' 178 In
particular, he correctly observed that the evidence from nineteenthcentury American sources indicated that "habeas courts in this country
routinely allowed prisoners to introduce exculpatory evidence that was
either unknown or previously unavailable to the prisoner," and thatcrucially-the "scope of 1habeas
review in part depends upon the rigor of
79
any earlier proceedings."'
Justice Kennedy thus acknowledged that more muscular procedural
protections were constitutionally necessary in habeas cases challenging
non-criminal executive detentions than are necessary in challenges to
state-court criminal convictions. Exhaustion requirements and deference
to the state courts were reasonable, he explained, where the relief sought
was from a court of record, "because it can be assumed that, in the usual
course, a court of record provides defendants with a fair, adversary proceeding."' 180 Such deference also accords with principles of federalism, a
concern that executive detention cases do not implicate.

175.
In rejecting the government's argument that the CSRT process conformed with the procedures suggested by the plurality in Hamdi, Justice Kennedy wrote that, "[sletting aside the fact that
the relevant language in Hamdi did not garner a majority of the Court," the Hamdi plurality's opinion "does not control the matter at hand." Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008); cf.
id. at 2284-86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (attacking the Boumediene majority opinion as inconsistent
with the Hamdi plurality opinion, but without arguing that the plurality's opinion was binding); id. at
2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
176.
Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2266 (2008).
177.
Id. at 2267.
178.
Id. at 2267 (citing, inter alia, BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 131 (describing habeas as
"the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement"); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
319 (1995) (noting that habeas "is, at its core, an equitable remedy"); Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (noting that habeas is not "a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has
grown to achieve its grand purpose")).
179.
Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2267-68. See also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 2102
(noting that the "early practice was not consistent" and that "courts occasionally permitted factual
inquiries when no other opportunity for judicial review existed").
180.
Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2268.
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Indeed, it is precisely where the petitioner has been detained by executive order that collateral review is "most pressing":
A criminal conviction in the usual course occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and committed to
procedures designed to ensure its own independence. These dynamics are not inherent in executive detention orders or executive review
procedures. In this context the need for habeas corpus is more urgent. The intended duration of the detention and the reasons for it
bear upon the precise scope of the inquiry. Habeas corpus proceedings need not resemble a criminal trial, even when the detention is by
executive order. But the writ must be effective. The habeas court
must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of
both the cause for detention and the Executive's power to detain.' 81
Of course, in the end these observations too are of limited value in guiding the lower courts in how to conduct a habeas hearing in the executive
detention context, and Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the Court in
Boumediene would "make no attempt to anticipate all of the evidentiary
and access-to-counsel issues that will arise during the course of the detainees' habeas corpus proceedings. 182 Balancing the government's
legitimate security needs against the prisoners' right to adjudication of
the legality of their detention, Justice Kennedy concluded, is "within the
expertise83and competence of the District Court to address in the first instance."'
Ill. HABEAS PROCEDURES AND NON-CRIMINAL EXECUTIVE DETENTION

Having canvassed the history of habeas in the English and American context, and reviewed relevant war-on-terror cases since 9/11, in this
part I provide a doctrinal justification for robust habeas measures in the
executive-detention context. After setting forth my recommendations for
appropriate habeas procedures, I end by assessing the adequacy of those
procedures that to date have been deployed by the courts in the small
number of executive-detention habeas hearings that have so far taken
place.
A. Habeas as a Flexible Remedy
In theory, the process due to a petitioner at his habeas hearing may
depend upon the basis of the federal court's jurisdiction to hear the case.
If the Guantd.namo petitioners, for example, are properly before the
courts pursuant to section 2241 of the Title 28 of the United States Code,
they would presumably be entitled to at least the "skeletal" procedures
provided by Congress for other habeas petitioners. If, however, their
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 2269.
Id. at 2276.

Id.
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presence in the federal court depends solely on the Constitution, they
might arguably be entitled only to the kind of common law hearing that
would have been available to a habeas petitioner in 1787, at the time of
the Constitution's ratification.
As discussed above, in the DTA and MCA, Congress sought to
amend the modem habeas statute by removing the federal courts' jurisdiction to hear cases from, respectively, the Guantdnamo prisoners and
all detainees being held as "enemy combatants" by the Department of
Defense. The Supreme Court in Boumediene held that this jurisdiction
strip was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ with respect to, at
least, the Guantdnamo petitioners because they were in fact protected by
the Suspension Clause. 184 Does Boumediene's holding mean that the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear the detainees' habeas petitions
flows directly from the Constitution and that the federal courts need no
further statutory authority to entertain the habeas petitions? 185 Or does
the Boumediene decision mean that Congress's attempt to modify (via
the DTA and MCA) its own statutory grant of habeas jurisdiction to the
federal courts (in the habeas statute) is itself inoperative, leaving the federal courts with statutory jurisdiction pursuant to the habeas statute?
In Ex parte Boilman, Chief Justice Marshall held that the federal
courts would not have jurisdiction to issue the writ absent written law
and that it was for this reason that Congress, acting "under the immediate
influence" of the Suspension Clause, "must have felt, with peculiar force,
the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in
existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.' 186 Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning in
Bollman has, of course, been criticized over the years, 187 but the holding
has never successfully been challenged. If Bolman remains good law,
therefore, the Guantdnamo habeas petitioners would appear to be properly in the federal courts only because statutory jurisdiction remains pursuant to section 2241, notwithstanding the DTA and MCA.
Regardless of whether the Guantinamo petitioners possess a statutory or only a constitutional right to habeas, the federal courts should
resist calls to return to the time of the framing of the Constitution in order to determine what a habeas corpus hearing looked like at that time.
As discussed at length above, habeas by its very nature is an evolving
and dynamic vehicle for reining in arbitrary executive action. There is
184.
Id. at 2240.
185.
Such might be the implication of Justice Souter's observation, concurring in Boumediene,
that, because Congress by legislation had "eliminated the statutory habeas jurisdiction" over the
Guantdnamo detainees' habeas claims, "now there must be constitutionally based jurisdiction or
none at all." ld.
at 2278 (Souter, J., concurring).
186.
ExparteBollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
187.
See Freedman, supra note 15, at 536-37.
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no evidence in the historical record to indicate that the Framers believed
they were enshrining in the Constitution a particular set of procedures
rather than a fundamental principle when they provided that the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus could be suspended in only certain dramatic
circumstances.
Instead, in devising habeas procedures, the courts should begin with
the premise that habeas has always been a flexible remedy, equitable in
nature, and designed to reach the substantive heart of the matter. 88 Although it is certain that we should "look to the common law" for guidance about the reach of habeas, 89 "[n]o one would now suggest that this
Court be imprisoned by every particular of habeas corpus as it existed in
the late 18th and 19th centuries."' 190 As discussed above, the essence of
habeas historically has been that it required a searching and independent
inquiry into the lawfulness of a prisoner's detention.' 9' Indeed, the crux
of the habeas right has long been to provide prisoners with enough information to meaningfully challenge the factual basis of their detention
and for the courts to have an opportunity to assess the legality
of the de192
tention based on the facts that have been developed before it.
The Supreme Court has recognized these facts. In Harrisv. Nelson
in particular, the Court made clear that the trial court must retain the
power to provide the quantum of due process that is necessary in any
particular case. The "very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected. 4 93 A habeas
proceeding "must not be allowed to founder in a 'procedural morass,"'
188.
"[H]abeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure. It
comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although every form may
have been preserved, opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell." Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
189.
See Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93-94 ("[F]or the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may
unquestionably be had to the common law.").
190. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 (1973); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66
(1968) (noting that "the development of the writ of habeas corpus did not end in 1789"); Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) ("[The writ] is not now and never has been a static, narrow,
formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose-the protection of individuals
against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty."). But see Ex
parte Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 78, 80 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853) (stating that "the proceedings upon this writ in
the federal courts ... [are governed] by the common law of England, as it stood at the adoption of
the constitution, subject to such alterations as congress may see fit to prescribe").
191. See, e.g., Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202 (1830) ("['Tihe great object of [the writ] is
the liberation of those ...imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is in the nature of a writ of error,
to examine the legality of the commitment."); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1947) (explaining that the writ's "most important result.., has been to afford a swift and imperative remedy in all
cases of illegal restraint upon personal liberty").
192.
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2266-69 (2008) (stating that because "the
writ must be effective. The habeas court must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful
review of... the cause for detention ....); id.
at 2270 (stating that habeas "includes some authority
to assess the sufficiency of the Government's evidence against the detainee," and the court "also
must have the authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not introduced
during the earlier proceeding").
193.
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969).
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particularly where the petitioner is "handicapped in developing the evidence needed
to support in necessary detail the facts alleged in his peti, 194
tion."
B. Sources of Authority to Develop HabeasProcedures
There are four possible sources for the federal courts to draw on
when fashioning habeas procedures in the executive detention context:
the Judiciary Act of 1867, as amended and codified; the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S.
District Courts; and the courts' inherent authority to fashion appropriate
modes of procedure pursuant to the All Writs Act. Although taken together these sources mandate little in the way of discovery and other due
process rights for habeas applicants, they provide adequate discretion for
the district courts to fashion procedures that comport with the historical
purposes of the writ.
First, there is little dispute that petitioners who have appropriately
invoked the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts are entitled to the
benefits of the "skeletal procedures" that originated in the Judiciary Act
of 1867 and that have since been amended. 195 These procedures include,
first and foremost, provision for the custodian to make a prompt "return
certifying the true cause of the detention,"' 96 and an opportunity for the
detained petitioner to "deny any
of the facts set forth in the return or al197
lege any other material facts."
In addition, the statute since 1948 has provided that "evidence may
be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by
affidavit. If affidavits are admitted any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants, or to file answering affidavits.' ' 198 Concededly, this provision has been construed by the Supreme
Court to be of restrained scope, "limited to interrogatories for the purpose of obtaining evidence from affiants where affidavits were admitted
in evidence."' 99 These provisions are therefore of limited value to a
court fashioning procedures seeking to determine whether a detention is
well-founded in fact and law.
Second, because habeas corpus is nominally a civil action, one
might suppose that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-and particularly their liberal discovery rules-would apply of their own force to habeas
actions. To a certain extent they do, but there are significant limitations
within the Rules themselves.
194.
195.

553, 525
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 291-92 (citation omitted).
Codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2243-2248 (West 2008).

(2004).
28 U.S.C.A. § 2243, 1 3 (West 2008).
Id. § 2243, 16.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2246 (West 2008).
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 296 (1969).

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S.
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As an initial matter, a glance at the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
will make clear why a habeas petitioner would want them to apply to his
court action. The Rules, promulgated in 1938, were designed to be
largely self-executing and to streamline litigation by forcing both sides in
a dispute to turn over material information in their possession. Thus, for
example, Rule 26 calls for prompt initial disclosures of "the name.., of
each individual likely to have discoverable information-along with the
subjects of that information-that the disclosing party may use to support
its claims or defenses"; Rule 30 allows for depositions; Rule 33 allows a
party to serve interrogatories; and Rule 34 allows for the production of
documents. 200 These procedures would be invaluable for a litigant challenging the legality of his detention since they would operate automatically to provide a wealth of information, while demanding little of the
petitioner in return.
While Rule 1 provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United
States district courts," they do so only with the exceptions stated in Rule
8 1.201 The first part of Rule 81(a)(4), in turn, provides that the civil procedure rules "apply to proceedings for habeas corpus" only "to the extent
that the practice in those proceedings . . . is not specified in a federal

statute, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, or the Rules Governing
Section 2255 Cases. 20 2 Where there is a conflict, in short, the court
must follow the statute or more-specific set of rules-in particular the
rules governing state prisoner challenges to the constitutionality of their
conviction (section 2254) and federal prisoner challenges (section 2255).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases will be discussed briefly below.
The second part of Rule 81(a)(4) states that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure apply to habeas proceedings only "to the extent that the
practice in those proceedings

. . .

has previously conformed to the prac-

tice in civil actions. 2 °3 The meaning of this provision is not perfectly
clear. Is a "practice" a specific procedural device like interrogatories, or
is a "practice" a general approach to certain matters? Does "previously
conformed" mean that the procedural device (or general approach) was
similar in habeas and other civil matters before the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938? Or does "previously conformed" mean that where habeas and other civil matters were treated
similarly before 1938, they should be treated similarly today, thereby

200.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i), 30, 33, 34.

201.

FED. R. CIv. P. 1.

202.
203.

FED. R. Civ. P. 81 (a)(4)(A).
FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4)(B).
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allowing habeas petitioners the2 °4benefit of the innovative rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
As it happens, these interesting questions have in practice been
mooted by the Supreme Court. In Harrisv. Nelson, the Court addressed
whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33-which allows a party to
propound interrogatories-was available as of right to habeas petitioners.
The Court noted that it was "true that the availability of Rule 33 would
provide prisoners with an instrument of discovery which could be activated on their own initiative, without prior court approval, and that this
would be of considerable tactical advantage to them in the prosecution of
their efforts to demonstrate such error in their trial as would result in
their release." 205
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that Rule 81 precluded the availability of Rule 33 as of right to habeas petitioners. There was "no indication," according to the Court, "that with respect to pretrial proceedings
for the development of evidence, habeas corpus practice had conformed
to the practice at law or in equity 'to the extent' that the application of
rules newly developed in 1938 to govern discovery in 'civil' cases
should apply in order to avoid a divergence in practice which had theretofore been substantially uniform. ' ,20 6 Not only could the automatic operation of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be burdensome and vexatious, but Congress itself had indicated no
intent to extend the Rules to habeas petitioners.20 7 In sum, it was clear to
the Court there was no intention on the part of the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to extend their broad discovery provisions
to habeas proceedings.20 8
That said, habeas petitioners are none the worse for the decision in
Harris. As the Court explained, to "conclude that the Federal Rules'
discovery provisions do not apply completely and automatically by virtue of [Rule 81] is not to say that there is no way in which a district court
204. See Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1154,
1155 (1970) (raising these questions).
205. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1969).
206. Id. at 294. Discovery per se in criminal matters is itself a relatively recent phenomenon.
See, e.g., William J. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Questfor Truth?, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 294 (1963) (calling for more criminal discovery); The King v. Holland, 100 Eng.
Rep. 1248, 1249 (K.B. 1792) (stating that to grant pretrial discovery would "subvert the whole
system of criminal law"); Sm JAMES FrrZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF

ENGLAND 226 (1883) (calling the view in Holland barbaric and noting that "it did not occur to the
legislature that, if a man is to be tried for his life, he ought to know beforehand what the evidence
against him is"). Even in civil cases, discovery was "nonexistent prior to the nineteenth century."
See Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 946 (1961) (discussing the
common-law reliance upon the pleading process and the gradual formalization of pleadings).
207. The Court noted that the "restricted scope of this legislation"-i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 2246"indicates that the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not intended to
make available in habeas corpus proceedings the discovery provisions of those rules." Harris,394
U.S. at 296.
208. Id. at 295-96.
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may, in an appropriate case, arrange for procedures which will allow
development, for purposes of the hearing, of the facts relevant to disposition of a habeas corpus petition.,, 209 The Court proceeded to make clear
that the federal courts had an independent obligation and authority to
fashion habeas procedures that would effectuate the office of the Great
Writ:
But with respect to methods for securing facts where necessary to accomplish the objective of the proceedings Congress has been largely
silent. Clearly, in these circumstances, the habeas corpus jurisdiction
and the duty to exercise it being present, the courts may fashion appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage. Where210their duties require it,
this is the inescapable obligation of the courts.
This authority,
the Court stated, was expressly confirmed in the All Writs
2 11
Act.

Harristherefore made clear that although particular rules of federal
procedure might not be operative in habeas matters, the federal courts
could adopt and adapt those rules, using procedures derived from them
by analogy based on their authority under the All Writs Act. The only
prerequisites set out in Harris were that the petitioners establish a prima
facie case for relief. Once "specific allegations before the court show
reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed,
be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities
and procedures for an adequate inquiry. 212 Indeed, under the reasoning
of Harris, there would be no reason for the federal courts to hesitate to
adopt procedures set forth in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as
well. 2 3

209.
210.

Id. at 298.
Id. at 299.

211.

Id.; see also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 283-84 (1948) (holding that purpose and

function of the All Writs Act to supply the courts with the instruments needed to perform their duty,
as prescribed by the Congress and the Constitution, provided only that such instruments are "agreeable" to the usages and principles of law, extend to habeas corpus proceedings).
212.
Harris,394 U.S. at 300.

213.
See id. at 293-94 ("It is, of course, true that habeas corpus proceedings are characterized
as 'civil.' But the label is gross and inexact. Essentially, the proceeding is unique.") (citation and
footnote omitted). See also Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 n.5 (1987) (stating that it is
appropriate to use general civil rules, by analogy or otherwise, where need is evident for principles
to guide conduct of federal habeas corpus proceedings, although under Rule 81 (a)(2) there are some

circumstances in which habeas corpus proceedings should not be governed by civil rule of procedure); Harris,394 U.S. at 300 ("Obviously, in exercising this power, the court may utilize familiar
procedures, as appropriate, whether these are found in the civil or criminal rules or elsewhere in the
'usages and principles of law."') (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2008)); Note, Developments in the
Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1160 (1970) [hereinafter, Harvard Habeas
Note] ("Habeas corpus has both civil and criminal elements, and the district courts should consider,

without regard to labels, any procedure well-suited to the particular problems that habeas presents.").
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Subsequent to Harris, the Supreme Court promulgated rules pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act to govern habeas corpus proceedings.
Although designed primarily for use in federal habeas challenges to the
legality of state criminal convictions, the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts may be utilized, at the discretion of the district court, in any other habeas actions.21 4
Because they were designed for the predominant type of habeas
case to reach the courts--constitutional challenges to state criminal convictions-many of the Section 2254 Rules are, however, inapplicable to
an executive-detention habeas case. For example, Rule 5 requires that a
petitioner's answer to the return "must state whether any claim in the
petition is barred by a failure to exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar,
non-retroactivity, or a statute of limitations. 215 Such concerns are not
present in the executive-detention context.
But several of the Section 2254 Rules, relating to discovery and
evidentiary hearings, are indeed applicable to executive-detention habeas
actions. Rule 6(a) authorizes a judge, "for good cause," to allow parties
"to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"
though the same rule also authorizes the judge to "limit the extent of
discovery. 2 16 Rule 6(b) also clarifies that it has not imported the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure wholesale into
the Section 2254 rules by placing further requirements on the party seeking discovery, including requirements to "provide reasons for the request," to "include any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission," and to "specify any requested documents. 2 7 Also, if the judge
does not dismiss the habeas petition summarily, he or she is instructed by
Rule 8 to "review the answer, any transcripts and records of state-court
proceedings, and any materials submitted under Rule 7 [concerning expansion of 21
the
record] to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is
8
warranted.,
Finally, in accord with Harris v. Nelson, Rule 12 provides that the
court may apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though only "to
the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or
these rules. 2 19 Whether or not the civil procedure rules are consistent
with other statutory provisions is the subject of the next section.

214. Rule 1(a), setting forth the scope of the Rules, states that they "govern a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus filed in a United States district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254," but Rule 1(b) further
provides that the "district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not
covered by Rule 1(a)." Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 1, 28 U.S.C.A foll. § 2254
(2004).
215. Id. Rule 5(b).
216. Id. Rule 6(a).
217. Id. Rule 6(b).
218. Id. Rule 8(a).
219. Id. Rule 12.
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C. What Habeas HearingsShould Look Like
Although the courts possess and should retain authority to develop
flexible procedures for adjudicating habeas claims in the executivedetention context, we may glean from the historical purpose and practice
of habeas over the centuries certain fundamental principles about what
the hearings should entail. Courts adjudicating habeas petitions from
detainees in the War on Terror will have to grapple with whether (and to
what degree) they should allow evidentiary hearings, discovery, and the
admission into evidence of hearsay. In addition, following the plurality's
statements in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the courts will likewise be asked to
consider which party bears the ultimate burden of proof as to the legality
of the detention, and whether the government's evidence is entitled to
any kind of presumption of reliability.
It seems clear that the districts courts, in devising procedures, will
inevitably heed the warnings of the Hamdi plurality by proceeding in a
"prudent and incremental '2 20 manner, deferring to some significant degree to the political branches. 221 But in doing so, the courts should first
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the kinds of exigent circumstances posited by Justice O'Connor in her Hamdi plurality are extant, and
whether they make deviating from ordinary habeas procedures potentially necessary. 222 While historically the courts have treated executive
claims of privilege with tremendous deference, 3 ideally the habeas
courts will exercise independent judgment in deciding when to take the
extraordinary step of abridging fundamental due process principles.224
Moreover, in devising appropriate habeas procedures, the courts should
heed the historical information-forcing role of the writ, with an eye toward flushing facts into the public realm. The information-forcing func220.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (plurality opinion).
221.
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008) ("In considering both the procedural
and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference
must be accorded to the political branches."). A number of scholars have, in fact, suggested that the
most appropriate course would be for the judiciary to stay entirely out of the business of reviewing
executive detentions. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Exigencies of War, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 869-70
(2005); John C. Yoo, The Continuationof Politics by Other Means: The Original Understandingof
War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 287-90 (1996); John C. Yoo, War and the ConstitutionalText, 69
U. CHI. L. REV.1639, 1665, 1682 (2002).
222.
See Carl Tobias, The Process Due Indefinitely Detained Citizens, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1687,
1730-31 (2007).

223.
See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (refusing even to review in
camera reports that the executive claimed contained military secrets, stating that "even the most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of [executive] privilege if the court is ultimately
satisfied that military secrets are at stake").
224. Reynolds, the fountainhead case for deference to claims of executive privilege on national
security grounds, is an object lesson in this regard. In 2006, the documents at issue in the case were
made public pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, and in fact were found to contain no military secrets whatsoever. See Louis FISHER, INTHE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (Univ. Press of Kansas 2006); BARRY SIEGEL,
CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE: A MYSTERIOUS PLANE CRASH, A LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASE, AND
THE RISE OF STATE SECRETS (Harper 2008).
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tions of the writ are important not only to provide the petitioner a fair
opportunity to challenge the legality of his detention, but also to allow
the citizenry an opportunity to determine whether the political branches
have acted wisely in making their detention decisions.
Evidentiary Hearings. Whenever a dispute arises as to a material
fact concerning the legality of the detention of terror suspect, the district
courts have a duty to hold a hearing to resolve the dispute. The need for
evidentiary hearings to resolve factual disputes has long been recognized
in habeas corpus jurisprudence, 5 and the Court in Harrisv. Nelson has
even concluded that it is "now established beyond the reach of reasonable dispute that the federal courts not only may grant evidentiary hearings to applicants, but must do so upon an appropriate showing., 226 The
threshold showing should be low in a challenge to executive detentions,
there is no underlying factual determination by a state or federal
because
22 7
court.

Of course, the district courts should retain discretion as to whether
or not to hold a hearing in a particular instance, as per the 2245 Rules. 2 8
But unlike the collateral appeal process for prisoners convicted of crimes
in state court, ordinarily good cause will be shown by petitioners who
raise a material factual dispute, since no other court will previously have
adjudicated the issue.
In addition, in the executive-detention context, factual disputes relating to alleged prior confessions made by the petitioner or to the credibility of prior statements made by third parties are likely to occur with
some frequency, at least if the Guantdnamo litigation portends the future.
For example, the reliability of any confessions that Guantdnamo prisoner
Mohammed al-Qahtani may have made to interrogators will necessarily
be called into question, since during his interrogations he was indisputably tortured.2 29 Likewise, any incriminating statements that Qahtani
225. See Stewart v. Overholser, 186 F.2d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ("When a factual issue is at
the core of a detention challenged by an application for the writ it ordinarily must be resolved by the
hearing process. This is a chief purpose of the habeas corpus proceeding."); id. at 342-43 (collecting
cases).

226.
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969) (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313
(1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 464 & n.19 (1953)) (emphasis added); see also Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 285-86 (1941) ("[A habeas petitioner is entitled to] 'a judicial inquiry...
into the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention .... ' Such a judicial inquiry involves
the reception of testimony.") (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466 (1938)).
227.
Cf. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13 (stating that if historical acts have not been found by
the state courts, federal habeas judge must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine them).
"If the petition is not dismissed, the judge must review the answer, [and] any transcripts
228.
and records of state-court proceedings . .. to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted." Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 8(a), 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254 (West 2004).
229. Judge Susan J. Crawford, the "convening authority" of the military commissions for the
Bush administration, told Bob Woodward of the Washington Post that she refused to allow the
prosecution of Qahtani because "his treatment met the legal definition of torture." Bob Woodward,
Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at Al. Qahtani was threatened
with a military working dog, forced to wear women's underclothing, led around on a leash and made
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made about other prisoners 230 would necessarily be suspect and would
surely require the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine their trustworthiness.23 1
Discovery. Likewise, the authority to order discovery must remain
with the district court judge and, consistent with usual habeas practice,
should be allowed for good cause shown.232 But, as with evidentiary
hearings, the "good cause" standard will ordinarily be met more easily by
habeas petitioners in the executive-detention context, because they will
not have been afforded the right to discovery in any previous judicial
proceeding.233
All of the rationales for allowing discovery in a court proceeding
will be present in habeas actions challenging executive detentions. Discovery focuses the litigation by removing issues from contention that are
unlikely to be seriously contested2 34 and, at least in theory, brings out
into the open all of the relevant evidence that should be needed to resolve
a dispute.235 In addition, there can be no argument against discovery in
the executive-detention context on the ground that discovery rights remain limited in the criminal context, since the chief concern in a criminal
trial is on the timing of the discovery rather than on whether or not it can
be ordered.236 Finally, it is precisely in the discovery phase of habeas
to perform dog tricks, told that his mother and sisters were whores, and subjected to eighteen to
twenty hour interrogations for forty-eight of fifty-four consecutive days, sometimes while standing
naked in front of a female agent. Once during this period, Qahtani's heart rate dropped to thirty-five
beats per minute, and he was taken to the camp hospital to prevent total heart failure. Classified
interrogation logs of these sessions were leaked to TIME Magazine and are available at
http://www.time.com/time/2006/log/log.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
230. Statements made by Qahtani have been used to justify the detentions of perhaps scores of
men at Guantfnamo. In a press release issued in June 2005, the Pentagon averred that Qahtani was
the primary source for the military's conclusion that at least thirty prisoners at GuantInamo were
affiliated with al Qaeda. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Guantanamo Provides
Valuable Intelligence Information (June 12, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/
2005/06/dod061205.html.
231. Accord Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) ("There can be no doubt
that, if the allegations [regarding coercion] contained in the petitioner's motion and affidavit are true,
he is entitled to have his sentence vacated."); see Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942)
(holding that petitioner is entitled to a hearing on "the material issue whether the plea was in fact
coerced by the particular threats alleged").
232. "A judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery." Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,
Rule 6(a), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (West 2004).
233. As Justice Kennedy explained in Boumediene v. Bush, "[t]he idea that the necessary scope
of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings accords with our test for
procedural adequacy in the due process context ....This principle has an established foundation in
habeas corpus jurisprudence as well." Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2268 (2008) (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
234. Discovery is efficient in that it "may reduce the number of habeas hearings a court must
hold." HarvardHabeasNote, supra note 213, at 1181.
235. Discovery "tends to ensure that all evidence will be unearthed and that concealment of
relevant information and materials will be minimized." Note, Developments in the Law-Discovery,
74 HARV. L. REV.940, 945 (1961).
236. "[Tihe limitation on criminal discovery restricts only the time at which a defendant can
obtain information. At trial he has very broad fact-finding powers. The policies which prevent a
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litigation that the government will ordinarily be compelled to demonstrate whether there is indeed an evidentiary basis for the legality of the
detention.
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court in its War on
Terror cases has affirmed that discovery will ordinarily be appropriate in
executive-detention habeas hearings. Boumediene, for example, emphasized that the availability of discovery to a habeas petitioner counted
among the procedural rights that historically "preserve the writ and its
function,' 237 and also noted that the failure of the DTA review process to
allow discovery was partly responsible for its "falli[ing] short of being a
constitutionally adequate substitute" for habeas.238
Nonetheless, in the War on Terror context there may well be times
when the courts will act within their discretion to limit discovery, and as
a matter of policy the vindication of the habeas right might have to be
balanced against legitimate concerns about national security. Of course,
as discussed above, discovery in the habeas context does not happen automatically without rule of court, in part because it can be "exceedingly
burdensome and vexatious" and in part because the extensive discovery
contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is "ill-suited to the
special problems and character of [habeas] proceedings. 2 39
Of particular concern to the government in an executive-detention
habeas action may be national security, including the potential revelation
of intelligence and intelligence-gathering methods and the burden of
producing battlefield evidence. As one district court judge recently observed, the "discovery process alone risks aiding our enemies by affording them a mechanism to obtain what information they could about military affairs and disrupt command missions by wresting officials from the
battlefield to answer compelled deposition and other discovery inquiries." 24° In theory, then, the potential for disruption should of course be

defendant from obtaining this information prior to trial are inapplicable to a habeas proceeding.

These limitations are grounded on a fear that disclosure of the prosecution's case will encourage
perjury, intimidation of witnesses and manufacturing of evidence, and that the accused, relying on
the fifth amendment, will block all discovery against himself. As a basis for restricting criminal
discovery, these limitations have been severely criticized." Harvard Habeas Note, supra note 213,
at 1182-83.
237. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263 (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299-300 (1969));
see also Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 273 n.16 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Traxler, J., concurring) (citing "discovery" as part of the "process normally available [to persons] who challenge
their executive detention"); El-Banna v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1144,2005 WL 1903561 (D.D.C. July 18,
2005) (ordering the government to preserve evidence regarding petitioners' detention at Guantanamo, in view of the habeas court's plenary power of inquiry, and petitioners' right to discovery).
238. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2272 (noting the detainee's lack of opportunity "to present
evidence discovered after the CSRT proceeding concluded").
239. Harris, 394 U.S. at 296-97; see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) ("A
habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a
matter of ordinary course.").
240.

In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 105 (D.D.C. 2007).
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weighed against the petitioner's right to a fair hearing. 24' But by the
same token, it should be incumbent upon the government to make a substantial showing that security will be compromised by fulfilling the discovery request. In short, the government must make at least a threshold
showing that exigent circumstances exist before the court considers restraints on discovery.242
This is surely what the Hamdi Court envisioned when it sought to
ensure that "military officers" engaged in combat operations would not
"be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation half a world
away. ,,243 Experience with the Guant6.namo cases, however, suggests
that in practice the courts may find no exigent circumstances. Indeed,
many of the detainees at Guantdnamo are not even alleged to have been
captured on a battlefield, nor are they alleged ever to have been in combat with U.S. forces; there may be no evidence to be gleaned from the
battlefield or that even had its source on a battlefield. 2 "
During wartime, one can expect the courts to maintain a deferential
attitude toward the President and Congress, the branches with expertise
in military affairs and the responsibility for making policy judgments.
And, of course, unlike an unelected judiciary, the members of the political branches will be held accountable to the people. Nonetheless, in determining what habeas procedures should look like, the courts should
take into account that the premise for political accountability performing
its democratic role is that the people have access to adequate information
to make sound choices about their leaders. And it is precisely political
accountability that will suffer if habeas procedures are weak and the facts
underlying executive detentions are never brought into the public
realm.2 45 Thus, in deciding whether discovery should be allowed, the
courts should consider that the harm they seek to prevent-the disclosure
241.

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (applying due process balancing test from

Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319, 335).
242.
Likewise, concerns about leaks of classified information will likely be mitigated in most
habeas litigation by stringent protective orders assuring that counsel is both security cleared and
sanctionable for releases of classified information. See, e.g., Amended Protective Order and Procedures for Counsel Access to Detainees at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, In
Re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179-80 (D.D.C. 2004).
243.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32.
244.
Abdulsalam Abdulrahman Al Hela, for example, was taken into custody by Egyptian
security forces in Cairo, Egypt. Other Guantdnamo detainees were taken into custody in Gambia,
Bosnia, and Thailand.
245.
Indeed, it may be asking a lot of the political process to expect that the public will rein in
the executive where a minority's rights are at stake. As a report of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York noted, as "a practical possibility in the context of the exercises of the President's
war power," the political process might provide a meaningful check when there is an "impact widely
on many citizens, such as mobilization, the draft, or rationing or higher taxes," but "where the exercise of the war power focuses on a discrete minority-the Japanese-Americans in World War 1 or
Arab-Americans and other Muslims in the war on terror-it is unrealistic to expect too much of the
political process." Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Federal Courts,
The Indefinite Detention of "Enemy Combatants": Balancing Due Processand National Security in
the Context of the War on Terror, 59 THE REC. 41, 106 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
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of information to our enemies-must be balanced against the benefit of
bringing information to light for the citizenry. Operating by much the
same principle that resulted in the development of the return requirement
at common law, discovery rights now will force the executive to justify
its detention decisions and then pay the political price (or reap the political rewards) from those decisions, once
the public can assess knowledg246
ably on what basis they were made.
Exculpatory Evidence. Complementary to the government's discovery obligations should be an obligation to provide the habeas petitioner with exculpatory evidence within its control. In criminal proceedings, the government "has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government's behalf,"247 and must disclose exculpatory and impeaching evidence that is "material. 2 48
Failure to disclose exculpatory information "undermines confidence
in the outcome" of a hearing. 249 The obligation thus not only guarantees
fair treatment for detainees subject to a substantial liberty deprivation,2 5 °
but is also necessary to preserve the truth-seeking function of an adjudicatory proceeding.25'
As Justice Kennedy noted in Boumediene, there is "evidence from
19th-century American sources indicating that, even in States that accorded strong res judicata effect to prior adjudications, habeas courts in
this country routinely allowed prisoners to introduce exculpatory evidence that was either unknown or previously unavailable to the prisoner. '252 Justice Kennedy went on to conclude that the DTA procedures
authorized by Congress were an inadequate substitute for habeas in part
because the Guantdnamo petitioners were not allowed to submit exculpatory evidence obtained subsequent to a CSRT determination253
that might
combatant.,
"enemy
an
as
classified
improperly
was
he
prove

246.
But see Robert J. Pushaw, The "Enemy Combatant" Cases in Historical Context: The
Inevitability of PragmaticJudicialReview, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1078-83 (2007) (arguing
that the courts have appropriately been deferential to the executive in the war-on-terror context); Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 606-11 (2003)
(suggesting that the courts should defer to the politically accountable executive branch and its military expertise).
247. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
248.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 668 (1985).
249.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 668.
250.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
251.
Monroe v. Blackburn, 476 U.S. 1145, 1148 (1986).
252.
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2267 (2008) (citing cases from 1848 to 1879). See
also Arkin, supra note 56, at 16-17.
253.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2270 ("For the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an effective and proper remedy in this context, the court that conducts the habeas proceeding
must have the means to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceedings. This includes ...
the authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not introduced during the
earlier proceeding."). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), overruled in part by
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992).
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Exculpatory evidence in the executive-detention context could, of
course, include statements from other prisoners that might tend to exonerate a petitioner. But another major category of exculpatory information
that the courts are likely to have to address includes any evidence that
would support the exclusion of statements attributed to the petitioner. In
Crane v. Kentucky,254 for example, a unanimous Supreme Court held that
evidence of coercion is relevant not just for determining whether a defendant's statement was admissible at trial, but also (if deemed admissible) whether it was credible. 55 As the Court went on to hold,
the physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession can also be of substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue
of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Confessions, even those that
have been found to be voluntary, are not conclusive of guilt. And, as
with any other part of the prosecutor's case, a confession may be
shown to ' be
"insufficiently corroborated or otherwise ... unworthy
256
of belief."

Other types of exculpatory information that are particularly likely to be
relevant in the executive-detention context include contradictory witness
statements and evidence that a witness had been shown a photograph of
the accused before identifying him.
In the criminal context, it is well-settled that the government has a
duty to disclose exculpatory material in the possession of the prosecution
even if the defendant fails to request such material. 57 But as with discovery, given national security concerns the government will surely argue with some frequency that it will not be appropriate in the executivedetention context to impose upon the government an automatic obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. That said, where a request for
exculpatory information has been made by a petitioner, the government
should be compelled to search for and turn over such information absent
a showing that the national security would be imperiled by such an order.
Hearsay. As a practical matter, one of the key issues in determining
adequate habeas procedures in the executive-detention context involves
the potential admission into evidence of hearsay. The courts have long
recognized that hearsay can be a particularly unreliable form of evidence,258 and the common law thus generally forbade its use, allowing
only narrowly-defined exceptions for statements made in circumstances
tending to lend them particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. These
narrow exceptions to the rule against hearsay have largely been codified
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, each pursuant to a well-recognized
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

476 U.S. 683 (1986).
Id. at 689.
Id. (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972)).
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976).
See Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. 412,436 (1836).
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reason to expect the statement would have a circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness. 259 And, by their terms, the Federal Rules of Evidence
apply in habeas corpus proceedings "to the extent that matters of evidence are not provided for in the statutes which govern procedure therein
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
or in other' 26rules
°
authority.

That said, there have long been persuasive arguments for more liberal admission into evidence of hearsay declarations, so long as the court
is attuned not only to the probative nature of the evidence but also to its
indicia of reliability.261 In the context of executive detentions during
wartime, relaxed hearsay rules may be appropriate, and it would be reasonable for some hearsay to be allowed if other sources of evidence are
unavailable-either because of intelligence and national security concerns, or because of the difficulties attending the gathering of evidence
and testimony from soldiers deployed on the battlefield.
Broadly speaking, this was the view of a plurality of the Supreme
Court opined in Hamdi, where Justice O'Connor wrote that "military
officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging battle would be
unnecessarily and dangerously detracted by [developing the case in chief
for] litigation half a world away," by a judicially-made prohibition
against the use of hearsay evidence to support wartime status determinations.262 Inwar there is no evidence room and there are no chain of custody procedures; evidence of combatancy (like weapons) is generally
destroyed; and much of the physical evidence may be "buried under the
rubble of war. ,,263
It remains important, however, to focus on both the actual need to
use hearsay and on the criteria for allowing it into evidence. The Hamdi
plurality stated only that hearsay "may need to be accepted as the most
reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.,,264 In acknowledging that hearsay may sometimes-in the specific

259.

See FaD. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's notes.

260.

FED. R. EvID. 1101(e). See e.g., Greiner v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305, 325-26 (2d Cir. 2005),

cert.denied, 546 U.S. 1184 (2006) (excluding hearsay in a habeas case pursuant to Federal Rules of
Evidence).
261.
The best treatment of this issue remains Jack B. Weinstein, The ProbativeForceof Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331, 344-45 (1961) (advocating for abandonment categorical exceptions in
favor of individual treatment in the setting of the individual case; admissibility would be determined
by balancing probative force of the evidence against possibility of prejudice, waste of time, and
availability of more satisfactory evidence).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,531-32 (2004) (plurality).
262.
Id. at 532.
263.
264.
Id. at 533 (emphasis added). The plurality likewise stated that "the exigencies of the
circumstances may demand that, aside from [the] core elements [of notice and an opportunity to be
heard], enemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to
burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict." Id. (emphasis added).
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context of a traditional battlefield detention 265-be accepted as "the most
reliable available evidence," the Hamdi plurality did not approve jettisoning the Federal Rules of Evidence altogether in the habeas context.
Indeed, in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy found that one of the fundamental due process flaws in the CSRTs was that "there [were] in effect no
limits on the admission of hearsay evidence," since "the only require' 266
ment [was] that the tribunal deem the evidence 'relevant and helpful.'
The lesson from the Hamdi plurality and the Court in Boumediene is
not that all hearsay is admissible in an executive-detention habeas action,
but rather that the district courts should exercise their discretion in de267
termining whether to allow particular hearsay statements into evidence
and should seriously consider the degree to which such statements could
be relied upon when assessing the legality of a detention.
These are not, of course, merely academic matters. In the case of
Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a United States resident who has been held
since June 2003 without charge as an enemy combatant, 268 the government's sole submission into evidence to justify the legality of the detention was a hearsay statement from Jeffrey N. Rapp, the Pentagon's senior
counterintelligence officer, who wrote that al-Marri possessed information of high intelligence value, including information about personnel
and activities of al Qaeda. In a five-to-four decision, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument that such a declaration should automatically be allowed into evidence on the authority of
Hamdi.
Writing for a majority of the court on the issue of procedures for alMarri's habeas hearing, Judge Traxler stated that the Hamdi plurality had
done no more than recognize that, in a particular case, it might be necessary to modify ordinary due-process standards as a result of wartime
exigency. "Hamdi's relaxed evidentiary standard of accepting hearsay
evidence and presumption in favor of the government arose from the
plurality's recognition that the process warranted in enemy-combatant
proceedings may be lessened if the practical obstacles the Executive
265. The Hamdi plurality addressed only "the narrow question" of the process due an enemy
soldier captured during combat against the U.S. and its allies on a foreign battlefield. Id. at 513, 516,
517, 522 n.l (plurality opinion).
266. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008).
267. The habeas statute permits admission of affidavits in habeas corpus cases, in the court's
discretion, but such permission triggers the opposing party's "right to propound written interrogatories to affiants, or to file answering affidavits." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2246 (West 2008). Discretion to
admit evidence by affidavit must be exercised with caution. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
417 (1993) ("affidavits are disfavored [in a habeas corpus action] because the affiants' statements
are obtained without the benefit of cross-examination and an opportunity to make credibility determinations").
268.
AI-Marri was initially arrested in December 2001 and held as a material witness in relation to the 9/11 attacks; in January and Febmary 2002 he was indicted on charges relating to credit
card fraud and making false statements to the FBI; charges were dropped with prejudice in June
2003, and he has been held without charge as an enemy combatant since then.
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would confront in providing the procedural protections normally due
warrant such a modification. 26 9
Judge Traxler explained that hearsay evidence might be admitted
upon a proper showing of need by the government, but that
the Hamdi plurality neither said nor implied that normal procedures
and evidentiary demands would be lessened in every enemycombatant habeas case, regardless of the circumstances. And I cannot endorse such a view, which would allow the government to seize
and militarily detain any person (including American citizens within
this country) and support such military detention solely with a hearsay declaration of a government official who has no first-hand information about the detainee-regardlessof whether more reliable evidence is readily available or whether the presentation of such evidence would impose any burden upon the 27government
or interfere at
0
all with its war or national security efforts.
Under Judge Traxler's persuasive reading of the Hamdi plurality's opinion, categorical admission of hearsay evidence was improper. While
hearsay declarations "may be accepted upon a weighing of the burdens in
time of warfare of providing greater process against the detainee's liberty
interests," in order to decide whether a hearsay declaration is acceptable,
"the court must first take into account the risk of erroneous deprivation
of the detainee's liberty interest, the probable value, if any, of any additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and the availability of additional or
substitute evidence which might serve the interests of both liti27 1
gants.
One further elaboration on hearsay is in order. While the district
courts should take into consideration the government's interest in protecting its sources and methods of intelligence gathering, these interests
should not excuse admitting hearsay without sufficient information to
assess its reliability. 2 Among other circumstances that should be considered with regard to the credibility of the source is the manner by which
any hearsay declaration was obtained. The court should, for example,
require the proponent of hearsay to disclose to the district court and opposing counsel the interrogation techniques employed on its sources.27 3

269.
AI-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Traxler, J., concurring). Judge Traxler went on to note that Justice Kennedy's decision in Boumediene likewise emphasized that relaxation of due process norms would be appropriate only in "particular circumstances." Id. at 265 n.7.
270.
Id. at 268.
271.
Id. at 269 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
272.
See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("[W]e do not suggest that hearsay evidence is never reliable-only that it must be presented in a form, or with sufficient additional
information, that permits the Tribunal and court to assess its reliability.").
273. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) ("The tendency of the innocent, as well
as the guilty, to risk remote results of a false confession rather than suffer immediate pain is so
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In addition, in determining whether exigent circumstances exist meriting
the introduction of hearsay, the courts should also consider the extent to
which the Classified Information Procedures Act 274 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act275 provide adequate procedures obviating the
need to stray further from the baseline of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Burdens. In a typical habeas action, the petitioner initially bears the
burden of proof. 276 Executive-detention habeas actions, however, are not
typical, and in the context of habeas challenges to executive-detentions,
the burden should rightly fall on the government. Once a petitioner has
established that he is in prison, the justification for the imprisonment
should fall by law on the custodian to justify his act.277 In this respect, at
278
least, the Hamdi plurality's suggestion of a burden-shifting scheme
should be rejected by district court judges, regardless of the existence of
exigent circumstances.
Habeas petitioners in the executive-detention context will be seeking review of the executive's unilateral decision to detain them, rather
collaterally attacking the judgment of a prior competent court of
record. 279 Thus, in contrast to a petition challenging a criminal conviction, the executive has not already demonstrated to the satisfaction of a
neutral adjudicator that the evidence is sufficient to meet the executive's
asserted need for detention. As Justice Kennedy noted in Boumediene, a
"criminal conviction in the usual course occurs after a judicial hearing
before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own independence. These dynamics are not
inherent in executive detention orders or executive review procedures." 280 In this context, the burden should remain on the government
to convince the fact-finder of the legality of the detention. 81

strong that judges long ago found it necessary to... treat[] any confession made concurrently with
torture or threat of brutality as too untrustworthy to be received as evidence of guilt.").
274.
18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 1-16 (1982) (applicable by its terms only in criminal cases).
275. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a)-(p).
276. See Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 46 (1995) (stating that the "habeas petitioner generally bears the burden of proof"); Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 314 (1946)
(stating that the petitioner "had the burden of showing that he was unlawfully detained"); Williams
v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 472, 474 (1945) (similar); Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941)
(similar); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (similar).
277.
Cf Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, 245 (Atkin, L., dissenting) (stating this it is
"one of the pillars of liberty ...that in English law every imprisonment is primafacie unlawful and
that it is for the person directing the imprisonment to justify his act").
278.
See infra text accompanying notes 282-84.
279.
Compare ExparteWatkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1830) (recognizing limitation on habeas
courts authority to review factual judgments of "court of competent jurisdiction"), with Boumediene
v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2268 ("The present cases fall outside these categories, however, for here
the detention is by executive order.").
280.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269 (2008).
281.
Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("Due process commands that no man shall
lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of.. . convincing the factfinder of his
guilt.").
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In Hamdi, it is true, the plurality suggested that a burden-shifting
282
scheme might be appropriate and constitutional in some habeas cases.
The process envisioned by the plurality begins with the Government's
submission of a factual return that "puts forth credible evidence that the
habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria. 2 83 If the Government files a return supported by credible evidence, the burden shifts
to the petitioner to rebut, "with more persuasive evidence," the Government's classification. 284 The parties should then have the opportunity to
brief the legality of detention based on the record and to make arguments
as to the credibility and weight of the evidence presented. If a petitioner
is unable to overcome the Government's evidence, no further steps need
be taken and the Government prevails.
Still, as with the plurality's suggestions about the treatment of hearsay, the burden-shifting scheme is presented only as a constitutionally
adequate alternative to ordinary due-process procedures that might be
appropriate upon a showing of need by the government. As Judge Traxler observed in Al-Marri, the Hamdi plurality did not "provide a cookiecutter procedure appropriate for every alleged enemy-combatant, regardless of the circumstances of the alleged combatant's seizure or the actual
burdens the government might face in defending the habeas petition in
the normal way. 2 85 Moreover, it is difficult even in the abstract to imagine what circumstances should relieve the government of its burden,
since it is a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence that imprisonments
are presumptively illegal.
Absent an extraordinary showing of the need for an alternative, the
burden should therefore be on the government to justify the legality of
the executive detention. Exactly what the burden should be, however, is
another question left open by the Supreme Court cases.286 In the criminal
context, of course, the government must justify detentions with proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the context of ordinary civil litigation, the
ordinary burden is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Because
habeas actions are civil in nature, a preponderance standard might seem
to be an appropriate default. But habeas actions are only nominally civil, 287 and the deprivation of liberty at stake in the executive-detention
context should therefore raise the government's burden.

282.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004).
283.
Id.
284.
Id.
285.
AI-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 272 (4th Cir. 2008) (en bane) (Traxler, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
286.
In Boumediene, the Court left open for the district courts to decide the "extent of the
showing required of the Government in these cases." Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271
(2008) (emphasis added).
287.
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969).
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In civil commitment cases, for example, the government's burden is
to show by "clear and convincing" evidence that continued detention is
proper. The D.C. Circuit has noted that "where the various interests of
society are pitted against restrictions on the liberty of the individual, a
more demanding standard is frequently imposed, such as proof by clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence., 288 This standard has been deployed in a host of civil commitment contexts, including detention for
deportation,289 sex-offender civil commitment,29 continued commitment
of criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity,291 and pretrial detention based on dangerousness.292
Despite the government's suggestion that the Guantdnamo prisoners
have all been taken into custody from the battlefield, a reasonable argument can be made that many of the detentions are in fact criminal in nature and the result of police rather than wartime actions. In such cases,
placing a reasonable doubt standard on the government would doubtless
be justified.293 But given the Supreme Court's holding in Hamdi that the
detainees captured pursuant to the Afghanistan conflict are being held
pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force,294 and the wartime context for most of the habeas petitioners in federal court at the
present time, the courts will likely conclude that something less than a
reasonable doubt standard is appropriate. 295
Presumptions. Finally, the plurality in Hamdi suggested that "the
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the
Government's evidence., 296 As with hearsay and burden-shifting, the
rationale for such a presumption is that the wartime context of executive
detention decision may, in some situations, make normal procedures
impracticable due to concerns about revelations concerning intelligence
and intelligence gathering or about difficulties in managing evidence
gathered from the battlefield.
288.
In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
289.
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
290.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997).
291.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,81 (1992).
292.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
293.
Cf Tobias, supranote 222, at 1735.
294.
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
295.
Matthew C. Waxman has compared the detention of "enemy combatants" with the targeting of terror suspects, suggesting that the standard of certainty for detention should be "reasonable
due care played out over time." Waxman, supra note 171, at 1407. He suggests, among other
things, that repeated periodic status reviews by the executive will eventually weed out "falsepositives." Id. at 1412. Experience at Guantdamo, however, has proven such assumptions wrong.
Of the first twenty-seven habeas hearing to reach decision, fully twenty of the petitioners were
granted the writ after their detention was held illegal by an Article III judge. See Marc Falkoff, No
Room Left for Doubt: New Revelations About Guantanamo, JURIST (Jan. 17, 2009)
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/01/no-room-left-for-doubt-new-revelations.php. Each of those
men was held at GuantAnamo for nearly seven years, each received both a status hearing and yearly
reviews, and each was held for years without any sign that the military would ever acknowledge its
errors.

296.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
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Whether a presumption is appropriate, however, should again depend upon the individual circumstances of an individual case, and the
presumption should certainly be disallowed absent a particularized showing by the government that it is necessary to relieve the government of an
undue burden in the litigation. In addition, according to the Hamdi plurality, in order to be constitutional, the presumption must "remain[] a
rebuttable
one and [a] fair opportunity for rebuttal [must be] pro297
vided. ,
Of course, assuming that a presumption in favor of the government's evidence would ever be appropriate,
a categorical
presumption
in
,
•
298
favor of the government's evidence would certainly never be.
D. What (Some) Habeas HearingsAlready Look Like
After the Boumediene decision came down in June 2008, the district
courts in the D.C. Circuit heard argument about what procedures would
be used in the Guantdnamo habeas actions that had been pending, in
some cases, for more than six years. For the most part, the habeas cases
were consolidated before Judge Thomas F. Hogan, to allow him to devise common procedures to be used by the other members of the court.
Judge Hogan issued a Case Management Order ("Hogan CMO") in November 2008 which has, with limited exceptions, been adopted in large
part by the other judges in the district-although as this article goes to
print, few habeas hearings have actually taken place in which such procedures were deployed.
Although the Hogan CMO offered little in the way of supplementary analysis, the procedures are largely in accord with the recommendations contained in this article. 99 Most importantly, the judges of the district court have declined to make blanket rulings about the admissibility
of hearsay or presumptions in favor of the reliability of government evidence. Instead, they have reserved to themselves discretion to determine
whether ordinary procedures associated with due process should be suspended in the particular circumstances of the particular habeas cases before them. Of most concern, however, is the adoption of a preponderance standard-with the burden on the government-to determine
whether a petitioner is an "enemy combatant."
297. Id.
298. See AI-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F. 3d. 213, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Traxler, J.,
concurring) (noting that "Hamdi's relaxed evidentiary standard of accepting hearsay evidence and
presumption in favor of the government arose from the plurality's recognition that the process warranted in enemy-combatant proceedings may be lessened if the practical obstacles the Executive
would confront in providing the procedural protections normally due warrant such a modification")
(emphasis in original).
299.
Among other things, the court ordered the government to file factual returns for cases in
which they had not already been provided, and it ordered the petitioners to file traverses. See In re
Guantdnamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-0442, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97095, at *97,
*103 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Hogan CMO].
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The basics of the Hogan CMO can be easily described. The petitioners will be allowed discovery, some of which they will be entitled to
upon request (documents referenced in the factual return, statements
made by the petitioner and relied on in the return), 3°° and some of which
they may receive on a showing of good cause (for which he must "explain why the requested discovery will enable the petitioner to rebut the
factual basis for his detention without unfairly disrupting or unduly burdening the government"). 30 1 The chief objection to such provisions is the
requirement that the petitioner shoulder the burden of proving that his
discovery request will not burden the government.
In contrast, most of the judges in the district have chosen to allow
either party to introduce hearsay evidence that is "material and relevant
to the legality of the petitioner's detention," upon a showing that the
hearsay "is reliable and that the provision of nonhearsay evidence would
unduly burden the movant or interfere with the government efforts to
protect national security. ,,302 In other words, the burden with respect to
the introduction of hearsay evidence is (appropriately) on the party seeking to deviate from the ordinary rules of evidence. The government, in
short, must prove that use of hearsay is necessary to protect the national
security.
The Hogan CMO also provides that the government produce "all
reasonably available evidence in its possession that tends materially to
undermine the information presented to support the government's justification for detaining the petitioner., 30 3 The potential difficulty with such
a provision is determining what "reasonably available" means. Does it
include any exculpatory evidence on government data bases? Only such
evidence as government lawyers have come across? 3 All
evidence that
°4
interruptions?
battlefield
of
disruption
require
not
does
300. Id. at *99-*100. The petitioner is also entitled under the Hogan CMO to information
about the circumstances in which his statements were made or adopted. This category is particularly
interesting, since it seems geared at determining whether any kind of coercion was used in procuring
them. Indeed, Judge Bates modified Judge Hogan's CMO for use in cases in his court by adding that
the government must provide information about the circumstances of petitioner statements that
"including but not limited to any evidence of coercive techniques used during any interrogation or
any inducements or promises made." Case Management Order at 2, Zaid v. Bush, Civ. No. 15-1646
(JDB) (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Bates CMO].
301.
Hogan CMO, supranote 298, at * 101.
302. Id. at *105. Judge Bates has informed the parties before him that hearsay may be admissible, but only if "the movant establishes that the hearsay evidence is reliable and that the presentation
of the evidence in compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence would unduly burden the movant
or pose an unwarranted risk to national security." Bates CMO, supra note 299, at 3.
303.
Hogan CMO, supranote 298, at *98.
304.
Judge Bates revised his CMO to reflect that, "[in this context, the term 'reasonably available evidence' means evidence contained in any information reviewed by any attorney preparing
factual returns for any detainee," and "includes any other evidence the government discovers while
litigating habeas corpus petitions filed by detainees at GuantAnamo Bay." Bates CMO, supra note
299, at *2 (emphasis added). The Bates CMO is thus more in accord with the ordinary practice in
federal criminal trials. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1967) (holding that "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
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Finally, all of the courts' CMOs place the burden of justifying the
legality of the petitioner's detention on the government. The government's burden, however, is only to prove "enemy combatant" status by a
preponderance of the evidence. 30 5 As I argue above, the burden is on the
right party, but the civil standard is far too low to justify the long-term
deprivation of a petitioner's liberty. With respect to presumptions, each
of the district court judges has likewise adopted the provision in Judge
Hogan's CMO stating that the merits judge "may accord a rebuttable
presumption of accuracy and authenticity to any evidence the government presents as justification for the petitioner's detention if the government establishes that the presumption is necessary to alleviate an undue
burden presented by the particular habeas corpus proceeding. ''30 6 This
provision is, of course, in accord with the plurality's suggestion in Hamdi that such a presumption might not offend the Constitution in an appropriate case.
Those courts deciding whether to deploy the presumption should,
however, require the government to justify why such a presumption is
necessary. Presumably, there must be something unique about the nature
of the government's evidence in a particular case that would justify such
a presumption. The mere fact that all evidence in cases of this nature
necessarily touches on issues of national security should not be an adequate justification.
CONCLUSION

Seven years after the opening of Guant,.namo Bay as a detention
center, judges are only now beginning to address what habeas corpus
procedures should look like for persons indefinitely detained, without
charge, on suspicion of association with terrorist organizations. 30 7 Bewhere the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment"). In addition, other judges on the
court included provisions clarifying that the government was obligated to use "reasonable diligence"
to find all exculpatory information in its possession. See Case Management Order at 4, AI-Adahi v.
Bush, Civ. No. 05-0280 (GK) (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Kessler CMO]; Case Management Order at 2, Gherebi v. Bush, Civ. No. 01-1164 (RBW) (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2008) (referring to the
Hogan CMO). Judge Gladys Kessler also modified the Hogan CMO provisions for her cases, defining the term "exculpatory evidence" to include "any evidence of abusive treatment, torture, mental
incapacity, or physical incapacity which could affect the credibility and/or reliability of evidence
being offered." Kessler CMO, supra note 303, at 4. And Judge Ellen Huvelle was sufficiently
concerned about abuse to include language defining "exculpatory information" to include "evidence
that casts doubt on a speaker's credibility, evidence that undermines the reliability of a witness's
identification of the petitioner, or evidence that indicates a statement is unreliable because it is the
product of abuse, torture, or mental or physical incapacity." Case Management Order at 4, Qattaa
v. Bush, Civ. No. 080-CV-1233 (ESH) (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009).
See, e.g., Hogan CMO, supra note 298, at *104.
305.
306. Id. at *104 (emphasis added).
307. On his second full day in office, President Obama issued an executive order to close
GuantAnamo within one year. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 FR 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (section 3
states that it "shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this
order"). Habeas hearings have continued, however, because the current Administration has not
determined which if any of the petitioners will be released into freedom once Guantdnamo is closed
as a prison.
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cause most judges have come of age in an era in which they have been
compelled to exercise their latent habeas powers in a constrained manner, there is a danger that they will see their role in the review of the legality of long-term executive detentions through a similarly deferential
prism. But habeas was transformed over the centuries into the great protector of individual liberties only because the courts were willing to challenge the executive to produce evidence and information justifying its
detention decisions.
As our courts continue to devise procedures for managing challenges to executive-detentions, we must remain cognizant of the historical nexus between the due-process protections of habeas and the writ's
information-forcing character. In short, we must remember that habeas
procedures have evolved to protect the rule of law not only by assuring
that the prisoner gets his fair day in court, but also by promoting the democracy-enhancing effects of bringing information into the public realm.

THE COST OF THE VOTE: POLL TAXES,
VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS, AND THE PRICE OF

DEMOCRACY
ATIBA R. ELLISt
INTRODUCTION

The election of Barack Obama as the forty-fourth President of the
United States represents both the completion of a historical campaign
season and a triumph of the Civil Rights revolution of the twentieth century. President Obama's 2008 campaign, along with the campaigns of
Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton and John McCain, was remarkable in
both the identities of the politicians themselves' and the attention they
brought to the political process. In particular, Obama attracted voters
from populations which have not been traditionally represented in national politics. His run was hallmarked, in large part, by significant grassroots fundraising, a concerted effort to generate popular appeal, and,
most important, massive voter turnout efforts.2 As a result, this election
cycle generated significant increases in participation during the primary
season. 3 Turnout in the general election did not meet anticipated record
t
Legal Writing Instructor, Howard University School of Law. J.D., M.A., Duke University, 2000. An early version of this paper was presented at the Writer's Workshop of the Legal Writing Institute in summer 2007. Later versions were presented at the November 2007 Howard University School of Law faculty colloquy and the September 2008 Northeast People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference. I gratefully acknowledge Andrew Taslitz, Sherman Rogers, Derek Black, Paulette Caldwell, Phoebe Haddon, and Daniel Tokaji for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of
this paper. I am also grateful for the thoughtful conversations I have had on this topic with James
Coleman, Okainer Christian Dark, Lydie Pierre-Louis, Jena Martin, and Josephine Ross. I am indebted to James Nichols and Rae Cousins for their excellent research assistance. I also wish to
express my appreciation to Dean Kurt Schmoke of the Howard University School of Law for his
thoughtful comments and for providing research support for this effort.
I. Mr. Obama is the first American of African descent to be elected to the chief executive.
This is a great feat given the historic status of African Americans throughout the history of European
presence in North America. In particular, it represents a transformation from the period of the history of the United States where the policy of Jim Crow treated African Americans as second class
citizens. See infra Part II. Yet, Mr. Obama clearly was not the only candidate to make history in
this campaign season. Senator Clinton, though not the first woman to be considered for nomination
by a major party, was nonetheless a serious contender for the Democratic nomination. Additionally,
Senator McCain was among the oldest nominees of a major party for the office.
2. The voter turnout effort by the Obama campaign was noted early on as a hallmark of its
general electoral strategy. See Alec MacGiUis & Jennifer Agiesta, For Obama, Hurdles in Expanding Black Vote, WASH. POST, July 28, 2008, at A01. Indeed, this turnout effort focused on African
American voters and younger voters; increases in the participation of these groups were thought to
create significant opportunities for the Democratic campaign to be more competitive in close electoral states. Id.
3. Turnout reached an eight year high in thirty-six of the forty states that hold primaries.
Nearly fifty-eight million Americans participated in those primaries. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES,
2008 PRIMARY IN REvIEw 4, 6 (2008), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/
Primary%202008%20FINAL.pdf.
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levels, 4 but nonetheless it represented levels of participation higher than
in 2004. 5 Moreover, Mr. Obama appealed to a broad range of people
across the political spectrum; this led to his substantial popular vote majority and an electoral vote landslide for President Obama.
This election represents a sea-change from a time as recent as fifty
years ago when southern state governments used devices like poll taxes
and literacy tests to remove the poor, and specifically African Americans, from the voter rolls.7 Some of those voters who seek to register
today would have been shut out of the polls by these devices designed
with the intent of limiting the numbers of African Americans who could
register and vote. In large part, the Civil Rights revolution focused on
making the ballot box accessible to all.8 Ultimately, the legal advocacy
part of the revolution won significant victories in a series of cases where
the Supreme Court repeatedly announced a right to vote available to all
citizens. 9
The Supreme Court's rhetoric of a "right to vote" stands in contrast
with modern concerns regarding voter access. Even before the 2008
election, the question of access to the polls was alive and well and a pox
on American elections in the late twentieth century. In the controversial
presidential election of 2000, one of the major disputes concerned
whether voters were illegally purged from the polls. Advocates contended that the polls in Florida were unjustly and unfairly being purged
4.
This appeared to be the case notwithstanding the use of early voting and the long lines on
Election Day. Kate Phillips, Rate of Voter Turnout May Not Be a Record, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2008, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/voter-turnmout-not-near-a-record-yethfo/;
see
also The Pew Ctr. on the States, Electionline Weekly, Dec. 11, 2008, http://tinyurl.com/cw665o
(noting that turnout in 2008 was significant but did not achieve a record for turnout in American
presidential elections).
States
Elections
Project,
2008
Unofficial
Voter
Turnout,
5.
United
http://elections.gmu.edu/preliminary-vote..2008.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009). Turnout for the
2008 General Election among eligible voters was 61.7% or 131.3 million votes cast. This
represented an increase of 1.6% over the 60.1% turnout rate for the 2004 presidential election. Id.
6. See Alec MacGillis & Jon Cohen, A Vote Decided by Big Turnout and Big Discontent
with GOP, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A27. Significantly, the substantial amount of expected
turnout from younger voters and from African Americans did not materialize in record numbers. Id.
7. For a discussion of the operation of the poll tax, see C. VANN WOODWARD, A HISTORY OF
THE SOUTH: 9 ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, at 331-35 (Wendell Holmes Stephenson &

E. Merton Coulter eds., 1951). For a thorough single volume that has analyzed the operation of the
poll tax, see FREDERIC D. OGDEN, THE POLL TAX INTHE SOUTH (1958). For a history of the pattern
of disenfranchisement throughout the south, see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, (1974).
THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
8.
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:

DEMOCRACY INTHE UNITED STATES 257-268 (2000) (discussing history of the Civil Rights Movement and voting rights movements from the 1950s through the 1960s); see also Paula D. McClain,
Michael C. Brady, Niambi M. Carter, Efren 0. Perez, & Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto, Rebuilding
Black Voting Rights before the Voting Rights Act, in THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECURING THE
BALLOT 57, 70-72 (Richard M. Valelly ed., 2006) (discussing Freedom Vote and Freedom Summer
campaigns which led to voting rights reform legislation).
9. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government.").
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of minority voters due to felon disenfranchisement laws, inaccurate
record-keeping, and other practices that were meant to keep African
American voters from the polls.1t These allegations were raised aside
from the issue of election maladministration rasied before the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore.t And if these allegations are taken to be true,
their alleged consequences had significant results-the decisive results in
Florida were so narrow that a difference of several thousand votes could
winner of the 2000 presidential election rather
have made Al Gore the
12
than George W. Bush.
Eight years after Bush v. Gore, more questions have emerged about
the nature and quality of our election system. One fundamental question
that has garnered significant attention is the issue of what criteria ought
to be used to qualify voters. This question has most recently presented
itself through voter identification laws enacted in a number of states.
These laws require that voters possess government-issued identification
cards with photographs as a prerequisite to registering to vote and voting
in person at the polls. The Supreme Court has recently endorsed the use
of photo identification laws, finding that the voter identification statute
3
passed in Indiana law was, on its face, a reasonable election regulation.
This article argues that photo identification laws represent a continuation of the use of economic forces as a way to block people of lower
economic status from participation in the electorate. These laws are similar to other restrictions on the franchise, such as property requirements
and poll taxes, because the rules required the voter to demonstrate the
ability to meet an economic test-the ability to show a certain property
10. African Americans were nearly ten times more likely than whites to have their ballots
rejected in the November 2000 election. Poorer counties, particularly those with large minority
populations, were more likely to use voting systems with higher spoilage rates than more affluent
counties with significant white populations. Of the 100 precincts in Florida with the highest numbers of disqualified ballots, eighty-three of them were majority black precincts. Thirty-one percent
of the Florida disenfranchised population consisted of African American men. The report also
suggested that Florida's electoral reform law, recently enacted at the time the study was conducted,
failed to change the state's policy of permanently disenfranchising former felons, which produced a
stark disparity in disenfranchisement rates of African American men compared with their white
counterparts. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVtL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, at ch. 9 (2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubslvote2000/
report/ch9.htm.
11.
531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000). Richard Hasen points out that the Bush v. Gore decision provided an opportunity for the country to become aware of the systemic problems which plague the
electoral system and to apply the principles articulated in Reynolds and Harper to addressing current
problems in election administration. See also Richard Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore,
60 STAN. L. REv. 1, 43 (2007). Yet, Hasen notes that nonetheless the spectre of partisanship has
effectively allowed the politicians and the courts to relegate their post Bush v. Gore decisions to
default rles which represent a furthering of partisan retrenchments. Id. at 43-44.
12.

U.S.

COMM'N

ON

CIVIL

RIGHTS,

supra

note

10,

at

intro.,

available at

http:llwww.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/reportlintro.htm ('"The final vote tally in Florida was 2,912,790
for Bush and 2,912,253 for Gore. In the end, Bush became the president-elect, winning the Electoral
College by a margin of 271-267; Gore won the popular vote with 50,158,094 over Bush's
49,820,518.").
13.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1627 (2008).
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value, the ability to pay a tax, or the ability to obtain a photo ID. The
potential effect of such photo-voter identification laws is that the voters
at the lowest end of the socioeconomic scale are effectively excluded
from voting because they are the least able to afford the cost of voting
exacted by the law.
History has shown that the indirect, non-essential costs of voting are
subject to manipulation by political elites such as state legislators and
political party leaders as a means to shape the electorate to ensure that it
will be composed of voters more disposed to vote for those same lawmakers and party leaders. Thus, laws that rely on socioeconomic status
to define eligibility to vote have served-and currently risk becoming,
once again-a proxy for the exclusion of otherwise eligible voters from
the electorate. This article contends that such lines of exclusion are antithetical to the nature of democracy and ultimately constitute a tyranny of
the majority 14 against the minority at the lowest level of socioeconomic
status.1 5 Moreover, the courts have been largely indifferent to this effect.
The Supreme Court, in particular, has articulated a powerful vision of
participatory democracy, but has at the same time been apathetic towards
the effective exclusion of those on the lower end of the economic scale.
This is most clearly shown in the recent Supreme Court decision in
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.
The American system, unlike many other constitutional democracies, requires that the voter have sufficient socioeconomic status in order

14.
ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 239-42 (Harvey C. Mansfield and
Debla Winthrop trans., eds., Univ. Chi. Press 2000) (1835). The concept of the tyranny of the majority lies close to American democracy. Majority rule is the key thesis of the United States Constitution. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (Har-

vard Univ. Press 1980) (1938). Yet, the danger of rule of the majority is that the majority can then
trample on the rights of the minority. Id. This is often envisioned as a problem of express minority
discrimination in terms of race, gender, political factions, etc. Yet, the problem of economic exclusion in the electorate is one of implicit discrimination. There is no group advocating for the rights of
those left out of the electorate due to photo identification laws. Yet, the exclusion of them-and the
inability to have their voice heard in the process of American govemance-is wholly antithetical to
democracy. It is this kind of majoritarian tyranny which this article attempts to name.
15. The underlying principle here is the view that the democratic process must include all
citizens without distinction as to any category, including class, for American democracy to be meaningful. Distinctions on the basis of class ought not play a role in the question of who can participate in American democracy, i.e., who is allowed to vote. This view is as old as the republic itself.
Indeed, the idea that class ought not to play a role was recognized as a part of the constitutional
debates. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 348 (James Madison) (Bantham Books 2003) (1787-88)
("Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor; not the
learned, more than the ignorant .... The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the State."); see also ELY, supra note 14, at 5-6 (noting that the
Constitution is fundamentally a document designed to guarantee a system of representative democracy where all citizens are entitled to participate); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralismand Distrust:
How Courts can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L. J. 1279, 1282
(2005) (noting that the root of democratic reinforcement theory was the notion that democracy is the
premise of the Constitution-that "all adults must have the right to vote and to engage in expressive
activities").
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to participate in the electorate. 16 This dynamic has been true throughout
the history of the American electorate. The history of the administration
of voting laws and the evolution of voting rights illustrates how various
types of costs lie at the heart of the rules created to determine who could
vote and who could not vote.17 The greatest external cost-that is, outside of the voter's own motivational costs to vote-is exacted by those
8
rules and regulations created by governments to administer elections.
Thus, the history of the right to vote has been a steady struggle between those who wish to constrain or restrict the vote by raising the cost
and those who wish to make the vote more accessible by lowering the
costs. Moreover, this history represents a political struggle where the
bedrock of democratic systems-the ability for each and every eligible
citizen to have his or her vote counted without effective manipulation by
the political majority-is left prey to the calculations of politicians attempting to game the electorate. The effect is that a set of voters is left
susceptible to this manipulation and is effectively excluded from voting.
Even within the regime of voter identification laws, there are those who
are excluded from the process and unable to participate due to the shifting of the rules. Some advocates have called this "structural disenfranchisement."' 9 The effect of such disenfranchisement is the creation of an
underclass of citizens who are unable to vote and who will remain marginalized.
Little attention has been given to these issues by the law review literature. 20 This paper will argue that voting rights jurisprudence must fac16.
See SIDNEY VERBA, NORMAN H. NIE & JAE-ON KIM, PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL
EQUALITY: A SEVEN-NATION COMPARISON 2-3 (1978) (discussing the comparison of seven nations

which confirms a correlation between socioeconomic status and political participation specifically in
the United States as opposed to the other six nations); see also RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN
J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 13-36 (1980).
17. See Keyssar, supra note 8, at 9-10, 28-31, 35-37, 61-62, 111-12 (discussing laws that were
put into place to disenfranchise poor and minority voters).
18.
See id. Indeed, it almost goes without saying that the ability or right to vote only exists
within the context of the laws and regulations which define the exercise of that right and thus, the
rules themselves define who can and cannot vote. See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY:
THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION 13-15 (2006) (asserting that the election law system
dictates who can vote-that the "election rules, practices, and decisions filters out certain citizens
from voting and organizes the electorate... there is no right to vote outside of the terms, conditions,
hurdles, and boundaries set by" those responsible for enacting election laws).
19.
See, e.g., STEVEN DONZIGER, AMERICA'S MODERN POLL TAX: How STRUCTURAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT ERODES DEMOCRACY 1 (2001), available at http://www.advancement
project.org/reports/AMPT.pdf.

20. This is not to say that there has not been a great deal of commentary about photo identification requirements. This commentary has been led by Spencer Overton's seminal article which has
greatly influenced discussion in this field. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 631, 631 (2007). Additionally, there has been a significant amount of law review commentary
analyzing photo identification voter requirements. See, e.g., Richard Tyler Atkinson, Note, Under-

developed and Overexposed: Rethinking Photo ID Voting Requirements, 33 J. LEGIS. 268, 268
(2007); Kelly T. Brewer, Note, Disenfranchise This: VoterlD Laws and Their Discontents, A Blueprintfor Bringing Successful Equal Protectionand Poll Tax Claims, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 191, 19192 (2007); Chad Flanders, How to Think About Voter Fraud (and Why), 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93,
93 (2007); Samuel P. Langholz, Note, Fashioning a Constitutional Voter-Identification Require-
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tor in these express costs-whether direct or indirect-to ensure that
American elections are free, fair, and accessible by all willing participants. Part I of this article will provide an overview of American photo
identification laws and discuss the nature of the modem cost of voting to
the voter. It will draw upon political science voter participation theory
and demonstrate that voting registration and identification laws create
inherent burdens on voters and that those burdens are largely socioeconomic in nature. Part II of this article will discuss the history of voter
access laws in this country. That history has been premised on the idea
that voter access laws rely on economic status as a sufficient identifier
for those who have a sufficient stake in the electorate and thus are deserving of the exercise of the franchise. This part will conclude with a
discussion of Harper,which held that the ability to pay bears no rational
relationship with the ability to vote and clearly articulated a vision of a
fundamental right to vote. Part III will consider the potential socioeconomic impact of photo identification laws upon voters and how those
impacts are similar to historical class-based discrimination. It will examine in detail how the courts have been indifferent to the costs levied
upon on the right to vote by voter identification laws and how that indifference tracks the conflict over the socioeconomic burdens of voting
raised in Harper. Finally, Part IV will recommend how to reframe the
standards articulated in Harper to take into account this structural socioeconomic bias inherent in, and damaging to, the right to vote.
I. THE COST OF VOTING TO THE VOTER
The history of the American franchise has been one of a tension between those who wish to protect the vote from being freely accessed and
those who wish to have the vote defined more liberally to include a
broader cross section of the American public. This tension has been the
hallmark of battles over how to define the right to vote and who would
have access to it. Photographic identification laws represent the latest
ment, 93 IOWA L. REv. 731, 733 (2008); Debra Milberg, The NationalIdentification Debate: "Real
ID'"and Voter Identification,3 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SoC'Y 443, 444 (2008); Evan D. Montgomery, The Missouri Photo-ID Requirementfor Voting: Ensuring Both Access and Integrity, 72
Mo. L. RFV. 651, 651-52 (2007); Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisementand the Constitution: Finding a Standard that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1174, 1174 (2007); E. Earl Parson &
Monique McLaughlin, The Persistence of Racial Bias in Voting: Voter ID, The New Battleground
for PretextualRace Neutrality, 8 J. L SOC'Y 75, 76 (2007); David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental:
The Myth of Voter Fraud and the Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 485 (2008).
While this commentary provides a sound analysis concerning voter identification laws and
the impact that photo ID laws will have on the voting public, the commentary does not connect the
litigation surrounding voter identification laws with a broader historical understanding of the manipulation of election laws through the use of economic forces. Nor does the extant literature raise
concerns about the danger to the nature of democracy created by the problems exemplified by photo
identification laws-that the poor (especially poor ethnic minorities) may be excluded from the
democratic process through structural, economics-based means, and that such discrimination is
contradictory to basic conceptions of democracy. This article makes an initial attempt to provide
both analyses.
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manifestation of this tension. These laws, in effect, create an economic
barrier which the lowest economic classes in our society cannot surpass.
This section of the article will begin by discussing basic conceptions of
democracy and provide a framework for thinking about the range of
modem voter identification laws and define the kinds of costs such laws
impose on voters.
A. Democracy and Citizen Access
The notion that all citizens will be allowed to participate in the selection of our leaders lies at the heart of the concept of American democracy. 21 This core principle seems almost axiomatic to discourse about
democracy, yet it is not often articulated in a concrete way. Part of the
problem is that the notion of democracy applicable to the American political scheme often eludes definition.22 Yet, as a basic principle, it
would seem that the involvement of the people in making decisions concerning their choices as to whom may govern lies at the heart of the conception of democracy.23 A close examination of the founding documents
of the United States reveals that the key principle the founders sought to
protect was a democratic process. The Declaration of Independence, in
its appeal to fundamental principles of government, places the peoplewithout differentiation-as the source of the authority of government.24
Further, the Constitution points to the importance of the principle of participation by the people as at the heart of the American experiment.2 5
The Supreme Court, accordingly, has, as a manifestation of this
principle, recognized the right to vote within the scope of rights guaranteed American citizens. Yet in its jurisprudence this right was initially
located with the states rather than the federal government and, accordingly, the Court did not recognize the right to vote as fundamental or invi-

21.
The basic premise of republican democracy is that the citizens will have the opportunity to
participate in electoral process and have a say in choosing their representatives. See Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the Constitution Constructs the Pathways ofinformation,25 CARDOzO L. REv. 267, 278 (2003).
22. Jane Schacter explains that multiple meanings of the idea of democracy can be derived
from the constitution. See Jane S. Schacter, UnenumeratedDemocracy: Lessons From the Right to
Vote, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L 457, 472-73 (2007) (explaining in the context of using 'democracy' as a
value which can be defined as an unenumerated right, different perspectives can be reasonably
discerned from the Constitution which may be contradictory).
23. The bedrock principle of such an American democratic process is that the rule of the
country must be in line with the consent of the governed. See ELY, supra note 14, at 7. This is
democracy put most simply. Ely, in particular, argues persuasively that such protection of democracy is at the heart of American governance and the government must be constrained by that principle.
See id.
24.
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed .... ").
25.
Ely argues persuasively that a close examination of the Constitution itself reveals a concern for creating and protecting a democratic process. See ELY, supranote 14, at 92-93.
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olate.26 However, in the Warren Court era, the Court recognized that the
right to vote was a fundamental federal right. The Court of that era determined that the right to vote was fundamental because, without it, all
other rights of citizenship could be damaged. 27 It then follows that without the ability of each citizen to vote and thus have the bedrock amount
of participation in the democratic process and in our government, the
concept of democracy is meaningless. Moreover, minorities from various groups have struggled against the majority over the past two hundred
thirty-plus years to create access to the electoral process. With such
access comes the ability to cast a ballot and participate in the core act of
democracy-selecting representatives who will, on the local, state, and
national levels, dictate policy reflective of the needs and interests of all
its citizens.28 Thus, to preserve the core of American democracy, the
mechanisms of voting and political participation should be accessible to
all. Accordingly, to be a citizen in a democracy, one must participate
within its political activities equally with all other citizens.29
This inclusive vision of American democracy and the political
process is belied by the fact that many citizens in this country do not
participate in the electoral process. Voting in the American system is a
voluntary act. Thus, voting participation in the United States is not affected
by voters
any direct
official governmental
interest 3°are
in free
encouraging
3' American citizens
requiring
to participate.
and able or
to

26. This was not the circumstance during the first one hundred fifty years of the republic.
Indeed, the Court in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) stated that there was
no federal right to vote; the right to vote depended upon the regulation of the states; see also United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) ("In Minor v. Happersett, we decided that the Constitution of the United States has not conferred the right of suffrage upon any one, and that the United
States have no voters of their own creation in the States." (citation omitted)).
27. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily
abridges this right.").
28. See ELY, supra note 14, at 117 (noting that a right to vote is central to a right of participation in the democratic process).
29. Malinda L. Seymore, The Presidencyand the Meaning of Citizenship, 2005 BYU L. REV.
927, 965 (2005) (describing political participation as a key theory upon which the concept of citizenry is grounded and noting that "[p]olitical participation would encompass at the very least the right
and obligation to vote and the right and obligation to serve in political office").
30. This is separate and apart, however, from the interests of those who perform the governing
and are subject to elections. Those persons clearly have an incentive to induce citizens disposed to
voting for them to do so. Conversely, such politicians also have an incentive to discourage voters
who are not inclined to vote for them from participating. Herein is one of the core problems of
allowing partisan politics to set the rules for participation in democratic governance. See Schacter,
supra note 22, at 473 (citing ELY, supra note 14, at 105-34) (explaining the inherent conflict of
interest in allowing incumbent elected officials to control a system that benefits them despite whether or not that system conforms to constitutionally grounded democratic principles).
31.
This is in contrast to the mechanisms in other industrialized democracies. A number of
countries require that their voters participate in national elections through a number of direct and
indirect methods. In some countries, voting is legally mandated. In others, elections are held in
ways that are far easier for voters to access in comparison to the American system. For example,
voting may take place over a week-long period, or on a weekend, or on an official holiday. Addi-
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participate in the democratic process as they wish, with full freedom to
express-or not express-their preferences for the people who govern in
their name. 32 Despite the fundamental thesis of representative democracy and the resulting interest one would expect from all citizens in voting,
American voter participation continues to decrease. 33 Though biasdriven election barriers such as poll taxes, literacy tests, the all-white
primary, and other forms of voter exclusion have been eliminated from
various states' laws, voter participation in the United States continues to
diminish. 34 It has been well documented that the percentage of participation in American elections has dropped dramatically over the last forty
years.35
This issue has been addressed in various contexts. Political scientists have hypothesized about why so few Americans vote, and discussed
in detail whether there is a specific class gap in voter participation.36
tionally, in many systems, the government issues to all citizens voter identification (or some other
sort of national identification card) without requiring the citizen to make the effort to obtain such
identification. See Andrew C. Geddis, It's a Game Anyone Can Play: Election Laws Around the
World, 4 ELECT L. J. 57, 58 (2005) (reviewing Louis MASSiCOTrE, ANDRP BLAIS, & ANTOINE
YOSHINAKA, ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTION LAWS IN DEMOCRACIES (2004)).

32. Because participation in the democratic process is egalitarian in this sense, participation in
the process becomes an indicator of whether people are invested in the democratic process. Low
participation rates seem to reflect some degree of apathy concerning the typical American voter on
this score. Yet, the questions that the political participation scholars ask appear to go further than
merely inquiring about whether Americans do or do not care about the political process. The dramatically increased participation rates in the 2008 primary and general elections for President seem
to reflect interest, as opposed to apathy, in the political process. This appears generated by the fact
that Americans appear to see a greater stake in the question of who will lead their country at this
particular point in history. Given this heightened level of interest, the question of what other factors-particularly express and de facto legal factors-dissuade and isolate potential voters from
voting.
33.
According to the Federal Election Commission, 56.70% of the voting age population
participated in the 2004 presidential election. FED. ELECTION COMM'N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2004:
ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 5 (2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections

2004.pdf.
34. Michael McDonald, 5 Myths About Turning out the Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2006, at
B03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/27/AR200610
2701474.html (discussing how voter turnout in 1972, when eighteen-year-olds were given the right
to vote was 55.2%; this percentage declined to a low point of 48.9% in 1996).
35. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Forward: The Constitutionalizationof Democratic Politics,
118 HARV. L. REv. 28, 37, n.46 (2004) (citing THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER:
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 3-23 (2002)). Pildes notes that studies like

Patterson's have substantiated the claim that voter turnout has significantly decreased in American
elections between 1960 and 2000. This claim, however, has been a subject of recent debate among
political science scholars. See also Michael P. McDonald & Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of the
Vanishing Voter, 95:4 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 963, 963 (2001) ("[A]lthough the turnout rate outside the
South is lower than in the 1950s and early 1960s, there has been no downward trend during the last
30 years.").
36. For example, a number of political scientists have argued that voter turnout has fallen over
time and that such fallout has been concentrated among the poor. See RuY A. TEIXEIRA, THE
DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 59 (1992) (noting the popularity of the theory that a class gap
exists in voting and that this class gap results in the poor being left out of political discourse); see
also WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, The Appearance and Disappearanceof the American Voter, in THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 121, 123-25 (1982); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW
POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 180-83 (1984); FRANCES Fox PPVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY
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Though the ultimate ramifications of this research are debatable, the studies are premised on a model of political participation which stresses the
socioeconomic status of the participant and the fact that the participant
must make a rational cost/benefit analysis of whether to participate within the electoral process. 37 Such a model will be helpful in shaping the
way we think about the effects of voter identification laws. It will allow
us to articulate how such laws impose a cost on voting, both direct and
indirect, on the voter. Such analysis will allow us to articulate a means
to adequately analyze and promote solutions to the problems posed by
such laws.
B. The Costs and Benefits of Voting
Political scientists have, through their research, worked to develop
various models to describe American voting behavior. The model most
applicable to the question of economic impact of voting rules on voters is
the rational actor model of voting behavior. The first premise of this
model is that voting exacts a cost on the voter. 38 This cost is often exacted is an economic cost. 39 Additionally, there are a number of other
costs which should be taken into account. For example, the psychological costs of voting can deter a voter. Voting in an election requires a
level of interest and attention that will divert the voter from other activities to which the voter may wish to attend. 4° Thus, a voter must deliberately think about the choices between political participation and other
activities in his or her life. Put another way, choosing to vote requires a
voter to forego other activities which may provide that person a benefit.4'
For example, if the voter wishes to participate, the voter will then need to
educate him or her self on the candidates, issues, and other pertinent information related to the voting process.

AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 15-16 (1980). However, other political scientists have questioned the
notion of a class gap based on empirical study. See, e.g., TEIXEIRA, supra at 69-71 (disputing the
existence of a class gap and attributing a decline to the view that participation generally is decreasing
across socioeconomic groups).
37. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 10-13 ("[C]itizens of higher social and
economic status participate more in politics."). As such, socioeconomic status, whether it is measured in terms of level of education, income, or occupation, is an important variable in calculating the
benefits and costs of voting. But see DANIEL HAYES LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION
LAW 51-52 (2d ed. 2001) (summarizing the debates over whether socioeconomic status or the lack
of addressing the issues related to individuals of lower socioeconomic status is the source for low
American voter participation).
38. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8 (asserting that "[tihe likelihood that
an individual will vote is a direct expression of ... the costs associated with doing so"; the lower the
costs, the more likely it is that an individual will vote).
39. See id. (discussing registering to vote and traveling to the polls as examples of economic
costs associated with voting).
40. See id (discussing how costs such as learning about the candidates and deciding how to
vote are considered costs that require "postponing the opportunity to do something else that might be
more pleasurable").
41. Id.
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Second, voting requires the voter to meet the requirements for registration as set forth by state law prior to actually voting.42 A voter must
register before the election takes place, sometimes a month or more in
advance of an upcoming election, and then appear to vote on Election
Day (or cast an absentee ballot).4 3 As we will see below, the structural
cost of voting can be direct, as in the case of the poll tax, or indirect, as
in the case of voter identification laws and registration requirements generally. Further, in both instances, the fact that a cost is exacted creates a
disincentive for voters to cast their votes.
Third, intertwined with this structural or legal requirement is an
economic cost. On some level, even if the cost is relatively de minimis,
the voter has to make some kind of economic sacrifice to participate in
elections. Registering inherently requires voters to take time from economically productive activities to participate, thus losing potential income from that activity. Indeed, registration itself can be a cumbersome
process requiring a significant amount of time lost due to the fact that
registration offices are only open during business hours, registration oftentimes requires documentation, such as a birth certificate or a proof of
citizenship, and obtaining such documentation may require a great deal
of cost and effort to obtain. Measures such as the Help America Vote
Act (HAVA) and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA)
have helped to shift this cost. For example, the NVRA required that
states provide means for voters to register while applying for or renewing
their drivers' licenses. 44 This may shift the cost of voting to another activity, filing with the DMV, but nonetheless it does require an economic
cost of the voter.
Voters must, in effect, undertake a cost/benefit analysis to determine whether they will participate in the political process. For example,
because of the nature of registration requirements, a potential voter may
be forced to choose between time spent at work, and registering to vote.45
According to the rational actor theory of voting, which captures this kind
of analysis, a voter must weigh the costs of voting and compare those
costs with the benefits gained from voting.46 If the cost outweighs the
benefit, then the potential voter will not participate in the voting
process.47 However, if the voter believes that he or she will benefit from
42.
For a list of voter registration requirements state-by-state, see State Voter Information
Pages-U.S. Election Assistance Commission, http://www.eac.gov/voter/states (last visited Mar. 7,
2009).
43.

See, e.g., Alaska - U.S. Election Assistance Commission, http://www.eac.gov/voter/states

(follow "Alaska" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
44.
45.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1973gg-2 (West 2009).
See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8.

46.
See Ellen Dinsmore, One Person, No Vote: Socioeconomic Bias in American Civic Engagement 53-54 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Wesleyan University) (citing SYDNEY VERBA
& NORMAN H. NE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY

(1972)).
47.

See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8-10.
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the act of voting, and that those benefits will outweigh the costs, then the
voter will engage in the act of voting.48
Thus, several factors emerge to illustrate the cost of voting: the potential voter's interest in participating in the process, the potential voter's
willingness to become sufficiently educated in the issues and the candidates to be willing to vote, and the potential voter's ability and willingness to comply with the legal requirements related to voting-registering
and participating on election day.49
C. Directand Indirect Costs of Voting
The analysis that follows will focus mainly on this third factor, the
willingness and ability for potential voters to comply with the legal requirements related to voting. Usually, these requirements mandate that
the voter establish his or her registration with the state and then require
the voter to prove his or her identity at the time she wishes to vote. This
serves two purposes: to confirm the voter's identity and to ensure the
voter is actually registered to vote. 50 In particular, modem voter identification laws-specifically, those voter identification laws that require the
presentation of a government-issued photographic identification cardfocus most clearly on this proof-of-identity requirement. The key issue
for these laws is what forms of information the voter must gather to
prove his or her identity when registering and when appearing to vote.
Within the context of the legal barriers to the vote, several costs
present themselves. First, the registration requirements exact a particular
cost. Whether it is payment of a tax or gathering of registration materials, the effort to present appropriate credentials for voting exacts a burden on the voter to participate in the voting process. These considerations on voting can be considered as two types of costs-direct and indirect. Direct costs for voting are those payments made directly to the
government in exchange for the ability to vote. In other words, direct
costs relate to the express ability to access a ballot from a governing au48. See id.
49. Id. at 8. But see LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 37, at 48-49 (noting the limitations of
rational choice theory and noting that voter turnout may very well not be caused by the costliness of
voting in time and effort). Notwithstanding this criticism of the rational voter/voter costliness
theory, this paper argues that this theory provides and adequate lens for understanding the effects of
photo ID voter identification laws precisely because these laws raise the price of voting to a level
where some voters will likely be priced out of the voting process. Thus, the effects of the likely cost
should be considered, based upon empirical evidence, when evaluating these laws. See generally
OVERTON, supranote 18, at 161-62 (suggesting that judges also need to rely on empirical data rather
than just anecdotes and analogies when determining the constitutionality of photo identification
laws).
50. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTER
IDENTIFICATION (2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/taskfc/VoterlD
Req.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (providing information and tables outlining photo ID requirements in each state); State Voter Information Pages-U.S. Election Assistance Commission,
http://www.eac.gov/voter/states/voter-information-by-state (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (listing voter
registration requirements state-by-state).
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thority. Such costs would involve the exchange of money between the
potential voter and the government authority that is running the election
itself, e.g., the payment of a poll tax, the requirement to purchase an
identification card, and other such costs.
Indirect costs are the costs a voter has to expend to become eligible
to vote, but the costs are not paid directly to the government or otherwise
related to the actual casting of a ballot. Those costs include the cost related to a person identifying him or herself, whether through obtaining a
government-issued photographic identification card such as a driver's
license, passport, employment card, or some other related type of card;
proving one's citizenship; proving one's current address; proving one's
location of birth; or other requirements that relate to this proof.5' Often
such proof requires a potential voter to travel to the issuing office, obtain
documents which form the basis of being issued a governmental photo
ID, or other costs associated with obtaining an ID.
The indirect costs of voting are inherent in the act of voting. Unlike
other protected rights, the act of voting is voluntary and requires the voter to make an affirmative effort to participate in the electoral process.
Thus, the nature and complexity of the indirect costs to voting can create
disincentives for voting. Political science research suggests that such
costs, as represented by registration requirements and photo identification requirements, in and of themselves form a barrier to political participation for those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged. 53 The complexity of the legal rules surrounding voting simply creates a disincentive
for participation. Because the costs are so high to some, the disincentive
cannot be overcome simply by transforming one kind of indirect cost of
voting into another indirect CoSt. 54 The cost still remains, and for the
51.
See, e.g., U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL MAIL VOTER
REGISTRATION FORM (2006), available at http://www.eac.gov/files/voter/nvraupdate.pdf (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009).
52. See, e.g., Darryl Fears, Voter ID Law is Overturned,WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A03,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/27/AR2005102702
171 html (discussing hardships that voters in Georgia faced when attempting to register); Ian Urbina,
Voter ID Laws are Set to Face a Crucial Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at A01, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/us/O7identity.html?pagewanted=1 &r=- 1 (discussing an elderly
woman's hardship in getting to the voting office to prove her identity in time to vote); Joan Biskupic,
Indiana Voter ID Case may Hinge on the Theoretical; Supreme Court Takes up Dispute in Which
Both Sides are Lacking Proof of Actual Harm, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2008, at 4A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-01-06-court_- N.htm (identifying those who could
be hurt by voter registration laws; among them, a stroke victim who made one trip to a state office
for an alternative ID but did not have the proper document, and so returned home on foot with the
aid of his walker, and a mother of seven who found it would cost $26-$50 to round up the necessary
papers for a proper ID).
53. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8.
54. In other words, the cost of appropriate photo identification cannot be eliminated simply
because the cost of purchasing the photo identification from the government is minimized. In a
situation where a fee for a photo ID is not assessed, the cost of the fee is removed but the other
attended costs-gathering identification, losing time from other economically productive activity,
and so on--cannot be replaced. See OVERTON, supra note 18, at 153-54 (discussing the financial
burden associated with obtaining photo identification). For example, a certified copy of a birth
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voter who does not think that there is a benefit to participating and who
is, moreover, overwhelmed by the nature of the cost exacted, that person
will be effectively excluded from the electorate because that person will
choose not to vote. 55 This effect is sometimes called "structural disenfranchisement., 56 Structural disenfranchisement has been defined as a
complex interaction between the direct and indirect costs exacted upon
voters for participation in the electoral system.5 7 The courts have been
relatively vague and ad hoc in analyzing such indirect costs.
Political elites have used the costs of voting in a variety of ways to
create disincentives to vote during all periods of American history. Such
categories as property ownership, residency, and ability to pay poll taxes
have all been used as tools to exclude certain categories of otherwise
eligible voters from the polls. 58 The argument for use of such indicators
was one of proper stake of ownership within the society. 59 Historically,
this has been a shibboleth for marking a certain class or group of voters
as undesirable and a lower type of participant in society. The kinds of
social controls exacted by levying certain types of costs--direct and indirect-have been one of the means of identifying and excluding citizens
otherwise entitled to vote. This article will turn next to a discussion of
these costs as they have existed throughout the history of the American
electorate.
II. A PAY-TO-PLAY SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE COST OF THE VOTE
The use of economic restraints to effectively increase the cost of
voting to the voter is nothing new. Indeed, the use of an indicator of
socioeconomic status as a requirement to vote has been a requirement for
voting in the American system since the beginning of the American republic. 6° Unlike the ideal of American democracy-the view that all
citizens can participate in the electoral process-the American electorate
at its beginning was based on the notion that the voter must be able to
demonstrate an economic stake in the society in order to participate in
the political process. 61 The nature of the requirement has shifted from
certificate could cost anywhere between $10 and $45, a passport costs $85 to obtain, and limited
business hours and long lines at DMV offices discourage some from taking time out of their day to
obtain photo identification in order to vote. Id. It is these costs that prevent some voters, particularly voters who cannot afford to lose time from work or obtain necessary transportation, from obtaining an otherwise "free" identification card.
55. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 16, at 8 (suggesting that individuals who
most easily absorb costs associated with voting will find more of a benefit in voting than those with
minimal resources).
56. See DONZIGER, supranote 19, at 1.
57. Id.
58. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 9-10, 28-30, 35-37, 61-62 (discussing laws that were put
into place to disenfranchise poor and minority voters).
59.
Id. at 8-10.
60. See id.
61.
Id. at 9, 29 (suggesting that after the Revolution, the general attitude was that "only men
with property... were deemed to be sufficiently attached to the community and sufficiently affected
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one of requiring property to requiring the payment of a tax to possessing
the means to identify oneself within the context of being a member of the
voting community. Indeed, in some states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, both the property ownership requirement and the taxation
requirement were necessary to vote.62 Voters were required to demonstrate some minimum economic status they possessed before they could
be allowed to vote. This part of the article will discuss the history of this
socioeconomic requirement for the right to vote and the tension between
the democratic aspiration and the truth of the economic barrier to the
franchise.
A. The Franchisein the Early Republic
At the beginning of the American republic there were few centralized rules governing who would be admitted to the franchise. Each of
the thirteen original colonies had its own laws to determine voter eligibility in state elections. These requirements often centered on the voter
demonstrating that he owned some amount of property within the locality
in which the voter sought to vote. To the extent the original United
States Constitution speaks to voting, it did not create a specific voting
right or voting requirement. Indeed, the Constitution declined to take a
stance as to which people would affirmatively be allowed to vote.63 The
only references to the right to vote and who would determine the scope
of that right are inferential. For example, the Constitution specifies that
"the People of the several States" shall choose their representatives for
the House of Representatives 64 and the legislators of the state legislatures
shall choose the members of the United States Senate. 65 The Constitution also set out the Electoral College for the election of the President
and the Vice President of the United States.66 In both of these instances,
the Constitution leaves it to the states to determine who the electorate

by its laws to have earned the privilege of voting," and that "the interests of the propertyless...
could be represented effectively by wise, fair-minded, wealthy white men").
62.
See id. at 29 (discussing how even after the widespread abolishment of property requirements, many states enacted taxpaying requirements that preserved "the link between a person's
financial status and his right to vote").
63.
See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13-17 (1964) (providing a detailed discussion of the
framers' considerations about whether and how the right to vote to elect representatives should be
framed in the Constitution).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
2.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.2 (amended 1913). This requirement was changed to allow for
the popular election of Senators with the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIL § 1. However, while the amendment notes that the election of the Senators
will be done by the "people," it does not set up any requirements as to who the people will be. See
id.
66. U.S. CONST. art. 1I,§ 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The amendment in 1804
retained the structure that the electors shall cast ballots for the office of president rather than the
people directly. The assumption is that the electors shall vote for the person who won the popular
vote, though that assumption is not expressly stated within the Constitution.
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will be to choose their federal representatives and the state legislators
who will choose the United States Senate.67
The Constitution of 1787 left the states free to determine the population that would be the voting electorate. The states proceeded to define-or merely continued to use already existing-schemes to determine who would be counted within the electorate. The scheme most
frequently used within the early republic was the property ownership
requirement. Under the property requirement, one had to be a real land
owner, or possess at least $300 to $500 in personal property.6 8 The
rationale for the property requirement in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries was that "[o]nly men with property . . were deemed to be
sufficiently attached to the community and sufficiently affected by its
laws to have earned the privilege of voting. 69 Underlying this view
was the belief that "[t]he interests of the propertyless . . .could be
represented effectively by wise, fair-minded, wealthy white men. 7 °
Further, this barrier served to maintain order in society. The view was
if the propertyless were allowed to have the vote, they would prove to
be "a menace to the maintenance of a well-ordered community. 7 1
As the American republic grew and changed economically, qualifications based on property and literacy proved ineffective to maintain the
social order and exclude desirable voters from undesirable voters, particularly in the antebellum South. In other words, the wealth qualifications
had the effect of excluding white male voters who had an otherwise sufficient "stake" to participate in elections, even though they did not meet
These provisions of the Constitution suggest that states were left to develop and structure
67.
laws to access the vote. In contrast, the one area where the Constitution upheld a state practice of
voter exclusion was to exclude slaves from the electoral process. It does so by proscribing whom the
population will be for purposes of apportioning representation and taxation. The Constitution prescribes the use of a decennial census to tabulate the population of the United States. U.S. CONST.
Art I, § 2, cl.3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 2. Article I then directs that representation
will be based on the tabulation of the whole number of free persons, persons in servitude for a number of years, and three-fifths of "all other Persons." Id. The "three-fifths compromise" was meant to
strike a balance between the population of slave states, whose economy and population were based
upon slavery, and the free states, which had greater economic wealth but lower population. This
implicitly suggested that the voting populace (as well as the democratic citizenry for all intents and
purposes) only consisted of "free" persons; all others would simply serve to bolster the population
count and no other purpose. Thus, the Constitution suggested what was in practice at the time in the
individual states-that slavery was accepted and political representation depended on those persons
who were free, and the power that those free persons held over those bound up in slavery.
Indeed, the Constitution itself, which, as argued above, implicitly sanctioned a political
participation system based upon property ownership, allowed for the ability to practice the franchise
upon the ability of one person to own another and to allow the ownership of slaves to count as
"property" for purposes of voting. This quandary of a greater and a lesser class of people separated
by the subordination inherent in one group of people being the property of another group lies at the
heart of the American political dilemma concerning race and politics. I intend to explore this issue-and it's intertwined relationship between personhood, political power, and property-in a
future article.
68.
See WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 331.
69.
KEYSsAR, supra note 8, at 9.
70.
Id.
Id.
71.
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the property qualifications. In some Southern states, the median yearly
income did not equal the property qualification. Historian C. Vann
Woodward points out that "[o]f the 231 counties in the United States in
which 20 per cent or more of the whites of voting age were illiterate,
204 were in the South., 72 It was in these counties where poverty was
rampant and literacy rates low, white voters were largely excluded from
the polls. This became an untenable situation in a largely agrarian society where white men were increasingly accumulating wealth, even though
it was not in terms of real property, and demanding the vote. Because of
factors like this, an absolute bar based on property was unworkable.
Moreover, the property requirement in and of itself had the effect of
disenfranchising many otherwise voting-eligible white men. Indeed,
in North Carolina for example, the property requirements disenfranchised fifty thousand free white men.73 These voters frequently demanded their vote and this social pressure eventually caused the property requirements to be eased.74
B. The ReconstructionAmendments and Defining the Right to Vote
As noted above, the right to vote was not defined directly in the
United States Constitution. The states had the power to set the rules as to
how one could qualify to vote and to grant access to the polls on Election
Day. The states emphasized property requirements in order to ensure
that the voter had an economic connection to the community. However,
as a result of the Civil War and the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments to the Constitution, the right to vote was strongly implied
to exist and would be protected under the national Constitution. This
ideal was fixed into our constitutional scope; yet the amendments did not
change the fundamental relationship between the voter and the ability to
vote-an economic stake in the community.
The passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
Constitution represented an assertion of national power over the authority states had to control voting. This assertion of power was, by its nature, limited. The Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed that "[n]o state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States; . . . nor deny to any
72. WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 331-32. Another type of text that was instituted in the
nineteenth century was the literacy test. In several states where the property requirement had
evolved into a test of whether one simply owned real property in the jurisdiction, the literacy test
was added. It simply required that the potential voter had to be literate enough to read in order to
vote, though the judgment of "literate enough" was often in the hands of the registrar of voters. See
KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 112. Since one had to have sufficient wealth to obtain education during
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, literacy requirements also proved to be a wealth-based
form of discrimination.
73. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 41.
74. The property restriction on voting began to diminish after 1790. However, Massachusetts
and New York did not abolish their property requirements until 1821, Virginia not until 1850 and
North Carolina not until the mid-1850s. Id. at 29.
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person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 75 The
Fifteenth Amendment ordered that the right of citizens "to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude., 76 Thus, under
federal law, voters were guaranteed not to be discriminated against on
the basis of race when it came to voting. Yet, these rules merely prohibited express racial discrimination commands and did not guarantee the
right to vote to all citizens.77 As a result, states were nonetheless free
to create socioeconomic and other barriers to the full and free exercise
of the franchise.
This is not to diminish the fact that the enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by Union troops during Reconstruction provided the opportunity for former slaves to have an active and
tremendous impact on American electoral politics. African Americans
elected a number of representatives in many of the states of the former
Confederacy. African Americans sent representatives to Congress and
elected senior officials in state and local governments across the South.
African Americans made tremendous progress throughout the South between 1870 and 1890. Yet, this progress was thwarted through a series
of political, legislative, and judicial decisions. Federal forces were withdrawn from the South by President Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877. The
ex-Confederate states, without federal supervision, were able to reclaim
control of their state legislatures through the Democratic Party and institute plans to disenfranchise African Americans. Thus, neither the words
of the U.S. Constitution nor the courts would stand in the way of the
turn-of-the-century state constitutional revision conventions and their
agenda of disenfranchisement.7 8 Rather than a barrier to the polls
based on race, the mechanism the States
would use to disenfranchise
79
would be based on economic status.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV. The Nineteenth Amendment, which came into effect in 1920,
some fifty years after the Reconstruction amendments, made the same guarantee on the basis of sex.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
77. In essence, as long as the rules the states adopted did not explicitly differentiate the ability
to vote on the basis of race-that is, as long as those rules were neutral towards race--there was no
constitutional violation of the Constitution concerning the franchise. Consequently, such neutrality
merely enshrined the status quo of African American subordination through focusing ultimately on
the effects of creating a wealth requirement for voting, i.e., a poll tax. Cf. Beverly Moran & Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of Law and the Legal System, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1219, 1221 (2007) (noting how neutrality and equality can support subordination and
hierarchy through protecting property rights and status inequalities inherent in the economic system).
The risk is that the same effect may be present here in photo identification laws.
78.
KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 110-16 (discussing states that adopted laws disenfranchising
blacks in the face of the reconstruction amendments); see Michael J. Klarman, The Supreme Court
and Black Disenfranchisement,in THE VOTING RIGHTS Amr: SECURING THE BALLOT 38-46 (Richard
M. Valelly ed., 2006).
79.
Cf. Parson & McLaughlin, supra note 20, at 78 ("In an even larger effort to prohibit
African Americans from casting their vote, state officials would again enact race-neutral voting
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C. The Jim Crow Poll Tax of the Twentieth Century
By the turn of the twentieth century, the ex-Confederate states from
Mississippi to Virginia revised their constitutions to include economic
and educational requirements specifically designed to prevent African
Americans from possessing the right to vote. 80 These prerequisites to the
franchise included meeting particular standards of ownership of property,
passing literacy tests, and the payment of a poll tax. 81 Though the intent of these state constitutional provisions was plainly discriminatory,
these tests did not explicitly discriminate against any group, such as
African Americans, and the laws were ultimately considered neutral
and fair by the courts. 82 However, these neutral rules created a different
problem-they disenfranchised poor whites as well as poor blacks. To
address this concern, the state constitutional conventions created a series
of loopholes to guarantee poor white voting while discouraging the
African American exercise of the franchise.83 It was this economic
requirement which endured and which this paper will now examine in
detail.
The ex-Confederate legislatures turned specifically to the poll tax to
remove those voters-largely African Americans-whom they sought to
exclude from the electorate. The poll tax did not discriminate against
African Americans directly, but set up an economic status requirement
that, while neutral on its face, had the effect of disenfranchising many.
The discrimination was effective, however, because poll tax requirements were simply quite expensive. Poll tax payments ranged from
$1.00 to $2.00 per year, which was an extreme amount to many.84 This

qualifications with pretextual technicalities invented on the spot to eliminate African Americans
from the registration process.").
80. KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 111-13.
81.
Id. at 111-12, 351-58 tbls.A.9, A.10 & A.11, 362-67 tbl.A.13; see also Klarman, supra
note 78, at 37-38.
82. KEYssAR, supra note 8, at 111 (discussing ways in which "Democrats chose to solidify
their hold on the South by modifying the voting laws in ways that would exclude African Americans
without overtly violating the Fifteenth Amendment.").
83.
These voting "qualifications" are legendary and worth brief mention here. The first of
these qualifications, the "understanding clause," was implemented by the Mississippi constitutional
convention. It permitted poll registrars to register voters who could "understand" any section of the
state constitution read to them. KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 111. However, this method of enfranchisement was widely criticized as merely a means to perpetrate mass fraud in order to fill the electorate with voters the planter elite sanctioned. In reaction, southern states turned to the "grandfather
clause." "This [rule] exempted from the literacy and property tests those ...[who were able] to vote
...[, along with their sons and grandsons, as of] January 1, 1867." WOODWARD, supra note 7, at
334. It should come as no surprise that most of these exempted voters were white. See also
KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 112. Such provisions were also labeled and fought as "un-American,"
"undemocratic," and outright fraud. See WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 334. These special clauses
were of limited duration in some states---that is, they only carried validity for a limited amount of
time and then would be phased out. However, the poll tax-the requirement that a potential voter
had to pay a levy before being granted access to the franchise--endured in the south for eighty years
as a fixture in southern turn-of-the-century Jim Crow constitutions.
84. OGDEN, supra note 7, at 32-33 tbl. 1;see also KEYSSAR, supra note 8, 356-57 tbl.A. 10.
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expense was compounded by the set of complex procedures set up to
affect and prove poll tax payments. First, the payment of the poll tax
was optional. Usually, no tax assessor would solicit payment of the poll
tax along with the payment of other taxes. Even if a solicitor did require
poll tax payment, that person would not necessarily explain to the taxpayer that the poll tax payment was a prerequisite to voting. Second,
poll taxes accumulated. A potential voter had to have paid his or her poll
taxes for a period of one to three years prior to the period when he desired to vote before being allowed to proceed to the registrar. Third,
these cumulative payments had to be paid in full well in advance of the
elections for which it was required (sometimes, as far in advance as eighteen months). 85 As Woodward put it, "[g]reat effectiveness was expected of this feature in the case of the 'vicious voter' of both races."
Quoting an Alabama disenfranchiser, Woodward pointed to the heart
of the matter: "[w]e want that poll tax to pile up so high that he [the
"vicious voter"] will never be able to vote again." 86 Fourth, when the
poll tax was paid, the tax receipt had to be preserved and presented to
both the registrar
of voters at registration and the official at the poll on
87
Election Day.
The penalty for not following this complicated structure was disenfranchisement. Professor Woodward states: "[slince the payment of
the poll tax was optional, complicated, and burdensome, and since
additional tests and hurdles might still deprive prospective voters of
their ballots even if they paid the tax, it is little wonder that thousands
lost the suffrage. 88
Indeed, thousands of African Americans lost suffrage. In Alabama,
the eligible Black voting population had fallen to less than two percent.
In Virginia, the tax was implemented in 1903. By 1910, Black registration had sunk from its high participation rate to a paltry fifteen percent.
In contrast, the white voting rolls in Virginia maintained nearly eighty

85. OGDEN, supra note 7, at 46; see also id. at 32-33 (providing an overview of how poll tax
payments operated).
86. WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 336.
87. For further details concerning the form of and the collection of the poll tax, see OGDEN,
supra note 7, at 32-76.
88. WOODWARD, supra note 7, at 335. For example, the Virginia poll tax of 1966 required a
fee of $1.50, payable six months before the election in which the voter wished to participate. Given
the fact that different elections took place at different times of the year, different deadlines existed.
For instance, if the-voter wished to vote for the Mayor of Richmond, she was required to pay her
poll tax by early January of the year of the election. However, if one wished to vote only for governor of the state, she had to register by early May, six months before the November election. See
Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (No. 48), reprintedin 62 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTrrTUIONAL LAW 992 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)

[hereinafter BRIEFS].
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percent of the voters of age.89 This virtually all-white electorate continued to exist for nearly fifty years.
The legal genesis of this mass African American disenfranchisement was the constitutional conventions across the South. These conventions began with Mississippi in 1880. The last convention, held in
Virginia, was from 1901 to 1902. The purpose was quite simple: to disenfranchise the African American voter. The framers at these conventions justified this stance on their view that African Americans, who had
just emerged from slavery, had little education or knowledge of how to
participate in citizenship. Thus, to make African Americans equally
responsible citizens in the electorate would do injustice to both the Ne-

gro and the white man. Some delegates saw this as a problem of "enforced equality between unequal races." What they sought to avoid
was another period of history, like Reconstruction, where "the AngloSaxon will again submit to the domination of the black man." 90
The problem the conventions faced was how to solve the problem

of an African American electorate without violating the Fifteenth
Amendment. The solution was to implement the "Mississippi Plan" to

establish a number of suffrage requirements that would have the effect
of disenfranchising African Americans. The Supreme Court upheld
the Mississippi Plan and its basis, the legality of the poll tax, in Williams v. Mississippi.91 At the heart of the plan was the fact that the suf-

frage regulations had no direct animus against minorities and were
based on the notion of "fair administration" of elections.

Thus, they

passed constitutional muster.
The poll tax endured as a prerequisite to the franchise (and thus a
substantial barrier to the franchise for the poor, especially poor African
Americans) until it was struck down in the mid 1960s. For that amount
of time, however, the tax endured in Virginia (as well as in Alabama,
89.

DONALD G. NIEMAN, AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE IN THE POST-EMANCIPATION SOUTH,

1861-1900, 6 AFRICAN AMERICANS AND SOUTHERN
DISENFRANCHISEMENT, at xi (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994).

POLITICS

FROM

REDEMPTION

TO

90. Proceedingsof the ConstitutionalConvention, RICHMOND DISPATCH (Va.), Apr. 3, 1902,
at 10. It almost goes without saying that this view of the legislators in turn-of-the-century Virginia,
as well as all across the ex-Confederate south, was premised on the social inequalities created during
slavery. See supra note 67.
91.
170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898). Williams involved an African American convict who appealed
his sentence on the grounds that the jury who convicted him was composed in a manner that was
unconstitutional. The appellant complained that the composition of juries in Mississippi was based
upon a statute which required that all jury participants pay poll taxes to the state prior to being allowed to vote (or to serve on a jury). Because Mississippi juries then were all white, he complained
that the statute as applied was unconstitutional. The Court rejected these challenges on the grounds
that the statute did not discriminate on the basis of race and therefore did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court went further to reject the contention that the
disparate impact the statute had was a grounds for declaring the statute unconstitutional. See id.
("They [the Mississippi poll tax statutes] do not on their face discriminate between the races, and it
has not been shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under
them.").

1044

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

Mississippi and Texas) where in others states, including Louisiana,
Georgia, and North Carolina, the legislature or the people through referenda removed the tax from state constitutions.9 2 The main purpose of
instituting these revisions was to disenfranchise undesirable votersparticularly African American voters.9 3 These preparations, in their
meticulous detail, effectively disenfranchised the poor African American
voting populace by circumventing the intent of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Voting participation
by African American males declined from ninety-eight percent in 1885
to ten percent in 1905. 94
The poll tax served as a substantial class barrier to those who
wished to participate in elective politics. The southern disenfranchising
conventions set up a complex system for registering and made the effort burdensome for those who sought to comply. Yet, the discretion
remained in the hands of the registrar to examine the perspective voter.
This left open the possibility for fraud and manipulation of the voter
rolls. The end result was that for over sixty years, whites of all classes
could vote while poor Blacks could not.
D. The Courts and the Poll Tax in the Jim Crow Era
The intent of the turn of the twentieth century conventions was
clear: Southern legislatures sought to disenfranchise African Americans
through the use of economic measures-mainly, the poll tax. The consti95
tutionality of these measures was upheld in Williams v. Mississippi.
However, parties challenged the tax on various grounds. 96 The Court
upheld the tax and maintained, in effect, that class-based requirements
97
were constitutional grounds on which to withhold the franchise.

92. See Klarman, supranote 78, at 45 (discussing how North Carolina, Florida and Louisiana
abolished poll tax on their own prior to the Breedlove decision). In addition to its enduring quality,
the poll tax and other disenfranchisement tools enshrined in 1901 Virginia Constitution exemplified
of the types of laws that developed to restrain the franchise. As discussed earlier, the elements of the
understanding clause, the grandfather clause, and the poll tax were added to the constitutions of
southern states during the wave of revision conventions which took place between 1890 and 1910.
See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 111-13.
93.
KEYSSAR, supranote 8, at 111-13.
94.
KOUSSER, supra note 7, at 174. This was the clear intent of this plan: to disenfranchise
African American voters without violating the Reconstruction Amendments. For example, the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals went so far as to admit this: "[als we have seen, the principal
object of calling the convention of 1901 was to purge the electorate of undesirable and ignorant
voters, and the chief difficulty in accomplishing that object was found in thefourteenth andfifteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States." See Willis v. Kalmbach, 64 S.E. 342, 348 (Va.
1909).
95.
170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898).
96.
Id. at 220-21.
97. Id. at 225.
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1. Breedlove v. Stuttles
The monolith of the poll tax was fought on many fronts, including
popular politics, the legislature, and the courtroom. However, the legal
battle against the poll tax failed during the first half of the twentieth century. The major case of this era was Breedlove v. Suttles.98 The Supreme Court upheld the Georgia poll tax and affirmed its legality for the
next twenty-nine years. 99 Mr. Breedlove, a twenty-eight year old white
male, was denied the ability to register because he had not fulfilled the
poll tax prerequisite. He sued the state tax collector, claiming that the
denial of his right to vote because he did not pay his poll tax worked a
denial of his protected privilege and immunity to vote and his right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.'0°
The Court held that making a poll tax payment did not deny him
any privilege and immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.10 The
Court explained that the right to vote was not derived from the federal
Constitution but from the individual states.10 2 The only constraint on this
right existed in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. Therefore,
"the state may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate."'0 3 The Court
reasoned further that "the payment of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting is a familiar and reasonable regulation long enforced in many states
and for more than a century in Georgia. That measure reasonably may
be deemed essential to that form of levy."' 4 In other words, the Court
found that the state had a reasonable interest in collecting the tax, and
that making the tax a prerequisite to voting constituted a rational state
action. The court deferred to the judgment of the state. 0 5 Thus, the
1937 Supreme Court found that the poll tax was constitutional.' °6 Effec302 U.S. 277 (1937).
98.
Id. at 283-84.
99.
100. Id. at 280.
Id. at 283.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 283-84.
104.
The Breedlove decision did not consider the racial consequences of the poll tax--or, for
105.
that matter, the tremendous effect of disenfranchisement on poor whites. Interestingly, the one
major distinction that the decision drew was concerning men and women in relation to the poll tax.
Georgia law had required that the male, as "head of the family," was responsible for payment of the
tax. In the face of the plaintiffs' argument that this rule treated men and women differently for no
rational reason, the court stated that this tax burdened all men equally, and thus was not a violation
of equal protection. Id. at 282. "Women may be exempted on the basis of special considerations to
which they are naturally entitled. In view of burdens necessarily borne by them for the preservation
of the race, the state reasonably may exempt them from poll taxes." Id.
The year after Breedlove, in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
106.
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), the Supreme Court stated that "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution." This one sentence indicated that the Court will not easily defer to
legislative judgments concerning the validity of laws, especially if those laws affected the rights of
people as guaranteed within the Bill of Rights or within other protected contexts. The court offered
the "right to vote" as one of those arenas where the court would apply a stricter standard of review
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tively, the Supreme Court allowed the states to charge whatever cost the
legislatures deemed rational, and maintain its apathy towards this classbased exclusion from the electorate.
2. Butler v. Thompson: Racial Discrimination and the Poll Tax
In what was to mark the beginning of civil rights litigation to come,
a plaintiff challenged the poll tax as a violation of equal protection. In
Butler v. Thompson,10 7 Jessie Butler, an African American female,
brought suit against the Central Registrar of Arlington County, Virginia. Butler claimed that the registrar refused to allow her to register to
vote because she had not paid her poll taxes for the ten years preceding
her registration.' °8 Butler argued that the poll tax requirement was unconstitutional because the poll tax was enacted by the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1902 with the specific purpose of disenfranchising
the Negro. 109 Further, she alleged that the election officials of Virginia
had conspired to administer the law in such a way as to maintain the
disenfranchisement of the Negro.110 She contended that these laws violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.'
The Butler court summarily ruled against Ms. Butler. It stated that
the intent of the statute was irrelevant. The court reasoned that while the
Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1902 did express a desire to disenfranchise the Negro, the laws which resulted from the convention
were "valid under the Federal Constitution or Federal laws."'1 12 Further,
the court stated the administration of the law was fair. The court pointed
to statistics that stated that by 1950, sixty-one percent of the African
Americans in Virginia were assessed poll taxes as compared to approximately seventy-six percent of the whites in Virginia. Given this difference of poll tax assessment rates, the court contended that the tax
was administered fairly.' 13

than merely accepting any purpose a legislative body articulated. See id. ("[L]egislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation."). Though this statement was
merely dicta, this one recognition began the opening of the door for Harperand other cases that
sustained the right to vote for all without regard to class as well as other protected rights. See Jane S.
Schacter, Ely and the Idea Of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REv. 737, 739-41, 746-47 (2004) (noting that
Carolene Productsrepresents implementation of the democratic ideal of horizontal democracy).
107. 97 F. Supp. 17, 18-19 (E.D. Va. 1951), affd, 341 U.S. 937 (1951).
108.
Id. at 19, 24.
109. Id. at 20.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id. at 23. The Butler court stated "Certainly we cannot declare the Virginia poll tax laws
invalid solely on these statistics upon the assumption that a difference of 15% in poll tax assessments
between Negroes and white persons .... IId. This implies that the court had assumed some sort of
disparate impact standard and found the case failed to meet it here.
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Since the court found that the tax was fair and valid on its face and
as administered, the court upheld the poll tax by invoking what the court
called a settled rule of law: "Finally, in this connection, it is well settled
that a law that is fair on its face and is also fairly administered is not
rendered invalid by the evil motives of its draftsmen . . .[nor does]
such a law ...offend the Federal Constitution ... ,14 This was

true, according to the court, because "courts cannot inquire into the
motives of the legislators in passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or [inferable] from their operation ....,115
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed.
In both Breedlove and Butler, the federal courts upheld the poll tax
on the basis that the decision as to what types of qualifications were necessary for the vote lies in the purview of state legislatures. The courts
reasoned that if the basis is rational and the law is neutral on its face
(notwithstanding the discriminatory intent of the law) and the law is enforced fairly, then it would meet constitutional muster. Accordingly, this
economic standard-the poll tax-would be considered constitutional.
E.

The Abolition of the Poll Tax-Harper v. Virginia

Breedlove remained the law until 1966. By the early sixties, however, several events had taken place which inched the court to the realization that voting was a fundamental right and that the conditioning of
that right upon payment of a tax was unconstitutional. First, the nation
ratified the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964, which eliminated the
poll tax from all federal elections. Second, Congress passed the Voting
Rights Act in 1964 and the Civil Rights Act in 1965. This granted the
United States Justice Department broad power to initiate lawsuits to
protect African Americans from discrimination by the states, including
discrimination based on denial of the ability to vote.' 1 6 Finally, in this
context, the Civil Rights movement influenced policy makers who ratified the two aforementioned rules of law, and shaped the national conception of what should be considered as protected rights. 117

Id. at 21-22.
114.
id. at 21.
115.
116.
The Voting Rights Act accorded the United States Justice Department significant powers
to enforce the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment to protect African Americans from discrimination in voting. These protections resulted in massive gains for the African American right to vote.
As Parson and McLaughlin point out, "the percentage of African Americans of voting age registered
to vote in the South, which was approximately three percent (3%) in 1940, increased from 43.3
percent ... in 1934 to approximately 63.7 percent." Parson & McLaughlin, supra note 20, at 86.
These numbers also illustrate the deep impact that the poll tax had-along with other discriminatory
devices-in infringing on the right to vote.
117. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 257-68 (discussing the history of the Civil Rights Movement and voting rights movements from the 1950s through the 1960s). McClain et al., in THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECURING THE BALLOT, supra note 8, at 70-72 (discussing Freedom Vote and
Freedom Summer campaigns, which led to voting rights reform legislation).

1048

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

In this new political and legal environment came the challenge to
the poll tax that proved effective. Several African American men and
women attempted to register and vote in the early sixties. All of these
plaintiffs were Black citizens of Virginia who met the age and residency
requirements to participate in state elections. However, because they
were unemployed or employed in less than profitable occupations, they
were unable to meet the poll tax requirement. 1 8 As a result, they were
denied the right to vote." 9 These plaintiffs sued the Virginia State
Board of Elections on the grounds that the poll tax abridged their privileges and immunities as United States citizens as well as violated their
right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In an unsigned per curium opinion, a three judge panel of the Eastern
District of Virginia summarily dismissed the claim of the plaintiffs citing
Breedlove.120 The court noted that "[t]he tax is levied upon every adult
resident irrespective of his intent to vote. Moreover, no racial discrimination is exhibited in its application as a condition to voting.' 21 Ms.
Harper and the other 22plaintiffs appealed this decision to the United
States Supreme Court.
118.
They included Anne E. Harper, a single woman who supported herself by performing
household work. At the time of her lawsuit, however, she was dependent on federal social security
benefits. She was required to pay $4.74 in order to meet her poll tax requirement, a requirement she
could not afford. Gladys A. Berry was also single. She had no source of income and cared for seven
minor children (two were hers and the other five belonged to her married daughters). Curtis Burr
worked in the construction industry. His gross income was less than $5,000. He had to care for his
wife, Myrtle, and their nine children. In order to participate in the elections, the two of them would
have to pay $10.02. BRIEFS, supra note 88, at 881-83.
119.
KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 269-71.
120.
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 240 F. Supp. 270, 271 (1964).
121.
Id. Testimony was presented at trial as to the disparate economic and race-based effects
that the poll tax had on the poor. However, the court did not find that illegal racial purposes or
illegal application of the law played a role in the poll tax. Though the intent was clear to any skim of
the original constitutional convention record, the Supreme Court could ignore it because the district
court claimed that the administration of the tax in the 1960s did not rely explicitly on that original
intent.
122.
The Supreme Court arguments for the Harperplaintiffs focused on the economic impact
of the tax on the poor. Harper's counsel argued that the state had intentionally designed the poll tax
"to limit the right of suffrage to those who took sufficient interest in the affairs of the State to qualify
themselves to vote." BRIEFS, supra note 87, at 1028. He argued that it is obvious that the poor will
be excluded from the franchise by definition. Further, "the tax does not in any way establish their
[the poor's] lack of responsibility as citizens, nor their lack of intelligence." Id. Solicitor General
Thurgood Marshall argued that one cannot put a tax on the right to vote "in any form or fashion."
Id. at 1034. He argued that the republican form of the United States government assumed regular
state elections in which all the people would be able to participate. Thus, it made no sense to impose
a poll tax because it would interfere with this democratic process. Id. at 1034-35. He also alluded to
property qualifications as the original barrier for limiting the franchise, and he drew the parallel
between that barrier and poll taxes. Id. at 1034-37. George Gibson, on behalf of the State of Virginia, argued that the poll tax constituted a minimum requirement that was easily met. Id. at 1053.
Gibson argued that "the dissemination of voter qualifications is exclusively a matter of state concern,
and is to be exercised by the state as they may wish, unless their particular conduct in a particular
situation infringes upon some other constitutional inhibition." Id. at 1054 Because it was a state
concern, he argued there was no need for the Supreme Court to abolish the poll tax since there is no
authority within the Constitution for the Court to do so. He went further to argue that:
[A]n objection based upon payment of one dollar and a half is so insubstantial as to merit dismissal
on that ground alone ....[l]t is found that groups least able to pay a poll tax are also the ones least
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The Court struck down the Virginia poll tax in state elections as a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. In a majority opinion written by Justice Douglas, the
court reasoned that "once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines
may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."1 23 Though the law did not implicate race and was defensible as policy, the poll tax nonetheless bore no
rational relation to the ability to vote because it singled out wealth as a
qualification for voting.1 24 "Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral
of wealth or property, like those of
process. Lines drawn on the basis
1 25
disfavored."
traditionally
are
race
Further, the Court noted that "the Equal Protection Clause is not
shackled to the political theory of a particular era."1 26 The Court
claimed that it never excluded rights to a certain list of guarantees or to
historic notions of equality. The Court cited to Plessy v. Ferguson 27 and
Brown v. Board of Education128 as illustrations of how the Court grew
beyond notions of equality or inequality that existed in another erahere, the "separate but equal" doctrine. 29 The Court was unwilling to
"turn the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896" to support an outmoded way of thinking about
the law.' 30 The Court concluded by reiterating that the right to vote
was a fundamental right. "Wealth or fee paying has, in our view, no
relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned."' 31 Thus, the majority
applied a strict scrutiny analysis and declared the poll tax unconstitutional.
Though the majority pronounced the value of the right to vote and
held that its exercise had no relation to one's wealth or financial ability,
three justices dissented from the opinion and articulated a different view
interested in voting. This means that the incidence of the real prevention of voting because of the
dollar and a half requirement is very infrequent.
Id. at 1076. Under Gibson's reasoning, the relative economic conditions of those who are most
burdened by the tax are irrelevant in as much as they do not want to vote anyway. For Gibson, the
purpose the poll tax served was facilitating an effective electoral process. Thus, the tax was tied to
a rational basis and was "the simplest, the most equal, nondiscriminatory and objective test of minimum intelligence and responsibility to be devised." Id. at 1078.
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
123.
Id. at 666. It is worth mentioning that the court also affirmed the legal principle of the
124.
time that "the ability to read and write.. . has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot." Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
Harper,383 U.S. at 668.
125.
ld. at 669.
126.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896).
127.
128.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,487-88 (1954).
129.
Harper,383 U.S. at 669-70.
Id. at 670.
130.
131.
Id.

1050

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

of the nature of the right. Justice Black dissented on the grounds that
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to pass
legislation designed to protect the rights listed in the Amendment, and
32
therefore it was not the place of the Court to strike down the poll tax.
Justice Harlan, with whom Justice Stewart joined, dissented on the
grounds that the Court overstepped its powers by declaring the Virginia
poll tax law unconstitutional. They argued that the equal protection
clause does not require equal treatment of all people. What was necessary in evaluating these cases was a determination of whether the action
the state was taking was actually rational or not. Such a judicial philosophy would prevent the judiciary from imposing its own views on
those of policy-makers. 133
Harperis thus marked by the tension between two competing views
as to the nature of the right to vote. The majority view was that American democracy required allowing full access to the right to vote by removing economic barriers to the right to vote. The majority championed
the right to vote by striking down the poll tax. This contrasted with the
dissenters' view: that the right to vote was necessary but not absolute.
Reasonable burdens upon the right to vote are acceptable and should be
left in the judgment of either the states or the coordinate branches of the
federal government despite the cost to be paid by otherwise eligible voters like Annie Harper. Despite the dissents, the Court held the poll tax
unconstitutional.
Ill. MEASURING THE COST OF VOTING: HARPER, BURDICK, AND
BALANCING ACCESS AND BURDEN

A. The Balancing Test for Burdens on Voting
Harper marked a watershed in American election law. The Court
had, in striking down the poll tax, ruled that one's economic status-as
evidenced by one's ability to pay a tax-had no relation to the right to
vote. Wealth as a status had no bearing on the ability to vote, thus, the
poll tax served to be an invidious factor on which to condition access to
the right to vote. The Court of the Warren Era had articulated a vision of
the right to vote and found at the center of that vision that the right bore
no relation to one's economic status.
Yet after the watershed moment, the high tide of the right to vote
receded. The Court, forced to apply the right to vote to other contexts,
evolved an approach focused not on the fundamental nature of the right
to vote; instead, it articulated a standard that required the balancing of
the interests of the voter in voting with the interests of the government in
administrating fair elections.
132.
133.

Id. at 679.
Id. at 680-83.
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The Court articulated this approach in two cases, Anderson v. Celebrezze1 34 and Burdick v. Takushi.135 Anderson involved the third-party
candidacy of John Anderson for the Presidency of the United States. Mr.
Anderson had run for, and lost, the Republican Party nomination for
President. Thereafter, and after the early filing deadline had passed for
the Ohio primary, Mr. Anderson attempted to have his name placed on
the ballot as an independent candidate. Anderson proffered a nominating
petition signed by 14,500 residents of Ohio along with a statement of his
candidacy to the Ohio Secretary of State. 136 The Secretary of State refused his petition as untimely. 137 Anderson brought an Equal Protection
challenge asserting that the deadline for independent candidates, which
was different than the deadline for the major parties, was unconstitutional because it imposed different burdens on the different kinds of candidates.1 38 The state countered that the qualifications were constitutional
because they met the interests of (1) voter education; (2) equal treatment
139
for partisan and independent candidates; and (3) political stability.
In ruling on this challenge, the Anderson Court took care to note
that not all restrictions on the right to vote warrant strict scrutiny. 140 Indeed, generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that "protect the
integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself' should be upheld
as constitutional. 41 The Court suggested a balancing test to assess the
constitutionality of a challenged election law to be used on a case-bycase basis:
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the
Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of
those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these fac-

134.
460 U.S. 780, 821-22 (1983).
504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992).
135.
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782.
136.
Id. at 782-83.
137.
Id. at 783.
138.
Id. at 796.
139.
See id. at 788 ("Although [certain] rights of voters are fundamental, not all restrictions
140.
imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally-suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates ....To achieve [fair, honest and
orderly elections], States have enacted comprehensive ... election codes. Each provision of these
schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility
of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Nevertheless, the state's
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.").
Id. at 788 n.9.
141.
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tors is the reviewing court in a position
to decide whether the chal42
1
unconstitutional.
is
provision
lenged

After articulating its balancing test, the Court assessed the challenges that the rule imposed on Anderson and held that the statute in
question burdened an "identifiable segment of Ohio's independentminded voters."'143 The burden imposed by Ohio's early filing deadline
was "especially difficult" for the state to justify since it limited "political
participation by an identifiable political group whose members share'' 44a
particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.
The Court then dismissed the state's proffered interests and found for
Anderson.
Burdick involved a challenge to certain limitations set out in the
Hawaiian write-in ballot law which would prevent certain voters from
casting their ballot preferences. 145 The Court, in upholding the Hawai'i
law, rearticulated the Anderson balancing test for analyzing claims, but
then added an important caveat: that evaluation of the injury to the claimant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights must precede146any balancing of the claimant's rights against the governmental injury.
The Burdick Court held that this balancing test was the proper approach for assessing freedom of speech claims based on infringement of
voting rights. 147 The Court has held to this standard
for analyzing free
ever since. 148

speech voting infringement claims

142.
Id. at 789.
143.
Id. at 792.
144.
Id. at 792-93 (noting that the financial burdens that could be created by filing fees for
candidates could disproportionately affect independent candidates as opposed to major party candidates). The Court, in the context of dealing with an Equal Protection challenge, recognized that
economic impacts can affect the ability of open political participation. Indeed, within the context of
this situation, this represents a freezing of the political status quo because the disproportionate burden on independent candidates effectively helps to insulate the major parties from significant challenges. Such similar effects could arguably be at play within the voter identification context. Cf
Moran & Wildman, supra note 77, at 1221 (noting how neutrality and equality can support subordination and hierarchy through protecting property rights and status inequalities inherent in the economic system).
145.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992).
146. Id. at 434.
147.
Id.
148.
The Burdick decision has been criticized by many commentators as confusing and muddying the analysis of state election laws rather than providing clarity. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 20,
at 491-92 (criticizing the Burdick decision as diluting the otherwise fundamental right to vote; and
confusing due to the fact that it did not rely on right-to-vote cases and failed to define the distinction
between severe burdens on the right to vote and reasonable burdens on the right to vote). This shift
from presuming the right to vote as fundamental and the lack of clarity in effecting the balancing test
set forth in Burdick creates an inability for the test to comprehend the distinction between indirect
costs which create severe burdens on the right to vote and those indirect costs which create a reasonable burden. This becomes significantly burdensome due to the fact that evidence of burdens in the
photo identification context is difficult to produce and is problematic in terms of the analysis of these
problems. As a result, as is discussed below, the courts are left to rely on the rationales proffered by
the government without an effective counterweight in the Burdick balance. The result is one-sided
opinions which, in the absence of a normative standard, see Flanders, supra note 20, at 97, or statis-
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B. The Evolution of Voter IdentificationPolicy
While Burdick shifted the election administration analysis from the
strict scrutiny of Harper,the technological ability and needs for demonstrating one's identity also evolved over the thirty years between Harper
and Burdick. With the advent of photographic identification cards came
the ability to present such identification to register and to vote. However, a number of other forms of identification were also available which
voters could use to register and vote. These included the presentation of
letters from either the federal or state government bearing the voter's
name or address (including social security information, hunting and fishing licenses, and other types of documentation). State laws concerning
identification found these types of documentation acceptable for over
thirty years.
Moreover, there are those who do not possess government-issued
photographic identification cards. 149 This population of the United States

is shut out of the ability to participate in the activities that are day-to-day
for most citizens (e.g., boarding an airplane, entering a secured building,
etc.). They are also shut out of the ability to cast ballots for political
office.
National policy, nonetheless, has sanctioned, to some extent, the
move for states to require photo identification of voters seeking to register. Two major laws passed in the late 1990s and early twenty-first century affected this trend. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993,150
or NVRA, required that state governments register voters at various
points where they obtain governmental services, including Motor Vehicles bureaus, Social Security offices, and other points where citizens
would obtain governmental services.15 1 Additionally, the Help America
Vote Act of 2002,152 or HAVA, required that state governments insist
that first-time voters present photographic identification cards when registering to vote. 153 From these two national initiatives, Congress has

tical proof of which a court can categorize as severe, see Overton, supra note 20, at 672, the courts
tend to side with the state in upholding the identification laws.
According to the Brennan Center, twelve percent of eligible voters nationwide do not have
149.
Brennan Center For Justice, Voter ID, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/
photo IDs.
section/category/voter-id (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of
2007, the voting age population estimate was 227,719,424. U.S. Census Bureau, General Demographic Characteristics, http://tinyuri.con59114r (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). That means that there
are approximately 27.3 million eligible voters without photo IDs.
National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified at 42
150.
U.S.C.A. §§ 1973gg-1 to -10 (West 2009)).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1973gg-2 (West 2009).
151.
152. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat 1666 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 15301-15545 (West 2009)).
153. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West 2009).
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clearly suggested that voter identification laws are appropriate for use in
modernizing voter registration. 154
Following these imperatives to modernize elections, Georgia, Arizona, Missouri, Michigan, and New Mexico (along with approximately
twenty other states) either have passed or will be passing voter identification laws in the near future. 155 Although these laws provide exceptions
for indigent voters to vote based on an affidavit attesting to the voter's
poverty or allowing free identification cards to voters who cannot afford
them, it has been argued that voters must pay an indirect cost for voting
by providing documentation such as a birth certificate, demonstrating
one's residency, or otherwise gathering documentation to obtain the government-issued photographic identification. 156 This article will now turn
to an analysis of how different courts have evaluated voter identification
laws and addressed-if at all-the issue of the economic bias in such
laws.
C. JudicialAnalysis of Modem Voter Identification Laws
The voter identification dispute brings to the fore the issue of embedded socioeconomic bias against voters within the electoral system.
As argued earlier, the American republic has consistently looked toward
a socioeconomic indicator, such as the amount of property a free Caucasian man owned, or the ability of a voter to pay a poll tax, as a measure
of whether the citizen has a sufficient stake in the process to be granted
the vote. The intent of these barriers was to exclude those voters that the
majority in power wished to see excluded.
The courts in particular have been apathetic to this concern. Breedlove represented the Court's apathy towards the problem of states' use of
an economic indicator as a way to discriminate between the desired voters and the undesirable voters. Harper,in turn, marked a decided shift
from this view and articulated a right to vote that bore no relation to the
ability to pay a tax. Yet, the pendulum has now potentially swung back
to the view that voter identification laws which require photographic
154. Additionally, the Carter-Baker Commission, which was charged by Congress to study
election reform alternatives, suggested that voter ID rules should be used more aggressively as a tool
for registration.
See COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, at ii (2005), available at

http:llwww.american.edulialcfer/reportlfullreport.pdf. The Commission proposed that all states
require a valid photo ID card for purposes of registering to vote, but only to the extent that it's used
to register new voters instead of allowing the ID to be a barrier to voting. See id. at 18-21. The
Commission suggests that states would play an affirmative role of reaching out to the undeserved
communities by providing them more offices, including mobile ones, to register them and provide
photo IDs free of charge. Id. at 19-20.
155.
Twenty-four states have broader identification requirements than those listed in HAVA.
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 50. Seven of these states, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan and South Dakota, require photo ID. Id. The other seventeen require ID, but a photo ID is not required. lL
156. See &L (containing a list of voter ID requirements by state and also providing the steps
that voters without photo ID at the time of election need to do to have their vote counted).
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identification-and the prerequisites which have to be fulfilled to meet
that end-will create a new economic bright line, and the Court will retreat 157into apathy towards those effectively removed from the electorate.
This debate raises the question of whether the requirements would
actually have a detrimental effect on voters who are of lower socioeconomic status. Indeed, the question of whether any given potential voter's
socioeconomic status is relevant to the issue of determining the impact of
election laws is at the heart of the ongoing debate around voter identification laws. Yet, as we have seen, socioeconomic status has been one of
the fulcrums used by those in power to shape the electorate and influence
who can and cannot vote, regardless of the merit of the suggestion. Indeed, until Harper, these socioeconomic markers were considered to be
an appropriate measure of the ability to participate in the electorate. This
question of the role of socioeconomic status-the ability to show one's
stake in the voting process before one is even admitted to vote-lingers
under the surface of the recent judicial analyses of voter identification
laws.
A number of courts have addressed this issue within the last few
years. Many courts have rejected the argument that voter identification
laws have a harmful impact on the socioeconomically disadvantaged
because they found the evidence lacking of any such impact and, in the
absence of such evidence, that the government's rationale of maintaining
fair elections should be granted deference. This trend represents a return
to the apathy towards the plight of those discriminated against in the poll
tax era and a diminution of the right to vote. The Supreme Court's ruling
in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board shows that the Court has,
potentially, turned away from the principles of Harper.
The Court took the Crawford case from Indiana. The case began
when the state of Indiana passed a photo-identification requirement for
its voters. 158 The law required that all voters in Indiana have the requisite
voter-identification card to vote. Specifically, the Indiana law requires
that only identification issued by either the state of Indiana or the federal
59
government will qualify to meet the photo-identification requirement.
157. This fear has been echoed by many advocates against photo identification laws. They fear
that these laws will exclude otherwise eligible voters on the basis of whether that voter has the
ability to obtain appropriate identification or not since these voters simply do not have the economic
means to obtain the identification. Proponents of photo identification laws contend that these rules
are generally applicable regulations necessary to maintain the validity of federal elections. Generally, they argue that the risk of voter fraud is such that stringent voter identification regulations are
necessary and essential to ensure effective and fair elections.
158.
Act effective Jul. 1, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2005, 2005 Ind. Acts 2005 (codified at IND.
CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25 (West 2005)), repealed by Act of Mar. 24, 2006, Pub. L. No. 164-2006, sec.
143, 2006 Ind. Legis. Serv. 2006 (West). The requirement has been haled by some as the most
stringent in the land due to its rigorous requirements.
IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.2(b) (West 2009).
159.
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Thus, those otherwise eligible voters who meet the other registration
requirements and yet have not had the opportunity to obtain the identification card would be ineligible to vote. Additionally, the law required a
number of documents be presented to demonstrate the voter's identity.
The Indiana law, Senate Enrolled Bill 483, provides several exceptions
for the identification requirement: (1) if a person is unable or unwilling
to purchase an identification card from the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, he or she may cast an absentee ballot; (2) elderly people residing
in nursing homes may vote by absentee ballot; and (3) indigent voters
may file an affidavit attesting to the voter's indigent status and cast a
provisional ballot. 16°
The Democratic Party of Indiana sued to enjoin implementation of
the law. 16 The Party's theory was that by implementing these voter
standards, the Democratic Party would lose voters that would typically
vote with it. Additionally, in a separate but parallel lawsuit, two Indiana
democratic legislators sued to enjoin the law on substantially the same
grounds. 162 The plaintiffs, in essence, argued that the court ought to apply a strict scrutiny analysis to the law and hold it unconstitutional because it substantially burdened the fundamental right to vote, disproportionately affected economically disadvantaged voters by effectively placing a poll tax upon
them, and was not justified by existing circumstances
63
of voter fraud.
The Indiana photo identification law was upheld by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The district court held that the
evidence presented to it was not sufficient to enjoin the law in light of the
state's proffered justifications.' 64 The opinion was affirmed by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 165 The majority opinion by
Judge Richard Posner upheld the Indiana statute on the grounds that it
represented a rational interest of the state in preventing voter fraud. In
particular, Judge Posner reasoned that the cost impact on the certain set
of voters is negligible in comparison to the benefits that the law has in
preventing voter fraud. 166 Indeed, Judge Posner reasoned that the interests of those who may be most directly affected by the law are irrelevant
to the analysis of the law's constitutionality. The majority here believed
that the indirect costs of obtaining photo identification were wholly irrelevant to the consideration of the impact of the law. 67 The Seventh Cir-

160.
Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 786 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
161.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2008) (referring to the
lower court case of Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita).
162.
Id.
163.
ld. at 1615.
164.
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
165.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007).
166.
See id. at 952-54.
167.
Id. at 952.
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cuit en banc declined to rehear the case.1 68 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The Supreme Court upheld the Indiana photo identification law in a
fractious 6-3 ruling. The "Lead Opinion" by Justice Stevens performed
the Burdick balancing test and found that the interests of the state in
maintaining the voter-ID law outweighed any impact that the statute
would have on populations who may effectively be disenfranchised by
the law. 169 The Stevens opinion considered the three main bases which
the government proffered to support the law. First, it credited the government's argument that the law was necessary to maintain the integrity
of elections. The Stevens opinion recognized that Indiana had an interest
in modernizing its election process as well as preventing
potential voter
170
fraud in light of such risks as over-inflated voter rolls.
In contrast, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to present
sufficient evidence on the record to support their assertion that the law
should be struck down on a facial challenge. The Stevens opinion
pointed out that the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate one plaintiff
who had been directly affected by the law. The Stevens opinion also
asserted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate on the record how many
people actually would be affected by the law. The opinion conceded
that, conceivably, some voters would be effectively shut out by the inability to register under the structure of the law as written, but it declined
to overturn the law on this basis. The Stevens opinion contended that on
this record, it would be inappropriate to declare the law unconstitutional
simply because some voters may be affected, particularly in light of the
fact that
the government had offered justifiable reasons for enacting the
171
law.
The Scalia opinion declined to engage in the lengthy balancing
analysis. Instead, the Scalia opinion contended that the issue was easily
resolved under the principle that this election law was a moderate, reasonable regulation which effectively was only subject to rational basis
review. The Scalia opinion went further to argue that to provide further
analysis to the claims presented would cut against the long, well-settled
168.
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007). Judge
Diane P. Wood, joined by three other judges, dissented from rehearing en banc. Id. The dissenters
to the denial of rehearing en banc contended that the Seventh Circuit majority had ignored the potential impact of the regulation on individual voters. See id. at 438. Indeed, Judge Wood stressed that
the Supreme Court's precedent in this area did not give license to the view that no one vote matters.
Id. Judge Wood also stressed that the potential impact of the Indiana photo identification law had
not been determined and thus was a question of fact to be determined by the lower court. Id. at 439.
Judge Wood also noted that to the extent these laws completely disenfranchise voters, they
represented the same invidious harm that poll taxes represented. Id. at 438 ("To the extent that [the
photo identification law] operates to turn them away from the polls, it is just as insidious as the poll
taxes and literacy tests that were repudiated long ago.").
169.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616-19 (2008).
170.
Id. at 1618-20.
171.
Id. at 1620-24.
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precedent of the court that neutral laws of general application ought only
be subject to rational basis review; and that any disparate impact that is
the consequence of such laws is irrelevant to constitutional considerations. Moreover, Justice Scalia joined the lead opinion's view that the
law was founded on reasons172which are rational and justified, and therefore concurred in the result.
The two dissenting opinions took a different view. Justice Souter
(joined by Justice Ginsberg) dissented on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence on the record to demonstrate that the effect would be
substantial on an identifiable set of voters. Justice Souter argued that a
definable number of voters in Indiana would be effected by the law and
unable to vote in an election where the law was in place. 73 Additionally,
Justice Souter contended that the government's overriding rationale for
putting the law in place-the need to prevent voter fraud-was not credible. Justice Souter contended that there was no established case of voter
fraud in Indiana on which the government could base is rationale of
needing to prevent voter fraud. Justice Souter also contended that the
other basis upon which the rationale was offered had no support174and
should not weigh against the actual impact that the law would have.
Justice Breyer dissented separately. Justice Breyer agreed that the
Constitution does not prohibit Indiana from framing voter identification
laws. However, Justice Breyer contended that the burdens on the voters
are substantial and had not been taken into account by the state. Moreover, Justice Breyer compared the Indiana law to the laws passed by Florida and Georgia which, in his view, were less restrictive than Indiana's
law. Justice Breyer also substantially relied on the recommendations of
the Carter-Baker report to argue that such substantial burdens on voters
should be avoided. Justice Breyer concluded by realizing that while the
Constitution does not forbid voter identification laws, the Indiana statute
in particular overburdens175voters who do not possess the applicable photographic identification.

172. Id. at 1624-27. Justice Scalia's assertion here seems to amount to the suggestion that
voter impact concerns as those raised in the Crawford opinion should be considered purely under a
rational basis review, and that to countenance the application of the balancing test set forth in Burdick would run counter to the anti-disparate impact jurisprudence articulated in such cases as Washington v. Davis. This line of reasoning is consistent with the Justice's jurisprudence; however, its
discussion in the voting rights context raises a number of concerns. Adoption of this position within
the voting rights arena would substantially change the analysis of voting rights cases concerning
election regulations. It would, taken to an extreme, eviscerate both Burdick and Harperand extend
the influence of Davis into voting rights law and other areas of equal protection jurisprudence. In a
future article, I hope to contemplate the ramifications of this potential change in voting rights jurisprudence and its consequential effects on equal protection jurisprudence and voting rights jurisprudence in particular.
173.
Id. at 1632-34.
174. Id. at 1636-39.
175.
Id. at 1643-45.
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Crawford, ultimately, marks another moment where the Court appears to be at odds concerning the competing visions of democratic participation. Yet, in its 6-3 decision, the pendulum has decidedly shifted
from a vision of voter access unfettered that ought not to be defined by
an economic standard. The apparent shift is to a standard where the default position is one where the government's rationale for election integrity ought to control. Even within this, however, it seems clear that the
Court in itself is not of one mind about this issue. The Stevens opinion
relied on the premise that there was insufficient evidence to support
striking down the Indiana law. The Scalia opinion resisted the notion of
weighing the evidence of voter impact in its entirety. These two opinions represent two different versions of indifference by the Court towards the problem of the economic impact of voter identification lawsthe indifference of insufficient evidence and the apathy of relying solely
on the state's rationale. Both of these markedly contradict the vision in
Harper of a right to vote unfettered by the impact of an economic requirement.
Even prior to Crawford, lower court decisions have also followed a
similar line of analysis. Indeed, the unifying theme in the pre-Crawford
voter identification jurisprudence is the problem of presenting sufficient
evidence of voters being impacted by the identification laws. For example, Gonzalez v. Arizona 176 dealt with the question of the constitutionality
of Arizona Proposition 200. Proposition 200 required registering voters
to submit evidence of United States citizenship 177 as part of the registration process. The Gonzalez plaintiffs contended that the rule constituted
a poll tax, severely burdened the fundamental right to vote, and placed a
severe burden on the ability of naturalized citizens' to vote. The Ninth
Circuit rejected each of these claims. First, the Ninth Circuit held that
Proposition 200 was not a poll tax because "voters do not have to choose
between paying a poll tax and providing proof of citizenship when they
' 178
register to vote. They only have to provide the proof of citizenship."
Next, the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' assertion that Proposition 200
placed a severe burden on the fundamental right to vote by applying the
Burdick test and stating that "appellants have not shown that it is anything other than an even-handed and politically neutral law. The evidence that Arizona citizens may be burdened by the new law consists of

176. 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
177. Id. at 1046. "Satisfactory evidence of citizenship" may be shown by including, with the
voter registration form, any of the following: the number of an Arizona driver's license or nooperating identification license issued after September 1, 1996; a birth certificate; a copy of a U.S.
passport; or U.S. naturalization documents. This question of satisfactory evidence of citizenship
creates another level of difficulty-and another potential realm where voter identification laws will
have a disparate impact against a protected group, recently naturalized citizens. This topic merits
further study as to the ramifications for naturalized citizens and the exercise of their voting rights
and how these photo identification laws may impact the nature of citizenship in the United States.
178. Id.at 1049.
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' 179
declarations from individuals who are not parties to the litigation."
Finally, the Court disposed of plaintiffs' claims that Proposition 200 disproportionately burdens naturalized citizens by stating simply: "The

record before us ...

contains no affidavits or declarations from natura-

lized citizens. Therefore, we do not know the extent to which this requirement may burden.., any such citizen. 180 The Ninth Circuit essentially rejected the plaintiffs' claims that Proposition 200 was unconstitutional because the plaintiffs offered nothing except hypothetical speculation about the harm or burden imposed by Proposition 200.
Similarly, in Common Cause of Georgia v. Billups181 the plaintiffs
sued to challenge the constitutionality of the 2006 Photo ID Act. The
Act required all Georgia voters to obtain a special "Georgia Voter Photo
ID card"182 to vote in state and federal elections. 183 This provision did
not require registering voters to purchase a photo-identification card
from the state. 184 Those who could not obtain Georgia Voter Identification Cards could vote via absentee ballot. The Act provided for a place
within the registrar's primary office in each county of the state to process
applications for Georgia Voter Identification Cards and distribute such
cards. The Act also allowed the Georgia Department of Driver Services
("DDS") to register voters and issue voter identification cards. Further,
the Act provided for comprehensive notification and education efforts on
behalf of the state of Georgia to increase awareness of the requirements
of the Act.
The plaintiffs attacked the Act on the grounds that it placed a severe
burden on the voting rights of individuals who either lacked (1) the ne179. Id. at 1049-50.
180. Id. at 1050.
181.
Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (Common Cause 1/), 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1337
(N.D. Ga. 2007).
182. Id. at 1339.
183.
Georgia had previously attempted to implement photo identification requirements, yet
those requirements were struck down as a poll tax. See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups (Common Cause 1), 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005). Georgia had initially passed a photo identification law in 2005 which mandated that every voter purchase and present some form of governmentissued photographic identification to register to vote and prove the voter's identity on Election Day.
Proponents of the law argued that the law served to detour voter fraud and helped to secure elections.
The law passed over the objections of the Georgia Secretary of State, who stated that there was no
voter fraud problem or other election-day oriented security problem which required a photo-ID law.
After the law was passed by the Georgia legislature, the law then gained pre-clearance from the
United States Department of Justice. Id. at 1332-36. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia enjoined the law as a violation of the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments to
the Constitution. The court reasoned that the law would create an equal protection violation because
of its requirement that potential voters had to purchase their identification created a group that had
its ability to vote burdened. Moreover, the court in Common Cause I held that the photo identification requirement constituted a poll tax because all citizens had to purchase an identification card to
vote, and thus linking the purchase of an identification card to the ability to vote constituted a poll
tax. Id. at 1366-70.
184.
The 2006 Photo ID Act "requires the Board of Elections in each county to issue 'Georgia
voter identification card' containing a photograph of the voter, without charge to voters residing in
the county, upon presentation of certain identifying documents." Common Cause H1,504 F. Supp. 2d
at 1343.
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cessary "identifying documents" 8 5 needed to obtain a Georgia Voter
Identification Cards or (2) transportation to travel to DDS or county registrar offices to obtain the voter identification cards. Plaintiffs also asserted that the Act amounted to an unconstitutional poll tax because a
photo ID or proof of residential address was required to procure any of
the "identifying documents" needed to obtain a Georgia Voter Identification Card. 186 The Northern District of Georgia applied the Burdick test
and determined that the Act did not create a severe burden on voting
rights because (1) the photo ID cards could be obtained without any
payment to the state; (2) the two named plaintiffs testified that they could
and would travel to their local registrar's office if the Act were to be
upheld; (3) the state of Georgia made efforts to notify and educate voters
who lacked photo ID about the procedures for obtaining a Georgia Voter
Identification Card; and (4) voters who lacked acceptable identification
could vote by casting absentee ballots. On this basis, the court found that
the statute was a reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction on voting
rights.1 87 A significant part of the Common Cause 11 court's rationale
was none of the named plaintiffs could show the requisite amount of
concrete harm necessary to warrant a strict scrutiny standard of review.
Ultimately the court decided that the Act was not a poll tax and that the
restrictions imposed on fundamental rights
were not severe enough to
1 88
warrant a type of strict scrutiny review.
Even outside of the evidentiary context, at least one court has performed a facial analysis of a photo identification requirement and upheld
its constitutionality. In In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding
Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 8 9 the Michigan House of Representatives asked the Michigan Supreme Court to advise the House about the
constitutionality of pending voter identification legislation. Specifically,
the Michigan legislation would require that voters either present photo
ID or sign an affidavit averring that the voter lacks identification before

185.
For a comprehensive listing of "identifying documents," see id. at 1346-48.
186.
Id. at 1337.
187.
Id. at 1377-80.
188.
What is curious about the position of the Common Cause 11 court is its own description of
the operation of the Act itself. See id. at 1342-48, 1355-70. Although the court notes that over
600,000 Georgia residents could be potentially disfranchised, the notice provisions of the Act, the
minimal costs associated with obtaining a Georgia Voter Identification Card and the absentee ballot
exception, proved to be factors that convinced the court to deem the statute a reasonable and nondi-

scriminatory means of combating voter-impersonation fraud. Id. at 1360. Despite former Secretary
of State Cathy Cox's expressed belief that "[tihe Photo ID requirement for in-person voting was
unnecessary, created a significant obstacle to voting for many voters, was unlikely to receive preclearance from the Justice Department, violated the Georgia Constitution, and unduly burdened the

right to vote," the court was still disinclined to make the state actually prove (1) the existence of
voter fraud, (2) demonstrate that the Act was narrowly drawn to prevent such fraud, and (3) that
there were no less restrictive alternative means to achieve that end, because the Burdick test dictates
that the plaintiff show actual harm before strict scrutiny review is warranted. Id. at 1357.
189.
740 N.W.2d 444,447 (Mich. 2007).
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voting. The question presented to the court was whether this requirement
created an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote. 190
The Michigan Supreme Court held that (1) under the Burdick standard, the law was facially constitutional because it was a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restriction designed to prevent the dilution of votes
and (2) since no voter is required to incur the costs of obtaining a photo
ID as a condition of voting, the identification requirement could not be
characterized as a poll tax. Among other objections, the opposing Attorney General asserted that even if the Court deemed the proposed restriction a reasonable, nondiscriminatory means to prevent voterimpersonation fraud under the Burdick rational basis standard, the legislature should still be required to make a showing that the voterimpersonation fraud actually exists and that the restriction is rationally
related to furthering the state's interest in preventing such fraud. The
Court rejected this assertion and held that as long as the restriction is
reasonable and nondiscriminatory, "the state is not required to provide
any proof, much less 'significant proof,' of in-person voter fraud before
it may permissibly take steps to prevent it." 191
Not all courts have upheld voter identification laws. For example,
in Weinschenk v. State, 192 the Missouri Supreme Court, applying the
state's constitution, struck down the Missouri voter identification law.
The Weinschenk court determined the evidentiary record sufficient to
support an attack on the photo identification laws. On that basis, the
Weinschenk court analyzed the indirect costs imposed by the statue and
found that those costs created an adverse impact on voting.
There, the plaintiff was a disabled woman who sued claiming that
the Missouri photo identification law abridged her ability to vote.' 93 Ms.
Weinschenk sued under both the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution as well as the Missouri State Constitution. The Missouri
Supreme Court found that under Missouri state law, the law was unconsGenerally, 2005 PA 71 requires voters, at each election, to show photo ID to an election
190.
official and execute an application that contains among other identifying information, proof of
address and the voter's mark or signature. If a voter does not possess valid photo ID, the individual
shall sign an affidavit to that effect before an election inspector and be allowed to vote. A voter
allowed to vote without photo ID is subject to challenge by an election official. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 168.523 (West 2009).
Constitutionalityof 2005 PA 71, 740 N.w.2d at 459. This case is notable for the clarity
191.
and reasonableness of Judge Cavanaugh's dissent. Judge Cavanaugh asserted that the relevant
inquiry in these types of cases should be "whether, and to what degree, in-person voter fraud would
be addressed by the photo identification requirement," irrespective of the level of scrutiny applied
dissenting). The dissent questioned whether the
under the Burdick test. Id. at 474 (Cavanaugh, J.,
proposed legislation can actually prevent in-person voter fraud when there is no evidence that voter
fraud actually exists in the state of Michigan. Id. at 472-78 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting). Ultimately,
Judge Cavanaugh rejected the proposed legislation as unconstitutional because the burdens imposed
are severe and the operation of the challenge provision of the proposed law itself is subject to abuse
by overzealous election officials.
192. 203 S.w.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006).
193. Id. at 208.
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titutional as applied to Ms. Weinschenk and the other plaintiffs in this
lawsuit. 94 The majority in Weinschenk focused on the fact that under
both the federal constitution and the State of Missouri constitutions, the
right to vote qualified as a fundamental right. Thus, the court measured
the nature of the
burdens imposed by the photo-identification law under
195
strict scrutiny.
Accordingly, the court found that the burdens imposed on the ability
to vote were great, and the state had not used the least restrictive means
to affect its aim. The court's reasoning focused on the fact that there
were a substantial number of Missourians who did not have federal or
state-issued identification containing a photograph. The court also relied
upon the fact that a number of these residents were either elderly or disabled and thus had little opportunity to gather the documents and credentials necessary to obtain the photo identification card. The court stressed
that materials such as birth certificates, citizenship papers, and other required documents cost a significant amount of money and time, which
would be difficult for such citizens to expend. The court recognized this
as a cost that effectively would prevent voters-particularly the elderly
and those 96
who did not have such documents-from being able to cast
their vote. 1
Another case where a court struck down a voter identification ordinance on its face was ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes.197 At issue in Santillanes was an amendment to the town charter of the City of Santillanes,
NM which required all who voted in-person at the election polls in municipal elections to present a valid and current photo identification card.
This amendment to the city charter was approved by voters. The American Civil Liberties Union and others brought suit to enjoin the ordinance. 198 The Santillanes court held that the law was unconstitutional on
its face. It reasoned that the plaintiffs showed a realistic threat to their
legally protected interests in voting in-person. The court went further to
hold that the amendment posed a severe burden on indigent citizens'
right to vote. 199 Thus, according to the court, heightened scrutiny was
merited under Burdick. Under this strict scrutiny analysis, the court
found that the burden imposed by the amendment was not adequately
tailored to further the city's interest in preventing voter-impersonation
fraud.2 °°
In Weinschenk and Santillanes, the courts recognized that the right
to vote was directly burdened by costs created by the state or local gov194.

Id. at 219.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 216.
Id. at 213-15.
506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 636.
Id. at 636-42.
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ernment election laws. The plaintiffs in these cases were able to present
concrete evidence of how the indirect cost generated by obtaining supporting materials to obtain a card frustrated the plaintiff's right to vote.
Nonetheless, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that the conflicted apathy towards the right to vote is not only representative in the
Crawford opinions but in the lower courts as well. The lower courts
have, in the absence of direct evidence showing the impact of voter identification laws, effectively defaulted to the rationale of the government in
implementing these laws. The legal question has significantly shifted to
one of requiring sufficient evidence to support the inference that photo
identification laws effectively disenfranchise potential voters of lower
socioeconomic status. This represents a failure to take into account the
severity of the impact of indirect costs in considering voting. That failure is, in large part, due to the unfocused structure of the Burdick test. It
is to this problem the article will now turn.
D. The Burdick Sliding Scale and Unfocused Analyses of the Economic
Cost of Voting
Courts applying the Burdick test have tended to discount, in the absence of significant evidence, the indirect economic costs to be taken into
account when analyzing the effects of voter identification laws. Most
courts considering the issue have adopted a two-part approach: First, the
courts will tend to reject analogies between the direct costs of the poll tax
and the indirect costs brought on by needing to meet the requirements of
obtaining photographic identification. Second, the courts then tend to
rule in favor of the state's interest in maintaining election integrity or
have defaulted towards the state's interest in light of insufficient demonstrated proof of the economic burden upon voters. These courts, moreover, have apparently assumed as a starting premise that the indirect costs
imposed by the burdens of narrowed voter identification laws as less
relevant than the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of elections.
Consistently, the courts have defaulted to supporting the state's interests
when considering these laws under a Burdick balancing test.
This inability to account for the indirect costs exasperates the longstanding problem of economic bias and the requirement of an economic
stake within society in order to exercise the political right to vote. In
essence, voter identification requirements which narrow the list of prescribed voting requirements and thus force voters to obtain the information-at substantial cost of time, money, and in some cases, a strain on
the abilities of the voter-create a barrier which the prospective voter
cannot effectively overcome. The ability to accomplish the fulfillment of
these costs acts as a barrier which separates those who are allowed to
vote from those who are not. As such, the economic effect is, as the
Missouri Supreme Court observed, tangible. It is this dynamic which
creates a political underclass of those who cannot, despite being other-

2009]

THE COST OF THE VOTE

1065

wise qualified, vote. This is antithetical to a coherent theory of democracy.

201

Such an analysis is often rejected on the grounds that there are only
a miniscule number of voters who are affected by this dynamic. Indeed,
the courts often observe that a balance must be struck between the interests of the state in administering fair elections with the interests of the
voter in having his or her vote counted fairly.2 °2 This recognition has
been used as a means for courts to ignore the issue of the effectswhether speculative or actual-of the cost of voter identification cards
upon potential voters. It manifested itself in the eras of property requirements and of poll taxes when the courts would defer to the states'
unfettered ability to set up the qualifications for voting. And it seems
apparent now in the era of voter identification laws.
This is not to diminish the importance of the need to prevent voter
fraud. The integrity of the democratic process is, in itself, an important
and necessary interest to be protected. An election process that does not
possess the basic guarantees which ensure that the votes cast are authentic, are properly counted, and are correctly reported, effectively undermines the democratic process. Without basic guarantees which ensure
that those registered are those who actually cast votes, the system will be
subject to immense fraud. All of the courts to decide this issue have
found this to be true. This is a basic tenet of election law.
However, the emphasis of the facts related to voter fraud tends to
focus not on in-person voter impersonation, but on fraud in absentee ballots and problems with electronic voting. The balance of issues related
to integrity through voter identification is, in essence, a solution seeking
a problem. In the absence of actual documented contemporary problems
concerning voter impersonation fraud, courts and legislatures weighing
the implementation and adjudication of voter identification laws should
base their analyses on maintaining the ease with which voters can access
the polls as opposed to abstract notions of voter integrity which lack actual substantiation.0 3
201.

See JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 4-5

(1992) ("What distinguishes democratic from nondemocratic societies is . . . the way in which power
is acquired and decisions are arrived ...." In particular, Cohen and Arato stress that "[s]o long as
some core set of civil rights is respected and regularly contested elections are held on the basis of a
universal franchise ... a polity can be considered democratic."). Thus, to set forward a form of
constituting the polity that will tend to exclude some segment of it creates doubt in the integrity of
the democratic nature of the institution. This is the problem of the photo ID laws. See also Parson
& Mclaughlin, supra note 20, at 95-96 (noting that voter identification laws coupled with other
."burdensome laws" erode the public's faith in the electoral system).
202.
See supra Part Ill.
203.
The Burdick balancing seems to create a false dichotomy between the interests of voters in
expressing their First and Fourteenth Amendment free expression rights and the state's interests in
maintaining fair elections. Any democratic government must premise its entire existence on the
notion that the people and their ability to govern is the source of the government's legitimacy. See
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure these rights, Govern-
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In the end, the interest in election integrity must be balanced with
the interest in ensuring that every otherwise-qualified voter can have
access to the ballot. This is the core premise of American democracythat everyone who can rightfully vote should be able to vote. The battle
of access described in this article is ultimately one of ensuring that there
must not be any invidious requirement which prevents voters from voting. This is the tie that binds us together in our civic society and should
not be easily discounted simply because, as in the voter identification
controversy, only a relative few voters may be affected. °4 It is to this
end of preserving the value of realistically complete access to American
elections for all who are eligible to vote that our laws should be directed.
IV. REFRAMING THE ANALYSIS TO ACCOUNT FOR SOCIOECONoMIc BIAS

The open legal question here is what kind of role should the indirect
cost of voting play within the context of analyzing the burdens presented
by voter identification laws. This article contends that the consequences
of economic status should be taken into account when analyzing voter
identification laws. As a practical matter, this article makes several recommendations.
First, judicial analysis under either a Burdick balancing test or under
a defined right to vote under a state constitutional scheme needs to weigh
expressly both the direct and the indirect costs of voting within the context of the balancing of the individual voter's rights compared to the interests of the state. The directives of Harper, which note that there
should be no price attached to the ability to exercise the right to vote,
should be interpreted to require courts to strike down voting regulations
which exact unreasonable costs on voting. The calculation of this cost
should include the direct costs-as we can see in the poll tax and those
voter identification laws which have been held unconstitutional because
they required a direct payment from the voter as a precondition of voting.
This calculation should also capture the indirect costs of voting, including the need to spend money to obtain the documentation necessary to
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... ").
Because the consent of the governed is the bedrock of democracy generally, and the founding source
of American democracy in particular, it is a strange juxtaposition to set at odds the interests of the
governed against the interests of the government. This vision of voting rights-which sets the rights
of the people at odds with the government itself-is a major contributing factor to the antidemocratic
results we see in the majority of the photo identification cases. A better way to frame the Burdick
test as well as to think about this issue of democratic process would be to set the people's interest in
voting as the first and most important interest the government possesses in administrating elections.
Once seen through this lens, the ability to better construct and consider the costs of voting upon the
voter and how that frustrates voter participation would become clearer.
204. This is because these requirements will exclude voters from the process and thus obstruct
their core political rights as citizens. See Overton, supra note 20, at 673-74 ("Photo-identification
requirements that exclude legitimate voters interfere with the ability of citizens to identify with one
another as a political community, create alliances with others of different backgrounds, and use the
vote instrumentally to enact political change.").
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vote, as well as the time loss and potential employment loss and travel
costs to obtain the voter ID. This analysis should occur in the first instance rather than waiting for a preliminary showing of substantial harm
by the plaintiff prior to determining the level of scrutiny to which the law
may be subject.
In other words, there ought to be a reordering of the Burdick test in
light of the Harperrationale. Rather than a balancing test that defaults to
the interests of the state, the test should be structured to require the state
to demonstrate that the means it has adopted in its voter identification
laws represent a significant interest in preventing voter fraud coupled
with a showing that the conditional costs-direct and indirect-to the
voter are minimized in the scheme the government is implementing.
Those costs ought to be presumed to affect voting; thus the government
should demonstrate that its rules account for the indirect costs and provide alternatives which will minimize those costs. Once it has done so, it
would be up to the plaintiffs to disprove the government's proof.
In a larger sense, courts should take into account the complexity
that surrounds voting when considering voter identification laws and
laws that condition voting generally. The political science literature
shows us that it is these kinds of restrictions which influence whether
voters will actually participate in the electoral process. Moreover, it is
the amount of economic stake required to vote-and its susceptibility to
manipulation by the political majorities-which forms the backbone of
the historical evil of the poll tax. Similarly, this same susceptibility is at
play here with the voter identification laws when one focuses on the socioeconomic forces which underlie the tax. As such, the effect of the
policy consequences of relating the choice of applying a voter registration regime which depends upon the socioeconomic status of the potential voter creates a dynamic where policy makers can choose what electorate they may wish to have or not wish to have. Because of this, the ability to vote becomes subject to a kind of tyranny of the majority which
runs counter to the notion of what the vote is for-to allow each and
every citizen to make their voice heard.
As seen above, judicial analyses have tended to only look at whether there was a literal cost of the poll tax or something comparable. Indeed, most jurisdictions when analyzing the burdens have simply dismissed even the specter of costs outside of the direct costs as irrelevant
to the analysis. This reduction of this crucial issue to virtual irrelevancy
will cause courts to miss the point completely concerning the socioeconomic effects of voter identification laws. Moreover, a policy of adopting an express analysis of both the direct and indirect costs of the vote
and thus preventing such costs from escaping scrutiny in analyzing voting laws will move election laws one step further towards formulating a
uniform right to vote which is not bound by socioeconomic biases or the
whims of a potentially tyrannical majority.
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The challenge is finding a method for courts to engage in this analysis. Finding the answer is difficult in as much as courts have tended not
to be persuaded by purely statistical analyses showing the degree of citizens who would be plausibly affected by the economic bias. For example, as an evidentiary matter, the trial court in Crawford rejected the research proffered by the experts. As explained earlier, other courts have
rejected analyses based on statistical evidence. Moreover, as the Crawford case showed, it is difficult to find the live plaintiff directly affected
by these rules because such citizens are virtually invisible. Yet, the
Weinschenk decision demonstrates that such statistical analysescoupled with an identifiable plaintiff who had been effectively excluded
by the laws-would provide a basis sufficient for a court to strike down
the law. Plaintiffs and courts ought to look towards this example of evidentiary sufficiency as a model for future cases.
Moreover, one of the difficulties illustrated across the history of the
vote is the fact that within both the federal system and each state system
are different standards of qualifications to vote. Indeed, as seen in Weinschenk, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted the Missouri Constitution to reach the result that the voter identification laws at issue in that
case created too great of an infringement on the right to vote. Yet, given
that Missouri appears to have relied on state law rather than federal law,
other states have ruled that such laws are constitutional; and given that
over half of the states have yet to consider the issue, it seems important
to establish a clear uniform interpretation of these laws to ensure that the
balance between election integrity and voter access are met. The only
way to ensure uniformity of such laws is, in the long term, to explicitly
define in affirmative terms what the right to vote means and how it
should be interpreted in relation to voter identification laws and other
relevant rules. Congress, through HAVA and the NVRA, has made
some suggestions as to both the validity of voter identification laws and
the need for uniform standards. Those suggestions seem to bend in the
interests of ensuring efficiency of elections and ensuring their fairness.
This work should continue; it should also take into account the socioeconomic bias discussed here.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the manipulation of the costs of voting
is the steady, consistent theme which underlies both the anti-democratic
history of the right to vote as well as the future threat presented by photo
identification requirements as prerequisites for voting. Such lines of
exclusion are antithetical to the nature of democracy and ultimately constitute a tyranny of the majority against the minority at the lowest level
of socioeconomic status. In light of this, judicial and legislative analyses
of these laws should focus on the indirect costs of voting and how those
costs potentially exclude voters. Only in this way will we be able to
create an enduring and greater character for American democracy.

A CRITIQUE AND COMPARISON OF EN BANC REVIEW IN
THE TENTH AND D.C. CIRCUITS AND UNITED STATES V.
NACCHIO
INTRODUCTION

All federal circuit courts allow for rehearing en banc. The en banc
mechanism enables the full circuit to devote its attention to issues of considerable importance that may not otherwise make it to the Supreme
Court's limited docket.' En banc review is typically the only means
available for overruling precedent and resolving inconsistencies within a
circuit. 2 En banc cases are "arguably the most significant cases decided
by the courts of appeals[,] ' '3 receive "more attention in the legal community, and are more likely to be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court than
are rulings by three-judge panels. ' 4
Standards used to determine the cases appropriate for en banc consideration are, however, complex and convoluted.5 Appellate courts are
divided as to what standards to apply in considering petitions for rehearing en banc and as to the correct method of application. 6 Although
guided by statute,7 each circuit likewise relies on federal and local rules
in determining the standard for en banc review. 8 Despite similar standards, however, considerable variations exist among the circuits. 9
From 2003 to 2007 the Tenth and D.C. Circuits have remained relatively consistent in the number of cases heard en banc.10 Conversely,
1.
Pierre H. Bergeron, En Banc Practice in the Sixth Circuit: An Empirical Study, 19902000, 68 TENN. L. REv. 771, 771 (2001).

2.

Id.

3.

Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc

Review, 74 WASH. L. REv. 213, 217-18 (1999) (arguing that en banc cases are "of greater consequence" because en banc procedure (1) limits the number of cases heard by the entire court to those
selected by a majority of the active judges, (2) "expends greater judicial and litigant resources," (3)
exposes the parties and the circuit to inconsistent rulings, and (4) lessens some restraints of the
appellate level of review).
4.

Michael E. Solimine, Due Process and En Banc Decisionmaking, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 325,

325 (2006).
5.
See George, supra note 3, at 220; Judah 1.Labovitz, Notes, En Banc Procedure in the
FederalCourts ofAppeals, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 220, 221 (1962).
6.
See Labovitz, supra note 5, at 221-27.

7.
Id. at 220-21(citing 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1958)); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (West 2009)
("A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service, or such number of
judges as may be prescribed in accordance with Pub. L. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1633 (1978) . .
8.
See id. at 221-27.
9.
Id. at 221.
10.
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 46 tbl.S-1 (2008), available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2OO7/tables/SOISepO7.pdf [hereinafter 2007 ANNUAL REPORT];
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF

THE

UNITED

STATES

COURTS,
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50

tbl.S- 1

(2007),

available

at
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each circuit's pronounced and underlying reasoning in granting or denying these petitions has shifted during the five-year period. In addition to
the inconsistent application of en banc standards within each circuit, discrepancies also exist between the two circuits in the interpretation of
substantially similar standards.
Part I of this Comment sets up the legal background and history of
en banc review. Part II surveys the Tenth Circuit's treatment of en banc
review from the years 2003 to 2007. Part 1I discusses the D.C. Circuit's
standards and decisions in respect to en banc review from 2003 to 2007.
Part IV analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision to rehear United States v.
Nacchio en banc in the context of the Tenth Circuit's prior considerations. Part V explores whether United States v. Nacchio would have
been treated differently if heard in the D.C. Circuit.
I. A HISTORY OF EN BANC REVIEW IN FEDERAL COURTS

A. The Pastand Purposeof En Banc Review
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the first circuit courts."i Appellate panels consisted of three judges including one circuit judge and two13
trial judges. 12 Not until the Evarts Act of 1891 ("The Evarts Act"),
however, did Congress create the now familiar three-tiered system of
trial, appellate, and Supreme Courts.1 4 Each appellate or circuit court
received three judgeships. 15 The Evarts Act also created a certiorari procedure, ensuring that the Court could decide its own docket and rendering the court of appeals16 the "court of last resort" for the majority of federal appellate litigants.
The adoption of the 1911 Judicial Code extended the judgeships of
appellate courts to more than three, but made no explicit provisions for
en banc review. 17 In the 1920s and 1930s, as caseloads grew, "Congress
authorized more judgeships."1 8 As more judgeships were added the pohttp://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2OO6/tables/sI.pdf [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT]; ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, 40 tbl.S-1 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/
tables/sl.pdf [hereinafter 2005 ANNUAL REPORT]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 37 tbl.S- 1
(2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2OO4/tables/sl.pdf [hereinafter 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 34 tbl.S-1 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2003/tables/s 1.pdf [hereinafter 2003 ANNUAL REPORT].
11.
Richard S. Arnold, Why Judges Don't Like Petitions for Rehearing, 3 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 29, 30 (2001).
12.
Id. The 1869 Judiciary Act created one circuit judgeship for each judicial circuit. Id.
13.
Id.
14. kL
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id. at 30-31.
18.
Id. at 31.
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tential for inconsistent panel decisions increased, providing a growing
need for an administrative solution.
The Ninth Circuit first took up the issue of en banc review in
1938.'9 In 1937, a divided Ninth Circuit panel ruled on an estate tax
issue in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner.20 Just one year later in Lang's Estate v. Commissioner,21 a panel
of three different Ninth Circuit judges revisited the same issue but arrived at a different conclusion.22 The two conflicting rulings presented a
uniformity issue within the circuit, with no mechanism in place to resolve this conflict. The Lang's Estate panel, "faced with the situation
where the decision of two judges of the circuit made a precedent for the
remaining five," 23 chose to certify the estate tax question to the Supreme
Court rather than overturn the previous panel decision, effectively ruling
out an en banc process. 24
Two years after Lang's Estate, the Third Circuit disregarded the
Ninth Circuit's dicta that a court could not sit en banc, and the full court
25
of five judges heard Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities Corp.
The Third Circuit concluded that the court had the "power to provide...
for sessions of the court en banc, consisting of all the circuit judges of
the circuit in active service." 26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
unanimously affirmed, reasoning that, "en banc sittings would make for
'more effective judicial administration' because en banc review would
promote finality of decision within the courts of appeals and would aid in
resolving intra-circuit conflicts. 2 7
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the "courts of appeals
were empowered, but not required, to sit en banc. 2 8 A circuit could
"devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby
a majority may order such a hearing." 29 Each circuit, therefore, had the
discretion to determine whether to grant en banc review and to determine
the criteria for granting en banc review. 30 The resulting uncertainty and
inconsistency among the courts of appeals with regard to en banc review

19.
Id.
20.
90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1937).
97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938).
21.
22.
Id. at 869.
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 869-70; see also George, supranote 3, at 227-28.
25.
117 F.2d 62, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1940) (en banc), affid, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
26. Textile Mills, 117 F.2d at 71.
27. Arnold, supra note 11, at 31 (quoting Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 335). This decision was
codified seven years later in section 46(c) of the Judicial Code of 1948. Id.
28. Id. (citing W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953)).
29.
W Pac.R.R., 345 U.S. at 250.
30. Arnold, supra note 11, at 31-32.
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caused Congress to standardize practices through the ratification of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.31
B. PurportedStandardsof En Banc Review
As a hearing by a full panel of all active judges consumes a considerable amount of both the time and resources of the court, the rules governing en banc review are fairly restrictive. The federal and local rules
of several circuits address the potential burden of en banc review, and
state that convening the full court for a hearing is not favored.32
Federal rules governing en banc review include Title 28, Section
46(c) of the United States Code 33 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.34 Under § 46(c), en banc review of a case "may be conducted if
such review 'is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit
who are in regular active service.' ' 35 In addition, the statute provides
that an 3 en
banc court generally consists of "all of the active judges on the
6
court.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 provides the mechanism by
which "a party may suggest the appropriateness of convening the court in
banc."37 Generally "not favored, 38 en banc review may only occur
where "(1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance., 39 The need for uniformity most often
involves a conflict between two panel decisions. 4° "Resolving conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent," clarifying cases of "general confusion
within the circuit," and "overruling precedent that appears to be out of
step with the current court" are also common reasons for granting en
banc review.
A decision to reconvene en banc based on uniformity is easier to
analyze than review for matters of "exceptional importance. 'A 2 The exceptional importance standard is far more subjective and is therefore
more difficult to apply in a consistent fashion.4 3 In many respects, the

31.
George, supra note 3, at 230 & n.94.
32. FED. R. APp. P. 35(a); see, e.g., 10TH CR. R. 35.1(A).
33. 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (West 2009).
34. FED. R. App. P. 35.
35. Harry W. Welford, Anna M. Vescovo & Lundy L. Boyd, Sixth Circuit En Banc Procedures and Recent Sharp Splits, 30 U. MEM. L. REv. 479, 481 (2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(1993 & Supp. 1999)).
36. Id.
37. FED. R. App. P. 35 advisory committee note (1967 adoption).
38. Id. 35(a).
39. Id. 35(a)(1)-(2).
40. Bergeron, supra note 1, at 783.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 782.
43. See id.
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exceptional importance standard is the default standard.44 Cases not exmust necessarily fall into the category of
hibiting issues of uniformity
"exceptional importance." 45
Attempting to decode the meaning of "exceptional importance" is a
"somewhat elusive endeavor"46 that begs the question of whether courts
should weigh the impact on the public, the judiciary, or the parties. 7
"The public is concerned about cases that can have a widespread impact
on matters of interest to the community;" the court's interest may be in
"the need to streamline 'the administration of justice' within the circuit; ' 48 and the parties have at issue "large amounts of money or [matters
of] extraordinary emotional impact .... 49 Another reason that courts
agree to rehear cases en banc is to "correct an apparently erroneous result" made by either the panel or the binding precedent of an earlier panel. 50 The court's failure to clearly state its reasons for granting en banc
review makes it increasingly difficult to classify 51to whom the matter
must be exceptionally important and to what extent.
The Tenth and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals each have local rules
that address en banc review. 52 Courts are entitled to considerable deference in interpreting and applying their own rules of practice and procedure.53 Tenth Circuit Rule 35 provides that en banc review is limited to
panel decisions of exceptional public importance or those that conflict
with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of the Tenth Circuit Court. 54 D.C. Circuit Rule 35 is identical to Tenth Circuit Rule 35
except that it does not specify that matters must be of exceptional importance to the public.55
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT EN BANC: 2003-2007
The Tenth Circuit interprets Federal Rule 35 in its Tenth Circuit
Rule 35, which is nearly identical to Federal Rule 35.56 Like Federal
See id. at 782-83.
44.
Id. at 782.
45.
46.
Id. at 784.
47.
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1008, 1025 (1991).
48.
Bergeron, supra note 1, at 784 (quoting Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 47, at 1028).
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 47, at 1032.
49.
50. Id. at 1023.
51.
See Bergeron, supra note 1, at 774-75.
52. See Labovitz, supra note 5, at 221-22, 226-27.
53. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 796 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Lance, Inc. v.
Dewco Servs., Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that "[li]ocal [r]ules are promulgated
by District Courts primarily to promote the efficiency of the Court, and that the Court has a large
measure of discretion in interpreting and applying them").
54.

10TH CiR. R. 35.1(A).

55. See D.C. CIR. R. 35.
56. See OTH CR. R. 35.1(A) ("En bane review is an extraordinary procedure intended to
focus the entire court on an issue of exceptional public importance or on a panel decision that conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of this court.").

1074

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

Rule 35, the Tenth Circuit's rule provides that "[a] request for en banc
consideration is disfavored., 57 The Tenth Circuit's adaptation of Federal
Rule 35 specifically requires that matters of exceptional importance be of
exceptional public importance.58 This single addition fundamentally
changes the analysis of the type of cases that merit en banc review.
The Tenth Circuit hears only a small number of cases by the full
court each year. 59 From October 2003 through September 2007, the
Tenth Circuit resolved twenty-seven en banc appeals on the merits out of
7,670 total appeals, representing only .35 percent of the total number of
cases terminated on the merits.60 From these statistics it appears that the
Tenth Circuit heard roughly the average number of en banc cases as other circuit courts from the years 2003 to 2007.61
The twenty-seven en banc decisions in the Tenth Circuit from 2003
to 2007 present a variety of issues. 62 The following three cases, presenting issues of Fourth Amendment rights, evidentiary hearings, and caps
on damages, exemplify the Tenth Circuit's approach in deciding which
cases meet the standard of "exceptional public importance."
A. Cortez v. McCauley

63

Cortez v. McCauley dealt with issues of constitutional rights and
freedoms, but the main issue driving en banc review was whether a claim
64
of excessive force must be subsumed into a claim of unlawful seizure.
It is likely that the full court agreed to rehear this case not because of its
exceptional public importance, but because of its future implications for
judicial administration within the circuit, and to provide finality for this
issue and establish controlling precedent.
In 2001, the Bernalillo County Sheriffs department responded to a
call from a nurse at a local hospital reporting complaints of sexual abuse
by a babysitter's husband. 65 The defendants-police officers McCauley,
Gonzales, Sanchez, and Covington-responded to the call immediately
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-l; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S- 1.
60.
See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1;
2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 thl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-l; 2003 ANNUALREPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S-l.
61.
For this same time period, the number of en banc appeals terminated on the merits for all
United States Courts of Appeals was 304. Spread out over the twelve U.S. Courts of Appeals, the
average would be 25.3 appeals terminated on the merits, en banc. See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 46 tbl.S- 1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 50 tbl.S- 1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-l;
2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-1; 2003 ANNUAL
REPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S-1.
62.
See cases listed infra Appendix.
63.
478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
64.
Id.at 1112.
65.
Id. at 1112-13 & n.1.
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without waiting for medical examination results confirming the abuse,
without taking the time to interview the child or the mother, and without
seeking to obtain a search warrant. 66 When the defendants arrived at
babysitter Tina Cortez's home, two of the officers awoke her husband
Rick Cortez from his sleep, ordered him to exit his house, "seized him,
handcuffed him, read him his Miranda rights, and placed him in the back
of a patrol car .... 67 Meanwhile, Defendant McCauley entered the
Cortez's home, "seized [Tina Cortez] by the arm, and physically escorted
6 8 One of the
her from her home" to a separate patrol car for questioning.
69
officers then searched the home without a warrant.
Plaintiffs Tina and Rick Cortez filed suit against employees of the
Bemalillo County Sheriffs Department and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Bernalillo, New Mexico, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.70 The Cortezes sought to recover for unlawful arrest,
excessive force, and unreasonable search of their home arising out of an
unsubstantiated claim of child molestation.7"
Circuit Judges Ebel, White, and Henry presided over the case and,
in an opinion by District Judge White of the District of Colorado, affirmed in part and reversed in part.72 Judge Henry concurred in part and
dissented in part with respect to Tina Cortez's excessive force claim,
arguing that the defendants clearly violated her right to be free from exclaim should not have been
cessive force and that the excessive force
73
claim.
arrest
unlawful
the
into
subsumed
All active judges of the court reheard the case en banc to consider
under what circumstances an excessive force claim could be subsumed
into an unlawful arrest claim.74 On rehearing en banc, the court affirmed
the panel's opinion in part and reversed in part. Judge Kelly wrote the
majority opinion upholding the district 76court's denial of qualified immunity, minus one excessive force claim.

66.
Id. at 1113.
67.
Id.
Id.
68.
69.
Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2009) ("Every person who, under color of any statute
70.
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ...except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.").
Cortez, 478F.3dat 1112.
71.
72. Cortez v. McCauley, 438 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2006).
73. Id. at 1002-03 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1112.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1112, 1132-33.
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The court broke down the unreasonable seizure claims into four
separate discussions of the Fourth Amendment and individually analyzed
each of the plaintiffs' excessive force claims.77 After analyzing each of
these claims, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to Plaintiff Rick Cortez's claim of an unreasonable seizure, but reversed as to Plaintiff Rick Cortez's claim of excessive force in connection with the arrest. 78 The en banc court affirmed the district court's
denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff Tina Cortez.79 Circuit Judge
Kelly wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Judge Tacha and Circuit Judges Ebel, Henry, Briscoe, Lucero, and Murphy. 80 Circuit Judges
Hartz, McConnell, and Gorsuch each wrote separate dissenting opinions. ' The main premise of the dissents was that
the court overcompli82
cated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims.
The Cortez court did not discuss its reasons for granting en banc review.83 The court did note that it agreed to rehear the case to decide the
narrow issue of whether, "when a case contains claims for both an unlawful seizure and excessive force arising under the Fourth Amendment,
the latter claim must always be subsumed within and resolved in like
fashion as the former claim., 84 Rather than exceptional public importance or uniformity, this case appears to present an issue of judicial administration regarding the treatment of unlawful seizure and excessive
force claims.
85
B. United States v. Nacchio

Although United States v. Nacchio involved a high-profile company
and has been a hot topic in the Colorado news, the case did not represent
issues of exceptional importance to the public as required by the Tenth
Circuit's local rules, but rather presented an issue of importance to judicial administration in the circuit. Of the multiple issues involved, the en
banc court chose to ignore the substantive legal issues and instead to
rehear the "sleepier" issue concerning the exclusion of testimony and the
need for an evidentiary hearing when neither party requested it. This
again represents an issue of judicial administration.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado convicted Defendant Joseph Nacchio, former CEO of Qwest Communica77.
See id. at 1115-32.
78.
Id. at 1132-33.
79.
Id. at 1133.
80.
Id. at 1112. Circuit Judges Hartz, O'Brien, McConnell, Tymkovich, Gorsuch, and
Holmes joined in part. Id.
81.
Id. at 1133-49.
82.
See id.
at1133 (Hartz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83.
See id. at1112-15.
84.
Id. at 1137-38 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85.
519 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2008).
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tions International, Inc., of nineteen counts of insider trading. 86 Nacchio
appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict, that the
jury was improperly instructed, and that the trial judge improperly excluded expert testimony and classified information that Nacchio's key
expert witness sought to introduce. 87 The trial court judge excluded the
expert's testimony on the ground that Nacchio's Rule 16 disclosure
failed to discuss the witness's methodology.88 The defense's strategy
rested on the key expert witness testimony of Professor Daniel Fischel
and classified information regarding Qwest's business prospects. 89 The
district court kept both out of court. 90
"The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a defendant under certain circumstances to provide to the government, upon request, 'a
written summary of any testimony that the defendant intends to use [at
trial] under Rules 702,91 703,92 or 70593 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."' 94 "The summary must describe the witness's opinions, the
95
bases and reasons for these opinions, and the witness's qualifications."
The defense disclosed its intent to call expert witness Professor Daniel
Fischel to testify about Nacchio's trading patterns in an economic context, and the "economic importance of the allegedly material inside information." 96 The district court agreed with the government's argument
that this disclosure was insufficient under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 1697 "because the defense had 'offer[ed] no bases or reasons
for Professor Fischel's opinions contained in the sumwhatsoever
n ,r.',,98

mary-.ii
The defense then filed a revised disclosure describing Fischel's
background and qualifications as an expert witness and stating his belief
that "Mr. Nacchio's sales were inconsistent with what one would expect

86.
Id. at 1144.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1148, 1150.
89. Id. at 1148.
Id.
90.
FED. R. EviD. 702 (requiring the expert witness' testimony to be based upon sufficient
91.
facts or data, to be a product of reliable principles and methods, and requiring that the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case).
92.
FED. R. EvID. 703 (stating that facts of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences on the subject need not be admissible in evidence
in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted).
FED. R. EviD. 705 (stating that the expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
93.
give reasons therefore without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise).
94. Nacchio, 519 F.3d at 1149 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(C)).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(l)(C).
95.
96. Nacchio, 519 F.3d at 1149.
97. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(l)(C)(ii) (2008) (requiring a defendant to notify the Government of its intent to call an expert witness and provide a summary of the expert's testimony, the
reasons and basis for his opinion and his qualifications).
98. Nacchio, 519 F.3d at 1149 (quoting App. at 352).
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them to be if the government's claims were true." 99 When it came time

to call Fischel to the stand, the district court judge dismissed the jury and
declared the testimony inadmissible.' °° The judge reasoned that the defendant had failed to meet Rule 16 and that the "expert economic analysis would 'invit[e] the jurors to abandon their own common 1 sense
and
0
common experience and succumb to this expert's credentials.' '
On appeal, the case went before a panel of three judges comprised
of Circuit Judges Kelly, McConnell, and Holmes.l0 2 The appellate court
held that it was an abuse of discretion to exclude Fischel's testimony,
and that an expert witness could not be excluded solely on the basis of a
deficiency in a Rule 16 disclosure without the opportunity for briefing or
hearing. 10 3 Because the improper exclusion of Fischel's testimony prejudiced Nacchio's defense, the court reversed his conviction and left the
government the ability to try him a second time. °4 The case was remanded for a new trial before a different district court°6judge.10 5 Circuit
Judge Holmes dissented in part and concurred in part.'
The full circuit convened on September 25, 2008 for the en banc
hearing, but for reasons unstated, Judges O'Brien, Tymkovich, and Gorsuch did not participate, 10 7 leaving only nine of the twelve judges to resolve the case. With the views of Holmes, Kelly and McConnell clear,
the outcome depended on six "wild card" judges, including Judges Henry, Tacha, Briscoe, Lucero, Murphy and Hartz.
The court did not include its reasoning for agreeing to rehear the
case en banc in its order granting the petition, nor did any judges file a
dissent from the order. 10 8 The issues to be reconsidered en banc primarily concerned the evidentiary hearing. 1°9 The en banc court ignored the
materiality issue. " Although the court did not include its reasoning for
granting the petition for rehearing en banc, the parties' briefs in support
99.

Id.

100.

Id.

101.
102.

Id. at 1150 (quoting App. at 3920).
Id. at 1144.

103.

See id.at 1154.

104. Id. at 1169.
105.
Id. at 1169-70. Judge Nottingham has since stepped down.
106.
Id. at 1170 (Holmes, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
107. See United States v. Nacchio, 535 F.3d 1165, 1165 (10th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
108. See id. at 1165-66.
109. See id. at 1166. The full list of issues to be reconsidered en banc were:
(1) Was the defendant sufficiently on notice that he was required either to present evidence in support of the expert's methodology or request an evidentiary hearing in advance of presenting the expert's testimony? (2) Did the defendant have an adequate opportunity to present such evidence or request an evidentiary hearing in advance of presenting the expert's testimony? (3) Did the defendant bear the burden of requesting an
evidentiary hearing? (4) Did the district court abuse its discretion in disallowing the evidence, and if so, is the appropriate remedy necessarily a new trial, or is a remand for purposes of conducting an evidentiary heaing adequate?
Id.
110.

See id.
at 1165-66.
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and in opposition of en banc review suggest possible facts and issues that
the court may have taken into consideration.
In its petition for rehearing en banc, the government argued that the
panel's decision both (1) departed from precedent, and (2) threatened to
restrict the judges' "traditional and important discretion to exclude unsupported expert opinions and unnecessary economic commentary." ''
This argument goes to the uniformity standard of Rule 35.112 The government also argued that "the universe of potentially affected cases is
questions of exceptional
broad" and that "the panel's decision presents
'' 13
review."
banc
en
warranting
importance
In opposition to the government's petition for rehearing en banc, the
defense argued that en banc review was unwarranted because (1) the
government's decision announced no new law, (2) the court's decision
was correct and the government did not even claim that it directly conflicted with other Tenth Circuit precedent, and (3) the court's opinion did
not impose costly and unnecessary burdens on district courts to always
114
hold hearings before excluding testimony as the government argued.
The discussion in the courtroom centered on whether it was an
abuse of the court's discretion to fail to hold a hearing before excluding
Fischel's expert testimony and whether this required a new trial." 5 Maureen Mahoney, counsel for Nacchio, began her argument by noting that
"the case had come down to the sole question of whether the defense
forfeited the right to present Fischel's testimony by the failure to ask for
a hearing." ' 1 6 Mahoney argued that the defense was given insufficient
time to request a hearing, and that the exclusion of Fischel's testimony
was a complete surprise. 1 7 Edwin Kneedler, counsel for the government, argued that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Fischel's testimony, and that the defense "had opportunity after the fact to
revisit the exclusion issue but did not take all the steps they could [have
taken]."118
The court issued its opinion on rehearing en banc on February 29,
2009, five months after the en banc hearing. 119 In a 5-4 decision, the
majority opinion-written by Judge Holmes who also wrote the dissenting panel opinion-held that Fischel's expert testimony was properly
Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140 (No. 07-1311), 2008 WL
111.
2072295.
112. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1).
113. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 111, at 2.
114. See Appellant's Opposition to the Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, 10, Nacchio, 519
F.3d 1140 (No. 07-131 1), 2008 WL 2113264.
to the Bottom,
to The Race
Robert Brown
See
Posting of J.
115.
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/nacchio-trial/ (Sept. 25, 2008, 14:36 MST).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118.
Id.
119. United States v. Nacchio, No. 07-1311, 2009 WL 455666 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2009).
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excluded and thus affirmed the district court's judgment. 120 Judges Tacha, Briscoe, Lucero and Hartz joined in the majority opinion. 21 The en
banc decision vacated the panel's opinion and reinstated Nacchio's conviction.122 Judge Holmes and the en banc majority held that: (1) defendant "was sufficiently on notice that he was required to present evidence
in support of his expert's testimony;" 123 (2) the burden of requesting a
hearing fell to the defendant;' 24 and (3) "the district court properly performed its Daubert gatekeeping role in excluding Professor Fischel's
testimony as inadmissible for lack of reliability."'' 2 5 Judge McConnell,
who wrote the panel majority opinion, dissented and was joined by Chief
Judge Henry, Judge126Kelly, who also joined in the panel majority opinion,
and Judge Murphy.
C. Robbins v. Chronister 1

7

Robbins v. Chronisterexamined whether to place a cap on the attorneys' fees for those representing prisoners as proposed by the Prisoners' Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").128 At stake in this case was
whether the prevailing party's attorneys' fees should be capped at $1.50
or if the fees should stand at roughly $9,000.129 Given that the decision
of the case would impact future applications of the cap on attorneys' fees
under the PLRA, and that the court would likely encounter this issue
again, it is possible that the court agreed to rehear the case en banc as a
matter of judicial administration.
Plaintiff-Appellee Ralph Robbins, who happened to have several
traffic warrants out for his arrest at the time, waited was waiting in his
car for a pump to become available when a police officer, Chronister,
pulled into the gas station.13 Officer Chronister recognized Robbins
from an altercation a few weeks earlier and approached, baton in hand.' 3 '
32
Chronister identified himself but Robbins refused to get out of his car.
Chronister shattered the car window with his baton and attempted to pull
Robbins through. 33 While attempting to get away, Robbins' car fish-

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.at *7.
Id.at *12.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *16.
402 F.3d 1047 (loth Cir. 2005), rev'd en banc, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006).
Robbins, 402 F.3d at 1048.
See id. at 1049.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tailed on the icy pavement, toward
Chronister. 3 4 Chronister shot twice,
135
side.
and
chest
striking Robbins'
Robbins pled guilty to aggravated assault of a police officer and
filed a complaint alleging excessive force in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. 136 The court held that Chronister's use of deadly
force in shooting at the car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
but that shattering the driver side window with his baton was not. 137 Not
physically injured from Chronister's breaking of the window, Robbins
received nominal damages equal to one dollar. 138 Robbins filed a motion
to recover attorneys' fees and Chronister responded by arguing that attorneys' fees should be capped at 150% of the damages awarded, or
$1.50.139
Chronister based his argument on § 1997e(d)(2) of the
PLRA, 14° because Robbins was imprisoned when he filed suit.' 4'
Judges Seymour, McWilliams, and Hartz declined to cap the attorneys' fees, upholding the ruling of the trial court that reasoned "applying
the PLRA in these circumstances would produce an absurd result because Congress could not have intended the statute to apply to merito' 42
rious civil rights claims that arose prior to a prisoner's confinement."'
The court awarded Robbins $9,680 in attorneys' fees and $915.16 in
expenses. Chronister sought en banc review, arguing that the fee cap
should have been enforced. 143 Judge Hartz dissented, disagreeing with
the majority's view that "it would be absurd to think Congress wished144to
apply [the PLRA] to suits alleging preconfinement [sic] misconduct."'
The full court convened to rehear the case. 145 Judge Hartz wrote the
en banc opinion, reflecting the court's decision to reverse the district
court's award of attorneys' fees and limit the award to $1.50.1 46 The
court did not give explicit reasons for agreeing to rehear the case, but
Hartz's dissent and the decision of the en banc court indicate that the

134. Id.
135. Id.
136.
Id. at 1049; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
137. Robbins, 402 F.3d at 1049.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(2) (West 2009) ("Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in
an action ... a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the
amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not
greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.").
141.
Robbins, 402 F.3d at 1049.
142.
Id. at 1048-49.
143.
Id. at 1049.
144.
Id. at 1055 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
145. Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
146. Id. at 1244.
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court may have been motivated by the absurdity of applying the147PLRA
cap where the inmate's suit alleged pre-confinement misconduct.
There is no mention of a uniformity issue motivating en banc review, nor is there an explicit discussion of "exceptional importance." A
matter concerning caps on damages does not appear to be of exceptional
importance to the public, especially when contrasted with the type of
cases that the D.C. Circuit commonly rehears en banc. Nor do the facts
suggest that the case represented an issue of exceptional importance to
the parties. However, it is possible that the court agreed to rehear Robbins en banc as a matter of judicial administration. The court might have
believed that the original panel had reached an erroneous result, or simply wanted to clear up the question of whether attorneys' fees should be
capped under the PLRA.
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT EN BANc: 2003-2007

The D.C. Circuit's local Rule 35 is virtually indistinguishable from
Federal Rule 35.148 The wording of the sections discussing uniformity
and exceptional importance are an identical match. 149 Unlike the Tenth
Circuit's Rule 35, the D.C. Circuit's Rule 35 standard for en banc review
retains the Federal standard of "exceptional importance" without the
additional qualifier of "to the public." 5 ° In theory, this leaves the D.C.
Circuit with broader discretion in applying the exceptional importance
standard.
The D.C. Circuit rarely takes cases en banc. From the years 2003 to
2007, the D.C. Circuit consistently ranked among the lowest number of
appeals heard en banc in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.' 51 From 20032007, the D.C. Circuit decided a total of ten appeals on the merits en
banc, compared to an all-circuit average of 23 during that time. 12 This
represented only .38 percent of the total appeals terminated on the merits
after oral hearings or submission on briefs in the D.C. Circuit. 5 3 Of the
ten cases that the D.C. Circuit terminated on the merits en banc from
2003 to 2007, the following two cases dealt with access to prescription
drugs for the terminally ill and a federal wire-tapping scandal.
147.
See id. at 1239; Robbins, 402 F.3d at 1055 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
148.
Compare Fed. R. APP. P. 35, with D.C. CIR. R. 35.
149.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1)-(2); D.C. CR.R. 35(a)(1)-(2).
150.
Compare FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2), and D.C. CiR. R. 35(a)(2), with 10TH CR. R. 35.1(A).
151.
See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-I; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT; supranote 10, at 34 tbl.S-1.
152.
See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-l; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-1; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S-1; see also infra
Appendix.
153.
See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S- 1; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S- 1.
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A. Abigail Alliance
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von
154
Eschenbach
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von
Eschenbach represents the type of case that the D.C. Circuit typically
rehears en banc because of its exceptional importance on a national level.
The case concerned the availability of experimental drugs to terminally
ill patients across the United States. It also involved issues of fundamental human rights and constitutional issues that gained national attention.
Plaintiff Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs ("Abigail Alliance"), a public interest group, sued to enjoin the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") from barring the sale of experi55
mental drugs not yet approved for public use to terminally ill patients.
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") prohibits access to new
drugs "unless and until they have been approved by the [FDA].' 56 The
approval process for a new drug is often lengthy and requires multiple
57
steps.1
Abigail
complaint
alleged
58 that the FDA's new drug
testing process
wasAlliance's
excessively
drawn out.
Abigail Alliance petitioned the FDA, proposing that early access to
investigational drugs be allowed "based upon 'the risk of illness, injury,
or death from the disease in the absence of the drug.' ' 159 The FDA responded by arguing that Abigail Alliance's proposal would place too
much emphasis on the early availability of drugs to terminally ill patients
16 °
and not enough on the investigation of the drug's benefits and risks. 161
After rejection by the FDA, Abigail Alliance "turned to the courts."
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Abigail
Alliance's complaint challenging the FDA's refusal to allow
access to
162
FDCA.
the
under
patients
ill
terminally
to
drugs
experimental
The full court of the D.C. Circuit convened to consider the issue of
"whether the Constitution provides terminally ill patients a right of
access to experimental drugs that have passed limited safety trials but
have not been proven safe and effective."1 63 Judge Griffith wrote the
majority opinion, with Judges Rogers and Ginsburg dissenting." 6 On
154. 495 F.3d 695(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
155.
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d
470, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 495 F.3d. 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Abigail Alliance "is an organization of terminally ill patients and supporters that seeks to expand access to
experimental drugs for the terminally ill." Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697.
156. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697.
157. Id.
158.
Id. at698.
159. Id. at 699 (quoting Abigail Alliance's petition to the FDA).
160. Id. at 700.
161. Id.
162.
See id.
163.
Id. at 697.
164. Id. at 695.
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rehearing en banc, the court opted to hear the due process question and
voted to vacate the panel's decision, holding that "there is no fundamental right 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' of access to
experimental drugs for the terminally ill. ' 165 Accordingly, the en banc
court affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the FDA's
policy of limiting access to investigational drugs to the terminally ill.' 66
This case demonstrates the D.C. Circuit's practice of taking cases en
banc that are exceptionally important to the public on a national level.
B. Boehner v. McDermott

67

Boehner v. McDermott also represents the D.C. Circuit's standards
for rehearing a case en banc. The case involved constitutional issues,
public political figures, and scandal. Boehner received attention on a
national level in the media and in the legal and political communities,
and was eventually reviewed by the Supreme Court. The decision to
grant en banc review in Boehner is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's
practice of agreeing to convene the full court for matters of exceptional
national public importance.
Defendant James McDermott, a Democratic member of the House
of Representatives, disclosed to the New York Times and the Atlanta
Journal-Constitutionthe contents of an illegally intercepted conference
call between Plaintiff John Boehner, a Republican member of the House
of Representatives, and several other House Republican leaders. 168 The
intercepted conversation also included Newt Gingrich, who was undergoing investigation by the House Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct, the "House Ethics Committee."' 69 The purpose of the conference call was to discuss "how they might deal with an expected Ethics
Committee announcement of Gingrich's agreement to accept a reprimand
and to pay170a fine in exchange for the Committee's promise not to hold a
hearing.
John and Alice Martin, residents of Florida, used a police radio
scanner to pick up the conversation through the in-range cellular telephone of Plaintiff Boehner, who was in Florida at the time.' 71 The Martins recorded the conference call and turned it in to a Florida Representative who refused delivery of the tape. 172 The Martins then delivered the
tape-along with a letter stating that the Martins "understand that [they]
will be granted immunity"-to Defendant McDermott, who was the
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 697 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
d. at 713.
484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
See id. at 575-76.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 575-76.
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accepted the tape.
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73

McDermott

Upon listening to the tape, McDermott called reporters at both the
New York Times and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution,both of which
75
subsequently published articles relating to the wiretapped conference.
Neither of the articles named McDermott as the leak, but the Martins
in a press conference and he resigned from the Ethics
named McDermott
1 76
Committee.
Boehner's complaint alleged that McDermott's disclosure violated
18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(c), a wire-tapping statute which "makes intentional
disclosure of any illegally intercepted conversation a criminal offense if
the person disclosing the communication knew or had 'reason to know'
that it was so acquired." 177 The district court found a violation and, on
appeal, a panel of the D.C. Circuit comprised of Chief Judge Ginsburg
Sentelle
and Circuit Judges Sentelle and Randolph affirmed. 178 Judge
80
dissented. 179 The D.C. Circuit court granted en banc review.'
All active judges of the D.C. Circuit met to review the case en
banc 81 The issue to be decided was whether Defendant McDermott had
a First Amendment right to disclose the tape to the press given the manner in which he received the tape, his ongoing proceedings before the
Ethics Committee, and McDermott's position as a member of the Committee. 182 On rehearing en banc, the court affirmed the panel's grant of
McDermott did not
summary judgment to Plaintiff Boehner, ruling that
1 83
tape.
the
disclose
to
right
Amendment
First
have a
The en banc court reasoned that when McDermott became a member of the House of Representatives Ethics Committee, he accepted a
duty of confidentiality that superseded his First Amendment right to disclose the wiretap recording to the press.1 84 Because McDermott's speech
was limited by the Committee's rules, he was not able to invoke First
Amendment protection against charges under the wiretap statutes of the
United States and Florida. 85 Judge Randolph filed the majority opinion,
with Circuit Judge Griffith concurring. 186 Judge Sentelle filed a dissent
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
F.3d 573
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 576.
Id.
Id. at 576-77.
See id. at 577.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(c) (2006)).
Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010, 1010-11 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 484
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
Boehner, 441 F.3d at 1017.
See Boehner, 484 F.3d at 574.
See id.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 581.
Id.
Id. at 579-81.
Id. at 575, 581.

1086

[Vol. 86:3

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

joined by Judges Rogers, Tatel, Garland, and Griffith. 187 The issue in
this case, First Amendment freedom of speech, exemplifies the type of
case that the D.C. Circuit typically agrees to rehear en banc because of
the exceptional national importance.
IV. TENTH CIRCUIT EN BANC REVIEW OF UNITED STATES V. NAcCHIo

Federal Rule 35 states that decisions to grant en banc review are
"not favored."' 88 Similarly, Tenth Circuit Rule 35 allows en banc review
only for "an issue of exceptional public importance or a panel decision
that conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court" or
with some precedent in the Tenth Circuit. 89 Despite the circuit's strict
rules, the court interprets "exceptional public importance" loosely and
often takes cases based on importance to judicial administration, as demonstrated by Cortez, Robbins, and Nacchio.
Nacchio affects the proper functioning of the trial courts in the
Tenth Circuit. 190 As stated in a post on the blog theracetothebottom.org,
"[t]he panel decision (finding that the failure to hold an unrequested
hearing was reversible error) affects every trial judge in the circuit." 191
The blog post noted that if the panel opinion remains in place, the circuit's trial courts "will likely be forced to hold hearings sua sponte even
when not requested in order to insulate their decision from reversal. ' 92
This, of course, would prove unfavorable to the courts, as it would be "an
inefficient, time consuming addition to the work load [sic] of already
busy courts.,

193

The blog post presents a compelling argument that it

was the impact on the trial courts that created the "exceptional importance" motivating en banc review. 194
V. UNITED STATES V. NAccHIo IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT?

Some have concluded that D.C. Circuit judges are more politicized
than other circuits. 195 As a result, they may have a different approach to
en banc review. Because D.C. Circuit judges often have Supreme Court
aspirations, this might lead the court to hold petitions for en banc review
to a higher standard of exceptional nationalimportance. 96 Compared to
Tenth Circuit judges, who are not known to "seriously aspire" to sit on
the Supreme Court bench, and who are "generally not motivated by publicity or the need to demonstrate their intellectual acumen by writing
187.
Id. at 581.
188.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
189.
1OTH. C .R. 35.1(A).
190. See
posting
of J.
Robert
Brown to
The Race
htp://www.theracetothebottom.org/nacchio-trial/ (Aug. 5, 2008, 6:15 MST).
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194. See id.
195.
Id.
196.
See id.

to

the

Bottom,
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particular
ground breaking opinions," D.C. Circuit judges may be more
19 7
in selecting the cases that merit the attention of the full court.
The D.C. Circuit consistently hears a very low number of cases en
banc each year. 198 The Circuit also tends to grant en banc review to issues of national public importance, fitting with the idea that the judges of
the D.C. Circuit are primarily concerned with matters that would merit
the attention of the Supreme Court, the public, and the media on a national level. Although the D.C. Circuit's rules do not reflect its focus on
matters of public importance, its practice of en banc procedure indicates
that possibly the most important factor in granting en banc review in the
D.C. Circuit is whether a case presents an issue that will gain national
attention and readership.
Two cases recently heard en banc by the D.C. Circuit include Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach and Boehner v. McDermott. Each of these cases presented an issue
of exceptional national public importance. In examining the following
two cases, and keeping in mind the D.C. Circuit's rules governing en
banc review, it appears doubtful that Nacchio would have merited en
banc review if the case were in the jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit.
Abigail Alliance presented the issue of whether terminally ill patients should have earlier access to investigational drugs. 199 The decision
of whether to allow terminally ill patients access to investigative drugs
has widespread national impact, and the issue of preserving fundamental
Constitutional rights is certainly a matter of exceptional importance. The
Supreme Court also deemed Abigail Alliance worthy of its time and attention, another factor that is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's reasoning
in its decision to grant en banc review.
Boehner dealt with a matter concerning speakers of the United
States House of Representatives and a "scandal" that was widely reported in the national media at the time. The case's "flashy" nature, the
national media coverage, and the fact that it involved highly public figures all may have played a role in the D.C. Circuit's decision to take on
the case en banc.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing the cases that the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
agreed to rehear en banc from 2003 to 2007, it appears that the Tenth
Circuit tends to rehear a higher number of cases en banc, including even
197.
Id.
See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
198.
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-1; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S-l.
Abigail Alfiance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
199.
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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the "sleepiest" of issues. The D.C. Circuit, which hears far fewer cases
en banc each year, is more selective in the cases it chooses to rehear en
banc, and seems to focus its en banc attention to "flashy" cases that are
likely to gain attention on a national level.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to grant en banc review in United States v. Nacchio, despite its failure to meet the requirements of federal (Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35) and local
(Tenth Circuit Rule 35) rules governing en banc review, exemplifies the
court's use of broad discretion in applying its local rules. The court's
decision also represents the complex and convoluted process of en banc
review.
It was the decision's impact on the functioning efficiency and the
workload of the trial courts, and not the public impact, that motivated the
court to grant the government's petition for en banc review in Nacchio.
In comparing the Tenth Circuit's en banc rules and standards to those of
the D.C. Circuit, and considering that the D.C. Circuit has historically
only reheard cases en banc that clearly satisfy the exceptional importance
standard on a national level, it is unlikely that Nacchio would have merited en banc review in the D.C. Circuit. Since the result of the Tenth
Circuit's decision to rehear Nacehio en banc was to vacate the panel opinion and reinstate the conviction, it appears that Nacchio was unlucky to
be subjected to suit in the Tenth Circuit.

Sarah J. Berkus*

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Denver Sturm College of LAw. I would like to thank
Professor J. Robert Brown for his insight and assistance.
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FTC v.
Kuykendall,
371 F.3d
745
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1108
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F.3d 1168
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U.S. Dept.
of Educ.,
437 F.3d
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and Referendum Inst.
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U.S. v.
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F.3d 1256

__________

12006

Robbins v.
Chronister,
435 F.3d
1238

Beem v.
McKune,
317 F.3d
1175

D.C.
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Grace United Methodist Church v.
City of
Cheyenne,
451 F.3d
643
Boehner v.
McDermott,
376 U.S.
App. D.C.
75

U.S. v.

Valdes, 475
F.3d 1319
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Better
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Drugs v.
Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 65

Wilson-Bey
v. U.S., 903
A.2d 818
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U.S. v.
Powell, 483
F.3d 836

COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY V. WEAVER:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE "PERVASIVELY
SECTARIAN" DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION

The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Colorado ChristianUniversity v. Weaver' reflects the chaotic state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This chaos stems from the very nature of religion, as well as the
inherent tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. The Supreme Court's proliferation of competing, contrasting,
and confusing opinions fails to provide legislatures and lower courts with
meaningful guidelines when considering government action that penetrates the religious sphere. The Constitution demands more than a "when
we see establishment we'll know it" mentality; it demands a consistent,
logical interpretation. While the disjointed collection of Supreme Court
opinions ostensibly reflects an ineffective bench, the true culprit of confusion lies in the language of the Religion Clauses. With such an immovable obstacle recognized, the American people need to rectify the
situation and clarify the principles through ratification of a Constitutional
Amendment.
Weaver displays the problem of attempting to legislate publicly
funded scholarships in the midst of contradictory case law. Many of
Colorado's publicly funded scholarships share two eligibility requirements: (1) A student must attend an institution of higher education, and
(2) the institution must not be "pervasively sectarian" as a matter of state
law.2 When Colorado enacted the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine in
1977, it attempted "to make funds available as broadly as was thought
permissible under the Supreme Court's then-existing Establishment
Clause doctrine.",3 Ironically, because of the Supreme Court's subsequent banishment of the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine, the only way to
fulfill the original goal of Colorado's scholarship legislation was to find
it unconstitutional.
Part I of this Comment discusses the inherent tension between the
Religion Clauses, and summarizes the competing approaches employed
to analyze Establishment Clause cases. Part II reviews the Court's at1. 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008).
2.
Id. at 1250-51. The scholarships include: Colorado Leveraging Education Assistant
Partnership Program; Supplemental Leveraging Education Assistant Partnership Program; Colorado
Student Grants; Colorado Work Study; and College Opportunity Fund. These scholarships are
administered by the Colorado Commission on Higher Education. Id.at 1250.
3.
Id.at 1251.
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tempt at creating an enduring standard in Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 as well as
how the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine fits into the Lemon Test. Part
III documents the beginnings of change in Establishment Clause inter5
pretation as displayed by Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
6
and Agostini v. Felton. Part IV reviews the landmark decision of Mitchell v. Helms, 7 where the Court explicitly "buried" the "pervasively
sectarian" doctrine. Part V analyzes the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the
Establishment Clause after Mitchell, which exemplifies the pervasively
sectarian debacle. Part VI concludes that the chaotic state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence reflects the insuperable conflict inherent in
the language of the Religion Clauses and calls for a constitutional
amendment to define the boundary of government interaction with religion.
I. THE INHERENT TENSION IN THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. An Amendment Divided CannotStand
The Religion Clauses, encompassing the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause, state: "Congress shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
,8 While the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause share
in the protection of religious freedom, the language employed to create
that protection often places them in tension. 9 For example, a prison
broadcast of religious programming on inmates' televisions may be
viewed as the government establishing religion, while failure to provide
such programming may be viewed as denying inmates the right to exercise their religion freely. 10 Chief Justice Burger described the language
of the Religion clauses as "at best opaque,"'1 and candidly acknowledged
that the Court "can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible
government activity in this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.,,12

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

403 U.S. 602 (1971).
509 U.S. 1 (1993).
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

9.

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1182-83

(3d ed. 2006) ("Government actions to facilitate free exercise might be challenged as impermissible
establishments, and government efforts to refrain from establishing religion might be objected to as
denying the free exercise of religion."). Chief Justice Burger echoed this sentiment when he noted
that "[t]he Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
10. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1183 (using a military chaplain example to describe
the inherent struggle between the two clauses).
11.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
12.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
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While the constitutional language and the exact boundaries of government action may be unclear, there are two general guidelines that the
Supreme Court has been consistent in upholding. First, early in American jurisprudence, the Court rejected the argument that every form of
public financial aid to religious institutions violates the Religion Clauses.' 3 The Supreme Court has stood by this notion that "[i]nteraction between church and state is inevitable, and [the Court has] always tolerated
some level of involvement between the two.' 14 Second, the Court has
also made clear that the Establishment Clause "means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.' ' 15 These
two guidelines place a large fence around the Establishment Clause. On
one end, the Government is forbidden from creating a state church, and
on the other end, the Government must provide general welfare (police,
fire, sanitation) to religious institutions. While this fence provides some
guidance, there is still too much room for interpretation, and the Court
has struggled with drawing a hard line.
B. Lost in Interpretation
The Supreme Court's inability to "establish a clear or practical constitutional standard"' 16 results in uncertainty for lower courts.' 7 While the
Justices appear to agree on the general concept of "separation of church
and state," the variety of approaches employed to define the proper degree of separation represent the underlying discord. 18 In fact, Establishment Clause jurisprudence appears so convoluted that scholars and
commentators disagree as to the correct number of approaches. 19 According to the most liberal counting, six approaches materialize from the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence: (1) Separation; (2)
13.
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298 (1899) ("That the influence of any particular
church may be powerful over the members of a non-sectarian and secular corporation, incorporated
for a certain defined purpose and with clearly stated powers, is surely not sufficient to convert such a
corporation into a religious or sectarian body.").
14.
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (citation omitted).
15.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
16.
Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment
ClauseAnalysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503, 534 (1990).
17.
David Felsen, Comment, Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis:
Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 395, 413 (1989) ("Lower courts lack certainty in
determining which doctrinal viewpoint to apply in the Lemon analysis."); see also Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 804 (2000) ("The case's tortuous history over the next 15 years indicates well
the degree to which our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted in recent times, while nevertheless retaining anomalies with which the lower courts have had to struggle.").
18.

JOHN WrrrE,JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 188 (2d

ed. 2005) ("The only 'first principle' that the Court has consistently invoked is that of 'separation of
church and state,' .... [Tihe Court has developed a number of unique, and often sharply juxtaposed,
approaches.").
19.
Compare CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1192-93, 1196 (describing three approaches: (1)
strict separation; (2) neutrality; and (3) accommodation/equality), and Rezai, supra note 16, at 50716, 521-25 (describing three approaches: (1) strict separation; (2) accommodation; and (3) flexible
accommodation), with WrTE JR, supra note 18, at 188 (outlining six approaches: (1) "separationism"; (2) "accomodationism"; (3) neutrality; (4) endorsement; (5) coercion; and (6) equal treatment).
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Accommodation; (3) Neutrality; (4) Endorsement; (5) Coercion; and (6)
Equal Treatment. However, both Endorsement and Equal Treatment
appear to be mere tests used to assess Neutrality. Therefore, this Comment proposes four distinct approaches:
1. Separation
Separation promotes the notion that "to the greatest extent possible
government and religion should be separated. 2 ° Justice Jackson, writing
for the dissent in Everson, echoed Thomas Jefferson's metaphor of a wall
separating church and state 21 by declaring that any form of public aid
was forbidden under the First Amendment.2 2 Everson itself takes a moderate separationist approach by holding that the challenged government
action-reimbursing sectarian student's parents for bus transportationwas permissible.23
2. Accommodation
The second approach to Establishment Clause interpretation has
been termed "Accommodation." Under this theory, the Court should
"recognize the importance of religion in society and accommodate its
presence in government., 24 The Accomodation approach has its roots in
the eighteenth-century Puritan and Civic Republican groups.
The
Court in Zorach v. Clausen first articulated the Accommodation approach by upholding the constitutionality of a New York regulation that
allowed for the early release of students in order to attend religious services. 26
While acknowledging the ideal of separation of church and state,
the Zorach Court rejected the notion that church and state are to be separated in all situations.2 7 The Court's reasoning centered around the tradi20.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1192.
21. Id. (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a
Comm. of the Danbury Baptist Assoc. (Jan. 1, 1802), in WRrTINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984)). The majority also uses Jefferson's metaphor. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330
U.S. 1,18 (1947) ("The First Amendment has erected a wall of separation between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach."). However, the majority's holding-affirming the constitutionality of the reimbursement of bus fare for
sectarian school children-appears to contradict the spirit of this Jeffersonian rhetoric. See id.at 18.
22.
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 26-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("The Amendment's purpose ... was to create a complete and permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public
aid or support for religion.").
23.
See id. at 18.
24.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1196.
25.
WrrrE JR., supra note 18, at 191. Founders representing these groups argued that governments "must support some form of public religion, some common morals and mores to undergird
and support the plurality of protected private religions." Id.
26.
343 U.S. 306, 308 & n.1, 315 (1952); see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3210 (McKinney

2009).
27.
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312 ("The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and
all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State .... Otherwise the state and religion
would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.").
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tional acceptance of religion in our society. 28 Thus, five years after the
separationist decision in Everson, the Court turned to a contrasting accommodationist approach.
3. Neutrality
After creating two competing approaches, the Court fell to the middle road with the principle of Neutrality. Under the Neutrality approach,
the First Amendment requires that government be neutral towards religion. The shared principle of Neutrality existed in both the separationist
Everson decision, as well as the accommodationist Zorach decision.2 9
Neutrality represented an attempt at an integrated,
consistent standard,
30
Kurtzman.
v.
Lemon
in
manifested
first
and was
While the test put forth in Lemon stands as the accepted test to determine neutrality, three competing tests have emerged to assess a regulation's neutrality. First, some Justices favor establishing neutrality
through a "symbolic endorsement test"-whether a reasonable person
passing by the religious symbol would conclude that the government is
endorsing religion. 31 Even among those advancing the symbolic endorsement
test, disputes arise as to the proper perspective from which to
32
apply it.
The second competing test to establish neutrality is Equal Treatment. Similar to Endorsement, Equal Treatment can be viewed as a
measure of neutrality. In certain situations, Endorsement would prohibit
government funding or alliances with religion because it may give the
appearance of government advancing religion. However, Equal Treatment "allow[s] such funding and alliances so long as nonreligious parties
similarly situated receive comparable treatment., 33 On a practical level,
Equal Treatment has some appeal because it creates neutrality between
aid given to religious and secular institutions. Yet, we must still be wary
28. The Court supports the traditionalism argument by noting the religious nature of our
country, and that, "[wihen the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions." Id. at 313-14.
29.
Compare Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("[The First]
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers .... State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religion, than it is to favor
them."), with Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 ("The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects.").
30.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
31.
See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,763-64 (1995).
32. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1194-95 (discussing the contrasting views of the Justices
in what government actions constitute "symbolic endorsement" of religion). Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Thomas reject the symbolic endorsement test. See id. at 1195. Justices
O'Connor, Souter and Breyer believe the symbolic endorsement test should be applied from an
informed reasonable person standard, while Justices Stevens and Ginsburg believe that Justice
O'Connor enhances the reasonable person standard, and the test should be considered from the
perspective of a tort law reasonable person standard. Id. at 1194-95.
33.
WTrE JR, supra note 18, at 199.

1096

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

of the dangers that lurk upon such a slippery path. The Constitution bars
more than the establishment of religion; it bars laws "respecting" the
establishment of religion. Therefore, even a foot in the door towards an
establishment of religion can be unconstitutional.
Finally, the most recent method used to assess neutrality is based
upon determining whether government funds were channeled through an
individual, and therefore, whether the allocation of those funds to any
institution was the complete private and independent choice of the individual. If government funds wind up in a pervasively sectarian institution, it was the individual's choice and, as such, the government has not
aided that institution.
4. Coercion
The Coercion approach goes beyond accommodation and endorsement by finding a violation of the Establishment Clause only when government action effectively coerces people to "support or participate in
any religion or its exercise ...

Perhaps the clearest articulation of

the coercion approach occurred in the majority's opinion in Lee v. Weisman.35 In Lee, the Court confronted a case involving a high school principal who invited a rabbi to pray at the high school graduation.16 The
Court found that the principal's actions violated the Establishment
Clause, and based its finding on the inherently impressionable nature of
elementary and high school students.3 7 Elementary and high school aged
children are impressionable, and when effectively forced to attend a
graduation ceremony that mandates prayer, a coercive environment has
been created. a
These vastly differing approaches to Establishment Clause interpretation leave lower courts, and legislatures, to guess at which approach
will prevail on any given statutory challenge.3 9 One commentator aptly
described the situation by stating that, "[b]y 1985, these cases ... began
40

increasingly to 'partake of the prolixity' of a bizarre byzantine code."

Commentators are not the only ones left perplexed; even Chief Justice Rehnquist displayed frustration at the current state of the law:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend
maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State may
34.

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989).

35.

505 U.S. 577 (1992).

36. Id. at 581.
Id. at 592.
37.
Id. ("As we have observed before, there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom
38.
of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.").
39. Felsen, supra note 17, at 419 ("The Supreme Court's failure to adopt one clear doctrinal
viewpoint has resulted in inconsistencies at all levels of constitutional adjudication.").
40. WITTE JR, supra note 18, at 210.

2009]

COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY V. WEAVER

1097

lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a
film of George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history
class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend
workbooks in which the
parochial school children write, thus render41
ing them nonreusable.
II. SETTING THE GROUND RULES: LEMON V. KURTZMAN

42

The Court's 1971 decision in Lemon attempted to create an integrated standard by distilling a three prong test, the "Lemon Test," from
previous opinions.43 The Lemon Test, while modified in Agostini, has
for more than three decades remained the only formal standard of review
for claims arising under the Establishment Clause. 44 Yet this broad analytical framework, much like the initial fence created in Bradfield, left
room for too much "play in the joints'A5 and wound up allowing the
competing approaches of the Justices to dictate the outcome of the case.
A. Background: The Pre-Lemon Cases
1. Everson v. Board of Educationof Ewing Township4
Everson presented the Court with the first opportunity to decide an
Establishment Clause claim brought against a state government. The
application of the First Amendment to states through the Fourteenth
Amendment facilitated the Court's examination of a New Jersey statute.
The New Jersey statute provided funds to reimburse parents of private
school children for bus fare to the school. While the tenor of the opinion
exuded separationism, the Court found that the New Jersey statute failed
to breach the wall between church and state. 47 The Court classified the
busing reimbursement as public welfare, and analogized it to providing
police, fire, and sanitation services to churches.4 8 Yet, neutrality rhetoric
managed to sneak into an ostensibly separationist opinion. 49 Even at the
advent of Establishment Clause cases induced by state action, the Court
failed to provide a uniform standard, as evidenced by the undermining of

41.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
42. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
43. Id. at 612-13.
44. WITrE JR, supra note 18, at 188. While the Lemon Test stands as the only formal standard of review, the individual Justices have developed a myriad of approaches to adjudicating cases
under this test, including "separationism," "accommodationsim," neutrality, endorsement, coercion,
and equal treatment. Id.
45. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664,669 (1970).
46. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
47. Id. at 18.
48. Id. at 17-18.
49.
Id. at 18.
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the majority's proclamations of strict separation by an outcome that promotes neutrality.5 °
2. Walz v. Tax Commission of New York5'
The next milestone on the journey towards Lemon stemmed from
New York's tax laws. In Walz, a real estate owner brought suit against
the state of New York claiming that a state statute exempting religious
organizations from paying property tax violated the Establishment
Clause.52 While adhering to a separationist approach, the language used
by the Court in stating the standard displayed the underlying uncertainty
in the proper analysis. Justice Burger mixed the phrase "room for play in
the joints" with separationist rhetoric in laying forth the applicable standard. He inserted this ambiguous language for fear of imposing too rigid
a standard.5 3 This simple phrase, "room for play in the joints," reinforces
the move away from consistency and towards subjective judicial discretion. However, as a precursor to the Lemon Test, the Court identified the
importance of the purpose and effect of government action.5 4
B. Facts of Lemon
In 1968, Pennsylvania passed the Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act,55 which authorized the superintendent to purchase
specific secular educational materials for nonpublic schools. These materials included secular textbooks, actual expenditures for teachers' salaries, and other instructional material. A year later, Rhode Island passed
the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, 56 which provided public funds
to supplement nonpublic school teachers' salaries.57
C. The Lemon Test
In setting a standard to analyze this case, the Court drew upon prior
decisions to focus its interpretation and create a lasting standard: (1) the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the statute's principal
or primary effect must be one that neither enhances or inhibits religion;
50.
Justice Jackson's dissent chastised the majority for such doublespeak. Id. at 19 (Jackson,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their
commingling in educational matters."). Justice Jackson's sentiments foreshadowed the difficult road
ahead.
51.
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
52.
Id. at 666.
53.
Id. at 669 ("[Rligidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions .....
54.
Justice Burger frames the question by asking "whether particular acts in question are
intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so."
Id. (emphasis added).
55.
24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5608 (repealed 1977).
56.
R.L GEN. LAWS §§ 16-51-1 to -9 (repealed 1980).
57.
The Rhode Island statute limited the aid to supplementing salaries of teachers who taught
secular subjects, and such supplements could not elevate a private school teacher's salary above that
of a public school teacher. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971).
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and (3) the statute
must not foster an excessive government entanglement
58
with religion.
1. Secular Purpose
The first prong is at best an academic exercise for the statute's proponents. Showing the existence of a secular purpose merely requires the
proponent of the statute to imagine any possible secular goal served by a
particular statute. 9 In the case of Lemon, both Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island argued that the statute served the secular purpose of improving
secular education at both public and private schools. 60 This broad legislative purpose satisfied the Court, which explicitly noted the importance
of imparting deference to legislatures.61
2. Secular Effect
The secular effect prong of the Lemon Test provides for greater
analysis than the secular purpose inquiry. The Court frames the question
as whether the government action "will in part have the effect of advancing [or inhibiting] religion., 62 In Lemon, the Court forwent deciding the
effect question, and instead rested its analysis on an excessive entanglement of government and religion.
3. No Excessive Entanglement
In order to determine whether the government has created an excessive entanglement with religion, courts must consider (1) "the character
and purposes of the institutions that are benefited," (2) "the nature of the
aid that the State provides," and (3) "the resulting
relationship between
63
the government and the religious authority.,
It is under the first consideration of the entanglement inquiry that
we find the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine. The term "Pervasively Sectarian" was coined by Justice Powell when he stated:
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, for the plurality, concluded that despite
some institutional rhetoric, none of the four colleges was pervasively
sectarian, but held open that possibility for future cases: "Individual
projects can be properly evaluated if and when challenges arise with

58.
Id. at 612-13.
59.
Rezai, supra note 16, at 518.
60.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
61.
Id. at 613 ("As in Allen, we find nothing here that undermines the stated legislative intent;
it must therefore be accorded appropriate deference.").
62.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971).
63.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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respect to particular recipients and some evidence is then presented' 64to
show that the institution does in fact possess these characteristics."
The Court in Lemon found that providing aid to a school whose religious nature is so pervasive that there can be no distinction between
secular and sectarian education was unconstitutional.6 5 Thus, Lemon
cemented the Pervasively Sectarian doctrine as a pillar of the entanglement inquiry.
In observance of Lemon, Colorado's legislature, hoping to provide
as many students as possible with aid for college, drafted the requirements for its publicly funded scholarships. Those requirements confunds to stutained a provision prohibiting disbursement of scholarship
66
dents who attended "pervasively sectarian" institutions.

I1. WINDS OF CHANGE: ZOBREST, AGOSTINI, AND "PRIVATE CHOICE"
Zobrest and Agostini set the stage for the eventual dissolution of the
"pervasively sectarian" doctrine. Zobrest displayed the Court's newfound silence on the "pervasively sectarian" issue. Agostini modified the
Lemon Test by folding the entanglement inquiry into the effect prong.
Zobrest's silence weakened the precedent backing "pervasively sectarian" analysis, and Agostini's modification weakened the power of the
"pervasively sectarian" inquiry by rendering excessive entanglement no
longer dispositive, but merely a factor used to analyze secular effect.
A. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District

67

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)68 provides
federal funding "to ensure that educators and parents have the necessary
tools to improve educational results for children with disabilities ....
James Zobrest had been deaf since birth, and when James attended a
public junior high school, the State provided him with a sign-language
interpreter.70 The case arose when, at the beginning of high school,
James enrolled at Salpointe Catholic High School, a sectarian institution.7 1 When James requested that the school district furnish him with an
interpreter at his new school, his request was denied.7 2
64. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (emphasis added) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 682 (1970)).
65. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616 ("The substantial religious character of these church-related
schools gives rise to entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to
avoid.").
66. CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-3.5-102(3)(b), -3.3-101(3)(d), -3.7-102(3)(f), -18-102(9)
(West 2009).
67. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
68. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1490 (West 2009).
69.
§ 1400(d)(3).
70. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
71.
Id.
72. Id.
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In explaining neutrality through private choice, the Court shifted its
focus from the nature of the institution to the way in which the institution
received the funding. Essentially, the question became whether the government directly or indirectly provided the aid. The Court determined
that because the government provided aid to the student, and it was his or
her (or his or her parent's) private choice where to use that aid, that the
government was not violating the Establishment Clause.
By settling upon private choice as the correct test by which to
measure neutrality, Zobrest not only declined to entertain the "pervasively sectarian" nature of the new school, but also discarded the use of the
endorsement test. This case presented a situation where placing a government employee in a sectarian school presented a symbolic union between the government and the school. The Court unsatisfactorily addressed (1) the very real appearance that the government was in union
with the institution by nature of providing a government employee at a
sectarian school, and (2) the fact that the government employee would be
relaying religious messages. The only on-point response mustered by the
Court was unconvincing; "the Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school. 73
B. Agostini v. Felton: 74 Folding the Entanglement Inquiry into the Effect
Inquiry
Agostini involved a reconsideration of the Court's prior decision in
Aguilar v. Felton,75 which prohibited New York from "sending public
school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education to
disadvantaged children .... 76 While acknowledging that Lemon still
controlled the inquiry, the Court modified its "understanding of the crite77
ria used to assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect.,
This modification "simplified" the Lemon Test by folding the entanglement prong into the effect prong. This change diluted the strength of the
entanglement inquiry by transforming a dispositive
issue into merely one
78
of several factors used to assess secular effect.
Practically, this modification permitted the Court to abandon the
presumption that sending state-paid teachers to sectarian schools inevitably results in "the impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination
or constitutes a symbolic union between government and religion. 79
These words exemplify the consequence of the modification of the "per73.
74.

Id. at 13.
521 U.S. 203 (1997).

75.

473 U.S. 402 (1985).

76.

Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208.

77. Id. at 223.
78.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000) ("[W]e therefore recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect.").
79. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223.
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vasively sectarian" doctrine. By downgrading the importance of the entanglement inquiry, the Court effectively weakened the "pervasively
sectarian" standard.
IV. BREAKING DOWN THE WALL: MITCHELL V. HELMS8 °

With the stage set, Mitchell employed the neutrality approach to explicitly bury the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine. Mitchell represented
the endpoint in the Supreme Court's journey towards full subjectivity. 8
Such subjectivity is an impermissible use of the Court's authority, and
has transformed our highest court into "a national theology board. 82
A. Factual Background
Under the Education and Consolidation Act of 1981,83 federal funds
were provided to state educational agencies to improve elementary and
secondary education. These funds were distributed by Local Educational
Authorities ("LEAs") to both public and private schools. 84 Religious
private schools were among the schools qualified to receive federal
funds. However, in an attempt to prevent any possible inference of government sponsorship of religion, the statute included two safeguards.
First, all "services, materials, and equipment" supplied to the schools
was required to be "secular, neutral, and nonideological. 8 5 Second, private schools were required to apply for educational equipment and, if
approved, the equipment was loaned-not given-to the school. 86 Despite these safeguards, opponents of the funding program challenged the
legislation as a violation of the Establishment Clause, based upon the
large percentage of sectarian private schools receiving aid.87
B. The End of the "Pervasively Sectarian" Doctrine
The plurality opinion provided four justifications for burying the
"pervasively sectarian" doctrine. First, the relevance of the doctrine in
precedent cases was in "sharp decline., 88 The doctrine had not been used
to strike down an aid program since the 1985 decisions Aguilar and
Ball.89 Indeed, the Court failed to even mention the "pervasively sectarian" doctrine in an establishment case decided a mere one year after Ball
80. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
81.
See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) ('The standards should rather be
viewed as guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the Religion Clauses
have been impaired.").
82. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
83. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 7301-7373 (West 2009).
84. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802.
85. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7217a(a)(1)(A)(i).
86. 20 U.S.C.A. § 7217a(a)(3), (c)(1).
87. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 803-04.
88. Id. at 826.
89. Id.
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and Aguilar.90 Finally, Agostini and Zobrest had upheld aid aimed at
"pervasively sectarian" elementary and secondary schools. 91
Second, the Court shifted its emphasis to the private choice of the
individuals, and away from the nature of the institution.9 2 The Court
argued that in a situation where private choice dictates which institutions
receive government funds, the pervasively sectarian entity had not received any special favor from the government.93
Third, the inquiry into the recipient's religious views to determine
whether a school was pervasively sectarian was "not only unnecessary
but also offensive.
glement issues.95

94

Such an inquiry raised serious excessive entan-

Finally, the Court pointed to the bigoted history of hostility towards
pervasively sectarian schools. Opposition to aiding sectarian schools
began in the 1870s, when Congress considered passing the Blaine
Amendment. 96 Promoted by Protestant legislators, the Blaine Amendment would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to sectarian
("code for 'Catholic"') institutions. 97 "In short," the Court concluded,
"nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs, and other
doctrines of this Court bar it. This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be
buried now.

98

V. A POST-MITCHELL LANDSCAPE: COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY V.
WEAVER

The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Weaver represents the consequence of the discretionary precedent set by Mitchell. Mitchell's exchange of the "pervasively sectarian" for a private choice analysis completely erodes any consistency in the standards for evaluating Establishment claims. Weaver's procedural posture and analysis displayed confusion at both the district and appellate levels, and its holding reflects the
confusion faced by state legislatures.

90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 827.
92.
Id. ("[Tlhe religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitutional analysis,
so long as the recipient adequately furthers the government's secular purpose.").
93.
Id. ("If a program offers permissible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the a religious, and the irreligious, it is a mystery which view of religion the government has
established, and thus a mystery what the constitutional violation would be.").
94.
Id. at 828.
95.
Id. ("[C]ourts should refrain from trolling through a person's or institution's religious
beliefs.").
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 829.
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A. Facts
Colorado provided scholarships to eligible students who attend any
accredited college in the state (public or private, secular or religious) so
long as that institution was not deemed "pervasively sectarian" by government officials. 99 The relevant provision had been interpreted, by the
Colorado Commission on Higher Education, to require the fulfillment of
six enumerated criteria: (1) the faculty and students are not exclusively
of one religious persuasion; (2) there is no required attendance at religious convocations or services; (3) there is a strong commitment to principles of academic freedom; (4) there are no required courses in religion
or theology that tend to indoctrinate or proselytize; (5) the governing
board does not reflect nor is the membership limited to persons of any
particular religion; and (6) funds do not come primarily or predominantly
from sources advocating a particular religion.1 °
Colorado Christian University ("CCU") applied to participate in the
financial aid programs in September, 2003. A financial aid officer became skeptical of the application, and upon further review the Commission concluded that CCU failed three of the six criteria. First, the Commission concluded CCU's courses impermissibly indoctrinated the
school's students. 1 1 Second, CCU's board of trustees reflected a single
religion. 10 2 Third, the university impermissibly required attendance at
religious ceremonies. 10 3 The Commission rejected CCU's application, as
well as the application of Naropa University, but provided funding to
Regis University and University of Denver, both of which are religiously
affiliated1 °4 Therefore, the Commission drew a line between sectarian
schools and "pervasively" sectarian schools. 10 5
B. ProceduralPosture
After being denied by the Commission, CCU brought suit alleging
that the funding statutes, and subsequent Commission action, violated the
Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses."' 6 The district court granted summary judgment for the state defendants. Confused
as to the proper standard to apply, the district court settled upon rational
99.

Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).

100.

Id. at 1250-51.

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id.
While the opinion clearly paints the University of Denver ("DU") as a Methodist Institu-

tion, DU's affiliation with the Methodist church is more complex. The Colorado Constitution recognizes the school as "Denver Seminary," and the school does boast a Theological Graduate Program. However, as the University Chaplain explains, "there is (as far as I can tell) NO tight connec-

tion. In this way, DU is like Northwestern, Syracuse, USC, and others that have a Methodist heritage, but not necessarily a tight linkage." E-mail from Gary R. Brower, University Chaplain, University of Denver, to author (Mar. 25, 2009, 19:01 MST) (on file with author).
105.
Id. at 1258.
106.
Id. at 1253.
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basis for adjudicating the Free Exercise argument, and heightened scrutiny for the Establishment and Equal Protection Clause arguments.1 7 In
finding for the state, the district court allowed the government to justify
its impermissible violation of the Establishment Clause through its interest in "vindicating its state constitution. ,,108
C. The Tenth Circuit'sAnalysis
The Tenth Circuit's analysis in Weaver can best be described as disjointed. The court began by seeking answers in recent Supreme Court
1°9
precedent, which it interpreted as a statement of legislative discretion.
Emboldened by this interpretation, the Tenth Circuit included a heightened scrutiny analysis within the Lemon framework. Yet, wary of presenting too radical an analysis, the Tenth Circuit coupled the heightened
scrutiny analysis with the accepted neutrality approach.
1. A Stepping Stone: Locke v. Davey"
Locke represents the most recent decision by the Supreme Court addressing the provision of federal funds to religious colleges. Locke reiterated the "private choice" holding in Mitchell."' However, the Court
drew a limiting line by prohibiting the use of a government scholarship
to fund a degree in "devotional theology."
The Commission in Weaver argued that "Locke subjects all 'state
decisions about funding religious education' to no more than a 'rational
basis review.""' 2 The Tenth Circuit replied that Locke does not stand for
a rational basis standard, but rather interprets the decision to promote
"balancing interests."' " 3 Fortunately, the Tenth Circuit did not pursue
this standard, but rather stated, "[w]e need not decide in this case whether such a balancing test is necessary or how it would be conducted," because Locke is distinguishable from Weaver." 4 The court found the two
cases distinguishable because (1) the Colorado statute expressly discriminates among religions by permitting "sectarian" schools to receive aid,
but not those schools that are "pervasively sectarian," and (2) the characterization as "sectarian" or "pervasively sectarian" entails intrusive go107.

ld.

108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 1254.
110.
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
Id. at 719 (stating that "pervasively sectarian" colleges are not necessarily prohibited from
111.
receiving government funds, because the "link between government funds and religious training is
broken by the independent and private choice of recipients").
112.
Weaver, 534 F.3d at 1254-55 (quoting Brief of Appellees at 33, Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245
(No. 07-1247), 2007 WL 4778873).
113.
Id. at 1255-56 ('"The Court's language [in Locke] suggests the need for balancing interests: its holding that 'minor burden[s]' and 'milder' forms of 'disfavor' are tolerable in service of
'historic and substantial state interest[s]' implies that major burdens and categorical exclusions from
public benefits might not be permitted in service of lesser or less long-established governmental
ends." (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720, 725 (2004))).
114. Id. at 1256.
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vernmental scrutiny into religious beliefs and practices. 1 5 While the
Tenth Circuit rejected the balancing test, it did borrow the notion of legislative discretion from the opinion. 116
2. Discriminating Among and Within Religions
Responding to CCU's argument that the Colorado statute impermissibly discriminated among religions, the State provided three arguments. First, the Commission argued that "Colorado's law . . . distinguishes not between types of religions, but between types of institutions.' 17 Second, the Commission argued that "discriminatory funding
is permissible because the State is entitled to discriminate in spending
legislation in ways that it could not if legislating directly."" 8 Third, the
Commission assumed that discrimination in favor of some religions is
permissible as long as the discrimination is not based on "animus." '1 19
In response to the first argument by the Commission, the court discussed discrimination among religions, a discussion which centered on
120
the preferential treatment of some religious institutions over others.
The court began by addressing the purpose of the Colorado statute, and
found that the "sole function and purpose of the challenged provisions of
Colorado law. . . is to exclude some but not all religious institutions...
,,121 Instead of determining whether the purpose was secular, the Court
122
stated that this case is subject to "heightened constitutional scrutiny."
Yet, the Tenth Circuit did not follow a heightened scrutiny analysis.
Rather, it proceeded to discuss the abolishment of the "pervasively
secta123
rian" doctrine in the Supreme Court as well as in other circuits.
Second, the Commission argued that "discriminatory funding is
permissible because the State is entitled to discriminate in spending legislation in ways that it could not if legislating directly." 124 The State attempted to parallel government funding choices pertaining to religious
institutions with government funding choices pertaining to healthcare
funding for both abortion and childbirth. 125 The Court did not accept this

115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 1254 ("There is room for legislative discretion. Locke is the Supreme Court's most
recent and explicit recognition of that discretion.").
117.
Brief of Appellees at 51, Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (No. 07-1247), 2007 WL 4778873.
118.
Weaver, 534 F.3d at 1259.
119. Id. at 1260.
120. Id. at 1259.
121.
Id. at 1258 (citations omitted).
122. Id.
123.
Id. at 1258-59.
124.
Id. at 1259.
125.
Id. at 1259-60 (discussing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-318 (1980), and Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)).
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analogy: "The right to choose abortion is a right to be free of undue ' bur126
dens; the right to religious liberty is a right to government neutrality."
Finally, the Commission argued that it may discriminate in favor of
some religions and against others so long as the discrimination was not
based on "animus" against a religion. The Tenth Circuit replied that
while it is certainly necessary that a regulation not be motivated by animus, it is not sufficient to keep
the law constitutional merely because it
127
was not motivated by animus.
3. Intrusive Religious Inquiry: Entanglement Discussion
The Lemon Test came back to life in the final section of the Tenth
Circuit's opinion. After using neutrality and heightened scrutiny to
move through the purpose prong, the court analyzed the effect prong by
focusing on the prohibition of "excessive entanglement" between religion and government. 128
The Tenth Circuit found two entanglement issues pertaining to the
challenged Colorado provision. First, and most potentially intrusive, was
the requirement that the Commission staff "decide whether any theology
courses required by the university 'tend to indoctrinate or proselytize. ' ' ' 129 The court focused on the reasons for disqualifying CCU as a
proper recipient of funds. The court appeared concerned with the
amount of discretion being placed in the hands of a government official
to decide the religious nature of the applicant. 130 For example, the
Commission ' ' was
left free to define such words as "indoctrinate" and
"proselytize. 131
Even more intrusive than defining the terms by which to measure an
institution's religious practice was the actual measurement of those practices. The court noted that inquiries of such an intrusive nature have
"long been condemned by the Supreme Court."' 32 Moreover, the Tenth

126.
Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 177 (2004), quoted in
Weaver, 534 F.3d at 1260.
127.
Weaver, 534 F.3d at 1260 ("If First Amendment protections were limited to 'animus,' the
government could favor religions that are traditional, that are comfortable, or whose mores are
compatible with the State, so long as it does not act out of overt hostility to the others.").
128.
Id. at 1261 ("Properly understood, the doctrine protects religious institutions from govemmental monitoring or second-guessing of their religious beliefs and practices, whether as a
condition to receiving benefits.., or as a basis for regulation or exclusion from benefits .....
129.
Id. (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-3.5-105(l)(d) (2008)).
130.
See id. at 1261.
131.
Id. at 1262.
132.
Id. ("The prospect of church and state litigating in court about what does or does not have
religious meaning touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee against religious establishment." (citing New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977))).
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Circuit noted that133the subjective nature of such an assessment was susceptible to abuse.
The second intrusive entanglement issue presented by the challenged Colorado law was the assessment of the religious affiliation of the
board of trustees. The Tenth Circuit rightly took issue with government
officials determining what a Catholic, Jewish, or Muslim "policy" on
education would look like. Such an inquiry involves the government
official making conclusions about religion that they are34not able to make
without excessively entangling themselves in religion.'
4. Governmental Interest
The court ended its analysis by discussing the government's interest. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit validated the use of heightened scrutiny in Establishment Clause adjudication. The court assumed, based upon
Supreme Court precedent, that heightened scrutiny should be used as the
analysis for non-entanglement Establishment Clause issues. The Tenth
Circuit stated that "Establishment Clause violations, by contrast, are
usually flatly forbidden without reference to the strength of governmental purposes. 135 Then, using Larson as its base, which the court admitted stood "alone among Establishment Clause cases," the Tenth Circuit
concluded that "statutes involving discrimination on the basis of religion,
including interdenominational discrimination, are subject to heightened
scrutiny... aris[ing] under the... Establishment Clause... while those
involving other Establishment Clause issues, such as excessive entanglement, are unconstitutional without further inquiry."' 36 After stating
the court's proclivity for heightened scrutiny, the court failed to employ
it because
it stated that the Commission "scarcely has any justification at
137
all."
D. A HeightenedScrutiny of the Tenth Circuit'sAnalysis
The Tenth Circuit's confusion over the proper standard became apparent when the court began discussing strict scrutiny. Essentially, discrimination based on religion or between religions will be analyzed using
strict scrutiny whether arising under the Free Exercise Clause (Lukumi);
Establishment Clause (Larson); or Equal Protection Clause (Locke). Yet,
understanding that Lemon is the "enduring standard," the Tenth Circuit
conceded that statutes involving other Establishment clause issues, such
as excessive entanglement, are unconstitutional without further inquiry.
133.
Id. at 1262-63 ("The line drawn by the Colorado statute, between 'indoctrination' and
mere education, is highly subjective and susceptible to abuse.... The First Amendment does not
permit government officials to sit as judges of the 'indoctrination' quotient of theology classes.").
134. Id. at 1263.
135.
Id. at 1266.
136.
Id. (citations omitted).
137.
Id. at 1267.
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So which is it? By "other Establishment Clause issues,'' 138 is the court
referring to the three prongs of the Lemon Test? The truth is that the
opinion is not clear exactly what standard is to be applied to the variety
of issues present in such an Establishment Clause interpretation.
It appears as though the Tenth Circuit knew that this statutory provision was unconstitutional based upon the death of the "pervasively
sectarian" doctrine in Mitchell. However, the court's outcomedeterminative analysis produced a soup of standards, and reflected a very
real confusion as to how they should proceed. The opinion referenced
rational basis, heightened scrutiny, the Lemon Test, and even a balancing
test. However, the court never really fully developed any cogent analysis, but instead picked certain aspects of each standard to shoot down the
Commission's arguments.
Perhaps the confusion in Weaver was best revealed during the discussion of heightened scrutiny. The court used one Supreme Court case
as precedent for its bold assertion, but in the same sentence admitted the
singleness of that opinion.1 39 In application, such a standard would allow
the government to justify its actions, and place the decision of whether
the government's interest is "compelling" in the hands of a judge. That
dynamic leads to the government judging its own actions against a discretionary standard, instead of against a consistent predictable rule.
VI. AN APPEAL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
When creating the Constitution, our forefathers traded oppression
for freedom. Imbedded within the general idea of freedom is a desire for
religious freedom. 14° The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise
Clause stand as twin manifestations of that desire.1 41 Yet, the sublime
language carefully chosen to guard that freedom has placed far too much
discretion with the Supreme Court. 142 The Supreme Court Justices, as a
microcosm of society as a whole, view this language through six differing, and often competing, lenses. 143 Such discord within the nation's
138.
139.

Id. at 1266.
Id. (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982)).

140.

JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING

OF A NATION 84 (2006) ("[T]he nation was not 'Christian' but rather a place of people whose experience with religious violence and the burdens of established churches led them to view religious
liberty as one of humankind's natural rights-a right as natural and as significant as those of thought
and expression.").
141.
As John Quincy Adams stated, "Civil liberty can be established on no foundation of
human reason which will not at the same time demonstrate the right to religious freedom ......
Letter from John Quincy Adams to Richard C. Anderson (May 27, 1823), in 7 WRITINGS OF JOHN
QuiNcy ADAMS 1820-1823, at 466 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1917).
142.
This is not to say that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not agree upon the purpose of
the Clauses, but rather they approach its meaning in different ways. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I think it relevant to face up to the fact that
it is far easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the First Amendment's Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their application.").
143.
Sees discussion supra Part I.B.
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highest court has clouded our understanding and subsequent interpretation of the Religion Clauses. Why are these clauses so difficult to understand? While myriad social, philosophic, theocratic, and political factors
could be contemplated, two complementary and inherent reasons that
conspire to frustrate the Religion Clauses stand out.
First, the nature of religion presents a unique challenge. Religion is
such a personal aspect of human life, whether one is a believer or not,
that it stands closer to our hearts than the other liberties protected by the
Bill of Rights. 44 History is pockmarked with drastic actions prompted
by religion. Nations go to war over religion, people commit suicide in
the name of religion, and religion ignites revolutions. The same cannot
be said for the right to trial by jury, the right to reasonable search and
seizure, or the right to bear arms.
Second, the language used to protect religion has failed to enlighten
the modem era. The long line of jurisprudence, from Everson to Locke,
makes clear that even our most exalted arbiters find the language of the
Religion Clauses vague and misleading. 45 Such difficulty with the interpretation of the clauses has led directly to confusion among lower
courts and legislatures. Weaver typifies this dilemma by displaying both
the effect of the Supreme Court's confusion on the Colorado Legislature,
as well as the consequence of lower courts using contrasting precedent.
It is often the duty of lawyers to play with language and to interpret
that language to the client's advantage. Whether it is a constitutional
clause, a statutory provision, or an administrative regulation, vague or
general language can be twisted to support differing propositions. When
vague language creeps into a statute, the state or federal legislative body
can amend the statute, and bring greater clarity and understanding to
society. However, we are often loathe to change the language of the
supreme law of the land-our federal Constitution. But should we be so
unwilling to change our Constitution? Chester Antieau echoed this sentiment in his book, A U.S. Constitutionfor the Year 2000: "Although the
individuals who gave us the original Constitution were great thinkers, it
must be understood that they found it perfectly appropriate
for the docu146
ment to be amended whenever the people saw fit."
This does, however, raise the question of which parts of the Constitution need clarity, since all aspects of the Constitution need interpreta144.
See MEACHAM, supra note 140, at 5-6 ("Yet because faith is such an emotional subject for
both believers and nonbelievers, discussion of the question of religion and public life can often be
more divisive than illuminating.").
145.
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 221-22 (2d ed. 1994) ("[T]he Court has managed to unite those who stand at polar
opposites on the results that the Court reaches; a strict separationist and a zealous accommodationist
are likely to agree that the Supreme Court would not recognize an establishment of religion if it took
life and bit the justices.").
146.

CHESTER JAMES ANTJEAU, A U.S. CONSTITUTION FOR THE YEAR 2000, at vii (1995).
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tion, and Justices often argue as to the correct interpretation. Essentially,
what makes the Religion Clauses so special? Certainly the very nature of
religion elevates these clauses, and when coupled with the "opaque" language used to protect religious freedoms, the practicality of a clarifying
amendment becomes clear. Many commentators would dismiss such a
attempt to persuade the Justices that a
drastic measure,
.147
....and would instead
Yet, these commentators miss
is
correct.
solution
specific definition or
the problem. It is not the analysis that is flawed, but the nature of the
Amendment itself. An Amendment that affects our religious freedom by
using broad, malleable language leaves too much to interpretation. The
case law addressing religious freedom screams loudly that now is the
time for change. It is time to bring freedom of religion into the twentyfirst century, and finally clarify what we the people mean by phrases
such as "religious establishment" and "free exercise."
CONCLUSION

Chaos best describes the present state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. This confusion stems from the inherent tension between the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the variety of approaches
created by the Supreme Court to interpret these clauses, and the very
nature of religion itself. The foregoing examination of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence displays the Court's fruitless search for a workable
standard. The failure to create a consistent, workable standard results in
decisions such as Weaver, where lower courts begin to create their own
dysfunctional analysis while staying within the broad framework of the
Lemon Test. One option would be to continue the wild-west showdown
in the Supreme Court and persist on the Court's long journey towards the
prophetical standard. The second option would be to recast the declaration of our religious freedom in clear, contemporary language. The flexible nature of our Constitution not only allows for periodical amendment,
it demands such an amendment when the original language prohibits the
pursuit of justice in the most sacred of liberties.

ChristopherP. Brown*

See, e.g., Rezai, supra note 16, at 536-40 (proposing the "correct" definition and standard
147.
to employ when interpreting the Establishment Clause).
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Chen for his assistance, the Denver University Law Review board for their edits, my wife
Amanda for her enduring love and support, and my father Gregory for his insights and revisions.

GOLAN V. GONZALES AND THE CHANGING BALANCE
BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT, COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION, AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
INTRODUCTION

Copyright lawyers and scholars all over the United States have been
talking about the Tenth Circuit's decision in Golan v. Gonzales.' Lawrence Golan, a nationally recognized symphony orchestra conductor,
teaches and directs at the University of Denver's Lamont School of Music. 2 He, like other plaintiffs in this case, regularly uses works found in
the public domain in the course of his profession, including works
created by foreign composers like Dmitri Shostakovich and Igor Stravinsky.
When Congress passed section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("§ 514"), 4 things changed for people like Mr. Golan. The
Act restored copyright protection to certain foreign works, which Mr.
Golan and the other plaintiffs were either already using from the public
domain or expecting to be released soon into the public domain. The
restored copyright protection of foreign works required plaintiffs to pay
increased performance, rental and royalty fees, which in some cases were
cost prohibitive.6 For example, before the restored protection, Lawrence
Golan could have purchased the sheet music for the Lamont Symphony7
Orchestra to perform Shostakovich's Symphony No. 1 for only $130.
After § 514 restored copyright protection to this piece, the cost of renting
the same music for a single performance increased to $495.8
So, why are scholars and lawyers so interested in the Tenth Circuit's recent decision? For the first time in decades, a federal appeals
court stood in the way of laws that continue to increase copyright protections. 9 Many have been arguing that it is time for the law to check the

1. 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. University of Denver Lamont School of Music, Lawrence Golan Biography,
http://www.du.edu/lamonYLawrenceGolanBiography.htnl (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
3.
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
4.
Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976-81 (1994) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 104A, 109 (West 2009)).
5.
Golan, 501 F.3dat 1182.
6. Id.
7.
Brief of Appellant at 17, Golan, 501 F.3d 1179 (No. 05-1259), 2005 WL 2673976.
8.
Id.
9.
David Nimmer, LexisNexis Expert Commentaries, David Nimmer on the Potential Invalidation of Portions of the Copyright Act Based on a Conflict with the First Amendment in Golan v.
Gonzales2-3 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at LEXIS, 2008 Emerging Issues 908.
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progression of this property right.' As copyright protection increases,
the valuable public domain becomes stagnant." l Because the goal of
copyright protection is progress for the general public, 2 copyright laws
that only protect individual creators no longer serve that purpose. This is
for the broad claim the plaintiffs asserted in the Tenth
the foundation
3
Circuit.'

The Golan plaintiffs' most successful argument, one that was advanced in Eldred v. Ashcroft,'14 posits that there is a boundary for copy-

right protection-a line that Congress cannot cross.15 That boundary is
formed by the "traditional contours of copyright protection.' 6 And the
Golan court recognized that Congress may have crossed the line when it
passed § 514 and restored copyright protection to foreign authors. 17 The
Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the "traditional contours" is at odds with
those of other circuits, including the Ninth and D.C. Circuits.
Many scholars claim this landmark case is a victory for all Americans.'1 It is part of a new course for copyright law, balancing the need
for copyright protection with the First Amendment right to free expression. 19 What complicates this, however, is Congress's reason for passing
§ 514. The statute is a codification of an international agreement with
over 150 nations, and an attempt to harmonize copyright law throughout
the world.2 ° In the agreement, American lawmakers consented to protect
the works of foreign authors, primarily to secure protections for U.S.
authors in the rest of the world. 21 Current technology makes global dissemination of information easy and inexpensive. Therefore, copyright
protection is not easily bound by domestic laws.22
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Golan forces courts and lawmakers
to consider and shape more clearly the delicate balance between copy10.

See, e.g.,

A Big Victory:

Golan v.

Gonzales, http://www.lessig.org/blog/2007/09/

a-bigvictory-golan-vgonzales.html (Sept. 5, 2007, 04:05 PST) [hereinafter Lessig].
11.

See id.

12.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).

13.
14.
15.

See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007).
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182, (holding that the lower court must apply First Amendment

scrutiny, because congressional enactment of § 514 altered the traditional contours of copyright
law). Compare id. at 1889 ("[T]he traditional contours of copyright protection include the principle
that works in the public domain remain there and that § 514 transgresses this critical boundary,"),
with Eldred, 537 U.S. at 265 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In my view, '[t]ext, history, and precedent,'
support both the need to draw lines in general and the need to draw the line here short of [the Copyright Term Extension Act]." (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
16.
Eldred,537 U.S. at 221.
17.
18.
19.

Golan, 501 F.3d at 1195.
See e.g., Lessig, supra note 10.
See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 4.

20.

Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *44 (D. Colo.

Apr. 20, 2005).
21.
See id.
22.
See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, THOMAS COTrER & FRANCIS GURRY, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 1-2 (2007).
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right protection, First Amendment freedom, and America's relationship
to the rest of the world. 23 Now that lower courts must answer new questions and follow new instructions to apply First Amendment scrutiny to §
514,24 many scholars have and continue to postulate what will and what
should happen. This Comment concludes that, after application of intermediate First Amendment scrutiny, the district court should find §
514, when limited to restoration of certain foreign works, is within Congress's lawmaking authority.
Part I of this Comment provides a background on the current status
of copyright law, including recent acts of Congress that are based on
international agreements and cases that have challenged those Acts. Part
II discusses the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Golan v. Gonzales,
which suggests a new direction for copyright law. Finally, Part HIIanalyzes the possible implications of Golan and how it should be decided on
remand in district court.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Copyright Protection
Core American values inform the fundamental principle that before
any work is protected or privately owned, it is free and accessible to the
public.25 People are free to speak, write, or perform any thoughts, words,
ideas and expressions, regardless of who has already expressed them.26
Therefore, when Congress steps in to grant copyright protection for
someone's expression, it directly infringes on the rights of others to use
that expression. 27 The grant of protection to one person is, in effect, a
violation of someone else's freedom of expression.28 This concept, first
articulated by Melville B. Nimmer in a 1970 law review article, is the
primary way that the Golan plaintiffs captured the court's attention.29
The federal government's authority to grant a limited monopoly
over a certain expression or collection of ideas comes from the Copyright
Clause of the United States Constitution. 30 Congress utilized this authority when it enacted the 1790 Copyright Act, which granted federal copyright protection to a creator, at the time of creation, for a term of fourteen

23.

See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 3-4.

24.

Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007).

25.

See Golan, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *7-8.

26.
See MICHAEL D. BRNHACK, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.01 [B] (2008).
27.
Id.
28.
See id.
29.
Id. § 19E.01 [A] (citing Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the FirstAmendment Guaranteesof Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970)).

30.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
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years, with the option of renewal for twenty-eight possible years of protection.3 1
Foreign works were not protected in this 1790 Act. 32 In fact, foreign works did not receive any legal copyright protection in the United
States until 189 1.33 Before that time, the United States was known to be
the "chief threat" of piracy in the world.34 Because foreign works were
not protected here, publishing companies in the United States could
choose to publish and sell the works of those creators without permission.35 Some argued that this unfettered access to foreign works inspired
creativity and progress in the United States and other developing nations,
which benefited all nations in the long term. 36 Currently developing nations sit in the same position the United States once held, with more interest in access to ideas than protection of ideas.37 Once the United
States developed, however, it had a greater interest in gaining protection
from other nations. Just as European authors had experienced, American
authors began to see they were "being robbed of the fruits of [their] creativity, '38 and unfettered access to their works "would discourage [them]
from continuing
to create, with resultant loss to [their] own, and other,
39
countries."

In 1989, the United States finally joined the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work ("Berne Convention"),
which was initiated in 1886 and now consists of 161 member nations.40
Prior to joining the Berne Convention, the United States only provided
limited protection to foreign works by federal statute, rather than any
international agreement.4 ' The Berne Convention, supplemented by the
TRIPS Agreement, 42 set the international standards for copyright protection.43 Through these international bodies, international copyright law
sets minimum standards for copyright protection and operates under two
primary principles: (1) national treatment, and (2) most favored nation
31.
Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism?,26 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 17, 37 (2002) (explaining the Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831)).
32.
Id. at 40.
33.
Michael Landau, Fitting United States Copyright Law into the International Scheme:
Foreign and Domestic Challengesto Recent Legislation, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 847, 847 (2007).
34.
ABBOTT Er AL., supra note 22, at 433.
See id.
35.
36.
Id.
37.
See id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40. World Intellectual Property Org., Member States, http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009).
41.
Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to
Promotethe Progressof Science and Useful Arts, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 323,326 (2002).
42. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") was a
result of the 1986 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. ABBoTr Er AL., supra note 22, at 3. This
agreement started an important shift in international copyright law, moving it into the trade arena
under the World Trade Organization. Id. at 3-4.
43.
See id. at 429.
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treatment. 44 Most notably here, the national treatment principle requires
nations to extend the same45type of protection to foreign works as it does
to its own authors' works.
Until the United States joined the Berne Convention, it was not obligated to extend protection, nor did it receive protection from member
nations. The agreements allow for some flexibility; each nation maintains its own copyright law, agreeing to give that same protection, and
nothing more, to foreign works. 46 International agreements have, however, influenced domestic American copyright law, creating tension with
the United States Constitution and pushing the bounds of the First
Amendment. 47
The courts have interpreted American copyright law to include two
built-in free speech accommodations: (1) the idea/expression dichotomy,
and (2) the fair use defense.48 The first accommodation is that while an
author's unique expression is protected by copyright, his ideas, theories
and facts are "instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of
publication. ' 49 More specifically, copyright law does not protect "any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery .... Second, the fair use defense allows the public
to use the author's expression "for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research ....
Although copyright protection does protect a work's creator, and allows him to be fairly compensated for sale of his creation, courts have
explained that its primary purpose is not for the benefit of the individual
creators, but rather "to promote the progress of science and the useful
In this way, the restriction on free expression is intended to be an
arts.
"engine of free expression. 5 3 That engine is further fueled, theoretically, by a work's release into the public domain when the copyright term
expires. 54
The value of the public domain is critical to the Golan plaintiffs'
argument because works that enter the public domain no longer belong to
44. Id. at 19.
45.
Id.
46.
See id.
47.
See Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 324-25; id. at 325-30 (describing the role of international
agreements in American copyright law and the importance of the United States' continued involvement).
48.
49.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
Id.

50.
17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 2009).
51.
Id. § 107.
52. Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *7 (D.
Colo. Apr. 20, 2005) (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)).
53. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
54. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007).
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the original creator. 55 At the point of entry, they belong to the public.
The public is then free to utilize and even publish those works, fostering
new creativity and general progress.5 6
B. The Public Domain
According to Black's Law Dictionary, the public domain is defined
as: "[t]he universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected
by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to
use without charge.... [and which] can be appropriated by anyone without liability for infringement., 57 This concise definition, however, does
not reflect the dynamic scholarly discussions surrounding the public domain. As Professor James Boyle asks: "What is the nature of. . . 'individual rights in the public
domain?' Who holds them? Indeed, what is
58
the public domain?
Despite the inexactness of the definition of the public domain, it is
59
highly valued by many as a source of creativity and development.
Songs, literary works, symphonic compositions, historic films, and software programs in the public domain inspire further creative expression
and ingenuity. 6° When the limited protection of a copyright ends, a work
enters the public domain and takes on new life.6 1
Many scholars, including the Golan plaintiffs' lawyers, argue that
intellectual property laws have stunted the public domain's growth to the
detriment of the general public and societal progress.62 Others maintain
that the digital age and general accessibility of information necessitate
63
Whether more protection or
greater intellectual property protection.
greater dissemination of information is the most effective engine for
progress and development is not clear. 64 But American laws, mostly in
response to European Union laws and international agreements, have
65
been moving in the direction of greater copyright protection.
Two of
the most recent Acts of Congress-the Copyright Term Extension Act
and § 514--reflect that trend.
55.
56.

Id. at 1192-93.
See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public

Domain, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33,37-38 (2003).
57.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1265 (8th ed. 2004).

58.
Boyle, supra note 56, at 59 (quoting David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 147, 147 (1981)). Boyle's contemporary, David Lange, explains: "the
term 'public domain' is elastic and inexact. A definition can be but one of many definitions, each
surely a function of perspective and agenda .... " David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463,463 (2003).
59.
See, e.g., ABBoTr ET AL., supra note 22, at 6.
60.
See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1188, 1193.
61.
Id. at 1189.
62.
See, e.g., id. at 1194.
63.
See e.g., Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 324.
64.
See ABBOTr ET AL., supranote 22, at 9.
65.
See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1-3 (explaining the general progression of copyright laws
leading up to Golan).
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C. Recent Acts of Congress
1. Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)
Congress passed the "Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act"
("CTEA") on October 27, 1998.66 As the title suggests, the CTEA extended the term of copyright protection for existing and future works.67
In the two hundred years prior to the CTEA, the term of protection had
increased from the original fourteen years to a term either of life-plusfifty-years, or the earlier of seventy-five years from publication or one
hundred years from creation by an unknown author.68 The CTEA added
twenty years to the term of protection, increasing most copyrights to lifeplus-seventy-years. 69
Congress approved this extension in response to the European Union's extension of its copyright protections, to life-plus-seventy-years,
through the European Union Term of Protection Directive. 70 Although
Sonny Bono and other artists would have liked to see the term of protection last even longer, 7' many people believed this new term came awfully
72
close to violating the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" provision.
The Golan plaintiffs challenged Congress's authority to extend copyright
of the next actterms in the CTEA, as well as the constitutionality
73
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
2. Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
President Bill Clinton signed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
("URAA") into law on December 8, 1994. 74 The Act incorporates foreign trade and treaty agreements into American law, and part of the Act
amends United States copyright law in 17 U.S.C. § 104A.75 Specifically,

Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
66.
U.S.C.A. § 302 (West 2009)).
Id. (extending protection for works created on or after January 1, 1978).
67.
68. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-95 (2003).
69. § 102(b) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2008)).
70. Keith Glaser, Comment, A Tune-Up on the Engine of Free Expression: The Traditional
Contoursof Copyrightin Golan, 18 DEPAUL J.ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 185, 186 (2007).
71.
Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1; see also 144 CONG. REC. H9946, 9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono) ("Actually, Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to
last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. I invite all of
you to work with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you
know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress.").
72. The "limited Times" provision explains that copyright protection is intended to be temporary and last only for a limited amount of time. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Nimmer, supra note 9,
at 2.
73. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007).
74.

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 38B: HIGHLIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT AMENDMENTS

CONTAINED INTHE URAA 1 (2006), availableat http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38b.pdf [hereinafter CIRCULAR 38B].
75. Id.
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§ 514 restores copyright protection to certain foreign works. 7 6 This section automatically restored copyright protection to certain eligible foreign works, which were already in the public domain in the United
States." To be eligible, the work must meet four requirements: (1) "[a]t
the time the work was created, at least one author.., must have been a
national or domiciliary of an eligible country ....;,,7(2) "[t]he work is
not in the public domain in its source country through expiration of the
term of protection; '79 (3) "[tlhe work is in the public domain in the United States because the work did not comply with formalities imposed at
any time by the U.S. law ....;,"80
and (4) "[i]f published, the work must
have first been published in an eligible country and must not have been
published in the United States during the 30-day period following its first
publication in that eligible country." 81
Under § 514, the work is treated as if it had never entered the public
domain in the United States, and the copyright term will last for the remainder of the term it should have received! For example, "[a] Chinese
play from 1983 [that has been in the public domain in the United States]
will be protected until December 31 of the seventieth year after the year
in which its author dies. 8 3 Although all eligible works are automatically
restored, any copyright holder must notify any reliance party of his intent
to enforce the copyright, either directly or indirectly by filing notice with
the United States Copyright Office.84 Additionally, the Act allows for a
12-month grace period, wherein reliance parties may freely continue
utilizing the work. 5
Agreements like the URAA help create uniformity in copyright law
around the world. 86 An author's work is protected through his own nation's copyright law, but is only respected in other countries through
agreements like the Uruguay Round Agreements. 87 And, because today's technology allows for quick and cheap access to worldwide
sources of information, it is more important than ever that Congress

76.

Carrie Lee, Recent Development, Golan v. Gonzales: Capitalizingon Eldred's Defeat, 16

TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 505,505 (2008).

77.
See CIRCuLAR 38B, supra note 74, at 2.
78.
Id. Eligible countries are those, other than the United States, which are members of the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the World Trade Organization,
or are subject to a presidential proclamation extending copyright protection based on reciprocal
treatment for U.S. authors. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 3. Reliance parties are businesses or individuals who have relied on the work's
availability in the public domain by using it before enactment of the URAA on December 8, 1994.
Id. at2.
86. ABBor ET AL., supra note 22, at2-3.
87. See id. at19.
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question how effective American copyright law would be without international agreements. 88
Section 514 created controversy, because it restored copyright protection to foreign works that Americans have already accessed through
the public domain.8 9 Likewise, principles of free expression establish
that once a work is in the public domain, it no longer belongs to the copyright holder. 90 By allowing the government to take these works out of
the public's hands, the Act deprived the public of something it owned. 91
The public's right to the information implicates the First Amendment,
and this agreement, along with the CTEA,
92 inspired litigation challenging
Congress's authority to pass such an act.
D. Challengesin the Courts
93

1. The Supreme Court: Eldred v. Ashcroft

In Eldred, individuals and businesses using public domain works
for their products and services challenged Congress's authority to pass
the CTEA. The plaintiffs claimed Congress had no authority to extend
the copyright protection of already existing works, although they did not
challenge Congress's right, under the Copyright Clause, to increase protection for new and future works. 94 The extension of existing copyrights
by twenty years, they argued, violated both the Clause's "limited
Times" 95 provision and the plaintiffs' free speech rights under the First
Amendment.96
The Court held that Congress's passage of the CTEA violated neither the "limited Times" provision nor the First Amendment free speech
rights of the plaintiffs.97 First, the Court reasoned that text, history, and
precedent all established Congress's power to extend the term of an existing copyright. 98 The Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that
the extension of twenty years made a term virtually unlimited, and that a
limited copyright must remain "fixed" or unchanged. 99 In fact, the Court
explained, history shows that Congress is empowered to give current

88. See id. at 1.
89. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007) (addressing the plaintiffs' challenge because the law actually pulls works from the public domain).
90. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 3.
91.
See id. at 3-4.
92. Lee, supranote 76, at 506-07.
93. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at 193.
94.
95. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. This term comes from the original Copyright Act of 1790,
declaring that protection would only be for a limited time, rather than permanent or perpetual.
96. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192-93.
97. Id. at 198.
98. Id. at 200-05.
Id. at 199-200.
99.
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authors the benefit of future term extensions "so that all under copyright
protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime."' °
Next, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the CTEA violated
First Amendment rights, noting that the proximity of the framers' passage of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment demonstrates
their compatibility.' 0 ' For additional support, the Court pointed out the
two previously mentioned free speech safeguards developed in copyright
law.' O2 Although the Court clarified that copyright laws are not "categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment," 10 3 it explained why the Eldred facts did not give rise to First Amendment scrutiny.1°4 First, the speech most securely protected by the First Amendment is one's own speech, whereas the plaintiffs in Eldred were asserting
their right to utilize the speech of others. 0 5 Second, the Court found that
passage of the CTEA did not alter "the traditional contours of copyright
protection . ..."'06
What the Court did not say in Eldred is what those "traditional contours" are, and what exactly would constitute an alteration of them. 0 7 To
the legal scholars pushing for more public access and less copyright protection, this phrase opened a pathway for new legal challenges. Those
challenges, brought in the D.C., Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, started a new
discourse about what the "traditional contours" of copyright law are.
2. The Circuit Courts
a. The D.C. Circuit
(2005): Luck's Music Library, Inc. v.
08
Gonzales'
In Luck's Music Library, the plaintiffs consisted of a corporation
selling classical orchestral sheet music and a film archivist.' °9 Some
works that the plaintiffs utilized were foreign works in the public domain." 0 They challenged Congress's passage of § 514, claiming it overstepped copyright limitations by removing works from the public domain."' The plaintiffs advanced a policy argument that Congress does
not create any incentive for creativity and progress (the goal of the Copy-

100.
101.
102.
103.
221.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 200.
Id. at 218-19.
Id. at 219; See supranote 48 (explaining the two recognized "free-speech safeguards").
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), questioned in Eldred, 537 U.S. at
Eldred,537 U.S. at 221.
Id.
Id.
See id.
407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1263.
Id.
See id.
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right Clause) by removing works from the public domain.1 12 The court
relied on Eldred to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims and held that Congress
does have authority to remove works from the public domain for copyright protection.1 13 This decision stands in direct contrast to the Tenth
Circuit's decision, two years later, in Golan.
1 14
b. The Ninth Circuit (2007): Kahle v. Gonzales

In Kahle, the plaintiffs operated an Internet service that offered free
access to films, books, software and other digital information generally
found in the public domain." 5 The plaintiffs claimed the CTEA unnecessarily extended copyright protection to these works, specifically alleging that its "opt-out" system "altered a traditional contour of copyright..
• The court rejected plaintiffs' challenge, based on the Eldred finding that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power." 7 The
CTEA's elimination of the renewal requirements, the court asserted, only
brought existing copyright protection "in parity with those of future
works." 18 The court also rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion that First
Amendment scrutiny was required, because here, as in Eldred, the free
speech safeguards of copyright law adequately protected the plaintiffs'
First Amendment interests"19
The decisions in Kahle and Luck's Music Library fell in step with
the deferential trend, which confirmed Congress's broad power to extend
copyright protections. Similarly, the District Court for the District of
Colorado looked to Eldred and the general precedent to affirm Congress's authority to pass both the CTEA and § 514.120
I. THE TENTH CIRCUIT: GOLAN V. GONZALES

12

Lawrence Golan was joined by other plaintiffs including a publishing company, a motion picture distributor, and a film archivist. 2 2 Each
of the plaintiffs relied to some degree on works in the public domain that
were re-protected under § 514.123 Additionally, the CTEA extended the
copyright protection of other works these performers and artists had expected to find in the public domain. 124 The plaintiffs filed suit against the
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 1266.
114. 474 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2007).
115. See id. at 666.
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 667-68.
118.
Id. at 668.
119. Id. at 668-69.
120. Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *42-43 (D.
Colo. Apr. 20, 2005)
121.
501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
122. Id. at 1181.
123. Id. at 1182.
124. Id.
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government in the United States District Court for the District of Colorapassage of the URAA and the CTEA was
do, claiming that2 Congress's
5
unconstitutional.1
A. ProceduralPosture-TheDistrictCourt Decision
The plaintiffs' challenge included three basic claims. 126 First, they
argued that the CTEA's extension of copyright protection from life-plusfifty-years to life-plus-seventy-years essentially created a perpetual copyright and violated the "limited Times" provision of the Copyright
Clause. 127 The district court dismissed this claim based on the Supreme
Court's decision in 8Eldred and granted the government's motion for
summary judgment.12

Second, the plaintiffs argued that Congress exceeded its inherently
limited Copyright Clause power when it passed § 514.129 This limited
power, they argued, does not authorize Congress to remove works from
the public domain. 130 The district court addressed this challenge with a
historical analysis of Congress's Copyright Clause authority. 131 In reviewing the Copyright Act of 1790, the 1832 Patent Act, Supreme Court
cases Wheaton v. Peters and Eldred v. Ashcroft, the court concluded that
Congress does have authority to remove works from the public domain. 132 The court explained: "that the public domain is indeed public
across which works pass into it candoes not mandate that the threshold133
not be traversed in both directions."'
To address the plaintiffs' third claim that § 514 violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, the court explained that because the works
are still available to the plaintiffs through contract with copyright holders, the plaintiffs could not accurately claim that their "participation in
speech is prohibited."' 34 The remaining question, then, was whether the
restored copyright protection places too great a burden on the plaintiffs'
free expression of ideas. 135 The court relied on established precedent to
conclude that a First Amendment analysis is not triggered by these legitimate limits on free expression of ideas. 36 Thus, the district court found
that Congress did not exceed its Copyright Clause authority nor violate

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 1183.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Golan, 501 F.3d at 1185.
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
Id. at 1186.
Id.

Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *15-43 (D.
131.
Colo. Apr. 20, 2005).
132.
Id. at *42-43.
133.
Id. at *9.
134.
Id. at *48.
135.
Id.
136. Id.

20091

GOLAN V. GONZALES

1125

the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights in passing
137 § 514, and it granted
summary judgment in favor of the government.
B. The Tenth Circuit Court ofAppeals Opinion
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed the plaintiffs'
three claims. 138 The court agreed with the lower court on the first two
claims. 139 The court disagreed, however, with the district court and with
the Ninth and D.C. circuits on whether Congress's removal of works
from the public domain interfered with the plaintiffs' First Amendment
14
right to free expression, thus triggering First Amendment scrutiny. 0
Although Eldredforeclosed the plaintiffs' challenge to the CTEA, it
created an opening for a First Amendment challenge. 141 The court explained that even when Congress has not exceeded its Constitutional
authority through the Copyright Clause it must remain within the boundaries of other constitutional limits like the First Amendment. 42 Here,
the Golan court used both a functional and historical analysis to discern
whether Congress had overstepped its boundaries by altering "traditional
143
contours of copyright law.
1. Functional Analysis
To get to the meaning of the Eldred Court's phrase, "traditional
contours of copyright law,"' 44 the court first looked to the dictionary to
define "a contour as 'an outline' or 'general form or structure of something.""145 The court then proceeded with an examination of the procedure or general form of copyright law in America.146 It concluded that
copyright structure is based on the principle that a limited monopoly over
an expression, which attaches at the moment of creation, will encourage
authors, composers, designers, and all types of creators to create and
share their ideas.' 47 The process, therefore, is that a work is first created,
then protected, and finally, after the term of copyright
protection expires,
48
released into the public domain for public benefit.

137.
Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2007).
138. Id. at 1183.
139. Id. at 1197.
140. Id.
141.
Id. at 1184.
142. Id. at1187.
143.
Id. at 1188-89.
144.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
145.
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 284
(9th ed. 1984)).
146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 1188.
148.
Id. at 1189.
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According to this court, § 514 changes the copyright sequence by
adding a fourth step after a work has entered the public domain. 149 This
fourth step, copyright protection after the work50has entered the public
domain, alters the ordinary copyright procedure.
2. Historical Analysis
The Eldred Court's use of the term "traditional"' 15 1 prompted an
analysis of copyright law's contours throughout U.S. history. 52 The
court revisited the original Copyright Act of 1790 and the context in
which the framers passed it.' 53 In contrast to the lower court's historical
investigation into whether Congress possessed the authority to take
works out of the public domain, the Tenth Circuit looked at not only
but also what is traditional or customary within copywhat is allowed,
154
right law.
Although it is uncertain whether the original Copyright Act protected works already in the public domain, various private bills and wartime acts did restore copyright to works in the public domain. 55 Rather
than demonstrating a tradition of restoring copyright to works in the public domain, the court concluded that these special acts of Congress revealed a historical practice of treating works in the public domain as
permanently public. 56 The court explained that "the fact that individuals
were forced to resort to the uncommon tactic of petitioning 1Congress
57
demonstrates that this practice was outside the normal practice.
The court concluded that, both historically and functionally, works
in the public domain are meant to remain in the public domain. 158 Thus,
§ 514 "altered the traditional contours of copyright protection."'' 59 Following the Eldred decision, the court
explained that the alteration
60
analysis.
Amendment
First
a
prompts
3. First Amendment Analysis
In conducting a First Amendment analysis, the court explained what
the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests were.' 6' Because works in the
public domain belong to the public, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id.
Id.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189.
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1191.
Id.
Id. at 1191-92.
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1192-93.
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had a "right to unrestrained artistic use of these works."1 62 Although the
works and expressions once belonged to the creator, the creator's limited
monopoly no longer exists.
Once protection expires, the court acknowledged that the works or speech belong to the public.' 64 The works'
removal from the public domain then infringes on the public's right to
use the works, thus infringing on its freedom of expression.1 65 In con-

trast to the Eldred plaintiffs, the Golan plaintiffs could claim a right to
protection of their own words, rather than the less-valued right to express
others' words.

66

After establishing that the plaintiffs' had a valid interest in the
works, the court then looked to the Copyright Clause's free speech safeguards to determine if those interests were already sufficiently
guarded.167 The court found that the two built-in safeguards did protect
the public's First Amendment rights during the term of the works' copyright protection, but did not address
the public's interest in works already
68
released into the public domain.
Furthermore, the court found that § 514 did not sufficiently address
the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests. 169 Unlike the CTEA, § 514
does not provide relief from royalties and fees for libraries, restaurants,
and other small businesses.1 70 If § 514 had included protections like
those found in the CTEA, First Amendment scrutiny may be unnecessary.'7 ' However, the court found that § 514's provision of a one-year
grace period for those using the works, as well as its notice requirement,
were not sufficient. 72 Therefore, the court concluded First Amendment
scrutiny must be applied to Congress's passage of § 514. 173
4. Remand to the District Court
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to district court with detailed
instructions. 74 First, on remand, the court must determine if the § 514
restrictions on plaintiffs' free expression are content-based or contentneutral. 7 5 The court must then apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to
determine whether Congress's passage of § 514 violated plaintiffs' First

162.

Id. at 1193.

163.

See id.

164.

Id.

165.
166.

Id.
Id.

167.
168.

Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1195.

169.
170.

Id.
Id. at 1195-96.

171.
172.
173.
174.

See id.at1195.
See id. at 1196.
Id.
Id.

175.

Id.
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Amendment right to freedom of expression. 176 The district court should
balance the First Amendment implications of the law against the intent of
its reason for entering into important international
Congress, including
77
agreements.1
]m. ANALYSIS

A. Content-Neutralor Content-BasedRestriction?
On remand, the district court will have to determine whether the restrictions imposed by § 514 are content-neutral or content-based.178 Content-based restrictions, which trigger the strictest level of scrutiny, "are
those which 'suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon
speech because of its content."1 79 Content-neutral restrictions, on the
other hand, serve "purposes unrelated to the content of expression ...
even if [they had] an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but
not others."'' 80 The heart of the question the court must answer is
"whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
18
disagreement with the message it conveys.' '
Under § 514, speakers are restricted from using foreign works that
have fallen into the public domain in the United States, not because of
the works' content, but because of certain procedural failings. 182 Section
514 does not restore protection to works in the public domain created by
American authors or those foreign works previously in the public domain
if their copyright terms had legitimately expired. 83 Thus, the works are
not protected because of their subject matter or because of some disagreement the government has with the material being distributed in the
United States. The only element that is remotely content-oriented is the
works' so-called "foreignness."' 84 This, however, should not lead the
court to deem the restrictions as content-based. "Foreignness" relates to
procedural considerations; the subject matter is irrelevant in determining
85
whether the work will be resurrected from the public domain.'

176.

Id.

177.

See id.

178.

Id.

Id. (quoting Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 657
179.
(10th Cir. 2006)).
180. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), quoted in Golan, 501 F.3d at
1196.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
181.
295 (1984)).
182.
See CIRCULAR 38B, supra note 74, at 2.
See id.
183.
184.
Cf Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (explaining that a rule is content-based if it treats works
differently based on their content or substance).
185.
See CIRCULAR 38B, supra note 74, at 2.
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B. Application of IntermediateScrutiny
Therefore, the district court should find § 514 to be a contentneutral infringement on free speech, and it should apply intermediate
scrutiny. 186 Intermediate scrutiny requires the restrictive law to be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest" 187 and "leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. ' 88 Although courts have interpreted this level of scrutiny differently, intermediate scrutiny
is somewhere between strict scrutiny and ra189
tional basis review.
Accordingly, the district court must determine if Congress had a
significant governmental interest. Congress's primary purpose in enacting § 514 was to protect American creators by securing their copyrights
throughout the world. 90 Only through some level of agreement with the
other nations in the World Trade Organization could Congress secure
mutual copyright respect for U.S. authors in those countries. 191 However, if Congress's interest was nothing more than looking out for American authors' money-making ability, albeit an important goal, it may not
satisfy the first part of the intermediate scrutiny test. 92
If Congress's interest was the public good, it is more likely the court
will deem it significant. 193 As stated above, American copyright law is
not focused on the rights of the individual creators, but rather the broader
concern for the public good.194 If enactment of § 514 meant that authors
would continue to write, experiment, create, and share their ideas
through publication-knowing their works will not be exploited in other
parts of the world-then § 514 serves a greater good than merely authors' rights. 195 Notably, the House Committee on Ways and Means
supported § 514 by explaining that its enactment is "vital to our national
interest and to economic growth,
job creation, and an improved standard
' 196
of living for all Americans.

186.
See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (explaining that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate test
for content-neutral restrictions, while not making a conclusion on whether it should be applied);
Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 788 (2007).
187.
Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196.
188. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also Bhagwat,
supra note 186, at 789.
189. Bhagwat, supranote 186, at 788.
190. Lee, supra note 76, at 510.
191.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 (2003).
192.
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293.
193.
See Daniel Choi, Recent Development, Golan v. Gonzales: The Stalemate Between the
FirstAmendment and Copyright Continues, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 219, 238 (2008).
194.
Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *8 (D. Colo.
Apr. 20, 2005).
195.
See Austin, supra note 31, at 25.
196.
H.R. REP. No. 103-826(1), at 16 (1994), quoted in Golan, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at
*45.
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The Committee's support, along with Congress's stated purpose and
the lower court's previous finding, translates into a significant governmental interest. Moreover, it would be difficult to isolate a more narrow
or precise interest, other than one incorporating the international context
of copyright law. 197 Congress's enactment of § 514 and willingness to
negotiate with other nations "enhance[ed] our credibility" in the world
and "[made] the U.S. market [more] inviting, providing incentives to
and foreigners to create and disseminate their works
both nationals
198
here."
Additionally, the Supreme Court lent some insight to the weight of
the international context in Eldred when it discussed Congress's authority to enact the Copyright Term Extension Act. 199 The Court explained
that Congress passed the CTEA primarily in response to a European Union (EU) directive. 2° Per the Berne Convention, EU members were directed to "deny this longer term to the works of any non-EU country
whose laws did not secure the same extended term., 20 1 The Court legitimized the theory that Congress's broad purpose to promote the progress
of science through copyright law depends upon international copyright
protection. 0 2 Specifically, the Court noted that "[t]he CTEA may also
provide greater incentive for American and other authors to create and
disseminate their work in the United States. 20 3 Consequently, Congress
had two reasons for enacting § 514: (1) to protect the copyrights of
American authors throughout the world, and (2) to promote progress in
the United States. For this reason, the court should find that Congress
had a significant governmental interest in passing § 514.
Next, the court will have to determine if § 514 is narrowly tailored
to achieving the above interests. 20 4 This step requires determining
whether the restrictive law is not "substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the government's interest. 2 0 5 At the same time, courts have not
gone so far as to say the law need be the
20 6 "least restrictive means" available to achieve a governmental interest.

197.
See Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 329.
198.
Id. at 330.
199. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 (2003).
200. Id. at 205.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 206.
203. Id. (citing Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 330) (summarizing the persuasive comments of
author and former Associate Register for Policy and International Affairs in the United States Copyright Office, Shira Perlmutter).
204. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007) ("A content-neutral restriction must be 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest."' (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
205. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 800; see also Bhagwat, supra note 186, at 789 (discussing the quoted language).
206.
Bhagwat, supranote 186, at 789.

2009]

GOLAN V. GONZALES

1131

In order to determine whether the means are overbroad or narrowlytailored, the court must evaluate the First Amendment right being infringed. 20 7 In this way, intermediate scrutiny is a type of balancing test,
weighing a private First Amendment right against a social or community
interest advanced by the government. 20 8 The First Amendment right in
this case is freedom of speech. 20 9 Although First Amendment protection
is not absolute, free speech is afforded great protection as a fundamental
forms of expression like
right in our society. Speech includes valuable
210
films.
and
compositions,
musical
literature,
Here, Congress agreed to restore copyright to a relatively specific
segment of works in the public domain-those foreign-created works
Under §
that entered the public domain through a procedural failing.
and
the
public's
possession
514, rights to such works are taken out of
restored to the copyright owner only for the duration of the original copyright, had they not "mistakenly" entered the public domain. 21 2 This
restriction on speech is quite limited and not overbroad. Because intermediate scrutiny does not require the least restrictive means available, §
514 should be deemed to be narrowly tailored to the government's interest.
Finally, the court will need to determine if § 514 "leave[s] open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.2 1 3
Here, the court must consider that the privilege to use these works is not
completely removed. The freedom to contract with foreign copyright
holders still exists.21 4 Although this fact does not alleviate the First
Amendment concern altogether, it weighs against a view that § 514
closes off alternative channels of communication. The works, in the
hands of some copyright holders, will be available for a price. For other
works, the copyright will not even be enforced.2 15 While access to information may be less widely and freely available, channels of communication remain open. As a result, the court should find that § 514 satisfies First Amendment intermediate scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Last year, the Tenth Circuit made a critically important decision in
Golan v. Gonzales. The Golan court seriously acknowledged the tension
between copyright monopolies and First Amendment freedoms. And the
207.
See id. at 788.
208. Id. at 788-89.
209.
See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1193.
210. Id.
211.
See CIRCULAR 38B, supra note 74, at 2.
212.
See id.
213.
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
214.
Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *48 (D. Colo.
Apr. 20, 2005).
215.
See CiRCULAR 38B, supra note 74, at 3.
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Golan plaintiffs achieved a fundamental goal by establishing that First
Amendment boundaries exist in copyright law.216
In addition, the Golan decision has significant international implications. To influence international copyright law, the United States must
be at the negotiating table with other nations.21 7 If it is not flexible,
America may be forced to withdraw from the international arena of copyright protection. The resulting isolation could expose American creators to significant exploitation and piracy. 1 8
Two equally important elements-free speech and international relations-weigh heavily against each other in American copyright law.
Up to this point, lawmakers have prioritized international relations and
increased protections for American creators. Going forward, however,
lawmakers will need to seriously consider the role of the public domain
and free speech within copyright law. For their part, courts should require concrete evidence that increased protection through international
agreements is in fact aiding progress and advancing the public good.
And although, ultimately, § 514 should satisfy intermediate scrutiny,
Golan will be a landmark in setting a new direction for United States
copyright law, and shaping the delicate balance between free expression,
copyright protection, and our relationship to the rest of the world.

CarrieClaiborne*

216. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 6.
217. See Perlmutter,supra note 41, at 325.
218. See id. at 327.
*
I would like to thank Professor Viva Moffat for all her suggestions and the Denver University Law Review editors for their thoughtful revisions. And thanks to my family, especially Mark
and Olive Claiborne for their patience and encouragement.

UNITED STATES V. FRIDAY AND THE FUTURE OF NATIVE
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS CHALLENGES TO THE BALD AND

GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT
INTRODUCTION

For the Northern Arapaho Indian tribe on the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming, the Sun Dance is the most sacred of religious ceremonies.' Held annually "after the first thunder of the spring,, 2 and lasting
anywhere from four to eight days, the Sun Dance portrays the continuity
between death and rebirth and the interdependence of all natural things.3
The eagle, which is considered a "sacred messenger to the spirit world," 4
is an essential component of the Dance; without the tail of an eagle,
along with several other religiously significant objects, the Sun Dance
cannot occur.5
After he was prosecuted for killing a bald eagle for the Sun Dance,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered Northern Arapaho tribal
member Winslow Friday's religious challenge against the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA).6 The court held that the BGEPA's
Native American religious exception is facially valid and the least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in
protecting eagles. As a result, in Friday's case, the court held that the
BGEPA did not violate the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA). 8 Although the court noted that the permitting system
could be more accommodating, because Friday never applied for a permit to take an eagle, 9the court did not extensively consider the restrictive
nature of the system.
This Comment examines the Tenth Circuit's United States v. Friday
opinion along with its underlying implications. Part I provides a brief
historical analysis of the BGEPA and introduces relevant statutory provisions, including the exception that allows Native Americans to apply for
eagle take permits. Part II analyzes the development of RFRA to provide
1. Appellee's Opening Brief at 1, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. Jun 27,
2007) (No. 06-8093), 2007 WL 2437229.
2. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 942 (10th Cir. 2008). According to the opinion in
Friday, details about the Sun Dance are "guarded, and access by outsiders is limited... [without]
the consent of the Northern Tribal elders." Id.
3.
See Sun Dance, http://www.crystalinks.com/sundance.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
4. Antonio M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v.
Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771,774 (1995).
5. Appellee's Opening Brief at 2, Friday,525 F.3d 938 (No. 06-8093), 2007 WL 2437229.
6. Friday,525 F.3d at 942.
7. See id. at 942, 960.
8.
See id.
9. See id. at 960.
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a better understanding of how RFRA affects Native American religious
challenges to the BGEPA. Part 1II surveys relevant precedent in hopes
of better understanding the opinion in Friday, and the avenues left open
for future litigation. Part IV reviews the Friday opinion and discusses its
relevant procedural history. Part V analyzes the Friday opinion in context with relevant precedent, discusses the implications of the Friday
decision, and discusses the avenues left open for Native American religious challenges to the BGEPA after Friday.
I. THE BALD AND GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT' 0
A. History
The bald eagle began receiving congressional attention in the 1930s
as it became apparent that its populations were beginning to decline."
On June 8, 1940, Congress passed the Bald Eagle Protection Act; the
enacting clause described the bald eagle "as the national symbol" and
"no longer a mere bird of biological interest but a symbol of American
ideals and freedom."1 2 In 1962, Congress extended protection to golden
eagles in order to protect their dwindling populations and because they
were often mistaken for young bald eagles.13
The BGEPA subjects violators to both criminal and civil penalties. 14
Under the BGEPA, if an individual "shall . . . take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import"
any bald or golden eagle, "alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof
...
[the individual] shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year or both." 15 A violator is subject to civil penalties
of up to $5,000 for every violation.' 6 Because eagles are so important in
Native American religion, 17 Congress created an exception allowing the
issuance of permits8 for Native Americans wishing to take an eagle for
religious purposes.'

10. The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 668 (West 2008).
11.
See Matthew Perkins, The FederalIndian Trust Doctrine and the Bald and Golden Eagle
ProtectionAct: CouldApplication of the DoctrineAlter the Outcome in U.S. v. Hugs?, 30 ENVTL. L.
701, 705 (2000).
12. An Act for the Protection of the Bald Eagle, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (codified at 16
U.S.C.A. § 668 (West 2008)).
13. Tina S. Boradiansky, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of Federally Protected
Wildlife, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 709, 720 (1990).
14.
16 U.S.C.A. § 668(a)-(b).
15. Id. § 668(a).
16. Id. § 668(b).
17. De Meo, supra note 4, at 774 (noting that "Native Americans hold eagle feathers sacred
and equate them to the cross or the Bible in western religions.").
18. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 668(a); see also 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2008).
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B. The BGEPA Native American Religious Exception

19

The BGEPA accommodates Native Americans who need eagles in
two ways. First, Native Americans can obtain eagles and eagle parts
through the National Eagle and Wildlife Property Repository in Commerce City, Colorado. 20 Receiving an eagle from the repository takes up
to two years and the eagles received are often in dire shape. 21 In addition, obtaining eagles through the repository does not fulfill the demands
of many Native American tribes whose religious ceremonies require a
64
pure" eagle. 22
,

Alternatively, the Director of the Interior or the Director of the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) may issue a permit authorizing a Native American to "take" 23 a bald or golden eagle for religious
purposes. 24 Only members of federally recognized tribes may apply for a
permit. 25 The application requires an individual to specify the species to
be taken, the location of the take, the name of the tribe, and the religious
ceremony for which the eagle is to be used.26 In determining whether or
not to grant a permit, the FWS must consider the direct and indirect effect that issuing the permit will have on eagle populations, and whether
the applicant is "authorized to participate in bona fide tribal religious
ceremonies. 2 7
The FWS has never issued an eagle take permit for a Native American in the Rocky Mountain and Plains region.28 Nationwide, the FWS
has issued a take permit to the Hopi tribe every year since 1986 to take
golden eagles. 29 The FWS also periodically grants golden eagle take
permits to the Navajo tribe and the Taos Pueblo tribe.30 Overall, in the
Southwest, the FWS has issued golden eagle take permits to tribes, never
to an individual, seventy-five percent of the time. 31 The significance of
19. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2008).
20. The National Eagle Repository is a government warehouse where dead eagles are collected. Some of the eagles at the repository are confiscated contraband, some are the victims of
electrocution on power lines, some are roadkill. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 944 (10th
Cir. 2008).
21.
De Meo, supranote 4, at 790-91.
22. Friday, 525 F.3d at 943. A pure eagle is one that has been taken with care. It cannot have
died through poison, disease, or electrocution, and it cannot be roadkill. Id.
23. The term "take" includes to "pursue, shoot, shoot at, poison, wound, kill, capture, trap,
collect, molest or disturb." 50 C.F.R. § 22.3 (2007).
24.
16 U.S.C.A. § 668(a). The permitting exception within the BGEPA abrogates previous
treaties which allowed Native Americans to take bald and golden eagles. See United States v. Dion,
476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986).
25. See 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2008).
26.
Id. § 22.22(a).
27. Id. § 22.22(c).
28. Appellee's Opening Brief at 10, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. June 27,
2007) (No. 06-8093), 2007 WL 2437229.
29. Id.
30.
Brief of Appellant at 5, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (No. 06-8093), 2007 WL
1300419.
31.
Appellee's Opening Brief at 32, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (No. 06-8093).
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this seemingly high rate is minimized by the fact that there have been
only four applications to take a golden eagle, three of which were
granted.3 2 Furthermore, the FWS has never issued a permit to take a bald
eagle and has never issued an individual Native American a permit to
take either type of eagle.3 3
II. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND RESTORATION ACT OF 199334

The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 3 5 In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held that any burden on an individual's religion was subject to strict scrutiny and must be justified by a
"compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate. 36 In the late 1980s, however, the Court
began shifting away from strict scrutiny by providing more deference to
the state interest in question.37 In Employment Division v. Smith,3 8 the
Court seemingly changed its constitutional analysis of Free Exercise
claims. In Smith, the Court stated that "the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability." 39 A neutral law of general applicability,
therefore, was not subject to strict scrutiny, and did not require a compelling state interest in order to justify burdening an individual's religion.
In response to the decision in Smith, and to restore strict scrutiny, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA).4
Less than four years after its enactment, the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores.41 In Flores, the Court held that
Congress lacked the authority to enact RFRA through the Fourteenth
Amendment's enforcement clause; RFRA, therefore, became inapplicable to actions against the states.42 With regard to federal law, however,
the Tenth Circuit recently held that "the separation of powers concerns
expressed in Flores do not render RFRA unconstitutional as applied to

32. Id. at 10.
33. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Northern Arapaho Tribe in Support of Defendant-Appellee
at 3-4, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (No. 06-8093) (noting that permits have only been
granted to tribal entities).
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West 2008).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
36.
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
37. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1125 (10th Cir. 2002).
38. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb. RFRA states that the "[g]ovemment shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability...
[unless] the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." /d. § 2000bb-l.
41.
521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
42.
Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1126.
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the federal government. 4 3 As a result, religious burdens imposed by the
BGEPA, a federal law, must meet the strict scrutiny standard set forth in
RFRA.
III. POST-RFRA NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS CHALLENGES TO THE

BGEPA
A. United States v. Hugs44and DifferentiatingAs-Applied from Facial
Challenges
In United States v. Hugs the court considered a Free Exercise challenge to the BGEPA using the standards set forth in RFRA. 45 In Hugs,
two defendants were convicted of violating the BGEPA.46 The defendants were prosecuted after they led an undercover game warden on a
successful hunting expedition for bald and golden eagles on the Crow
Indian Reservation. 47 The defendants were precluded from bringing an
as-applied challenge to the statute because they failed to apply for a take
permit.48
A party bringing an as-applied claim may challenge a law "only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights."4 9 The claim is "evaluated considering how it operates in practice against the particular litigant and under the facts of the instant case, not hypothetical facts in other
situations." 50 Citing Madsen v. Boise State University,5 1 the Hugs court
held that an individual lacks standing to challenge a rule "to which he
52
has not submitted himself by actually applying for the desired benefit.
Because the defendants did not apply for a permit, therefore, the court
only considered the defendant's facial challenge to the BGEPA.53
A successful facial challenge invalidates a statute so that it may
never be constitutionally applied.54 A party making a facial challenge
bears a heavier burden seeking to "vindicate not only his own rights, but
those of others who may also be adversely impacted by the statute in
question. 55 Generally, in federal court a facial challenge requires "a
43. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950,959 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
44.
109 F.3d 1375, 1377 (9th Cir. 1997). The decision in Hugs occurred while the Supreme
Court was considering the constitutionality of RFRA in Flores.Because the Supreme Court's ruling
in Flores only invalidated RFRA when applied to state matters, the court in Hugs correctly applied
the RFRA strict scrutiny standard when considering a challenge to the BGEPA, a federal law. Id. at
1377-78.

45.

Id. at 1377-78.

46.

Id. at 1377.

47.

Id.

48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1378.
See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979).
16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 187 (2008).

51.
52.
53.

976 F.2d 1219, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id.

54.

ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 50.

55.

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999).
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showing that
no set of circumstances exist under which the statute would
56
be valid.,
In analyzing the statute's facial validity in Hugs, the Ninth Circuit
held that the government's compelling interest in protecting bald and
golden eagles justified the substantial burden imposed upon Native
Americans by the BGEPA. 57 The court further held that the BGEPA's
permit 8exception was the least restrictive means of effectuating that in5
terest.
59
B. Unites States v. Hardman

In United States v. Hardman, the Tenth Circuit consolidated three
cases involving government prosecutions against Native Americans for
violating the BGEPA. 60 Although the defendants failed to apply for a
take permit, the Tenth Circuit held that the defendants had standing to
challenge the statute because they were not members of a federally recognized tribe, and so it "would have been futile for these individuals to
apply for permits., 6 ' The court further held that the government's compelling interest in protecting bald and golden eagles outweighed the substantial burden imposed on Native American religion. 62 However because the government failed to provide information supporting its proposition that "limiting permits... only to members of federally recognized
tribes is the least restrictive means of advancing the government's interests," the court ruled in favor of the defendants.63
64
C. United States v. Antoine

Similar to the situation in Hardman,in United States v. Antoine, the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the BGEPA violated RFRA with regard to a Native American who was not a member of a federally recognized tribe.65 Contrary to the holding in Hardman, however, the Ninth
Circuit held that the BGEPA permitting system was the least restrictive
means of achieving the government's compelling interest.66 Thus, the
fact that the defendant was not a member of a federally recognized tribe
was immaterial.
56.

Constitutional Law, supra note 50.

57.
See Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378.
58.
Id.
59.
297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002).
60. ld. at1118.
61. Id.at1121.
62. See id. at1126-28 (stating that "the bald eagle would remain our national symbol whether
there were 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles. The government's interest in preserving the species remains compelling in either situation. What might change depending on the number of birds existing
is the scope of a program that we would accept as being narrowly tailored as the least restrictive
means of achieving its interest.").
63.
Id. at 1132.
64.
318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003).
65.
See id. at 920.
66. See id. at 923.
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The court explained that the long delays that Native Americans experience in obtaining eagle parts through the repository demonstrates the
high demand that exists with regard to federally recognized tribal members. 67 Consequently, "if the government extended [permit] eligibility
[to non-federally recognized Native Americans], every permit issued to a
nonmember would be one fewer issued to a member.", 8 The court concluded, therefore, that the alternative suggested by the defendant, to allow non-federally recognized Native Americans to apply for permits,
"can't fairly be called 'less restrictive' [because] it places additional burdens on other believers. 69
IV. UNITED STATES V. FRIDA?7°
A. Facts
Winslow Friday, a member of the Northern Arapaho Tribe of
Wyoming, shot and killed a bald eagle for the Sun Dance. 71 Friday never
contacted the eagle repository, nor did he apply for a take permit before
he shot the eagle.72 The government charged Friday with violating the
BGEPA; Friday argued that enforcing the BGEPA impermissibly burdened his religion in violation of RFRA.73
B. ProceduralHistory
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming.74 Citing Hardman,the District Court
found that Friday had standing because it would have been futile for him
to try and obtain an eagle through either the repository or the permitting
system. 5 Because the Sun Dance calls for a "pure" eagle,76 requiring
Friday to use the National Eagle Repository was not an option.77 Also,
because the FWS issued so few take permits, the District Court held that
the permit exception within the BGEPA was effectively futile and imposed a substantial burden upon Native American religion.78 In addition,
the court held that the BGEPA's exception for Native American religion
67.
See id.
68. Id.
69.
Id.
70.
525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
71.
Id. at 942.
72. Id. at 945.
73. Id. at 946.
74. Id. at 960.
75.
United States v. Friday, No. 05-CR-260-D, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74970, at *8 (D. Wyo.
Oct. 13, 2006) ("Based upon the agency's conduct in every other respect, it is clear that Defendant
would not have been accommodated by applying for a take permit."), rev'd, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir.
2008).
76. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 943 (10th Cir. 2008). The Sun Dance requires
a "pure" eagle. The tail may not be reused, and the eagle must have been taken with care, it cannot
have died through poison, disease, or electrocution, and it cannot be roadkill.
77. See Friday,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74970, at *10, rev'd, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
78.
Id. at *8, *10, rev'd, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
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restrictive means of furthering the government's comwas not the least
79
pelling interest.
The District Court held that the limited number of take permits
granted by the FWS is evidence that the process is not the least restrictive means of effectuating its compelling interest. 80 Important to the
court's decision was the fact that the bald eagle has experienced increased rates of recovery and that a greater cause of eagle mortality is
electrocution.8 ' Consequently, the District Court ruled in favor of FriBGEPA to make more accommodaday, holding that RFRA requires the
82
tions for Native American religion.
83

C. Judge McConnell's Majority Opinion
1. Scope of Review

Because Friday did not apply for a permit to take an eagle, the court
stated that he was precluded from raising arguments that his religion
might have been unduly burdened. 84 In other words, on an as-applied
basis, Friday was limited to challenging only those portions of the permitting system that actually affected him.85 The court declared Friday
could, however, attack the statute's facial validity without having applied
for a permit.86
2. Substantial Burden
The court began by analyzing the severity of the burden imposed
upon Friday's religion. 87 This is seemingly separated into a two-part
inquiry. First, the court stated that "a law that limits the Fridays' access
to the eagle needed for the ceremony substantially burdens their ability to
exercise their religion . ,88 This portion of the analysis suggests that,
had Friday applied for a permit, the court would have found that the
permitting process imposed a substantial burden.
Because Friday did not apply for a permit, however, the court only
considered whether "it substantially burdens Mr. Friday's religion to
79.
See id. at *14, rev'd,525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
80. Id. at *14.
81.
Id. at *14.
82.
Id. at *15 ("Although the Government professes respect and accommodation of the religious practices of Native Americans, its actions show callous indifference to such practices. It is
clear to this Court that the Government has no intention of accommodating the religious beliefs of
Native Americans except on its own terms and in its own good time.").
83.
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938,942 (10th Cir. 2008).
84. Id. at 950-51 (stating, "[tihese include his claims that the process might have taken too
long, that he might have been wrongfully denied a permit even if he was entitled to one, or that the
FWS might have imposed conditions on the permit that are religiously objectionable").
85.
See id. at 951.
86.
Id. Friday is not precluded, for example, from arguing that the permitting process "contains so many obstacles that it would effectively have been futile for him to apply for a permit."
87.
See id. at 947.
88.
Id. The court refers to the Friday family entity.
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require him to obtain a permit in advance of taking an eagle. '89 In taking
this path the court only considered the burdens imposed by the statute
facially. The court noted that many religious activities, like building a
church, require some form of advance authorization from the government. 90 Because Friday did not set forth sufficient evidence that his "religious tenets [were] inconsistent with using an application process," the
court found that requiring Friday to apply for a permit did not pose a
substantial burden upon his religion. 9' Nonetheless, the court did not rest
its decision on the lack of a substantial burden because it concluded that
the permit process was a reasonable accommodation and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's compelling interest.92
3. Facial Challenges

93

a. Futility
The court first considered Friday's facial challenge to the BGEPA.94
Because this was a facial challenge, Friday was entitled to raise the claim
regardless of whether or not he applied for a permit. 95 The District
Court, citing Hardman,found thatthe application process was futile and,
therefore, not the least restrictive means of achieving the government's
compelling interest. 96 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the
record lacked sufficient evidence showing that the permit application
process was futile. 97 Unlike Hardman, in which it was "legally futile"
for the defendants to apply for a permit because they were not members
of a federally recognized tribe, the court held that Friday, a member
of a
98
federally recognized tribe, could, in theory, have received a permit.
The court cited testimony that the Hopi tribe had applied, and received, a take permit for golden eagles, and the "the record reveals no
reason to believe that an application to take a single eagle annually for
the Sun Dance... would have been treated any less favorably." 99 Al89.
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2008).
90. Id.
91.
Id. at 948.
92.
Id.
93.
Id. at 951. "A facial challenge is one that contends the statute is impermissible in all, or at
least the 'vast majority[,] of its intended applications." (quoting Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Roy,
465 F.3d 1150, 1157 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2006)).
94. Friday,525 F.3d at 953.
95. Id.
96.
Friday, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74970, at *14-15, rev'd 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
Judge McConnell noted that the District Court acknowledged that the issue decided in Hardman was
different than the case at bar. In Hardman the defendants "were not members of a federally recognized tribe ....
In other words, it was legally futile for them to apply because they were legally
ineligible." Friday,525 F.3d at 953.
97.
Friday, 525 F.3d at 954-55. "Although there is evidence in the record that one permit
application was denied, there is no evidence that this denial was improper, and no evidence regarding other permit applications." Id.
98. Id. at 953.
99. Id. at 954.
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though the FWS may not readily issue permits, the Tenth Circuit held
that the evidence in the record did not demonstrate that the process was
futile.' °
b. Governmental Interest in Requiring Permits
Next, Friday argued that the permitting system does not advance the
government's compelling interest in protecting eagles because allowing
Native American religious takings does not harm eagle populations.' 0 t
The court disagreed stating that the permitting system was facially valid. 0 2 This is because it allows the government to track the amount of
legally taken eagles, gives the government discretion over what eagles
can be taken, and allows the government to
allocate takings in a manner
03
that protects eagle populations as a whole.
4. As-Applied Challenges
a. The Sacred Nature of the Sun Dance
The court first addressed Friday's argument that 50 C.F.R. §
13.21(e)(2)'0 4 violates the sacred nature of the Sun Dance. 0 5 Judge
McConnell noted that if this provision was construed to allow FWS
agents to attend the Sun Dance, this "condition would violate the sacred
nature of the ritual.' 1 6 However, because Friday testified that he did not
know about the permitting system until after he killed the eagle, the provision "could not have influenced Mr. Friday's decision not to apply for
a permit."' 0 7 As
a result, the court stated that the provision did not affect
18
Friday's case. 0
b. Lack of Outreach
The court then considered the as-applied challenges to the permitting process that affected Friday, given that he did not apply for a permit.1°9 First, Friday argued that the permit program lacked any type of
100. Id. at 955.
101.
See id. at 955. Friday conceded that the government had a compelling interest in protecting bald and golden eagles. Id. at 956. Instead, Friday argued that the permitting system was facially impermissible because it did not advance the government's compelling interest. Id. at 955.
102. Id. at 956.
103.
See id. at 955. As Judge McConnell stated, "[e]ven if unregulated religious takings would
not be numerous enough to threaten the viability of eagle populations, the government would still
have a compelling interest in ensuring that no more eagles are taken than necessary, and that takings
occur in places and ways that minimize the impact." Id. at 956.
104.
The provision states "by accepting a permit, the permittee... shall allow entry by agents.
•. upon premises where the permitted activity is conducted."
105.
Id. at 951-52.
106. Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id. Judge McConnell noted, "[s]hould the FWS insist on an inspection that would violate
tribal religious beliefs, an affected person or tribe could bring an as-applied claim under RFRA
specifically targeted to the religiously offensive condition." Id.
109. Id. at 956-57.
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outreach.' 10 As a result, very few Native Americans knew that the permit
program existed; and thus, Friday argued that the permit application
process was not the least restrictive means of furthering the government's interest.' The court dismissed this claim, stating that the permit
process is published in 16 U.S.C. § 668.112 Further, the court held that
the government did not violate Friday's Free Exercise rights simply be13
cause he was unaware of the existence of an available accommodation."
Eliminating another potential challenge to the BGEPA, the court
ruled that the government's trust obligation to Native Americans did not
require the government to engage in affirmative outreach. 1 4 The court
stated that in Friday's case there was no legal trust obligation" 5 because
the BGEPA does not create any type of fiduciary relationship, and because the case did not involve Native American property held in trust by
the government." 16
c. Electrocution
Finally, the court addressed Friday's argument that the government
could preserve the eagle in a less restrictive manner by prosecuting the
electric companies whose power lines electrocute eagles.'1 7 The Court
responded to this argument by stating that the government
does prosecute
8
electric companies whose power lines kill eagles."
The court concluded by stating that the government attempts to accommodate the Native American religion while still accomplishing its
compelling interest.119 Although the permit process might be "improperly restrictive, burdensome, unresponsive or slow," the court stated that
Friday could12not
challenge these shortcomings because he failed to apply
0
for a permit.
V. ANALYSIS

In the following analysis of the Friday opinion, section A provides
a detailed synopsis of the aforementioned precedent in combination with
110.

Id.

111.

Id. at 957.

112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.

115.
See Perkins, supra note 11, at 704 (arguing that the Federal Indian Trust Doctrine might
provide a means of attacking the constitutionality of the BGEPA).
116. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 957-58 (10th Cir. 2008).
117.
Id. at 958 ("Mr. Friday is correct that when strict scrutiny is applicable the government is
generally not permitted to punish religious damage to its compelling interest while letting equally
serious secular damage go unpunished.").
118.
Id. at 958-59 ("In the one recorded case on the subject, a Colorado district court agreed
with the government, and refused to dismiss criminal charges under the Eagle Act and the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act against a rural electric company whose wires had killed 38 eagles, without proof of
intent or even of negligence.").
119.
120.

Id. at 960.
Id.
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Friday in order to better understand the state of the law as it applies to
Native American RFRA challenges against the BGEPA. Section B describes the avenues left open for future litigants challenging the statute
on both an as-applied basis and challenging the statute's facial validity.
Although Friday implies that future challenges are going to be successful
only on an as-applied basis, section B also suggests that the court in Friday may have imposed a futility standard that was too strict and not in
accordance with relevant precedent. As such, future litigants are provided with an additional means of challenging the facial validity of the
statute.
A. Native American Religious Challenges to the BGEPA: Synopsis
1. Substantial Burden
Since the enactment of RFRA, case law suggests that the BGEPA
does impose a substantial burden upon Native American religious practices. 12 1 In Friday, the court did not find that the permitting system, in
itself, posed a substantial burden; 122 it did, however, find that the permit
process would impose
a burden on a Native American who actually ap123
permit.
a
for
plies
2. Compelling Governmental Interest

t24

All courts found, and defendants generally do not challenge, that the
government has a compelling interest in protecting bald and golden
eagles. 12 5 A minority of courts held that the government does not possess a compelling interest in protecting golden eagles and other birds that
are not endangered. 26 Yet, no court held that the government does not
possess a compelling interest in protecting bald eagles, regardless of
121. United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997) ("We do not question that the
BGEPA imposed a substantial burden on the practice of such religions by restricting the ability of
adherents to obtain and possess eagles and eagle parts."); see also United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d

919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding "that BGEPA imposed a substantial burden"); United States v,
Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Any scheme that limits their access to eagle

feathers therefore must be seen as having a substantial effect on the exercise of religious belief.").
122. Thus, if a Native American does not apply for a permit, that person cannot claim that the
permitting system imposes a substantial burden upon his or her religion.
123.
See supra text accompanying notes 88-90.
124.
"Whether something qualifies as a compelling interest is a question of law." Hardman,
297 F.3d at 1127.
125.
See Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378 ("The Hugs do not deny that protection of bald and golden
eagles serves a compelling government interest."); Antoine, 318 F.3d at 924 ("The government has a
compelling interest in eagle protection that justifies limiting supply to eagles that pass through the
repository, even though religious demand exceeds supply as a result."); Hardman,297 F.3d at 1128.
126.
United States v. Abeyta, 632 F.Supp. 1301, 1307 (D.N.M. 1986) ("The golden eagle is not

an endangered species. The uncontradicted testimony at trial established that some eagles could be
taken without harmful impact on the remaining population. The government's conservation interests

therefore are not compelling and cannot warrant a constriction of Indian religious liberty."); see also
Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 559 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) ("However, the Commonwealth
has not established that application of Code § 29.1-521(A)(10) to the Horens furthers any compel-

ling state interest.").
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whether or not it is listed on the endangered species list.127 Whether or
not the bald eagle is listed as endangered, however, could affect what
constitutes the least restrictive means of protecting eagles: "[w]hat might
change depending on the number of birds existing is the scope of a program that we would accept as being narrowly tailored as the least restrictive means of achieving its interest. ' 2 In Friday, the court found that
the government
did possess a compelling interest in protecting bald and
1 29
eagles.
golden
1 30
3. Least Restrictive Means

The least restrictive means aspect of the strict scrutiny test provides
future litigants with the greatest opportunity for successfully challenging
the BGEPA. To fulfill its burden, the government must prove that "no
alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." 131
With regard to Native American challenges against the BGEPA, the
least restrictive means portion of the analysis has received differing
treatment. In Hugs, the court found the permitting system necessary to
ensure that eagles are used only for religious purposes; as such, the court
held that the system was the least restrictive means available to protect
eagles.132 Importantly, because the defendants never applied for a permit, the court held that they were "precluded from challenging any deficiencies in the manner in which the permit system operates.' 33
In Hardman, the Tenth Circuit held that the government "failed to
show that limiting permits for eagle feathers only to members of federally recognized tribes is the least restrictive means of advancing the government's interests." 134 In other words, the government did not sufficiently prove that the BGEPA's limitation, which restricts granting permits to members of federally recognized tribes, was the least restrictive
means of effectuating its compelling interest.
In Antoine, contrary to the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Hardman,the
court held that restricting permits to federally recognized tribal members
was the least restrictive means of effectuating the government's inter127.
United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002) ("The bald eagle would
remain our national symbol whether there were 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles. The government's
interest in preserving the species remains compelling in either situation.").
128.
Id.
129.
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 955 (10th Cir. 2008).
130. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court defined least restrictive means in the realm of
Free Exercise. 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). "[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id.
131.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
132.
United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997).
133.
Id. at 1379. In other words, the court did not consider the validity of the permitting system on an as-applied basis.
134. United States v,Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002).
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est.135 Important to the court's rationale was the fact that federally recognized tribal members experienced long delays in obtaining eagles from
the repository. 36 As such, providing more Native Americans with access
1 37
to eagles would only increase delays and would not be less restrictive.
To summarize, the circuits are split as to whether the BGEPA's federally recognized tribe limitation is the least restrictive means for the
government to further its compelling interest. With regard to the rest of
the permitting system, the circuit courts held that the system is conducted
in the least restrictive manner and is facially valid.
B. Future Litigation:Avenues Left Open After Friday
Although the Friday decision likely yields some positive implications for Native Americans,' 38 future litigation may offer additional redress. The following sections explore ways in which a future litigant
might bring successful as-applied and facial attacks against the BGEPA.
An individual bringing a facial challenge bears a much greater burden
than an individual bringing an as-applied challenge. 139 As such, a future
litigant who actually applies for a permit is more likely to successfully
challenge the BGEPA.
1. As-Applied Challenges I: Applying for a Permit
If a Native American is prosecuted for violating the BGEPA after
having applied for a take permit, the individual will make a strong asapplied challenge against the statute. In this type of scenario the individual will argue that the permitting system is not the least restrictive means
for the government to protect eagles. Courts have not considered the
issue extensively because an individual has never faced prosecution after
having applied for a permit. The courts evaluating the permitting system, therefore, only considered its facial validity.
14 °
Because the bald eagle no longer faces the risk of extinction,
granting permits no longer affects the preservation of bald eagles to the
extent it would have in the past.t4 1 Evidence regarding the restrictive
135.
136.

Id. at 922-23.
Id. at 923.

137.

Id.

138.
The Friday opinion might, for example, notify Native Americans that they can apply for
an eagle take permit; the opinion might also notify the FWS that the permitting system is very restrictive and result in an increased amount of permits granted.

139.
ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 50 ("An 'as applied' challenge is a claim that the operation of a statute is unconstitutional in a particular case, while a facial challenge indicates that the
statute may rarely or never be constitutionally applied.").
140.
Removing the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States From the List of Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife, 72 C.F.R. 37346-01, 37346 (2007).

141.
But see United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003) ("changed circumstances
may, in theory, transform a compelling interest into a less than compelling one, or render a welltailored statute misproportioned. Nonetheless, the government cannot reasonably be expected to
reitigate the issue with every increase in the eagle population").
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nature of the permitting system adds support to an as-applied challenge.
For example, although the FWS has issued permits to take golden eagles,
there has never been a permit issued to take a bald eagle. 42 In addition,
the FWS has only granted
permits to tribal entities, but never to individ143
ual tribal members.
This hypothetical as-applied scenario would look something like
this: an individual Native American applies for a permit to take a bald
eagle for a sincere Native American religious ceremony; after the FWS
denies the permit application, the individual still takes the eagle for a
religious ceremony and is prosecuted for violating the BGEPA; the Native American then brings an as-applied challenge against the BGEPA.
Under RFRA, the individual will likely not have any trouble asserting
that the permit denial or undue delay posed a substantial burden. 44
asserting that it has a
Likewise, the government will have no trouble
45
compelling interest in protecting bald eagles.1
The threshold matter, then, becomes whether or not the restrictive
nature of the permitting process is narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means for the government to protect eagles. To meet this requirement, the government must prove that "no alternative forms of regulation
would combat such abuses without infringing first Amendment
rights."' 146 Because "[t]he bald eagle population in the lower 48 States
has increased from approximately 487 active nests in 1963, to an estimated minimum 9,789 breeding pairs today," the FWS promulgated a
final rule to remove the bald eagle from the endangered species list. 147
Citing Hardman, "[w]hat might change depending on the number of
birds existing is the scope of a program that we would accept as being
narrowly tailored as the least restrictive means of achieving its interest."' 148 Following this logic, and given the fact that the FWS has never
issued a take permit for a bald eagle, this individual makes a very strong
as-applied argument that the permitting system is not conducted in the
least restrictive manner.
In issuing a permit, the FWS considers "[t]he direct or indirect effect which issuing such permit would be likely to have upon the wild
142.
Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Northern Arapaho Tribe in Support of Defendant-Appellee
at *1, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, No. 06-8093 (10th Cir. July 2, 2007), 2007 WL
2437228.
143. Id. at *3-*4.
144. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[A] law that limits...
access to the eagle needed for the ceremony substantially burdens their ability to exercise their
religion by sponsoring and taking part in the Sun Dance.").
145. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (10th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he bald eagle
would remain our national symbol whether there were 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles, the government's interest in preserving the species remains compelling in either situation.").
146. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,407 (1963).
147. Removing the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States From the List of Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife, 72 C.F.R. 37346-01, 37346 (2007).
148. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1128.
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populations of bald or golden eagles." 149 Because the bald eagle is no
longer endangered, this consideration lends support to the hypothetical
individual's argument that denying all take permits is overly restrictive.
It would be much less restrictive if the FWS were to grant the occasional
take permit for religious purposes; further, the FWS can still meet its
criteria requiring consideration of a take permit's effect upon eagle populations. 50
In sum, this person presents a strong argument that the permitting
system is unconstitutional because the bald eagle is no longer endangered
and the individual in question applied, but did not receive a take permit.
On an as-applied basis, this hypothetical scenario suggests that the permitting scheme is not the least restrictive means available for the government to effectuate its compelling interest.
2. As-Applied Challenges II: The Sacred Nature of the Sun Dance
Another potential as-applied challenge is mentioned by the court in
Friday. Under 50 C.F.R. §13.21(e)(2), an individual who receives a take
permit is required to "allow entry by agents.., upon premises where the
permitted activity is conducted.''
In Friday, the court states that if this
provision allows FWS agents to attend a religious ceremony like the Sun
Dance, and "should the FWS insist on an inspection that would violate
tribal religious beliefs, an affected person or tribe could bring an asapplied claim under RFRA specifically targeted at the religiously offensive condition.'1 52 The Court never considers this issue in Friday because Friday was unaware that the permit system even existed, and therefore, this
provision could not have affected his decision to not apply for a
153
permit.
3. Facial Challenges I: A Second Look at Futility
In Friday, the Court differentiated the futility faced by the defendants in Hardman from the alleged futility faced by Friday. 154 In Hardman, according to the court in Friday, it was "legally futile" for the defendants to apply for a permit because they were not members of a federally recognized tribe, and therefore, ineligible to receive permits. 55 In
Hardman, the court cites Jackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier 56 and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States157 to support its futility ar-

149.

50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c)(1) (2009).

150.

Id.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. § 13.21(e)(2).
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 952 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 953.
Id.
115 F.3d 1091 (2d Cir. 1997).
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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gument1 58 The following section suggests that the court in Friday imposed a futility standard that was too strict and not in accordance with
this precedent.
In Jackson-Bey, a prison inmate filed suit against several prison officials alleging that they violated the Free Exercise Clause by precluding
him from wearing certain religious garments to a funeral while he was
incarcerated. 59 Because the inmate never applied for the benefit of
wearing his religious garments, the prison officials argued that the inmate lacked standing. 16° The Second Circuit stated that the "threshold
requirement for standing may be excused only where a plaintiff makes a
substantial showing that application for the benefit would have been futile."' 16 1 Because the prisoner failed to show that his religion would not
have been accommodated had he applied for the benefit, the court held
that the registration process was not futile and that the prisoner lacked
standing. 162
Although denying the plaintiff standing, the opinion does not suggest a claimant must show that an application process is strictly impossible for a finding of futility. Instead, the opinion suggests that a claimant
must only "make a substantial showing" that applying would have been
futile. 163 The "substantial showing" language in Jackson-Bey suggests
that the Tenth Circuit's interpretation requiring an application process to
be "legally futile" reaches too far.
The Supreme Court's opinion in International Brotherhood provides further support for the argument that the futility standard adopted
in Friday was too strict. In International Brotherhood the Supreme64
Court analyzed futility in the realm of employment discrimination.1
Although the employees never applied for the job in which the alleged
discrimination occurred, the Court held that the "employee's failure to
apply for a job is not an inexorable bar to an award .... Individual nonapplicants must be given an opportunity to undertake their difficult task
of proving that they should be treated as applicants ... ."
,65 The Court
held that the government provided ample evidence of discrimination
which made clear that it would have been futile for the employees to

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116,1121 (10th Cir. 2002).
Jackson-Bey, 115 F.3d at 1093.
Id.
Id. at 1096.
See id. at 1097-98.
See id. at 1096.
Int. Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328 (1977).
Id. at 364.
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have applied. 66 As a result, the Court allowed the employees to
chal167
lenge the employment practices without ever applying for the job.
The rationales in Hardman, Jackson-Bey, and International Brotherhood all suggest that the Court in Friday imposed a futility standard
that was too strict and not in accordance with precedent. In Friday, the
court differentiated Hardman by stating it would have been "legally futile" for the defendants in Hardman to apply for a permit because they
were not members of a federally recognized tribe, whereas Friday was
not legally precluded from receiving a permit. 168 In other words, the
court equated futility with impossibility; the aforementioned precedent,
however, suggests otherwise. Although it was legally futile for the defendants in Hardman to apply for a permit,
the opinion never suggests
1 69
that strict impossibility is a prerequisite.
A precedent-based definition of futility does not require an individual to show that obtaining a permit would have been legally impossible,
as argued by the court in Friday;rather, an individual must only make a
"substantial showing" of futility. Given this analysis, the evidence in
Friday that the FWS has never granted a bald eagle take permit 170 might
bear some weight. Although refuted by the Court in Friday,171 this evidence provides adequate support that the FWS would not have accommodated Friday's religious needs had he applied for a take permit. The
application process was, therefore, futile.
Adding further support to Friday's futility argument is the fact that
the bald eagle was still listed as threatened on the Endangered Species
List when Friday killed the eagle. 172 Thus, even had the FWS granted
Friday a take permit under the BGEPA, the Endangered Species Act
17 3
(ESA) would still have prevented Friday from legally taking the eagle.
In its reply brief, the United States argued that 50 C.F.R. § 17.32 authorizes the Secretary to issue a permit allowing an individual to take a species protected by the ESA. 174 If Friday's religious taking fit within one

166.
See id. at 365-66. The Court further noted that the employees needed to provide evidence
that they would have applied for the job but for the alleged discrimination. Id. at 371.
167.
See id. at 371.
168.
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938,953 (10th Cir. 2008).
169.
See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002).
170.
Appellee's Opening Brief at 31, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-8093).
171.
Friday,525 F.3d at 955 ("It is simply not clear that [Mr. Friday] would not have received
a permit if he had applied, and therefore it is not clear that he would not have been accommodated
by not applying for one.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
172.
See id. at 945; Removing the Bald Eagle in the Lower 48 States From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2007).
173.
This argument is never addressed by the court in Friday because Friday never expressly
made the argument. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 13-14, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938
(10th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-8093).

174.
Id. This provision only allows the issuance of a permit "for one of the following purposes: Scientific purposes, or the enhancement of propagation or survival, or economic hardship, or
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of the categories listed in 50 C.F.R. § 17.32, the Secretary would have
been authorized to issue a take permit for the bald eagle. 175 If Friday's
taking did not fit within 50 C.F.R. § 17.32, however, then it actually was
"legally futile" for him to apply for a permit. 176 The mere presence of
the eagle on the Endangered Species List at the time of the taking should
have, at a minimum, added support to Friday's futility argument.
4. Facial Challenges II: Requiring Permission to Take an Eagle
Imposes a Substantial Burden
The Friday opinion suggests another way in which a future litigant
may bring a successful facial challenge. The court states, "[1n theory a
claimant's beliefs might forbid him from asking the government for permission to take the eagle, perhaps because such a request would fail to
treat the eagle as 'a gift of the Creator."", 177 The court seemingly suggests that an individual could challenge the mere fact that the BGEPA
requires an individual to ask permission to take an eagle. The court never considers this
issue in Friday, however, because Friday never made
8
the argument.17
During trial, Nelson White Eagle, a member of the Northern Arapaho tribe, testified concerning using the repository to obtain eagles: "[i]t's
like you, the non-Indian. You know, you don't have a repository for the
Bible,. . . and our Bible is from... the mother earth alone."' 179 Although

Friday never made the argument expressly, Nelson White Eagle's testimony suggests that the Northern Arapaho tribe considers using the repository to obtain an eagle as analogous to forcing a non-Indian to use a
repository to obtain a Bible. 80 Following this logic, even having to ask
permission to take 81an eagle imposes a substantial burden upon Native
American religion.'

zoological exhibition, or educational purposes, or incidental taking, or special purposes consistent
with the purposes of the Act." 50 C.F.R. § 17.32 (2009).
175.
50 C.F.R. § 17.32 (2009).
176.
This is because even if he had been granted a take permit under the BGEPA, he would
still have been precluded from taking the eagle under the ESA.
177.
United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2008).
178.
Id. at 947.
179.
Appellee's Opening Brief at 9, United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-8093).
180.
Id.
181.
Importantly, this argument applies only to the substantial burden portion of the RFRA
analysis. The court in Friday suggested this potential argument as a way that Friday could have
demonstrated a substantial burden without having applied for a permit. However, as previously
noted, as the eagle continues successful recovery, the least restrictive means requirements may
change, and this argument provides a way for an individual to demonstrate a substantial burden
without actually applying for a permit.
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5. Facial Challenges
HI: The Federally-Recognized Tribe
82
Requirement1
As previously mentioned, there is a circuit split with regard to
whether the BGEPA's permitting system, which limits available permits
to members of federally recognized tribes, is the least restrictive means
of effectuating the government's interests.' 83 Here, a future challenge
involves a sincere practitioner of a Native American religion, who is not
a member of a federally recognized tribe, foregoing the permit application process. 184 Unless the government provides evidence that limiting
permits to federally recognized tribal members is the least restrictive way
to protect eagles, the individual might bring a successful challenge to the
facial validity of this portion of the BGEPA permitting scheme.
CONCLUSION

Judge McConnell's opinion in United States v. Friday closed many
avenues for future litigants seeking to challenge the constitutionality of
the BGEPA. The greatest chance of success will arise when a Native
American applies to take an eagle for a religious ceremony and is denied
or experiences undue delay. If prosecuted, the individual will make a
strong case that the permitting system within the BGEPA is not the least
restrictive way for the government to ensure the protection of eagles. In
addition to future as-applied challenges to the BGEPA, future litigants
may successfully challenge the statute's facial validity. One might argue, for example, that the futility standard imposed in Friday was too
strict, or that having to ask permission to practice religion is burdensome,
or that the BGEPA's sole application to federally recognized tribes is
overly restrictive.
The bald eagle has made great strides in its recovery as a species
and is no longer in danger of extinction, and yet the FWS has never
granted a Native American a permit to take a bald eagle. As such, a future litigant bringing an as-applied challenge will make a strong case that
the BGEPA permitting exception for Native American religion is not
conducted in the least restrictive manner. For if the FWS does not intend
to grant bald eagle take permits, why have the exception at all?

182.
50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2009).
183.
Compare United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the government "failed to show that limiting permits for eagle feathers only to members of federally
recognized tribes is the least restrictive means of advancing the government's interests."), with
United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding, "[w]e do not believe that
RFRA requires the government to make the showing that the Tenth Circuit demands of it").
184. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 953 (10th Cir. 2008).
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PEDOPHILES, POLITICS, AND THE BALANCE OF POWER:
THE FALLOUT FROM UNITED STATES V. SCHAEFER AND THE
EROSION OF STATE AUTHORITY
INTRODUCTION

In a September 2007 opinion that triggered a national response, a
three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals absolved Kansas
citizen William Schaefer of his federal convictions for receipt and possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252.1 The court held
that the government failed to prove the interstate elements of Schaefer's
crimes, thereby stripping the federal government of its jurisdiction over
the case.2 The critical issue involved the question of whether Internet use
alone, without any other evidence, is sufficient to prove a nexus to interstate commerce. 3 The court answered this question in the negative, refusing to assume that Schaefer's use of the Internet to view child p6 rnography involved knowing transportation of images across state lines.4
Lacking direct evidence of interstate transport, the court overturned
Schaefer's convictions.5
The Schaefer decision outraged Congress, which promptly responded by passing legislation to extend the reach of federal child pornography
statutes to the full scope of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. 6 With
President George W. Bush's signature on October 8, 2008, federal prosecutors gained jurisdiction over all production, distribution, receipt, and
possession of child pornography that substantially affects interstate
commerce. 7 While this knee-jerk reaction may close the loophole that
allowed Schaefer to walk out of federal prison, it will also limit the application of state child pornography laws by vastly extending the federal
government's intrusion into these traditionally local crimes. Was Congress's sweeping reaction appropriate? Or was it an unwarranted response to a weakly prosecuted case? This Comment argues that Congress overreacted to the Tenth Circuit's Schaefer decision and expanded
federal jurisdiction into an area of law where state statutes provide more
effective solutions.

1. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2007).
2.
Id. at 1198.
3.
Id. at 1200.
4. Id. at 1205.
5.
Id. at 1207.
6. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-52 (West 2009)).
7.
See Rep. Boyda, Attorney General Steve Six Announce New Law to Protect Kansas Kids
From Predators,U.S. FED. NEWS, Oct. 15, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 20424888.
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I. CONGRESS HAS CONSISTENTLY EXPANDED FEDERAL JURISDICTION
OVER CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CRIMES SINCE

1977

The explosive growth of the Internet during the past two decades
has generated myriad benefits, including access to global markets, unimpeded flow of information, and broadening opportunities for entertainment. However, it has also produced tremendous fallout of illicit activity
such as the international exchange of child pornography. 8 Congress's
response to the mushrooming child pornography problem evolved with
the Internet and with the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, following an often repeated pattern of expanding federal jurisdiction.
A. The Protectionof Children Against Sexual ExploitationAct of 1977
During the late 1970s, when the Internet was nothing more than a
loosely-linked network of military and research computers, 9 Congress
enacted the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
1977.10 The act primarily targeted the use of children in commercial
development of obscene pornography and commercial distribution of
obscene child pornography.' This initial federal effort drew motivation
from a woeful lack of state legislation; at the time, only six states prohibited the use of children in the production of pornography. 12 While Congress asserted that sexual exploitation of children was a problem that
could not be "adequately controlled by state and local authorities," it
acknowledged that "[w]hat is needed is a coordinated effort by federal,
state and local law enforcement officials aimed at eradicating this form
of child abuse."' 13 As a result, the act's legislative history expresses congressional intent to limit the scope of the federal power to those proscribed activities involving transportation in the United States mail or "in
interstate or foreign commerce."' 14 Congress viewed the nexus to interstate commerce as "necessary to preserve the balance between the law
enforcement responsibilities of federal officials on one [hand] . . . and
their state and local counterparts, on the other."' 5 Specifically, Congress
intended federal jurisdiction to stop short of "isolated, individual acts...

8. See Laura Ann Forbes, Comment, A More Convenient Crime: Why States Must Regulate
Internet-Related Criminal Activity Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 20 PACE L. REv. 189,
189-90 (1999).
9.
Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNEr SocIETY, Dec. 10, 2003,
http:llwww.isoc.orglinternet/historylbrief.shtml.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-53, 2423
(West 2009)).
Id.
11.
S. REP. No. 95-438, at 10 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40,48.
12.
13.
Id., reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 48.
14.
Id. at 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 53.
15. Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 53.
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. [W]hich
often are more appropriately the subject of state or local con16
cern."
Over the next seven years, federal prosecutors secured only twentyeight indictments under the 1977 law. 17 Congress blamed these meager
results on the legislation's pecuniary restrictions, which limited its appli8
cation to child pornography produced for sale or distribution for sale.'
Recognizing that many producers and distributors of child pornography
often act with prurient motives rather than profit motives, Congress went
back to the drawing board.' 9
B. The Child ProtectionAct of 1984
By the time Congress reevaluated its first-generation child pornography statutes in 1984, at least forty-seven states had enacted laws criminalizing either the distribution of child pornography or the use of
children in the production of pornography.2 0 However, rather than waiting for the states to experiment with additional legislation, Congress
opted to enact the Child Protection Act of 1984.21 This effort closed
many of the loopholes inherent in the 1977 legislation and occupied
much of the remaining legal territory related to production, distribution,
and receipt of child pornography. The 1984 amendments accomplished
this by (1) eliminating the commercial restrictions on federal jurisdiction
over criminal distribution of child pornography, (2) eliminating the obscenity requirement for child pornography crimes, and (3) adding a crime
for reproducing child pornography.22
While the changes effected by the Child Protection Act significantly
broadened its reach, the statutes retained the jurisdictional hooks that
required transport of proscribed materials in the mail or "in interstate or
foreign commerce., 23 These jurisdictional limitations preserved the
principles of federalism, leaving the states free to legislate and prosecute
within the sphere of purely local, intrastate activities while allowing fed16.
Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 53. The initial version of the legislation, Senate
bill S. 1011, 95th Cong. (1977) introduced by Senator William Roth (R-DE), included language
extending federal jurisdiction to knowing transportation, shipment, or mailing of child pornography
"in such a manner as to affect interstate or foreign commerce." Id. at 25, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 60. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, while crediting Senator Roth for
bringing the problem of child pornography to the attention of the Senate, expressly rejected his
proposal because of its jurisdictional deficiencies, which were perceived to extend to "purely local
acts" that "should be left to local authorities." Id at 11, 26, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 48,
61.
17.
H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 2 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493.
18. Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 493.
19. See id., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 493.
20. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 & n.2 (1982).
21.
Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-53, 2423
(West 2009)).
22. H.R. REP. No.98-536, at 7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 498.
23. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-53, 2423
(West 2009)).
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eral investigators to bring their significant resource advantage to bear
against larger, multi-jurisdictional cases of child pornography. The jurisdictional balance struck by the Child Protection Act of 1984 would
gradually tip in favor of the federal government as the exigencies of the
Internet revolution changed the modus operandi of pedophiles around the
world.
C. The Child ProtectionAct of 1988 IncorporatedComputer
Transmissions
Even before the rise of the Internet as the new central nervous system of commerce and communications, Congress modified federal statutes in 1988 to proscribe knowing transportation, shipment, receipt, or
distribution of child pornography in interstate commerce by any means,
including by computer.24 With this change, Congress unambiguously
expanded its jurisdiction in child pornography crimes to include not only
the Internet as a conduit for criminal activity, but electronic data as a
form of proscribed material.2 5
D. Schaefer's Prosecution Under the 2003 PROTECTAct Exemplifies
Expanded FederalJurisdiction
Ultimately, the government prosecuted Schaefer under the
PROTECT Act of 2003, a version of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 substantially
similar to the 1988 Child Protection Act, but with tougher sentences and
penalties. 26 The thirty-year evolution of federal child pornography statutes leading up to Schaefer's conviction and appeal reflect a gradual but
unmistakable expansion of federal jurisdiction. The slow jurisdictional
accretions reflect Congress's efforts to keep pace with the rapidly changing approaches of child pornographers and the dawn of the digital revolution. The initial statute, which proscribed commercial child pornography and preserved a role for state jurisdiction over local crimes, gave
way to an expansive and far-reaching law which, coupled with the proliferation of Internet child pornography, reached right into William Schaefer's personal computer in Kansas. 27
II. UNITED STATES V. SCHAEFER DEMONSTRATES THE EFFECT OF
JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENTS IN FEDERAL STATUTES

During early 2003, William Schaefer used his credit cards to subscribe to five members-only websites allowing access to electronic im-

24. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7511, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§
2251-53, 2423 (West 2009)).
25. See United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 741 (10th Cir. 1999).
26. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (current version at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-53,
2423 (West 2009)). PROTECT is an acronym for Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today. Id.
27.

See United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007).
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ages of child pornography.28 An Immigration and Customs Enforcement
investigation into the company processing his payments led federal authorities to search Schaefer's home, where they seized a desktop computer and several writable compact discs ("CDs"). 29 The computer contained a total of 999 images of child pornography, which were stored in
the computer's unallocated clusters and Internet cache.3 ° Investigators
also found several short video clips and images on the CDs; upon inspection, they determined that eleven of those images contained child pornography. 31 The resulting prosecution and appeal triggered another vast
expansion of federal jurisdiction over child pornography and a questionable federal intrusion into criminal territory typically regulated by states.
A. The DistrictCourt Convicted Schaefer on Thin Evidence
The government charged Schaefer with one count of receiving child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of
possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(4)(B).3 2 Under these statutes, the government must prove that
the images in question or the materials used to create the images were
"mailed, or... shipped or transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce... by any means including by computer..
S., The district court opinion focused almost exclusively on establishing Schaefer's knowing receipt and possession of the images on the CDs,
failing to address the jurisdictional grounds that allowed the government
to prosecute Schaefer under federal law. 34 The conspicuous lack of attention to the interstate elements of the crimes left a gaping hole in the
case and ample grounds for Schaefer's appeal.35
B. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Faceda Difficult Policy Decision
On appeal, Schaefer focused on the jurisdictional elements of §
2252(a) and argued that the government failed to present sufficient facts
showing that the images contained on the CDs actually crossed state
lines. 36 Thus, claimed Schaefer, the government failed to prove the ele28.
Id.; Brief of Appellee at 3, Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197 (No. 06-3080), 2007 WL 1379291.
29.
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198.
30. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 4. As described by the 10th Circuit, unallocated
clusters are "hidden files on the computer hard drive not usually accessible to a user"; the Internet
cache is a file that contains information about recently loaded websites that allow the site to be
loaded faster on subsequent visits. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198 nn.2-3.
31.
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198.
32. Id. at 1197.
33.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (amended 2008).
34.
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1199. Schaefer opted for a bench trial over a jury trial. In its opinion, the district court concluded that Schaefer did not knowingly download the hundreds of images
found on his computer hard drive; rather, his computer automatically stored those images without his
knowledge. However, based on the CD evidence, the court found Schaefer guilty of receiving and
possessing child pornography and handed down two concurrent 70-month prison terms. Id. at 119899 & n.5.
35.
See id. at 1199.
36.
Id. at 1199-1200.
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ment of the crime requiring an interstate nexus. Notably, Schaefer challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, intentionally avoiding a constitutional challenge of the child pornography statutes
themselves.3 7
The significance of this distinction bears heavily upon the court's
analysis. When a defendant challenges the constitutionality of the statutory jurisdictional element, the reviewing court must apply the Commerce Clause analysis developed under United States v. Lopez and its
progeny to determine whether Congress had the authority to regulate the
defendant's conduct under its Commerce power.38 If the court determines that Congress acted within its power, the defendant's challenge
fails and the conviction is upheld.39
However, if the defendant merely challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to satisfy an element of the crime, then the reviewing court
applies a vastly different standard of review: it examines the evidence in
a light most favorable to the government and upholds the conviction unless no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.40 Interpreting the elements of a criminal statute, the court
gives the words of the statute their plain meanings.4
In a feeble effort to defend the convictions, the government offered
the following evidence linking Schaefer's actions to interstate commerce:
(1) Schaefer, who resided in Kansas, paid for access to Internet
websites containing child pornography; the payments were processed
by a New Jersey company with the assistance of a Florida company;
e-mails containing usemames and passwords to the site were sent to
Schaefer's e-mail account which had been issued by a Washington
corporation;
(2) One CD found in Schaefer's possession contained movie clips
and still images of child pornography; the movie clips consisted of
foreign language films and contained embedded Internet addresses;
the still images did not contain Internet addresses, but were "quite
obviously" captured from the movie clips;

Id. at 1200 n.7.
37.
38.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the United States Supreme Court
suggested that the presence of a jurisdictional element limiting the reach of a federal statute may
support the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 561-62. Thus, a challenge to the constitutionality of a
jurisdictional element invokes the Court's Commerce Clause analysis. See United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2006).
See MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 244-45; United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1138-39 (10th
39.
Cir. 2003).
40.
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1199-1200.
Id. at 1201-02, 1204-05 (interpreting plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) , criticizing
41.
the Third Circuit for an interpretation violating the plain terms, and concluding that the plain language of § 2252(a) contains no "Internet exception" to the requirement to prove images moved in
interstate commerce).
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(3) A second CD found in Schaefer's possession contained sexually
explicit images of a child known to federal investigators from previous prosecutions; the government suggested that Schaefer downloaded the images from the Internet to the CD. 42
Based on these facts, the government argued that "[p]roof the images
came from the internet suggests an origin
outside the state, and is suffi43
cient to establish the interstate nexus.
Schaefer countered, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that the jurisdictional element of § 2252(a) requires more than a circumstantial connection to interstate commerce; rather, it requires proof that the images or
materials containing child pornography in the possession of the defendant actually crossed state lines. 44 "[I1t is not enough to assume that an
Internet communication
necessarily traveled across state lines in inter5
state commerce.A
To arrive at this conclusion, the court examined the language of §
2252(a), which incorporates the language "in ... commerce."'46 As the
Supreme Court explained in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, "[t]he
plain meaning of the words 'engaged in commerce' is narrower than the
more open-ended formulations 'affecting commerce' and 'involving
commerce,"' implying that Congress intended to limit the reach of the
statute. 47 Applying this reasoning to § 2252(a), the Tenth Circuit concluded that "the plain terms of [the statute] convey that Congress intended to punish only those who moved images or 'materials' across
state lines." 4 The court's interpretation of the plain statutory language is
borne out by the acknowledged role of the states in the legislative history
of the federal child pornography statutes discussed above.49
Examining the government's case through this jurisdictional lens,
the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient. The interstate
connections provided by the processing of Schaefer's credit card payments bore no relevance to the physical movement of the CDs, or the
images they contained, across state lines.50 Additionally, none of the
evidence provided by the government foreclosed-beyond a reasonable
doubt-the possibility that the CDs in Schaefer's possession were pro51
duced by and obtained from sources entirely within the state of Kansas.
The government offered no convincing evidence that the movie clips or
42.
extracted,
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Brief of Appellee, supranote 28, at 9-10. Numbered items (1) through (3) have been
refined, and organized from the government's arguments in appellee's brief.
Id. at 9; see also Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1202.
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1200-01.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (amended 2008).
532 U.S. 105, 118 (2001).
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1202.
See discussion supra Part I.
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1198-99 & n.4.
See id. at 1201.
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still images were produced outside of Kansas, despite the fact that some
or all of the actors in the movie clips spoke languages other than English.52 Similarly, the appearance of a web address in several movie clips
failed to meet the standard of proof because the government produced no
evidence that the network servers hosting that website resided outside of
Kansas.53 And finally, even if Schaefer downloaded images from the
Internet and burned them onto CDs, the record was silent with respect to
the origin of the CDs and the locations of the network servers that facilitated the image transfers.54 The prosecutors did not even attempt to
prove that the movie clips or images on the CDs were the same as those
residing on Schaefer's computer hard drive. 55 Thus, the government had
not even proven that the images on the CDs resulted from Schaefer's use
of the Internet. Despite previous decisions acknowledging interstate
activity resulting from Internet use,56 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
government's evidence insufficiently linked Schaefer's actions to interstate commerce.5 7
Given the Tenth Circuit's strict textual interpretation of the governing statute, 58 the missing evidence of clear interstate movement of images in Schaefer's possession gave the court little choice but to reverse
the convictions. The court acknowledged that it could have taken judicial notice of the link between the Internet and interstate commerce, giving factual weight to the "vanishingly remote" possibility that the images
did not cross state lines. 59 However, this alternative would invoke the
discretion of the court and expand the jurisdiction of federal child pornography statutes through a judicial act. Alternatively, the court could have
affirmed the convictions based on circumstantial evidence, effectively
holding that a reasonable jury could infer a connection between Internet
communications and interstate commerce without explicit evidence of
52. Id. at 1206.
53. Id. at 1205.
54. Id. at 1206.
55. Id. at 1206 n.11.
56. Precedential decisions in the Tenth Circuit demonstrate the court's willingness to find
interstate connections involving the Internet as well as its insistence that the evidence clearly show
movement of proscribed materials across state lines. In United States v. Kimler, the defendant was
found guilty after the government showed that images he received and distributed were routed
through the e-mail service provider's servers in California and the intemet service provider's ("ISP")
servers in Missouri in addition to arriving or departing from the defendant's Kansas-based computer.
335 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 2003). Similarly, in United States v. Simpson, the government secured a conviction after introducing evidence that images downloaded over the Internet by the defendant traveled from out-of-state websites or electronic bulletin boards to the defendant's computer.
152 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1998). But see United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 744 (10th Cir.
1999) (overturning the defendant's conviction and finding the evidence insufficient to prove the
digital images moved through interstate commerce). The court even showed willingness to recognize an interstate nexus where an e-mail sent between two parties both residing in Utah traveled
through the ISP's servers in Virginia before being routed back to Utah. United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (1Oth Cir. 1999).
57. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1206-07.
58. See discussion supra Part I.B.
59. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1208 & n.8 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting).
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this fact. 60 Despite such holdings in other circuits, however, the Tenth
Circuit declined to take this option.6 '
C. The Tenth Circuit Splitsfrom Her Sister Circuits
The jurisdictional considerations of federal child pornography statutes surfaced in cases decided by other Circuit Courts of Appeals prior
to Schaefer. The Tenth Circuit reviewed these cases and distinguished or
disagreed with each one.
1. The First, Fifth and Third Circuits Equate Internet Use with
Interstate Commerce
In United States v. Carroll,the First Circuit upheld the defendant's
conviction for persuading his thirteen-year-old niece to participate in the
production of sexually explicit photos in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2251(a).6 2 The jurisdictional element in Carroll differed from that in
Schaefer, requiring the government to prove only that the defendant
knew or had reason to know that the photos would be transported in interstate commerce.63 Citing the victim's testimony that Carroll planned
to transport the photographs from New Hampshire to Massachusetts and
then distribute them on the Internet, the First Circuit held that
"[t]ransmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to
moving photographs across
state lines and thus constitutes transportation
64
in interstate commerce."
Relying on the First Circuit's reasoning in Carroll,the Fifth Circuit
came to an identical conclusion in United States v. Runyan,65 "join[ing]
the First Circuit in holding that 'transmission of photographs by means
of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines
and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce' for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2251. "66 But the Fifth Circuit's Runyan opinion
went beyond the holding in Carrolland addressed a second jurisdictional
element that was identical to the one at work in Schaefer.67 Unlike
60. See id. at 1200; see also Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1139-40; United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d
1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2000).
61.
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1203-05.
62.
105 F.3d 740, 741 (1st Cir. 1997). Note that Schaefer was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §
2252, not § 225 1(a).
63. Id. at 741-42. The jurisdictional element of § 2251 (a) only requires a showing of intent to
transport child pornography in interstate commerce. Id. at 741.
64. Id. at 742.
65. 290 F.3d 223, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). Runyan took sexually explicit photographs of a girl
when she was between the ages of fifteen and seventeen and told her that he intended to use the
Internet to sell the photographs internationally. Id. at 232-33, 238-39. Investigators also found CDs
in Runyan's possession containing images of child pornography. ld. at 232.
66. Id. at 239 (quoting Carroll, 105 F.3d at 742). Recall that the jurisdictional element of §
2251 only requires a showing of intent to transport child pornography in interstate commerce.
Carroll,105 F.3d at 741.
67. Recall that the Tenth Circuit interpreted the jurisdictional element as requiring actual
interstate movement of the images of child pornography in question. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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Schaefer, the defendant in Runyan admitted to authorities that he knew
that some of the images found in his possession contained child pornography that had been downloaded from the Internet. 68 Similar to Schaefer, however, one of the images featured an embedded Internet address.
Based on Runyan's admission and the embedded address, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Government adduced sufficient facts to "make a
specific connection between the images introduced at trial and the Internet ....

,,69

However, because a connection to the Internet was not enough to
prove interstate transport, the Fifth Circuit added that "circumstantial
evidence linking a particular image to the Internet (such as... a website
address embedded on the image) can be sufficient evidence of interstate
transportation to support a conviction .... ,70 Thus, not only was the
Fifth Circuit willing to infer a connection between Internet use and interstate commerce where only the intent to transport proscribed materials
was required for conviction, but the court was also willing to make the
inference under a statute requiring actual evidence of interstate transportation.
Finally, the Third Circuit made a similar assumption in United
States v. MacEwan, which addressed an evidentiary challenge similar to
the one in Schaefer.7 1 At trial, the district court convicted MacEwan of
receipt of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) based on
evidence that he had knowingly downloaded child pornography from the
Internet, an act that the district court concluded implicitly involved interstate commerce. 72 On appeal, the Third Circuit held that once "images of
child pornography [leave] the website server and enter[] the complex
global data transmission system that is the Internet, the images [are] being transported in interstate commerce. ' 73 In so holding, the court essentially rewrote the jurisdictional element of the crime, stating that it "does
not matter whether MacEwan downloaded the images from a server located within [his home state] or whether those images were transmitted
across state lines. It is sufficient that MacEwan downloaded those images from the Internet, a system that is inexorably intertwined with interstate commerce. 7 4
Based on these cases from the First, Fifth, and Third Circuits, it is
apparent that courts are willing to embrace the inference that mere Internet use involves interstate commerce for the purpose of satisfying juris-

68.
69.

Runyan, 290 F.3d at 232.
Id. at 242.

70.

Id.

71.
72.
73.
74.

445 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245.
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dictional elements in child pornography cases. However, the Tenth Circuit in Schaefer refused to take this position.
2. The Tenth Circuit Relied on Textual Arguments to Disagree with
Other Circuits
Addressing each of these cases, the Tenth Circuit distinguished or
disagreed with each one based on text of the relevant statute in Schaefer.
First, the court distinguished Carrollon the grounds that the jurisdictional element in that case required only the intent to move photographs
across state lines, 75 whereas actual movement across state lines was required under § 2252 in Schaefer.76 This distinction also applies to the
Runyan case, which relied exclusively on the logic found in Carroll. In
both the Runyan and Carrollcases, the defendants plainly manifested the
necessary intent to use the Internet to distribute child pornography
beyond state boundaries.77 In both cases, therefore, the jurisdictional
requirements of the statute were satisfied independent of the defendant's
use of the Internet. Thus, it was unnecessary for the Runyan and Carroll
courts to equate Internet use with interstate commerce. Because the
holdings in Runyan and Carrollwere logically unnecessary and because
the jurisdictional element in those cases was textually distinguishable,
the Tenth Circuit found the decisions unpersuasive.7 8
Oddly, the Tenth Circuit failed to address the second holding in Runyan, which presumed a connection between Internet use and interstate
commerce for the purpose of showing actual movement of proscribed
images across state lines. 79 Rather, the court addressed this issue in its
treatment of the MacEwan case, with which it respectfully disagreed.
The Tenth Circuit argued that the MacEwan court's interpretation of the
jurisdictional element impermissibly expanded the statute by allowing
convictions to be based merely on the use of an interstate facility (the
Internet) rather than requiring actual proof that images moved across
state boundaries. The Tenth Circuit pointed to other federal statutes in
which Congress specifically used more expansive language to "criminaliz[e] the use of 'any facility of interstate ... commerce.', 8 ° The fact
75.
United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007).
76.
Id. at 1201-02.
77.
Carroll told his victim that he intended to transport the illicit photographs he took in New
Hampshire to his colleague's computer in Massachusetts for scanning. United States v. Carroll, 105
F.3d 740, 742 (lst Cir. 1997). Runyan offered to pay his victim after he sold the images over the
Internet to customers in Japan. United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 232-33, 238-39 (5th Cir.
2002).
78.
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1203-05.
79.
The facts in Runyan closely matched those in Schaefer. Investigators found Runyan in
possession of, among other things, CDs containing child pornography downloaded from the Intemet.
Runyan, 290 F.3d at 232. One of the images contained an embedded Intemet address like the videos
found in Schaefer's possession. Compare id. at 242, with Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1206. As noted
above, the cases also shared a common jurisdictional element requiring actual interstate movement
of images.
80.
Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1205 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2006)).
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that Congress did not use such expansive language in the child pornography statutes at issue in Schaefer and MacEwan prompted the Tenth Circuit to reject the MacEwan court's conclusion that mere Internet use
without a proven interstate transmission satisfied the jurisdictional element of the crime. 8'
In summary, the Tenth Circuit's strict textual interpretation of the
jurisdictional element in Schaefer provided the foundation for the court's
split from her sister circuits and required actual proof that proscribed
images moved between states.82 The Tenth Circuit also held that such
proof could not be inferred from Internet use alone. 83 Because the government produced no evidence that Schaefer's images crossed state lines
other than his Internet use, the Tenth Circuit had no choice but to reverse. The court made an arguably reluctant decision that remained
faithful to the letter of the law 84 and avoided judicial activism. However,
it triggered a rapid response from Congress.

III. NOT IN KANSAS ANYMORE?

CONGRESS'S LEGISLATIVE REACTION
ECLIPSES STATE LAWS

On October 8, 2008, slightly more than thirteen months after the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Schaefer, Congress presented President
George W. Bush the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of
2007, which he signed into law. 85 Not only did Congress respond quickly, it responded comprehensively. The updated legislation unambiguously equates Internet use with interstate commerce and expands federal
jurisdiction over child pornography to the full extent of Congress's
Commerce powers. 86 Congress expressly stated that "[t]he transmission
of child pornography using the Internet constitutes transportation in interstate commerce., 87 In addition, Congress modified the jurisdictional
elements of the child pornography statutes to prohibit any transport,
shipment, distribution, receipt, or possession of such materials "using
any means or facility of interstate ... commerce" or "in or affecting in81.
Id.
82. Id. at 1201-02.
83. Id. at 1202.
84. See id. at 1207-08 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
85. Rep. Boyda, Attorney GeneralSteve Six Announce New Law to Protect Kansas Kids From
Predators,U.S. FED. NEWS, Oct. 15, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 20424888. The bill, authored
by Kansas Representative Nancy Boyda, passed the House of Representatives only 70 days after the
Tenth Circuit's ruling by a vote of 409 to zero. Biggert Combats Child Exploitation:House Passes
Bill to Close Child PornographyLoophole in FederalLaw, STATES NEWS SERV., Nov. 14, 2007.
The Senate required less than a year to add provisions strengthening the federal government's ability
to prosecute Internet child pornographers and then returned the bill to the House for final approval,
which was secured by a margin of 418 to zero on September 26, 2008. Boyda Hails Senate Passage
of Her Bill to Protect Kansas Kids From Predators,STATES NEWS SERV., Sep. 24, 2008; Biggert
Bill To Prevent Child Exploitation Heads To White House: New Legislation Will Close Child PornographyLoophole In FederalLaw, STATES NEWS SERV., Sep. 26, 2008.
86.
See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008).
87.
Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act §102(7).
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terstate" or foreign commerce.88 As the Tenth Circuit itself stated in
Schaefer, Congress's use of the "term 'affecting interstate or foreign
commerce' conveys its intent to exert full Commerce Clause power. 89
With this response, Congress ensured that prosecution of all acts involving child pornography can take place at the federal level-not just in
Kansas anymore.
A. The CurrentState of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Congress's response decisively closed the evidentiary loophole in
Schaefer: no longer must federal prosecutors prove that proscribed images cross state lines "in commerce" to satisfy the jurisdictional element
of federal child pornography statutes. The revised statute now proscribes
all shipment, transportation, distribution, or receipt of child pornography
using any means or facility of interstate commerce or in or affecting interstate commerce. 9° In addition, courts no longer must wrestle with the
assumption that Internet use involves interstate commerce. 9' These
changes will undoubtedly receive constitutional scrutiny in future prosecutions, requiring careful Commerce Clause analysis. The discussion
below summarizes current Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
1. The Lopez Framework for Regulation of Interstate Commerce
Recent Commerce Clause decisions include the trilogy of United
States v. Lopez,92 United States v. Morrison,9 3 and Gonzales v. Raich.94
The Lopez decision established Congress's authority to regulate three
areas under the Commerce Clause: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; 95 (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; 96 and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.9 7 Disputed applications
of Commerce Clause power tend to involve the third aspect of Congress's power. In Lopez,98 the Court considered four factors to determine
whether Congress can constitutionally regulate a given activity under the
Commerce power: (1) whether the regulated activity is economic; (2) the
presence of a statutory jurisdictional element limiting the statute's application to interstate activities; (3) legislative findings linking the prohi88.
89.
90.

Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act § 103.
United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007).
See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act § 103.

91.
92.

See id. § 102(7).
514 U.S. 549 (1995).

93.

529 U.S. 598 (2000).

94.

545 U.S. 1 (2005).

95. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. Channels of interstate commerce include such things as the
interstate highway system and the waters of the United States.
96.

Id. Instrumentalities of interstate commerce include people and things in interstate com-

merce like vehicles, aircraft, and interstate shipments.
97. Id. at 558-59.
98.
The defendant in Lopez challenged § 922(q) of the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990
(GFSZA), which prohibited possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school zone. Id. at 551
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
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bited activity to interstate commerce; and (4) the degree of attenuation
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. 99 Having established this analytical framework in Lopez, the Court later applied it in
Morrison and Raich.
2. Applying Lopez to Potentially Non-Economic Activities
Both Morrison and Raich addressed potentially non-economic activities, but the Court treated each differently. Addressing the issue of
violence against women in Morrison, the Court confirmed the value of
statutory jurisdictional elements'0° and congressional findings 01 when it
struck down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. The court found
that neither factor provided dispositive grounds to uphold the federal
statute, which regulated non-commercial activities. 102 In so holding, the
court implied that such statutes may require a closer nexus to interstate
13
commerce than statutes regulating purely economic activities. 0
Reaching the Supreme Court five years after Morrison, the case of
Gonzales v. Raich represents a situation where the Court found sufficient
grounds to uphold federal regulation of non-commercial activity: the
growth, possession, and distribution of medical marijuana prohibited
under the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"). 1°4 The Court found that
Congress could rationally regulate home-grown, non-commercial medical marijuana because it was "part of an economic 'class of activities'
that [has] a substantial effect on interstate commerce,"' 1 5 and failure to
control this source of marijuana could undercut the government's execution of the broader war on drugs.1°6 The Raich decision suggests that the
Court viewed home cultivation of medical marijuana as an activity with
such a close connection to interstate commerce that the non-commercial
99. Id. at 559-68; Tara M. Stuckey, Note, JurisdictionalHooks in the Wake of Raich: On
Properly Interpreting FederalRegulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOIRE DAME L. REV. 2101,
2109 (2006). Ultimately, the Lopez majority concluded that possession of a firearm near a school
was not an inherently economic activity, and was in fact severely attenuated from interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. The additional lack of a jurisdictional element or congressional
findings linking gun possession to interstate activity provided the Court with ample evidence that the
challenged statute exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power. Id. at 561-63.
100. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). In Morrison, the Court considered § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provided a federal civil
cause of action for victims of gender violence. Id. at 601-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994 &
Supp. 1995)). The Court in Morrison held that the lack of a jurisdictional hook contributed to the
unconstitutionality of the statute and cited other provisions of VAWA that appropriately included
jurisdictional hooks. Id. at 613 & n.5, 626-27; Stuckey, supra note 99, at 2109-10.
101.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15. Notably, VAWA's preamble included extensive congressional findings linking violence against women to negative impacts on interstate commerce. Id.
102.
Id. at 613-15.
103.
See id. at 611.
104.
545 U.S. 1 (2005). The plaintiffs in Raich challenged the government's ability under the
Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") to seize their medical marijuana, arguing that their operations
represented strictly intrastate, non-commercial activity. Id. at 7-8 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801 etseq.
(2000)).
105.
Id. at 17.
106. Id. at 26-27.
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product could easily enter the interstate commercial market. Most importantly, the Court provided Congress with a legislative alternative to
the jurisdictional element-in situations involving a broad statutory
scheme such as the CSA, the Court would generally avoid striking down
narrow, individual provisions of the applicable law. 107
In summary, Congress may comfortably regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 0 8 However, where Congress
chooses to regulate under the third prong of its Commerce Power-in
areas substantially affecting interstate commerce-two options exist.
First, if Congress enacts a specific, narrow statute, it must demonstrate
an adequate connection to interstate commerce through congressional
findings, use of a jurisdictional hook, or, preferably, both. 1°9 Second,
where Congress enacts a sweeping statute addressing multiple, interrelated economic activities, less evidence of an interstate nexus may be
required.1 10 The future of Commerce Clause jurisprudence remains an
open question; the recent amendments to federal child pornography statutes may raise controversies that prompt answers from the federal
courts.
B. Looming Commerce Clause Questions Related to Federal Child
PornographyStatutes
The 2008 amendments to federal child pornography laws eliminated
several statutory loopholes. First, Congress clearly equated the movement of child pornography over the Internet with interstate commerce,
regardless of whether images actually cross state lines. 1 ' Congress also
added all facilities of interstate commerce to the proscribed means of
transporting child pornography,' 12 again implicating all Internet facilities
such as servers, telephone and cable lines, and cellular phones. The statutory modifications ensured that the courts will never again lack statutory jurisdiction to uphold the convictions of purveyors and consumers of
Internet child pornography. However, the changes also present two important questions. First, does Congress have the authority to regulate
purely intrastate occurrences of child pornography solely because it utilizes or occurs over the Internet? And second, do the revised statutes
expand into areas beyond what was required to close the evidentiary loophole in Schaefer?

107.

Stuckey, supra note 99, at 2124.

108.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).

109.
See United States v. Morrson, 529 U.S. 598, 613-18 (2000).
110.
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 26-33.
111.
Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102(7), 122
Stat. 4001, 4002 (2008).

112.

Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act § 103.
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1. The Aggregation Principle Allows Federal Regulation of Purely
Intrastate Activity
In the New Deal Era case of Wickard v. Filburn, a single farmer's
violation of federal wheat growing quotas-where the excess wheat was
consumed on the individual's farm-was found to frustrate federal regulation of the national wheat supply. 113 On the assertions that local activi-

ties substantially affecting interstate commerce can be regulated by Congress' 4 and that, in the aggregate, local consumption of wheat grown in
excess of quotas substantially affected the interstate wheat market, 5 the
Supreme Court upheld federal fines levied against the defendant. Furthermore, the Supreme Court upheld this aggregation principle and extended it to non-economic or quasi-economic goods in the Raich deci1 16
sion, discussed above.'
Based on Wickard and Raich, the ability of Congress to regulate
purely local incidences of child pornography1 17 simply because they involve the Internet rests on the argument that, in the aggregate, an increase in purely local use of the Internet to distribute, view, and download child pornography may have a significant effect on the overall interstate supply and availability of child pornography on the Internet. Thus,
Congress likely enjoys the authority to regulate purely intrastate activity
solely because it utilizes or occurs over the Internet. The expansion of
federal child pornography statutes following Schaefer unquestionably
achieves these regulatory goals. But did the revisions go beyond what
was required to prevent the next William Schaefer from avoiding prison?
2. Going Beyond Schaefer: Congress Expands Federal Jurisdiction
to Purely Local Activity
What if Schaefer had been caught in possession of non-digital images depicting the sexual exploitation of children? Similarly, what if
Schaefer had entered an adult bookstore intending to view locallyproduced child pornography? The revised federal statutes appear to prohibit these activities as well.' 18

113.
114.

317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Id. at 125.

115.

Id. at 127-28.

116.

See discussion supra Part III.A.2.

117.
Such a case would occur where a defendant accesses images of child pornography via the
Internet but where the source of the images and all of the communications facilities utilized reside in
the same state as the defendant.
118.
The revised federal child pornography statutes prohibit any transportation, shipment,
distribution, or receipt of child pornography using any means or facility of interstate commerce or in
or affecting interstate commerce. In addition, the statutes proscribe knowingly possessing or accessing, with the intent to view, any child pornography that has been transported or shipped using any
means or facility of interstate commerce or in or affecting interstate commerce. Effective Child
Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, §§ 103, 203, 122 Stat. 4001, 4002-04
(2008).
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a. Purely Intrastate Possession of Child Pornography
Proponents of federal regulation of purely intrastate possession argue against the constitutionality of the revised statutes based on the noninfinity principle, a concept that prohibits endless aggregation of intrastate activity that would give the federal government "unlimited power to
regulate all activity, including activity that has historically been the province of the states .

. . ."1

9 Indeed, the Lopez Court found that intrastate

possession of an item was not necessarily economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.1 20 In addition, producers and consumers of child pornography often exchange images of children by gifting
rather than by purchasing,12 increasing the degree to which their activities are separated from commerce. These factors suggest that the revised
jurisdictional element which expands federal powers to any possession of
child pornography substantially affecting interstate commerce fails as a
meaningful restriction of federal jurisdiction, and therefore fails constitutional scrutiny.
On the other hand, non-digital images of child pornography sadly
achieve a quasi-economic character more similar to Raich's marijuana
than Lopez's firearm: they are highly sought after by a group of offenders, and even these non-digital images could easily enter the stream of
interstate and foreign commerce with a few clicks of a mouse in today's
world. Furthermore, the statutory scheme of the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act employs a broad approach to eliminate both the
supply of and demand for child pornography. 122 This scheme, combined
with the quasi-economic character of pornographic images of children,
may combine to place future intrastate possession cases within the
framework of Gonzalez v. Raich. Under such a scenario, a court would
likely find that the federal statutes represent a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce authority because failure to regulate the purely local
possession of child pornography would undermine the broader federal
statutory scheme by failing
to address a cumulatively large supply of the
123
materials.
proscribed
b. Accessing Child Pornography with the Intent to View
While the prohibitions on production, transportation, and distribution of child pornography attempt to eradicate the supply of such materials, a new provision of the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution
119.

Susanna Frederick Fisher, Between Scylla And Charybdis: The DisagreementAmong the

Federal Circuitsover Whether Federal Law Criminalizingthe Intrastate Possessionof Child Porno-

graphy Violates the Commerce Clause, 10 NExus 99, 101 (2005).
120.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-68 (1995).
121.
E.g., Dan X. McGraw, Ex-Pastor Guilty of Child Porn: Former Methodist Minister Admitted Trading Images Online, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 20, 2009, at 2B.

122.

Cf Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24-29 (2005).

123.

See id. at 31-32.
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Act attempts to curb demand by prohibiting any person from knowingly
accessing child pornography with the intent to view.' 24 This provision
creates the ultimate expression of Congressional intent to prohibit individual, intrastate acts, and seemingly reaches every act of seeking out
child pornography, regardless of its source. The critical statutory question related to this provision is whether the required state of mindknowingly-applies to the nature of the images or materials in question
as child pornography. As amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) reads:
Any person who . . . knowingly accesses with intent to view, 1 or
more [materials] which contain any visual depiction that has been
mailed, or has been shipped or transported using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which
have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if-(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as
provided .... 125
If the mens rea includes knowledge that the visual depiction involves the
use of a minor, the revised statute may fall within the scope of Gonzales
v. Raich as an essential component of a broad regulatory scheme. 126
However, if the mental state does not apply to the use of a minor in the
accessed and viewed images, this provision may also ensnare individuals
who access and view images that they believe depict adults engaged in
sexually explicit conduct. Such a scenario would result in strict liability
for engaging in legal, though perverse, conduct. As an example, consider the case of a producer of adult pornography who mass produces videos
and images involving a seventeen-year-old actor or actress. Suppose the
distributed videos and images either lack statements or contain false
statements establishing the majority age of all depicted persons. 127 Anyone knowingly accessing these videos or images in any situation may be
liable under § 2252 unless the mens rea is extended to include knowledge that the actor or actress is a minor.
Upcoming enforcement actions will determine the constitutional validity of the revised federal child pornography statutes. For now, it is
sufficient to note that the amendments represent a vast and perhaps ques124.
Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 203, 122
Stat. 4001,4003-04 (2008).
125.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
126.
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 28-29. This reading of Raich is fairly broad. In Raich, the Court
addressed the issue of production of non-economic or quasi-economic goods rather than possession
or accessing such goods with the intent to view. However, the breadth of Raich remains unsettled.
For purposes of this discussion, a wide reading of Raich brings within its scope the statutory prohibition of accessing child pornography with the intent to view.
127.
See 'Girls Gone Wild' Company, Founder to Pay $2.3M in Sexual Exploitation Case,
FoxNEWS.COM, Sept. 13, 2006, http:lwww.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,213496,00.html.
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tionable expansion of federal jurisdiction. A reasonable reading of the
revised statutory landscape leaves no conceivable act related to child
pornography outside of the purview of the federal government.
IV. THE UNFORTUNATE EFFECT OF SCHAEFER ON STATE LAWS

The outcome of Schaefer likely resulted from deficient investigation
and prosecution rather than deficient federal statutes. Schaefer's prosecutors plainly misunderstood the evidence required to satisfy the jurisdictional element of the federal child pornography statutes and failed to
produce any facts linking the images in Schaefer's possession to the Internet or showing the movement of images across state lines. 128 Such
evidence appears relatively simple to obtain, as evidenced by the number
129
of Internet child pornography convictions upheld by the Tenth Circuit.
The Schaefer decision was arguably the correct outcome of the 1law,
even
30
though it secured the freedom of an obviously guilty pedophile.
No sensible person would argue that the federal government should
be soft on criminals engaging in or supporting the child pornography
market. Yet the question of how to be tougher on crime deserves a more
thoughtful response than simply broadening federal statutes to include
more criminal activity, especially in cases where relevant state statutes
provide effective means to achieve the desired result. The critical issue
that has not been addressed is whether federal prosecution of Schaefer
was appropriate at all.
A. ProsecutingSchaefer Under Kansas Statutes Would Have Secured a
Conviction
Kansas maintains broad prohibitions on sexual exploitation of children, covering any act of enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit
conduct. 13' The statute also prohibits possession of any visual depiction
of a minor engaged in such activity.1 32 Jurisdictional clauses requiring
movement of persons or images across designated boundaries remain
logically absent from the state statutes since the Kansas legislature, un128.
See Brief of Appellee, supra note 28, at 6-10.
129. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1202-03 (2007); see also United States v. Kimter, 335 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Wilson, 182 F.3d 737, 744 & n.4 (10th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1998).
130.
See Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1207-08 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
131.
KAN.STAT.ANN. §21-3516(a) (2008).
Sexual exploitation of a child is: (1) ... employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing
or coercing a child under 18 years of age to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the
purpose of promoting any performance; (2) possessing any visual depiction, including
any photograph, film, video picture, digital or computer generated image or picture,
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical or other means, where such visual
depiction of a child under 18 years of age is shown or heard engaging in sexually explicit
conduct with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires or appeal to the prurient interest
of the offender, the child or another ....

Id.
132.

Id.
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like Congress, is not a creature of limited legislative authority. Thus, any
violation occurring within Kansas-whether or not in connection with
the Internet-may be prohibited based on the state's plenary police powers. The evidence presented during Schaefer's trial easily satisfied the
elements of the Kansas law, and would have secured an unassailable
conviction at the state level.
The main differences between the federal and state statutes in this
case involved sentencing, which varied based upon the age of the victim
at the time the crime was committed. 33 Since the available facts provide
no insight into the ages of the children used to produce the images in
Schaefer's possession, little can be said about the potential severity of his
sentence under Kansas law. But make no mistake - prosecuting Schaefer
under federal law resulted in acquittal, where the same evidence in a
Kansas courtroom would have put Schaefer in jail for at least fifty
months.
B. Should the FederalGovernment ProsecuteAll Crimes Tangentially
Involving the Internet?
As described in Part IV of this Comment, Congress reacted to the
Tenth Circuit's Schaefer reversal by expanding federal jurisdiction to the
limits of the Commerce power.134 But is this the most appropriate response to a mismanaged prosecution? Just because the federal government has the power to regulate crimes potentially affecting interstate
commerce does not mean that it should. Currently, federal statutes contain thousands of crimes, including many that address the core interests
of states in protecting the health and safety of their citizenry. 135 As more
criminals like William Schaefer begin to avail themselves of opportunities presented by the Internet, this number is sure to grow. In addition,
the federal government is likely to continue its expansion into local crim36
inal law because of the political benefits to incumbent lawmakers.'
Many commentators have addressed the expansion of federal power
through the Commerce Clause; however, the impact of the Internet on
this evolution merits special attention.
133.
The first offense for sexual exploitation of a minor in Kansas carries a minimum sentence
of 50 months in prison, while a similar offense under the federal statute involves a 60 month jail
sentence. Likewise, repeat offenders in Kansas face shorter prison sentences (9 to 10 years) than
they would at the federal level (15 to 40 years). An exception to the Kansas sentencing guidelines
exists if the victim is less than 14 years of age; in such a case, a mandatory hard sentence (which
allows no early parole) of 25 years imprisonment may be imposed for a first offense. Second and
third offenses in Kansas where the victim is less than 14 years old receive hard sentences of 40 years
and life without parole, respectively. Compare Kansas Sentencing Guidelines, Office of the District
Attorney, Sedgwick County (2005), http://www.sedgwickcountyorg/da/sentencinggrid.html, and
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3516(c), 21-4643 (2008), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(b) (West 2009).
134.
See discussion supra Part IH.
135.
See Ryan K. Stumphauzer, Note, ElectronicImpulses, DigitalSignals, and FederalJurisdiction: Congress's Commerce Clause Power in the Twenty-First Century, 56 VAND. L. REv. 277,
284 (2003).
136. Id. at 285.
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1. Principles of Notice, Consistency and Federalism Present
Competing Arguments Regarding Federal Regulation of
Activities Involving the Internet
Readily apparent jurisdictional boundaries do not exist on the Internet,' 37 with the exception of some state government websites and some
non-American websites that indicate a state or country of origin in their
web address. As a result, many Internet users have little notice as to
whether they have crossed jurisdictional boundaries while surfing the
web. 138 Some commentators argue in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction over the Internet because websites provide insufficient notice of
potential jurisdiction in other locations.' 39 Congressional findings related
to the Internet Tax Freedom Act support this argument: "Addresses on
the Internet are designed to be geographically indifferent. Internet
transmissions are insensitive to physical distance and can have multiple
geographical addresses." 4° The findings also stated that it is "infeasible
to separate domestic intrastate Internet transmissions from interstate and
foreign Internet transmissions. 1 41 Thus, concerns about uniformity of
law and 1jurisdictional
notice favor exclusive federal regulation of the
42
Internet.
However, as communications in the United States and worldwide
increasingly rely on the backbone of the Internet and other new technologies, a growing number of local crimes will incorporate interstate components ranging from routing an e-mail or file transfer across state lines
to utilizing cell phone towers located in multiple states. 143 Many crimes
now committed using the Internet and other inherently interstate systems
have typically been the province of state governments-"the 'ordinary'
crimes that target random citizens."' 144 This expansion of federal power
was a cause for concern for judges and states during the early stages of
the Internet's growth as a publicly available tool. In United States v.
Paredes, 45 the judge warned that the quickening pace of technological
advancement would allow the federal government "to prosecute types of
crimes from which it was barred in recent years, thus expanding the jurisdiction of the federal government to surpass that originally contem137.
Charles R. Topping, Note, The Surf Is Up, But Who Owns the Beach?-Who Should
Regulate Commerce on the Internet?, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 179, 189-90
(1999).
138. Id. at 189.
139. See id. at 189-90, 220-22.
140.
S. 442, 105th Cong. § 2(2), 144 CONG. REC. S11269-01 (1998) (enacted).
141.
Id. § 2(3).
142. See id. § 2(8).
143. See Stumphauzer, supra note 135, at 282.
144. Forbes, supra note 8, at 195.
145. 950 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), overruled by United States v. Perez, 404 F.3d 302 (2d
Cit. 2005). Paredesinvolved a murder-for-hire case in which the defendant challenged his conviction under federal statute, arguing that no interstate nexus existed despite the use of a paging system
with interstate capabilities during the crime. 950 F. Supp. at 584-85; Forbes, supra note 8, at 209-
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plated by the framers 'of
the Constitution, who feared an excessively cen46
tralized government."'
2. For Child Pornography Crimes, Cooperative Federalism
Provides a Robust Solution
Exercise of the federal power requires constant justification through
the use of jurisdictional elements or broad statutory schemes that potentially eclipse state laws. 147 By revising federal statutes in the wake of
Schaefer, Congress chose the latter option in the case of child pornography and went beyond regulation of crimes involving the Internet into
purely local crimes often prosecuted by states. However, as demonstrated in Schaefer, such broad federal regulation can prevent simpler and
more effective state solutions from securing needed convictions as states
decide to conserve their resources and defer to federal prosecutors. In
addition, federal laws that reach all local crimes threaten states' ability to
adopt different approaches to regulation. In the example of child pornography, states may wish to experiment with rehabilitation of first time
offenders or deal differently with crimes involving possession or accessing of proscribed images. The manner in which Congress expanded federal jurisdiction over local child pornography crimes virtually assures
constitutional challenges based on Congress's ability to regulate these
local activities. Regrettably, more child pornographers may go free as
courts resolve this complicated issue.
148
In the future, Congress should spend more than just a few weeks
considering the consequences of dramatic expansions of federal police
powers such as the one seen in the wake of Schaefer. A better alternative
would be to allow states "to preside over cases where there is a substantial vested interest in protection of the state's citizenry.' 4 9 This approach does not necessarily preclude federal involvement. Federal resources could still support state pursuit of the exploding number of local
crimes that, because of technology use, tangentially implicate interstate
commerce. The binary approach of federal versus state jurisdiction
should yield to a cooperative approach of utilizing federal resources in
combination with less complicated, and often more successful, state
laws. In Schaefer's case, such an approach would surely have secured a
conviction.
CONCLUSION

William Schaefer was guilty of possessing child pornography.
Without question, he was guilty under Kansas law; he should have found
no relief in the federal statutes under which he was tried. However, be146.
147.
148.
149.

Paredes,950 F. Supp. at 590; Forbes, supra note 8, at 210.
See Commerce Clause discussion supra Part ml.A.
See supra note 85.
Forbes, supra note 8, at 206.

2009]

UNITED STATES V. SCHAEFER

1177

cause of poor prosecution and decision making, Schaefer escaped conviction on an evidentiary technicality. Prosecutors at the federal level
must recognize that state laws are often less complicated and more capable than federal laws at catching and convicting local criminals. The rise
of the Internet has grafted an interstate component onto many traditionally local crimes,15 ° providing a politically ripe opportunity for Congress to
expand its jurisdiction and intrude into areas of criminal law typically
regulated by states.
In response to Schaefer's acquittal, Congress invoked its Commerce
Power to expand federal jurisdiction over crimes involving child pornography. 151 This expansion arguably leaves no act involving child pornography beyond the reach of federal authorities. In the rush to appear
tough on crime, however, federal lawmakers left the amended statutes
open to constitutional scrutiny-an act that may result in acquittal of
more criminals who could easily be jailed under state laws. Before intruding on areas of law traditionally left to the states, Congress should
consider innovative ways for the federal government to utilize effective
state statutes to achieve their goals. The Internet has allowed criminals
to innovate. Why should it not have the same effect on Congress?

David M. Frommell*

150. Id. at 195.
151.
Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 Stat.
4001 (2008).
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FINDING THE "ETERNAL AND UNREMITTING FORCE"' OF

HABEAS CORPUS: § 2254(D) AND THE NEED FOR DE Novo
REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
2

In Wilson v. Sirmons, the Tenth Circuit was placed in a rare and
important position to address a question that has divided the federal circuits regarding the availability of habeas corpus relief for state prisoners.
Namely, the Tenth Circuit was to decide whether federal courts should
apply de novo review to the decisions of state courts when new evidence
in support of a constitutional claim was presented for the first time in
federal court. Put more precisely, the question was whether § 2254(d)
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies
to federal habeas corpus claims that rely on newly found evidence that
the state court did not consider when reaching its capital conviction.4 As5
the abundance of litigation over the application of § 2254(d) indicates,
this is a question of paramount importance in the field of habeas corpus.
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit came to the correct decision in limiting the scope of § 2254(d) and instead chose to apply de
novo review to these kinds of federal habeas appeals. In Parts I and II,
this Comment describes the history of habeas corpus, the background of
the AEDPA, and the Supreme Court precedent in interpreting § 2254(d).
Part III highlights the important precedent of de novo review that
hatched from the Tenth Circuit. Part IV briefly looks at how other Federal Circuit courts have split on the proper scope of § 2254(d). Finally,
Part V examines how federal courts have misapplied § 2254(d), and argues that federal courts should return to the procedural requirements of
granting a "full and fair" hearing for habeas appeals. Moreover, as a
matter of equity and statutory construction, this Comment argues that the
courts should follow the Tenth Circuit's Wilson decision and apply de
novo review when "new" evidence is presented in federal court.
I. BACKGROUND OF HABEAS CORPUS

AND THE

AEDPA

Habeas corpus, a Latin phrase meaning "to have the body," is a writ
used to bring a person before the court when the legality of the person's

1.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) in ERIC M. FREEDMAN,

HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 159 n. 18 (2001).

2.
3.
4.
5.

536 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1073-74.
Id. at 1079.
See infra Part IV.
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imprisonment or detention is at issue.6 Habeas corpus is better known as
"the Great Writ," because, as Blackstone famously stated, it is "the most
celebrated writ in the English law" and remains "the stable bulwark of
our liberties." 7 Celebrated as it may be, the "Great Writ" has been greatly curtailed in recent years.
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 8 which codified many of the limitations set forth by the Supreme Court,9 while imposing a series of new and unprecedented limitations on the writ.' 0 One change of particular importance was to
§ 2254(d), which established a new standard of review for federal courts
to apply to state court decisions." Under § 2254(d), federal courts are
barred from granting habeas claims that were "adjudicated on the merits"
in state courts unless: (1) the decision was contrary to, or was an unreasonable application of, "clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court;" or (2) the decision resulted in an "unreasonable
determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
12
court proceeding."'
Accordingly, one of the major issues of § 2254(d) after the enactment of the AEDPA was determining how deferential federal courts
ought to be to state court decisions. For starters, many commentators
question the very the idea that § 2254(d) establishes a standard of review,
arguing instead that § 2254(d) is better understood as a limitation on relief.13 Moreover, the provisions within § 2254(d) remain intensely de6.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). in addition to issues of imprisonment,
habeas corpus is also used as a way to ask the court to review (1) the regularity of the extradition
process, (2) the right to or the amount of bail, or (3) the jurisdiction of a court that has imposed a
criminal sentence. Id.
7.

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.

8. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
9. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 381,
415 (1996) ("There is no denying that § 2254(d) captures something like the descriptions of 'new'
rules that appear in the Teague cases."); Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 501, 530-35 (2008) (pointing out that Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), further expanded the amount of deference the Supreme Court was willing to give state courts-and legislatures-in deciding what proportional punishment is).
10. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REv.
443, 506 (2007) (observing that the AEDPA went beyond the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to codify
jurisdiction limitations to: (1) most successive federal petitions, (2) most unexhaustive claims that
are deemed frivolous, and (3) any claim filed outside of the one year statute of limitations).
11.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
12.
Id.; See also Justin Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA
§ 2254(D)(2) and (E)(1), 82 TUL. L. REv. 385, 405 (2007) (explaining that § 2254(d) is a limit on,
and not a condition for, habeas relief).
13.
See, e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REv. 259,
284 (2006) (characterizing the majority of habeas corpus cases as governed by the AEDPA and
"§ 2254(d)'s limitation on relief provision."); Melissa M. Berry, Seeking Clarity in the Federal
Habeas Corpus Fog: Determining What Constitutes "clearly established law" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 747, 749 n.9 (2005) (agreeing with
the limitation on relief interpretation, and citing JAMES S. LIEEMAN & RANDY HERTZ, 2 FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 32.1, at 1419-21 (4th ed. 2001)); id at 1421
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bated. Primarily, the meaning of the phrases "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of' under § 2254(d)(1) have been the subject of various law review articles.' 4 As for § 2254(d)(2), commentators have debated what is actually
required for "an unreasonable determination of the
15
facts" to occur.

In recent decades, much of the § 2254(d) puzzle has been addressed
in a patchwork of Supreme Court decisions; there remains, however, a
critical gap in the jurisprudence. Specifically, § 2254(d)(1) fails to provide an adequate way to resolve federal habeas claims that proffer entirely new, potentially exculpatory, evidence on appeal. New exculpatory
evidence does not fit neatly into the § 2254(d)(1) framework because it is
not clear whether the claim was ever actually "adjudicated on the merits"
without the newly obtained evidence. That is to say, § 2254(d)(1) only
applies to claims "adjudicated on the merits," and when a federal court
has new evidence, there are significant reasons to doubt whether the
claim adjudicated in federal court is really the same as the claim adjudicated in state court. Accordingly, when there is significant new evidence
that comes up on appeal, including mitigating evidence that might have
had a direct impact on the sentencing on the defendant, it is entirely unclear whether § 2254(d)(1) even applies. In accordance with the Tenth
Circuit decision in Wilson, this Comment argues that when this kind of
situation arises, the only option available to addressing such habeas
claims is de novo review of the state court decision.
II. THE EXISTING § 2254(d) FRAMEWORK
A. Williams v. Taylor
Williams v. Taylor was the first Supreme Court case to interpret
§ 2254(d) after the enactment of the AEDPA.16 In Williams, the Court
produced two controlling opinions, one by Justice O'Connor and the
other by Justice Stevens. 17 In the O'Connor opinion, the Court held that
under § 2254(d)(1) a state court decision is "contrary to" federal law
when (1) the state court applies a rule that "contradicts the governing law
set forth in our cases,"'18 or (2) the state court decision "confronts a set of
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court
("[S]ection 2254(d)(1) operates as a 'constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant...
the writ .. " (first omission in original)(quoting Williams, infra note 33)); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.1, at 862 (4th ed. 2003) ("Technically, federal court consideration of
the habeas corpus petition is not considered a direct review of the state court decision: rather, the
petition constitutes a separate civil suit filed in federal court and is termed collateralrelief.")).
14.
See Berry, supra note 13, at 749 n.12 (providing an extensive list of law review articles
written on § 2254(d)(1)).
15.
See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 12, at 385 (discussing the deference owed to state findings
of fact); John K. Chapman, Note, Rewriting the Great Writ: Standardsof Review for Habeas Corpus Under the New 28 U.S.C. §2254, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1874-76 (1997).
16.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
17.
Id. at 367, 399.
18.
Id. at 405.
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and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." 9 As
for the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the O'Connor
opinion concluded that a state court's decision is unreasonable only if it
"correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably
to the facts of a particular case.",20 Thus, the O'Connor opinion declared
that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law, ' 2' thereby advancing a more deferential standard of review to state court decisions.22
Although the Court produced two controlling opinions by both
O'Connor and Stevens, O'Connor's opinion defining the "contrary to"
and "unreasonable application" clauses of § 2254(d)(1) garnered the majority vote. And, according to one commentator, the O'Connor opinion
was principally important for beginning to establish which standard of
review is required under § 2254(d).23 Williams signified a departure
from Brown v. Allen 24 and the so-called "Golden Era" of habeas, with
federal courts now having to defer to state court decisions even when
federal courts might have reached a different conclusion. 5 In other
words, "[e]ven if the state court ruling is incorrect-that is, even if a
federal court exercising independent judgment would reach a different
conclusion-federal habeas relief is available only if the state court's
application of established Supreme Court law is unreasonable." 26 Thus,
it was the legacy of O'Connor's opinion, rather than Stevens's, that controlled the analytical framework of § 2254(d) for future cases. After
Williams, then, it was clear that if § 2254(d)(1) applied, relief was not
available unless the state court's adjudication was unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law.
B. Lockyer v. Andrade
In Lockyer v. Andrade, the Supreme Court further clarified how severe the limitations implied by § 2254(d)(1) actually were. 27 In Lockyer,
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit by applying § 2254(d)(1) to the sentencing of a repeat offender. 8 For the "unreasonable application" clause
of § 2254(d)(1), the Court concluded that the standards of "clear error"
and "unreasonableness" are different because the "gloss of clear error
19. Id. at 406.
20. Id. at 407-08.
21.
Id. at 410 (emphasis in original).
22.
Id. at 411 ("[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.").
23.
Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners: How
Should AEDPA 's Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 WIs. L. REv. 1493,
1507 (2001).
24.
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
28.
Id. at 71.
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fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even
clear error) with unreasonableness. 29 In other words, unreasonableness
was a more deferential, higher standard to reach for the purposes of §
2254(d)(1). The Court thus defined the unreasonableness standard as
when a state court decisions rested on an application of federal law so
"erroneously or incorrectly" that the application itself is "objectively
unreasonable. 3 °
Lockyer's definition of "objective" reasonableness underscores the
importance of determining when § 2254(d)(1) applies. As one commentator lamented, after Lockyer, § 2254(d)(1) appears to narrow the qualified immunity framework in civil suit actions for damages under
§ 1983. 3' In effect, this would allow state judges greater protection in
determining federal claims in state courts the same way that "the law of
qualified immunity shield[s] executive officers administering state policies in the field.",32 Thus, Lockyer reflects the Court's willingness to
impose extraordinary deference on federal habeas courts in reviewing
state court decisions. Lockyer does not, however, nor has any Supreme
Court decision for that matter, define the necessary conditions for the
application of § 2254(d)(1).
Accordingly, at present lower courts are left in something of a bind.
After Williams and Lockyer, two fundamental messages emerged: (1) the
unreasonableness clause of § 2254(d)(1) was intended to establish substantial deference to state court decisions that were adjudicated on the
merits; but, on the other hand, (2) no clear guidelines were provided as to
when § 2254(d)(1) actually applied. 33 The Tenth Circuit's Wilson decision does much to resolve this dilemma.
1I. DE Novo REVIEW FROM THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In light of both the severity and lack of clarity in applying
§ 2254(d)(1), the Tenth Circuit recognized the procedural due process
issues inherent in deferring to a state court decision that ignored new
extrinsic evidence made available on appeal. 34 To address this problem,
the Tenth Circuit adopted de novo review in certain instances when new
evidence is admitted in federal court.35 By applying de novo review to
federal habeas appeals that involve new extrinsic evidence, the Tenth
Circuit avoids the pitfalls of due process that were involved with other

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.at 75.
Id. at 76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411).
Yackle, supra note 9, at 403-04.
Id. at 404.
Steinman, supra note 24, at 1509-10.
Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1082-83 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1079.
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courts straining to apply § 2254(d)(1) to these claims. 36 Below are the
recent seminal cases that have established this precedent.
A. Bryan v. Mullin: The Beginning of De Novo Review from the Tenth
Circuit
Robert Bryan was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
death in Oklahoma state court. 37 During a jury trial addressing the question of Bryan's competency, his counsel did not present any medical
testimony. 38 Even after Bryan had replaced his original counsel, his subsequent counsel had also failed to present any mental health evidence
during the guilt and penalty phase of the trial. 39 On appeal to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, Bryan claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel for the guilt and penalty phase of his trial because counsel failed
to present mitigating evidence of Bryan's mental illness.4° Although the
appeal was rejected, the Tenth Circuit granted rehearing en banc to determine whether failing to present mental health evidence at trial comports with the Constitution, and whether relief is available under the
AEDPA. 4 1
The Tenth Circuit held that Bryan was entitled to a hearing because
such legal issues were outside the scope of § 2254(d).4 2 More precisely,
the Tenth Circuit found that the court erred in applying the deferential
review standards set out in § 2254(d) in reviewing Bryan's claims that
his trial counsel was ineffective.43 The Tenth Circuit ruled that de novo
36.
Compare Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying de novo
review when a defendant is diligent in pursuing a new non-record claim, and the state court does not
consider the non-record evidence in affirming a sentence or denying an evidentiary hearing), and
Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying de novo review when the
reason for denying a hearing is not rebutted by the four factor test of unreasonableness under §
2254(d)(2)), with Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying deference to
claims where "new evidence is presented on federal habeas review," and distinguishing the Ninth
Circuit precedent as only applying to perjury caused by a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence), and Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 953 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to follow Tenth
Circuit de novo precedent because the Tenth Circuit was incorrectly applying pre-AEDPA rationale
to present cases).
37.
Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003).
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 1213.
40. Id.
41.
Id. at 1214.
42.
See id. at 1215. Instead of analyzing Bryan's claim under § 2254(d), the Tenth Circuit
began evaluating the issue under § 2254(e)(2) of the AEDPA. Id. Section 2254(e)(2) provides that
"[ilf
the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the
court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant" satisfies the exceptions
listed under § 2254(e)(2)(A) or (B). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2006). However, if the applicant did
not fail to develop the factual basis for his claim in state court, § 2254(e)(2) is not applicable, and "a
federal habeas court should proceed to analyze whether a hearing is appropriate or required under
pre-AEDPA standards." Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1214 (citing Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253
(10th Cir. 1998)). The Tenth Circuit found that, "[b]ecause Bryan diligently sought to 'develop the
factual basis of [his] claim in State court proceedings,' § 2254(e)(2) does not bar an evidentiary
hearing." Id. at 1215 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)).
43.
Id. at 1216 n.7.
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was the proper standard of review for Bryan's appeal because his ineffective assistance claim involved mixed questions of law and fact.4
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit noted that, because the state court did not
hold an evidentiary hearing in reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit
was in the same position as the state court to evaluate the same factual
record. 45 Thus, "to the extent the state court's dismissal of [Bryan's ineffective assistance claim] was based on its own factual findings, we need
not afford those findings any deference." 46 The court concluded that
counsel's choice in not presenting Bryan's mental health evidence during
the guilt and penalty phase was not "objectively unreasonable" because
counsel-and the court-believed presenting such testimony might ultimately do more harm than good for Bryan's case.
Through Bryan, the Tenth Circuit greatly refined how federal habeas courts may address the issue of hearing new evidence made available on appeal. Specifically, Bryan left a lasting impression on how to
approach newfound mitigating evidence on a federal habeas appeal that
would otherwise avoid having to force the courts to apply § 2254(d)(1)
under such circumstances. As a result, in recognizing that Bryan was
entitled to a full and fair hearing, the Tenth Circuit avoided the procedural due process issues of denying individuals a meaningful opportunity to
develop new and significant claims.48 Thus, the Tenth Circuit set the de
novo standard for addressing these types of federal habeas claims.
B. Wilson v. Sirmons: The Tenth CircuitSolidifies De Novo Review
In Wilson, the Tenth Circuit held that de novo review is required
when new evidence is admitted at the federal level. 49 As noted by the
Tenth Circuit in Wilson, Federal Circuits differ in determining whether a
claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" when, on appeal, there is
some indication that the exclusion of significant evidence led to a prejudicial state court decision. 50 To this controversy, the Tenth Circuit
applied de novo review because, according to Wilson, § 2254(d) deference does not apply to state court decisions that lack an evidentiary
hearing or, for that matter, to "any factual determinations made without
In other words, if the state court
reference to the proffered evidence.'
makes no reference to, or provides no procedures for, ensuring that significant mitigating evidence is part of its decision, then the claim was not

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. 1215-16 (citing Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1224.
Marceau, supranote 12, at 418 n.173.
Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1082 n.3.
Id. at 1082 (emphasis added).
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"adjudicated on the merits" and § 2254(d) deference does not apply
be52
cause the defendant was never given a proper full and fair hearing.
Wilson involved an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on federal habeas appeal from the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals. 53 Michael Wilson, sentenced to death for first degree murder and robbery
with a deadly weapon, argued that his capital conviction was unconstitutional because his attorney failed to adequately prepare a medical expert
to testify to Wilson's mental health problems during the sentencing phase
of his trial. 54 Although the medical expert performed tests prior to trial
that confirmed Wilson had suffered from various mental disorders (including anxiety, bipolar, and post traumatic stress), during the direct examination of the medical expert Wilson's counsel failed to ask about the
specific results from Wilson's psychiatric testing.55 By not having the
jury hear the results of the test, Wilson argued, the state 56
court's decision
to sentence him to death was "constitutionally deficient.,
In Wilson, the Tenth Circuit provided a comprehensive exegesis regarding when § 2254(d)(1) applies.57 Under § 2254(d)(1), the court
found that a state court decision is contrary to clearly established law "if
the state court applied a rule differently from the governing law set forth
in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. 58
The court also found that an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law occurs when "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case. 59
The Tenth Circuit uniquely drew on the import of "new evidence"
to alter how certain habeas claims might be adjudicated. 60 Rather than
applying § 2254(d)(1), the Tenth Circuit endorsed a more precise application of de novo review to those habeas claims with new non-record
evidence, which were previously denied an evidentiary hearing in state
court.
When a defendant is diligent in pursuing a new non-record
claim, and the state court did not consider the non-record evidence in
affirming a sentence or denying an evidentiary hearing, the Tenth Circuit

52.
See Marceau, supra note 12, at 424-37 (recounting the legislative history of § 2254 and
positing that the non-deferential standard adopted by the Tenth Circuit is in accord with legislative
intention).
53.
Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1070.
54.
Id. at 1072, 1074.
55.
Id. at 1075-76.
56.
Id. at 1077.
57.
Id. at 1073-74.
58.
Id. (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)).
59.
Id. at 1073 (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)).
60.
Id. at 1079.
61.
Id.
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held that de novo review governs such habeas claims. 62 Accordingly,
when a federal habeas claim provides new, significant evidence made
available on appeal, and the evidence has not been previously adjudicated, then § 2254(d)(1) simply does not apply.
The Tenth Circuit was quick to note that there were limits to what
type of new evidence calls for de novo review outside of the confines of
§ 2254(d) deference. The court reasoned that "[h]ad the state court evaluated the non-record evidence in its denial of Mr. Wilson's Strickland
claim and his request for an evidentiary hearing, we would apply
AEDPA's deferential standard. 63 Thus, it seems that a primary component as to why de novo applied in Wilson stems primarily from the fact
that the state court simply failed to examine proffered non-record evidence. As the Tenth Circuit stated, "the OCCA in this case, by contrast
[to other state courts], made clear that it was relying solely on the trial
record, and not the non-record evidence, when it denied the claim and the
evidentiary hearing. ' 64 Because the state court refused to make factual
findings on the evidence, let alone have an evidentiary hearing on the
matter, the Tenth Circuit concluded that65it had "no choice but to review
both legal and factual findings de novo."

Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the state court's
decision to not fully develop the facts through an evidentiary hearing-as
well as the lack of procedural fairness in deferring to the state court decision without the proffered evidence-to reach de novo review in Wilson. 66 The Tenth Circuit held that "[b]ecause Mr. Wilson's allegations,
if true and fully developed, would entitle him to relief, we reverse the
district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on this claim. ' 67 Additionally, throughout the opinion the Tenth Circuit evaluated the case
based on whether Mr. Bryan was given a "fundamentally unfair" hearing
in state court.68 Thus, the two factors of developing a full record and
conducting fair69hearings seemed tantamount to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Wilson.

Having described when § 2254(d) deference does not apply, the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the state court decision de novo.70 Beginning its
analysis, the Tenth Circuit noted the following:
[I]t is well established in this Circuit that when a state court's disposition of a mixed question of law and fact, including a claim of inef62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 472 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).
Id. at 1081.
See id. at 1083.
Id. at 1074 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1102, 1112,1114.
See id. at 1081.
Id. at 1079.
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fective assistance, is based on an incomplete factual record, through
no fault of the defendant, and the complete factual record has since
we apply de novo review to
been developed and is before this Court,
71
our evaluation of the underlying claim.
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that when a state court makes a decision
based on an incomplete factual record, those factual findings are given
no deference.72 Because the district court effectively ignored Bryan's
affidavits providing evidence of his emotional and mental problems, the
Tenth Circuit held that it had "no choice" but to review both the legal
and factual findings de novo.7 3
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit found de novo review by noting that
the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to address the exact same issue
in its upcoming 2008-2009 tenn.74 Although the case would later be
dismissed as improvidently granted,75 the Supreme Court nonetheless
initially granted certiorari to determine whether § 2254(d) deference applies to claims "predicated on evidence of prejudice" in a state court's
refusal to consider new and significant evidence.76 Recognizing that
Wilson involved the exact same issue, the Tenth Circuit's decision was a
call of action in many ways, with the court concluding that there is a
"need. for de novo review" when federal habeas claims involve evidence
that has not been adjudicated with a full and fair hearing.77 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit's decision was made with at least some consideration that
the Supreme Court will inevitably have to wrestle with the very same
issue.
Therefore, Wilson was a turning point not only for appropriately limiting the scope of § 2254(d)(1), but also for providing a more exacting
framework for when de novo review ought to apply. According to the
Tenth Circuit, de novo review is limited to those rare instances when a
full and fair evidentiary hearing has been denied such that new and significant evidence would be unfairly excluded from deciding the merits of
the habeas claim.78 The Tenth Circuit concluded that when a district
could has not held an evidentiary hearing or made any factual findings
based on the new non-record evidence federal courts have "no choice but
to review both legal and factual findings de novo., 79 As such, de novo

71.

Id. (citing Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Miller v.

Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998)).
72.
Id. (quoting Miller, 161 F.3d at 1254).
73.
Id.at 1081.
Id. at 1082 n. 3.
74.

75.
129 S. Ct. 393 (2008) (mem.) (per curiam).
76.
Bell, 128 S. Ct. 2108 (mem.) (granting certiorari as to Question 1 presented in petition);
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Bell v. Kelly, 129 S.Ct. 393 (2008) (mem.) (per curiam) (No.
07-1223).
77.

Wilson, 536 F.3d 1079.

78.

Id. at 1079-81.

79.

Id. at 1081.
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review is applied as a last resort; but, as the Tenth Circuit implied, it is a
necessary last resort when the defendant was never given a full and fair
hearing to adjudicate claims that implicate new and significant evidence. 8° Thus, the Tenth Circuit solidified an appropriate, albeit narrow,
place for de novo review in federal habeas proceedings.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS SPLIT: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER

§ 2254(d)
Although the Tenth Circuit has required de novo review of state
court decisions that failed to examine non-record evidence for claims
involving significant due process issues, other circuits have not. Of the
five other circuits to have addressed the issue, four have reached the opposite conclusion from the Tenth Circuit. For example, the Fifth Circuit
explicitly declined to follow the Tenth Circuit de novo precedent because, according to the court, the Tenth Circuit was incorrectly applying
pre-AEDPA rationale to present cases.81 Instead, the Fifth Circuit held
that a "full and fair hearing" was not a precondition for applying
§ 2254(d) standard of review.8 2 The Sixth Circuit also applied § 2254(d)
deference to claims where "new evidence [was] presented on federal
habeas review," and distinguished the Ninth Circuit precedent as only
applying to perjury caused by a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.8 3 The Seventh Circuit also implemented § 2254(d) deference to state court decisions having evidentiary issues on appeal.84 The
Seventh Circuit noted that, although an evidentiary hearing can "bear on
the reasonableness of the state courts' adjudication," the court simply did
not see why "it should alter the standardof federal review.,8 5
Recently, the Fourth Circuit held in the case of Bell v. Kelly86 that a
defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence, upholding the lower court decision as "reasonable" under
§ 2254(d). 7 In reaching the decision, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the
habeas appeal to determine "not whether the state court's determination
was incorrect but whether the determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold. ' 88 In other words, the Fourth Circuit found
substantial deference under § 2254(d)(1) to uphold a district court conviction. 89
80.
Id. at 1079-81.
81.
Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941,953 (5th Cir. 2001).
82.
Id. at 951.
83.
Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2005).
84.
See, e.g., Matheney v. Anderson, 377 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir. 2004); Pecoraro v. Walls,
286 F.3d 439,443 (7th Cir. 2002).
85.
Pecoraro, 286 F.3d at 443 (emphasis in original).
86.
260 Fed. App'x 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2008).
87. Id. at 607.
88.
Id. at 605 (quoting Schiro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2007)).
89.
Id. at 605; but see id. at 604 ("We review a district court's decision to grant or deny habeas relief de novo.").
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Fourth Circuit was correct in applying § 2254(d) deference when the
decision was "in conflict with decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits." 90 Although Bell v. Kelly was ultimately dismissed as improvidently granted,9 ' the Supreme Court is still looking for an opportunity to
address this circuit split. In particular, another case this term, Cone v.
of
Bell,92 had the Court again raising the possibility that the
93 reach
§ 2254(d)(1) might not be as broad as many circuits believe.
V. FOLLOWING THE TENTH CIRCUIT' S LEAD IN APPLYING DE Novo

REVIEW
In the twelve years since the enactment of the AEDPA, a troubling
trend has emerged. Namely, there seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding as to when deference is owed to state court decisions. Perversely, federal courts have rejected habeas claims that bring to light important prejudicial evidence that was excluded from otherwise reasonable
state court decisions.
The Wilson decision has changed all that. By emphasizing the factors of procedural fairness and the state courts' development of a full
factual record, the Tenth Circuit leads the circuit courts in determining
when "new evidence" is sufficient to require de novo review. As the
Tenth Circuit held, if the allegations in Wilson were true and fully developed, then the state court decision was never "adjudicated on the merits,"
and the defendant was therefore denied a proper full and fair hearing on
the claim.94 Thus, the federal courts should follow the Tenth Circuit's
lead in recognizing that § 2254(d) simply does not apply to claims that
had never been "adjudicated on the merits" in state court.
Historically, this was exactly how § 2254(d) was viewed. Prior to
the AEDPA, § 2254(d) provided that any proceeding instituted in a federal court by an application of writ of habeas "shall be presumed to be
correct" unless "the factfinding procedure employed by the State court
was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing. 95 This "full and fair"
requirement is derived from Professor Bator's seminal law review article,
which argued that the only instance where a federal habeas court has
jurisdiction to review a state court's final decision is when the state court
90.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bell v. Kelly, 2008 WL 819276, *1 (Mar. 26, 2008)
(requesting the Supreme Court whether "the Fourth Circuit err[ed] when, in conflict with decisions
of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, it applied the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which is
reserved for claims "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, to evaluate a claim predicated on
evidence of prejudice the state court refused to consider and that was properly received for the first
time in a federal evidentiary hearingT').
91.
Bell, 129 S. Ct. 393.
92.
128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008).
93.
Id. ('The question presented is whether petitioner is entitled to federal habeas review of
.
his claim that the State suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland .
94.
Wilson v. Sirmons, 563 F.3d 1064, 1074 (10th Cir. 2008).
95.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1994).

WILSON V. SIRMONS

2009]

1191

failed to "furnish a criminal defendant with a full and fair opportunity to
make his case and litigate his case. 9 6
Interestingly, the "full and fair" language was omitted from the
AEDPA version of § 2254(d).97 Some commentators have argued that
this omission was not a rejection of this procedural rule. 98 Rather, it
seems nearly self-evident that state courts would still be expected to have
adequate, full, and fair procedures in place to satisfy the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 99 The question, then, is why was the
"full and fair" language omitted from the AEDPA version of § 2254(d)?
The answer, according to at least one commentator, was that Congress
wanted to avoid linking the AEDPA to Bator's model of federal habeas
reform. 1°° Looking at the Congressional debates, "full and fair" became
a pejorative phrase to describe far-reaching habeas reform involving
complete deference to state court findings.' 0 ' Congress omitted the
phrase to instead include an "unreasonable application" clause in
§ 2254(d)(2) to define what procedural standard was required for state
court decisions. 10 2 Although this change in phrase is undeniably operative, it is important to note that the change was made because the phrases
"full and fair" and "unreasonable application" were viewed as redundant.10 3 Thus, although the "full and fair" language was dropped from
the AEDPA, the omission may have involved political semantics rather
than a substantive change in Congressional intent.
As such, federal courts should still apply the procedural requirements of a "full and fair" hearing to federal habeas claims. At a minimum, the absence of a full and fair hearing in the state court is itself a
relevant violation of due process.' °4 Thus, at a bare minimum, a "full
and fair" hearing is required for the state court to have properly adjudicated the merits of the case. As the Tenth Circuit made clear, if a defendant tries to develop facts for his claim that were excluded from a state
court decision, then the AEDPA is not applicable and "a federal habeas
court should proceed to analyze whether a hearing is appropriate or re-

96. Paul M. Bator, Finalityin Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441,456 (1963).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
98.

See Marceau, supra note 12, at 425-26; Yackle, supra note 9, at 381 ("On the whole [the

AEDPA] presupposes the basic framework already in place.... [Tihe new statute takes the preexisting habeas landscape as its baseline.").

99.
100.
101.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Marceau, supra note 12, at 430.
See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 9, at 428; S. Rep. No. 98-226, at 24-27 (1983); 137 Cong.

Rec. H8001 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Fish) (noting that the attempts to redefine
"full and fair" do not adequately address his concern that the reform will have the effect of stripping
federal courts' power to review the merits of state habeas decisions).
102. See Kovarsky, supranote 10, at 506.
103.

Id.

104.

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,299 (1992).
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quired under pre-AEDPA standards." 10 5 Thus, when a state court lacks
some extrinsic and substantive evidence to make a decision, the AEDPA
simply does not apply, and, therefore, de novo review is proper.
Additionally, a "full and fair" hearing is the most proper way to ensure that state court decisions are adjudicated on the merits. Granted, the
wording of the AEDPA is unequivocal in limiting federal courts from6
granting habeas to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits."'0
Nevertheless, if a state court decision was made without a full and fair
hearing, then the decision could not be-by sheer definition-properly
adjudicated on the merits. Consequently, as the Tenth Circuit correctly
found in Wilson, when a state court makes a decision based on an incomplete factual record, those factual findings afford no deference on federal
habeas appeal.10 7 Therefore, although the AEDPA was meant to generally limit federal habeas appeals, this limitation was not meant for cases
that failed to have a "full and fair" hearing in state court.
Having stated that, it is important to note that federal courts may
still have federalism concerns for applying de novo review. The AEDPA
emerged from an era when Congress feared that state court decisions
were not given proper deference in reaching judicial finality.'0 8 For example, one of the most significant arguments for habeas reform came
from Professor Bator, who recognized that finality in criminal law is
generally avoided until "we are somehow truly satisfied that justice has
been done."' 9 His point was that no judicial process can assure ultimate
truth, but a justice system can provide some finality in the process to gain
greater trust and confidence in the system.110 Professor Bator accordingly argued that the greatest mistake courts can make is to second guess
decisions "merely for the sake of second-guessing, in the service of the
illusory notion that if we only try hard enough we will find the
'truth."""' By allowing courts to continually second-guess other courts,
the justice system risks creating
greater disagreement and unease about
12
the criminal law system.'

105.

Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miller v. Champion, 161

F.3d 1249, 1253 (1Oth Cir. 1998)).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996) (emphasis added).
107.
1254).

Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller, 161 F.3d at

108.
Yackle, supra note 9, at 436 n.181 ("[If] we do not reform Federal habeas corpus review
of State cases, then we will have the same incessant, frivolous appeals ad hominem [sic], day and
night, from that point on because this amendment would not take care of that problem. If we are
going to pass habeas reform, let us pass real habeas reform .... Let us protect civil liberties, but let

us get some finality into the law so that the frivolous appeal game will be over.").
109.
Bator, supra note 96, at 441.
110.
Id.at 452.
Ill.

Id. at 451.

112.

Id.
at 443.
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As such, these concerns played a fundamental role in shaping the
policy decisions behind the AEDPA. 113 Though Congress was adamant
about rejecting Bator's phrase "full and fair" into the provisions of
§ 2254(d)," 4 Congress was nonetheless in agreement with Bator in desiring further limitations in which habeas appeals could be heard at the federal level. 1 5 The AEDPA was meant to correct deficiencies that members of Congress saw in the federal habeas appeal process, including
"frivolous" lawsuits clogging up the criminal courts.11 6 More broadly,
the AEDPA was intended to grant
state courts greater deference, as a
17
matter of comity and federalism.'
Yet, these policies of finality, comity, and federalism have led to the
creation of a higher standard of unreasonableness rather than addressing
state court decisions involving an incorrect error. As the Supreme Court
duly noted, "an unreasonableapplication of federal law is different from
an incorrect application of federal law."' 1 8 An unreasonable application
standard under § 2254(d)(1) permits state courts to err above and beyond
an incorrect application of the law. And, in turn, federal habeas courts
"may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly."' 9 Thus, the principles of finality, comity, and federalism are already captured in the §
2254(d)(1) provision, but only to those claims that have been adjudicated
on the merits.
As a result, federal courts can address these federalism concerns by
providing a clearer standard on what an unreasonable application of federal law entails. As provided by the Tenth Circuit in Wilson, "while federalism, comity, and finality ... are undoubtedly important values, the
importance of these values is reduced when a claim has never been considered on the merits. ' 2 ° Accordingly, de novo review is a drastic
measure, but it is a necessary one when the state court fails to hold an
evidentiary hearing or make factual findings on new significant evidence.
Thus, nearly the only time when new evidence requires federal courts to
apply de novo review is when, as the Tenth Circuit found in Wilson, the
federal court has "no choice but to review both legal and factual findings
de novo."' 121 In other words, by following the analysis of the Wilson de-

113. Cf. Marceau, supra note 12, at 429-30 (noting that Bator's approach was the model expressly and repeatedly rejected by Congress).
114. Id.
115. Yackle, supra note 9, at 388.
116.
Id. at 398.
117.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,436 (2000).
118. Id. at 410 (emphasis in original).
119.

Id. at411.

120.

Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1083 (10th Cir. 2008).

121.

Id. at 1081.

1194

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

cision, federalism is still upheld so long as the state court has demonstrated a full and fair examination of the facts in reaching its decision.
Finally, it is important to note that de novo review encourages federal courts to return to the duty of deciding matters of law. There has
been a general tendency by the federal courts-including the Supreme
Court-to use § 2254(d) as a way to avoid having to address significant
constitutional issues. 22 Habeas corpus is the Great Writ because it uniquely requires courts to address some of most fundamental issues of constitutional law in the context of criminal procedure. This includes the
possibility of a person being sentenced to death because of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a concealment of exculpatory evidence, or even a
confession that is obtained by artifice or force. 123 Federal habeas courts
must address these issues head on, rather than hide behind a mischaracterization of "§ 2254(d) deference."
For example, the Supreme Court has seemingly hidden behind
§ 2254(d) deference to sidestep making important decisions on whether
(1) the Eighth Amendment limits the states' three strikes policies for
applying harsher punishments, 124 (2) the Fourteenth Amendment limits
the potentially prejudicial effects of spectators wearing buttons depicting
the image of the murder victim during trial, 125 and (3) the Sixth Amendment renders an ineffective assistance of counsel claim successful when
126
the lawyer participates in a first-degree murder plea hearing by phone.
Consistently, the Supreme Court punts on these constitutional issues because its previous decisions "give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in [the habeas peitioner's] favor," and therefore "it
cannot be said that the127state court 'unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law."",
Although the proponents for habeas reform might call for federal
courts to avoid making decisions on these controversial constitutional
issues, it might be that this restraint is the very reason for why federal
habeas appeals still creates significant problems for procedural due
process. The most important constitutional rights in criminal procedure
sprang from the writ of habeas corpus, including the right to counsel for
indigents, 21 8 the incorporation of the rights to due process and protection
from self incrimination in state court proceedings, 129 and a constitutional
See "Clearly Established Law" in Habeas Review, 121 HARv. L. REv. 335, 336 (2007)
122.
(noting that the Supreme Court used the AEDPA to "neatly sidestep" substantive constitutional law
issues and instead provide deference to state-court decisions without offering "a coherent justification for its deference.").
123.
ANDREA D. LYON Er AL., FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus xiv (2005).
124.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76-77 (2003).
125.
Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).
Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743,746-47 (2008).
126.
127.
Id. at 747 (quoting Carey, 549 U.S. at 76-77 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
128.
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
129.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
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standard for when a defendant is receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. 130 This history has been compromised by Congress wanting to evade
these difficult issues by placing the weight of such decision in state
courts.
The net effect has been rather destructive for the justice system. By
abusing § 2254(d) as a shield from making decisions, federal courts have
created a checkerboard of constitutional rights where each state defines
fundamental rights in criminal procedure differently. 31 As Alexander
Hamilton portended, the consequence of this is that state courts will be
unlikely to "give full scope" to federal rights that are "unpopular locally. ' 32 In other words, fundamental rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause are compromised because each state might define the rights
in competing, if not entirely different, ways. Thus, it is little wonder
why the extreme misuse of deference under § 2254(d) has created great
confusion for habeas claims. Many federal courts simply do not want to
address the difficult legal questions that attach to writs of habeas corpus,
and therefore defer to state courts to decide.
Federal courts must return to using the Great Writ as a vehicle for
addressing major constitutional issues that arise in criminal procedure,
and federal courts should adopt de novo review to ensure procedural
fairness. In the famous words of Justice Marshall, it is the "province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' ' 133 Constitutional
rights are not meant to be fossilized under § 2254(d); rather, federal
courts should play an active role in deciding the merits of those rare habeas claims that offer significant new evidence that may bring to light
other substantive constitutional issues. As the Tenth Circuit ruled, if a
state court decision was made without an evidentiary hearing, where the
procedural requirements of a full and fair hearing is denied,' 34 the federal
1 35
court should apply de novo review to evaluate the underlying claim.
Thus, in those rare instances when state courts do not have enough factual information or legal precedent to make a decision, or in those even
rarer cases like Wilson where the state court refuses to consider even
having a full and fair evidentiary hearing to address the claim, 136 federal
courts should apply de novo review. By applying de novo review in such
rare circumstances, federal courts are given a better opportunity to ad-

130. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
131.
Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 316-17 (1982).
132.
Justin F. Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights: The Tension between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federalism Concerns that Underlie Modem Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 1231, 1293 (2008).
133.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
134.
Marceau, supra note 12, at 426-27
135. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bryan v. Mullin, 335
F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)).
136. Id.
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dress the substantive, rather than merely procedural, issues that are involved with federal habeas claims.
In sum, federal courts should adopt de novo review to ensure procedural fairness in the habeas corpus process. In Wilson, the Tenth Circuit
captured the three-way split in how federal courts have addressed significant constitutional claims involving habeas appeals. 37 For the Tenth
Circuit, the court viewed the habeas claim being brought in Wilson as
lacking the sine qua non of a full and fair evidentiary hearing.1 38 Thus,
when the state court failed to consider the mitigating evidence in reaching its decision, de novo review applied. 39 In the Ninth Circuit, the
court looked at whether the lack of a full fact-finding record resulted in
procedural unfairness. 140 If the reason for this lack of a hearing is not
rebutted by the four factor test of unreasonableness under § 2254(d)(2),
then de novo review is applied.' 41 Yet, the other Federal Circuit courts
seem less concerned with deciding these constitutional procedural issues
because the courts apply § 2254(d) deference to the state court decision,
even when these decisions often times lacked exculpatory evidence.1 42
Many Federal Circuits do not apply de novo review because, in the
courts' opinions, the merits have not changed from the state court decision to the habeas appeal. However, as has hopefully been made more
apparent from this Comment, this overextended application of § 2254(d)
deference has resulted in significant constitutional violations of procedural due process because many defendants have never received a full
and fair hearing on the merits of their new habeas claims.143 Thus, from
this three-way split, the best way to protect procedural due process is to
adopt the narrow application of de novo review from Wilson.
CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit recently granted the petition for en banc review
in Wilson to finalize whether the decision to deny an evidentiary hearing
by the state court "warrants deference under § 2254(d)." 144 Wilson has
already provided the most compelling reasons for why de novo review
offers a better solution. Namely, de novo review is the better way to
address habeas appeals that claim that a full and fair evidentiary hearing
was never afforded in state court. If the prerequisite of a full and fair
hearing is not met, then the claim could not have been adjudicated on the
merits, and, thus, § 2254(d) does not apply. Therefore, de novo review
137.

Id. at 1082 n.3.

138.

Id. at 1079.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
stripping
144.

Id. at 1080.
Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Marceau, supra note 12, at 408 (citing Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000-01).
See supranotes 74-82.
See Marceau, supra note 12, at 432 (characterizing the lack of a full and fair hearing as
federal evidentiary hearings of their legal effect).
Wilson v. Sirnons, 549 F.3d. 1267, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008).
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should be applied. Additionally, Wilson uniquely captured the importance of de novo review by emphasizing that due process requires a full
and fair hearing to address significant constitutional issues. By straining
to apply § 2254(d) deference, other federal courts might violate procedural due process rights. Thus, there needs to be a return to what Thomas Jefferson famously phrased as the "eternal and unremitting" force of
habeas corpus.1 45 There needs to be de novo review in the federal habeas
appeals process. In short, the Supreme Court should adopt the precedent
already set by the Tenth Circuit in Wilson.
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PACE V. SWERDLOW: CAN EXPERT WITNESSES FACE

LIABILITY FOR CHANGING THEIR MINDS? THE TENTH
CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN ON THE ELEMENT OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE IN A CLAIM OF EXPERT NEGLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION

Expert witnesses are a necessary component of the legal system because many claims involve technical facts that would be beyond the understanding of judges and juries without expert testimony.1 Expert witnesses are also pervasive throughout the legal system.2 For example, a
"recent survey of California civil jury trials determined that at least one
expert testified in eighty-six percent of all cases, with two or more opposing experts testifying in fifty-seven percent of the trials. 3 Courts,
motivated by a desire to obtain objective expert testimony, have historically held experts immune from liability based on their activities as experts.4 However, expert negligence has increasingly become a problem. 5
Thus, courts have recently begun to erode expert immunity and allow
claims against experts for alleged negligence-this trend is particularly
true regarding so-called "friendly" experts (experts subjected to suits
instigated by the same party that retained them).6
Liability for friendly expert negligence is sometimes referred to as
7 However, it remains
the "Pottery Barn Rule": you break it, you buy it.
unclear what exactly a friendly expert must do to "break" a case. This is
because friendly expert negligence is a relatively nascent cause-of-action
whose precedent is still "developing, unsettled, lacking in uniformity,

1.
Eric G. Jensen, When "Hired Guns" Backfire: The Witness Immunity Doctrine and the
Negligent Expert Witness, 62 UMKC L. REv. 185, 186-87 (1993); see also Steven Lubet, Expert
Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 465 (1999); Leslie R. Masterson, Witness Immunity or Malpractice Liability for Professionals Hired as Experts?, 17 REv.

LrrIG. 393, 395 (1998).
2.
Mary Virginia Moore, Gary G. Johnson & Deborah F. Beard, Liability in Litigation Support and Courtroom Testimony: Is it Time to Rethink the Risks?, 9 J. LEGAL ECON. 53, 54 (1999);
see also Jensen, supra note 1, at 186-87.

3.

Lubet, supra note 1, at 465.

4.
Andrew Jurs, The Rationalefor Expert Witness Immunity or Liability Exposure and Case
Law Since Briscoe: Reasserting Immunity Protectionfor Friendly Expert Witnesses, 38 U. MEM. L.
REv. 49, 51-52 (2007); see also Randall K. Hanson, Witness Immunity Under Attack: Disarming
"HiredGuns", 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 497-98 (1996).

5.
Moore, Johnson & Beard, supra note 2, at 55.
6.
Hanson, supra note 4, at 499 ("Six states have decided recent cases involving lawsuits
against [friendly] expert witnesses. Four of these six states have held [friendly] expert witnesses
accountable for their actions and have narrowly construed the protection of witness immunity."
(footnote omitted)); see also Jurs, supra note 4, at 63.
7.

Jurs, supra note 4, at 51.
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and, in many jurisdictions, nonexistent., 8 Consequently, there is little
consensus regarding the elemental requirements necessary to establish a
claim for friendly expert negligence. 9 However, synthesis of the minor
amount of existing case law reveals that such a claim is generally based
upon principles of professional negligence, tort liability, and breach of
contract.10
Generally, to establish a prima facie claim of friendly expert negligence the plaintiff must allege: (1) that the plaintiff was a person to
whom the expert owed a duty of care or with whom there was privity, (2)
the applicable standard of care or contract for services, (3) that the witness breached the standard of care or breached the contract, (4) that the
conduct of the defendant in failing to use the appropriate standard of care
or in breaching the contract was a proximate cause of the injury or damage of which the plaintiff complains (injury or damage in the context of
friendly expert negligence most often occurs in the form of an adverse
result at a hearing or trial for the party that retained the expert), and (5)
that witness immunity does not apply to the facts and circumstances of
the case in the plaintiff's jurisdiction."
Of the elements, proximate cause is one of the most difficult to establish. 12 Much of the difficulty surrounding proximate cause arises out
of the discrepancy between the legally prescribed role of experts as objective translators of technical facts, and the actual (or at least perceived)
role of many friendly experts as advocates for the party that retained
them. 13 While plaintiffs may feel it is the duty of their well-paid friendly
experts to testify in an expected manner and to effectively persuade on
their behalf, no liability exists for friendly experts who simply fail to
"deliver" an expected opinion, or to persuade a judge or jury. 14 Thus, for
8.

Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Action for Negligence or Malpractice of Expert

Witnesses, 17 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 263 (2008).
9.

See id.

10.
11.

See id.
Id.

12.

MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON, CAROL KRAFKA & JOE S. CECIL, EXPERT TESTIMONY IN

FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 4 (2000), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/ExpTesti.pdf/$file/ExpTesti.pdf (citing a survey of federal civil trials, which found that
expert testimony was needed to establish causation and damages in 64% of trials versus the reasonableness of the party's action (34%), and the standard of care owed by a professional (25%)).
13.
See Lubet, supra note 1, at 467 ("The single most important obligation of an expert witness is to approach every question with independence and objectivity."). But see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 257 (2001) (describing that, in reality, experts "are paid to be
'effective,' but not necessarily to be nonpartisan or even honest"); JOHNSON, KRAFKA & CECIL,
supra note 12, at 6 (citing a survey of federal judges and attorneys who ranked "experts abandon
objectivity and become advocates for the side that hired them" as the most significant problem with
expert testimony in federal civil trials).
14.
See, e.g., Schaffer v. Donegan, 585 N.E.2d 854, 860 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("'A witness
has a duty to appear and testify truthfully concerning his knowledge or belief.' [A Party] may not
turn that principle to support their argument that they had a fight to expect that [their expert] would
testify as to what [the party] regarded to be the truth, and that his failure to do so constituted a breach
of contract. Fundamentally, no witness can be required to testify... to anything other than the truth
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each claim of friendly expert negligence, a court must inquire as to
whether the alleged negligence arises out of the expert's objective or
contractual duties, or whether the complaint stems merely from the expert's effectiveness as an advocate. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
15
engaged in this type of inquiry in the recent case of Pace v. Swerdlow.
In Pace, the Tenth Circuit held that a change of opinion by a friendly expert, on the eve of a summary judgment hearing, was not, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence of proximate cause in a negligence claim
against the expert. 16 The Tenth Circuit reached its decision in Pace, in
part, because facts existed to suggest that the expert's change of opinion
was ill-timed and grounded in fear and intimidation rather than compelling new evidence that had come to light. 17
Part I of this Comment provides a broad look at the issues and significant cases involving expert witness liability and immunity. Part II
recounts the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pace. Part II analyzes Pace and
offers guidance for future courts in analyzing causation in claims of
friendly expert negligence involving a change of opinion by the expert.
I. BACKGROUND

A. History and Expansion of the Doctrine of Expert Immunity
The Tenth Circuit avoided directly addressing the issue of expert
immunity in Pace. Nonetheless, many of the policy implications underlying expert immunity permeate the majority opinion in Pace, as well as
Judge Gorsuch's partial concurrence and partial dissent. Thus, a brief
review of the doctrine of expert immunity is beneficial before evaluating
Pace.
Expert immunity was born out of general witness immunity.' 8 The
touchstone authority concerning witness immunity is the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Briscoe v. LaHue.19 In Briscoe, the Court granted
absolute immunity to fact witnesses in criminal trials--even in the event
of perjury. 20 In general, state and federal courts have interpreted Briscoe
broadly and have expanded immunity to include additional witness cateas he sees it .... The same is expected of expert witnesses. While [the party] may have expected
[their expert] would testify in accordance with his previous statements to them . . . that did not
change his paramount obligation to speak the truth.").
519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008).
15.
16. Id. at 1074; see also id. at 1075 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
17. See id. at 1075 (majority opinion) ("Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant's
change of position, as well as the timing of that change of position, proximately caused the state
court's grant of summary judgment ....")(emphasis added); see also id.at 1076 ("Dr. Swerdlow
changed his opinion we are encouraged to surmise, because he feared counsel's 'meanness' and
threat to attack Dr. Swerdlow's medical license.") (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part).
18.
19.
20.

Jurs, supra note 4, at 51-52 (describing the expansion of witness immunity).
460 U.S. 325 (1983).
Id. at 345-46.
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gories such as: fact witnesses for their pretrial statements, expert witnesses against suits instigated by the adverse party ("hostile" experts),
expert witnesses appointed by the court, and expert witnesses retained by
all parties.2 '
The rationale underlying the expansion of immunity generally consists of two major policy considerations: (1) that imposing witness liability may result in witness self-censorship, which in turn could threaten
the fact-finding (and truth-finding) abilities of judges and juries, and (2)
that witness testimony already contains sufficient checks in the form of
the oath to tell the truth, the threat of perjury, the oversight of the trial
judge, and, perhaps most importantly, the process of cross-examination.2 2
However, despite these policy considerations, granting witness immunity, particularly expert immunity, is not without problems. The next subsection details some of these problems.
B. The Problem of "Hired Guns"
In addition to immunity, experts are additionally protected by the
general absence of any binding standards regulating the quality or truthfulness of their testimony. 23 As a result, expert witnesses are often regarded as "mercenaries, hired guns, or as witnesses whose opinions are
for sale to the highest bidder," 24 and their testimony is often viewed with
distrust by judges and juries.25 Skepticism surrounding expert testimony
also stems from the economic reality that experts, unlike ordinary witnesses, are engaged in a voluntary-and often very lucrativecommercial undertaking where market forces influence the type of testimony provided. 26 Professor Jeffrey Harrison summarizes the problem as
follows:
Unlike virtually any other business, expert witnesses are not typically held accountable in either tort or contract law for their commercial activities. This means that many are inclined to deliver what the
market demands-partisan, biased, or plainly dishonest testimonywithout concern for the costs this testimony may impose on others.

21.
Jurs, supra note 4, at 55-60.
22.
See, e.g., Jurs, supra note 4, at 56 (analyzing the rationale of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals).
23.

See Lubet, supra note 1, at 465-67.

24.

Masterson, supra note 1, at 395.

25.
Harrison, supra note 13, at 256; see also Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L.
REv. 1113, 1114 (1991). However, despite growing distrust in the objectivity of expert testimony,

there is evidence indicating that expert testimony nonetheless remains significant in determining the
outcome of trials. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 188 (citing studies showing that seventy-one percent
of polled jurors in criminal trials felt expert testimony made a difference in the verdict, and additional studies finding that thirty-six percent of polled jurors in civil trials felt expert testimony "greatly"
influenced the verdict, while only thirteen percent felt the expert testimony made no difference).
26.

Harrison, supranote 13, at 314.
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This immunity from the internalization of the social cost of their27testimony is hard to reconcile with any moral or economic standard.
The combination of immunity and minimal regulation has resulted
in a lack of quality-control regarding expert testimony. Additionally,
many experts are expected-and paid-to be persuasive advocates for
the party that retains them.2 8 Indeed, empirical studies confirm that attorneys shop for experts who are good salespersons as well as technically
proficient.29 In response to this problem, many courts have begun to
erode--or at least refuse to expand-expert immunity. 30 This is especially true regarding friendly experts because courts, in general, have
found the underlying policy arguments for shielding friendly experts less
persuasive than those for shielding hostile experts.3'
C. Reluctance to Expand Immunity to FriendlyExperts
Six years after Briscoe, in Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assoc. Engineers, Inc.,32 the Washington Supreme Court-broadly interpreting Briscoe and its progeny-became the first court in the country to extend immunity to friendly experts.33 However, since Bruce, nearly every court
that has examined the issue has denied immunity to friendly experts.3 4
The general rationale supported by courts rejecting immunity for
friendly experts was articulated by the California Court of Appeals in the
case of Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co., where the court presented
four principal reasons for denying friendly experts immunity: (1) granting immunity to friendly experts does not encourage them to testify
truthfully, but instead has the opposite effect by shielding negligent experts from liability; (2) prior case law suggests that witness immunity
exists to protect adverse witnesses from suit by opposing parties after a
lawsuit ends, not to protect one's own experts; (3) a claim against a
friendly expert is analogous to a malpractice claim against a party's attorney after a lawsuit, therefore, if witness immunity applied in its
broadest interpretation, attorneys would also be shielded, a notion that no
court would embrace; and (4) many of the judicial system's guarantees
of truthful testimony (e.g. cross-examination) only logically apply to
hostile witnesses.35

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 253.
Id. at 257; see also Jensen, supra note 1, at 188-89; Lubet, supra note 1, at 468.
Harrison, supra note 13, at 262.
See Jurs, supra note 4, at 52.
Id.; see also Hansen, supra note 4, at 499-500.
776 P.2d 666 (Wash. 1989).
Jurs, supra note 4, at 52.
Id.
Id. at 67-69 (summarizing the rationale of the Califomia Court of Appeals in Mattco).
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36

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
Angie Putnam died following her breast augmentation surgery at the
Intermountain Health Center ("IHC") in Salt Lake City, Utah. 37 After
Putnam's death, her parents and heirs, Thomas A. Pace and Karol Pace,
filed a medical malpractice suit in Utah state court against Putnam's doctors. 38 The principal defendant in the suit was Putnam's attending anesthesiologist, Dr. Steven Shuput. 39 Dr. Shuput discharged Putnam after
her surgery despite allegations that "she was having difficulty breathing
and was experiencing pain of nine on a scale of ten.' '4° Putnam died the
night of her release; the exact cause of her death was never determined.41
Dr. Barry N. Swerdlow, a licensed anesthesiologist, contacted the
Paces' lawyer and offered his services as an expert witness.4 2 The Paces
retained Swerdlow as their expert and provided him with Putnam's medical records.43 After reviewing the records, Swerdlow's opinion was
recorded in an affidavit, which stated that "based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Shuput and 1HC Surgical Center did
breach the appropriate standard of care when releasing Angela Putnam
Further, Swerdlow suggested that inunder the circumstances ....
stead of being discharged, Putnam should have been transferred to a
nearby hospital for overnight observation, and that pursuant to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, "if she had been monitored overnight, it
is very likely that she would be alive today. ' '4 The affidavit also concluded that "as a direct and proximate result of her premature discharge,
Putnam died."46
"44

After recording Swerdlow's affidavit, the Paces' lawyer wrote a letter to Swerdlow requesting that he review Dr. Shuput's written discovery
responses which detailed Dr. Shuput's reasons for discharging Putnam.47
Swerdlow did not ask to alter his own affidavit after reviewing Dr. Shu-

36.
37.

519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1068.

38.

Id.

Id. at 1069 n.1.
39.
40. Id. at 1068.
41.
d; see also Pace v. Swerdlow, No. 2:06CV27DAK, 2006 WL 5778247, at *1 (D. Utah
May 23, 2006).
42. Pace,519 F.3d at 1068-69.
43.
Id. at 1069.
Id. (quoting Appellate Brief, Exhibit A, at 2, 5, Pace v. Swerdlow 519 F.3d 1067 (10th
44.
Cir. 2008) (No. 06-4157)).
45.
Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 3 15, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)). This statement was a handwritten correction by Swerdlow to the original sentence composed by the Paces'
lawyer that read: "If she had been monitored overnight, she would be alive today." Id.
46. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 4 18 Pace,519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
Id.
47.
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provided Swerput's comments. 48 In addition, the Paces' lawyer also
49
dlow with a copy of Dr. Shuput's deposition transcript.
Despite his strong support for the Paces' claim in his affidavit,
Swerdlow was not a strong witness for the Paces at his deposition by Dr.
Shuput's counsel.5 ° When asked whether he felt it was ethical to testify
against another anesthesiologist without first reviewing that person's
deposition, Swerdlow responded, "I think it would have been good for
me to have seen it, and I did not ask for it. I did not think to ask for it.
And I wouldn't comment upon the ethics thereof., 51 Swerdlow also
stated that he had never testified in trial, and that he was "a relative novice at this whole thing., 52 As to causation, Swerdlow testified that he
could not say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Putnam would be alive if she had been hospitalized, only that she would
have had an increased probability of survival.53 Swerdlow concluded
that his "ultimate opinion here is that discharging this patient with severity of pain, as documented in the PACU [Post Anesthesia Care Unit]
record, was not something that a prudent physician in Dr. Shuput's situation should have done." 54 However, Swerdlow also admitted that "Dr.
Shuput was not required under the standard of care to read [Putnam's]
pain score," and that if Dr. Shuput "was reassured that [Putnam's] pain
was moderate, reasonable, then he doesn't need to look at [her pain
score], 55 and "would not have breached the standard of care ' 56 if he felt
Putnam was not at that level of pain severity.
Following his deposition, Swerdlow called the Paces' lawyer and
complained that Dr. Shuput's counsel was "mean" and had threatened to
Swerdlow
report him to the American Society of Anesthesiologists.
also stated that "he did not want problems with his license. 58 Swerdlow59
then asked the Paces' lawyer for a copy of Dr. Shuput's deposition.
The Paces' lawyer provided a copy, as well as copies of the depositions
of two IHC nurses. 6° After receiving these documents, Swerdlow cut off
contact with the Paces and their lawyer and-without consulting either
the Paces or their lawyer--composed an addendum to his original affida48. Id.
49. Id. Swerdlow claimed he did not receive a copy of Dr. Shuput's deposition transcript
until after his own deposition by Dr. Shuput's counsel; however, because the case came to the Tenth
Circuit as an appeal of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court construed the
facts in the light most favorable to the Paces. Id. n.2.
50. Id. at 1069.
51.
Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 57, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
52. Id. at 1069-70 (quoting Appellate Brief at 55, 65, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
53. Id. at 1070.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 58-59, Pace,519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
56. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 62, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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vit in which he directly reversed his support of the Paces' claim, and
instead supported Dr. Shuput's defense.61 Specifically, Swerdlow stated
that it was now his opinion that "Dr. Shuput's care of Ms. Putnam-and
specifically his decision to discharge her from the Intermountain Surgery
Center . . . -was within the standard of care. ' 62 Swerdlow simultaneously faxed his addendum to both the Paces' lawyer and Dr. Shuput's
counsel-again without first consulting the Paces or their lawyer-on the
eve of the summary judgment hearing, which Dr. Shuput had filed a motion for days earlier.63
With the summary judgment hearing only a day away, the Paces attempted to contact Swerdlow about his change of position, but were unable to do so.64 The Paces also sent a letter to Swerdlow demanding that
he repair the damage he had done to their case. 65 At the summary judgment hearing, the Paces were granted a brief continuance. 66 When Swerdlow remained uncooperative, the Paces moved for another continuance,
withdrew Swerdlow as their expert, and filed a motion to designate a
new expert witness. 67 The Paces did not file a memorandum opposing
Dr. Shuput's motion for summary judgment. 68 The state court denied the
Paces' motions and granted summary judgment to Dr. Shuput.69
The Paces did not appeal the decision, and instead commenced a
suit against Swerdlow, again in Utah state court, alleging that his abrupt
change of position on the eve of the summary judgment hearing caused
the dismissal of their underlying malpractice suit against Dr. Shuput.7 °
Specifically, the Paces alleged seven separate claims: (1) professional
malpractice, (2) fraud, (3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) breach of fiduciary duty, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and (7) negligent infliction of emotional
distress.71
Swerdlow, a California resident, removed the case to federal court
under diversity jurisdiction and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing three grounds for dismissal: (1) that the doctrine of expert immunity barred the Paces from bringing any suit against
him, (2) that all seven of the Paces' claims collectively failed as a matter
of law for lack of proximate cause because his modified testimony was
not the sole or primary reason for dismissal of their underlying case, and
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 1071 (quoting Appellate Brief at 71-72, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
Id.

64.

Id.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

71.

Id.
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(3) that each of the Paces' seven claims failed individually as a matter of
law on independent grounds.72
The Federal District Court for the District of Utah granted Swerdlow's motion to dismiss on all seven claims, holding that his change of
opinion was not the proximate cause for dismissal of the Paces' underlying malpractice case.73 The district court explained that even without his
addendum, Swerdlow's original affidavit was not convincing enough to
withstand summary judgment because it contained conflicting testimony
concerning proximate cause.74 Specifically, the district court concluded
that Swerdlow's statements-"if she had been monitored overnight, it is
very likely that she would be alive today," and "as a direct and proximate
result of her premature discharge, Putnam died"-contradicted each other and were fatal to the Paces' suit before the addendum.
The district court also found that the Paces' failure to oppose the
motion for summary judgment contributed as much as anything to the
state court granting summary judgment to Dr. Shuput.7 5 The district
court declined to rule on the controversial issue of friendly expert immunity because it presented an issue of first impression under Utah law,
and because the lack of proximate cause was dispositive as a matter of
law to each of the Paces' claims, rendering a decision on immunity un76
necessary.
B. Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court, holding (1) that given the procedural posture of the case as an
appeal of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court had improperly
drawn critical inferences against the Paces, and (2) that the Paces had
alleged facts that, if proven, would be sufficient to establish the element
of proximate cause in their case against Swerdlow.7 7
Judge Briscoe, writing for the majority, began by explaining the
two-part procedural lens that is employed when considering a dismissal
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): the court must (1) "accept all the wellpleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff' 78; and (2) "look to the specific
allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support
72. Id. at 1068, 1071-72.
73. Id. at 1072.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. (quoting Pace v. Swerdlow, 2006 WL 5778247, at *34 (D. Utah May 23, 2006),
rev'd, 519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1073.
78. Id. (quoting Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).

1208

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

a legal claim for relief."79 Given this procedural lens, the court determined that the district court improperly concluded that the two statements in Swerdlow's affidavit addressing causation-the statements, "if
she had been monitored overnight, it is very likely that she would be
alive today," and "as a direct and proximate result of her premature discharge, Putnam died"-were in conflict.8 ° Instead, the court concluded
that the phrase "very likely" denoted a high degree of probability, and
thus was perfectly consistent with the later statement concerning proximate cause. 8 '
The court also held that the Paces had alleged facts that, if proven,
would be sufficient to establish the element of proximate cause in their
case against Swerdlow.82 The court began this portion of its analysis by
reviewing the element of proximate cause under Utah law:
Proximate cause is "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors
that accomplish the injury." 83 Further, there can be more than one
as each is a concurrent contriproximate cause of an injury so long
84
buting factor in causing the injury.
Under such a standard, the court concluded that Swerdlow's original
affidavit would almost certainly have enabled the Paces to survive Dr.
Shuput's motion for summary judgment. 85 Additionally, the court noted
the fact that under Utah law, "it is well established that the question of
proximate cause is generally reserved for the jury," and "only in rare
cases may a trial judge rule as a matter of law on the issue of proximate
causation. 86
The court also noted that under Utah's proximate cause standard,
the Paces were not required to allege facts demonstrating that Swerdlow's change of opinion was the proximate cause of the state court's
decision to dismiss their underlying malpractice claim against Dr. Shuput, but only that Swerdlow's change of opinion was a proximate cause
of that decision; that is, that Swerdlow's change of opinion was a "con-

79. Id. (quoting Alvarado, 493 F.3d 1210 at 1215).
80. Id.
81.
Id. at 1074.
82. Id. at 1073.
83. Id. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
84. Id. at 1073-74 (citing Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467
P.2d 45, 46 (1970); Jacques v. Farrimond, 14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963)).
Id. at 1074. On this point, the court highlighted the fact that "[tiellingly, Dr. Shuput did
85.
not view the affidavit as being weak. Rather in his motion for summary judgment filed in the medical malpractice action, Dr. Shuput's proximate cause argument relied upon [Swerdlow's] deposition
testimony-not [Swerdlow's] affidavit." Id
Id. (quoting Steffensen, 820 P.2d 482 at 486).
86.
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current
contributing factor" to the state court's decision to dismiss their
7
suit.1
The court also rejected the district court's conclusion that the Paces'
failure to file a memorandum in opposition of Dr. Shuput's motion for
summary judgment contributed as much as anything to the dismissal of
their case.88 Under Utah law, expert testimony is required to establish
causation in all medical malpractice cases where the cause of death is not
obvious. 89 Thus, the court concluded that the Paces' omission was irrelevant because at that point-i.e. following Swerdlow's change of opinion-they were without an expert witness, and only a day away from
the summary judgment hearing.90
Ultimately, the court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.9' The court stated that, on
remand, the district court was free to examine the additional questions
raised by Swerdlow's defense, such as whether each of the Paces' claims
failed independently on other grounds, or whether the Paces' claims were
collectively barred by immunity, including whether the latter question
should be certified to the Utah Supreme Court.92
2. Judge Gorsuch's Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent
Judge Gorsuch authored a partial concurrence and partial dissent to
the majority's opinion. 93 As a preliminary matter, Judge Gorsuch concurred with the majority's analysis of the proximate cause issue, including the majority's conclusion that Swerdlow did not demonstrate, as a
matter of law, that his initial affidavit was so weak or contradictory that
it would have necessarily failed to defeat summary judgment in the Paces' underlying malpractice suit. 94 However, Judge Gorsuch recounted
the fact that the court was free to affirm the verdict of the district court
on any ground supported by the record, and stated that the case should
not have been decided on the issue of proximate cause because a review

87. See id.
88.
Id.
89. Pace v. Swerdlow, No. 2:06CV27DAK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32718, at *10 (D. Utah
May 22, 2006).
90.
Pace, 519 F.3d at 1075.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. Swerdlow did in fact bring his case again in the federal district court as a motion to
dismiss based on witness immunity or, alternatively, that the issue of witness immunity should be
certified to the Utah Supreme Court. The federal district court denied Swerdlow's motion to dismiss
based on witness immunity, but granted his motion to certify the issue of witness immunity to the
Utah Supreme Court (Order of the Federal District Court for the District of Utah, Nov. 14, 2008,
available on PACER). However, before the Utah Supreme Court ruled on the certification issue, the
parties settled.
93. Pace, 519 F.3d at 1075.
94.
Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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of the Paces' complaint revealed several other grounds upon which to
affirm the decision of the district court.9 5
Judge Gorsuch also expressed concern about the policy implications
of the majority's decision: "[a]llowing this claim to march along sends
the message to would-be expert witnesses: [b]e wary-very wary-of
changing your mind, even when doing so might be consistent with, or
compelled by, the standards of your profession. 9 6 Additionally, Judge
Gorsuch took issue with the fact that the Paces had never demonstrated
that "another expert, provided with all the information available to Swerdlow at the time he changed his opinion, still would've thought Dr. Shuput engaged in malpractice," 97 and thus concluded that there existed "no
facts suggesting that any responsible physician, after reviewing the full
record, would've thought Dr. Shuput's conduct constituted malprac,,98
tice.
Judge Gorsuch further noted that the Paces themselves stated that
the reason for their dissatisfaction with Swerdlow was his failure to "deliver" the expert testimony he had promised them all along, 99 and warned
of the potential fall-out from creating a precedent that encourages expert
witnesses to "deliver" testimony as opposed to presenting their unbiased
opinions:
Parties already exert substantial influence over expert witnesses,
often paying them handsomely for their time, and expert witnesses
are, unfortunately and all too frequently, already regarded in some
quarters as little more than hired guns. When expert witnesses can be
forced to defend themselves in federal court beyond the pleading
stage simply for changing their opinions-with no factual allegation
to suggest anything other than an honest change in view based on a
review of new information-we add fuel to this fire. We make candor an expensive option and risk incenting experts to dissemble rather than change their views in the face of compelling new information. The loser in all this is, of course, the truth-finding function and
cause of justice our legal system is designed to serve. oo

95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 1077.
97.
Id. at 1076.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 1077.
100. Id. Additionally, Judge Gorsuch stated that even if the court were to put aside the lack of
factual allegations related to Swerdlow's misconduct, many of the Paces' claims nonetheless lacked
additional essential elements necessary to survive a 12(b)(6) dismissal. For example, the fact that
the Paces never alleged any fear of physical injury as a result of Swerdlow's conduct, but nonetheless asserted a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, which, under Utah law, requires an
allegation that the plaintiff feared physical injury or peril as a result of the defendant's negligence.
Id. at 1077-78.
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Ill. ANALYSIS

A. Pace Suggests There are Right and Wrong Ways for Friendly Experts
to Change Their Opinions

In Pace, the Tenth Circuit held that Swerdlow's change of opinion
was not, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence of proximate cause.' 0'
However, importantly, Pace does not suggest that any change of opinion
by a friendly expert is sufficient to establish a prima facie proximate
cause link in a negligence suit against the expert. Clearly, the manner in
which Swerdlow changed his opinion influenced the court's decision, as
did his alleged motivations for the change. 0 2 Specifically, Swerdlow
waited a month to announce his change of opinion, 10 3 and his announcement came on the eve of summary judgment via direct fax to opposing
counsel. °4 Further, allegations existed to suggest that the reasons behind
Swerdlow's change of opinion were grounded in fear and intimidation
rather than in a compelling new piece of medical evidence. 0 5 Had
Swerdlow kept the lines of communication open between himself and the
Paces once he began to doubt his earlier testimony, had he not waited
until the eve of the summary judgment hearing to announce his change of
opinion, and, most importantly, had he refrained from faxing his addendum directly to opposing counsel, the court would undoubtedly have had
a more difficult time concluding that his conduct was potentially actionable. 1°6
B. Looking Forward
The decision to recognize a cause-of-action for friendly expert negligence remains a matter of state law, as do the contours of such an action. However, the proximate cause analysis in Pace, having come from
the Tenth Circuit, will likely be regarded as considerable persuasive authority when assessing causation in future claims of friendly expert neg-

101.
Id. at 1074; see also id. at 1075 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
102.
See id. at 1075 ("Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant's change of position,
as well as the timing of that change of position, proximately caused the state court's grant of summary judgment .... ") (emphasis added); see also id. at 1076 ("Dr. Swerdlow changed his opinion,
we are encouraged to surmise, because he feared counsel's 'meanness' and threat to attack Dr.
Swerdlow's medical license.") (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
103.
Id. at 1069, 1071 (Swerdlow's deposition by Dr. Shuput's counsel was on January 4;
however, he did not fax his addendum until February 11).
104.
Id. at 1071.
105.
Id. at 1070; see also id. at 1076 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
106.
Although it is impossible to know what the Tenth Circuit might have done, it is interesting
to note that the Ohio Court of Appeals, in deciding one of the only other claims of friendly expert
negligence ever to turn on a change of opinion by the expert, held, in part, that the expert's change of
opinion was not the cause of the plaintiffs having to prematurely settle their suit because the expert
(1) changed his opinion based on a new piece of medical evidence that had come to his attention, (2)
reported his change of opinion to his hiring party as soon as he made up his mind, and (3) did not
communicate with the opposing party. See Schaffer v. Donegan, 585 N.E.2d 854, 857, 860 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990); see also Schaffer v. Donegan, Case No. CA 9108, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5382, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan 21, 1986).
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ligence involving a change of opinion by the expert.1 7 Thus, the ultimate impact of Pace will depend on how the decision is applied in similar cases in jurisdictions that recognize a cause-of-action for friendly
expert negligence. This section argues that Pace, although correctly decided, should be narrowly interpreted and its application restricted to
cases involving only very similar facts.
In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, Judge Gorsuch voiced
his concern that the majority's decision may discourage future experts
from changing their testimony even when they encounter new evidence.10 8 However, if Pace is applied narrowly, Judge Gorsuch's slippery-slope scenario seems unlikely to develop. This is because, in Pace,
Swerdlow's conduct was more than merely borderline unreasonable-it
was clearly egregious and reckless. 1 9 In particular, Swerdlow's actions
of waiting a month to notify the Paces of his change of opinion, and faxing his addendum on the eve of summary judgment directly to opposing
counsel without first consulting the Paces or their lawyer, were reckless
by almost any standard. Thus, if restricted to the facts, an argument can
be made that Pace places a very limited burden on future friendly experts
who change their opinions-they need only have genuine motivations for
their change of opinion (such as a compelling new piece of evidence that
has come to light), and to avoid clear negligence in communicating such
a change.
If Pace is applied more broadly, however, Judge Gorsuch's fears
seem more realistic. Much of the danger in a broad application of Pace
arises from the potential risk of lawyers shifting responsibility for their
own negligence or malpractice onto friendly experts. For example, an
argument can be made that an expert who fails to return phone calls or
delays in reviewing relevant case documents, and then suddenly changes
his or her opinion as a hearing or trial approaches, is negligent. However, an additional argument can be made that a lawyer who fails to monitor and replace such an expert is also negligent-and, in some cases, may
be more responsible than the expert. This is because lawyers, not experts, are expected to be familiar with the inner workings of the legal
system, and lawyers, not experts, have a duty of zealous representation to
clients. Thus, it should remain the duty of lawyers to choose their ex107. Interest in Pace is evidenced by the significant amount of coverage the case received from
tort-related media outlets. See, e.g., Robert Ambrogi, Top 10 Expert Witness Cases of 2008, IMS
ExpertServices, http://www.ims-expertservices.com/newsletters/dec/top-10-expert-witness-cases-of2008-120908.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (naming Pace as the third most significant expert witness case of 2008).
108. Pace, 519 F.3d at 1077.
109. Indeed, Swerdlow's conduct was likely sufficiently egregious and reckless to constitute
gross negligence, which under Utah law, is defined as "the failure to observe even slight care; it is
the carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that
may result." Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found. 179 P.3d 760, 767 (Utah 2008) (quoting Berry v.
Greater Park City Co., 171 P.3d 442, 449 (Utah 2007)).
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perts wisely, to guide their experts (no matter how experienced) through
the litigation process, and, if necessary, to replace underperforming experts-even if the experts' behavior might independently be considered
negligent. Therefore, in future claims of friendly expert negligence involving a change of opinion by the expert, the alleged negligence of the
expert in changing his or her opinion should be considered against the
diligence of the lawyer in preparing, guiding, and monitoring the expert.
Only if the negligence of the expert is clearly egregious, and could not
have been reasonably prevented by the lawyer, should the expert's conduct be found potentially actionable.
When applied to the facts in Pace, this proposed test supports the
Tenth Circuit's decision. Swerdlow's total collapse at his deposition by
opposing counsel suggests he was ill-informed and ill-prepared by his
own counsel for the experience. Nonetheless, any lack of diligence in
preparing Swerdlow by the Paces' lawyer was superseded by Swerdlow's own egregious conduct. That is, even if the lawyers were less
than thorough in preparing Swerdlow, and even if they suspected that he
was having doubts following his deposition by opposing counsel, there
was little reason for them to anticipate that he would do something as
reckless as faxing an addendum to opposing counsel, on the eve of summary judgment, without first consulting his hiring party's lawyers.
CONCLUSION

Under a narrow reading of Pace, experts are free to change their
opinions in a case, but (1) must do so based on reasonable new developments in a case (such as compelling new evidence), and (2) must avoid
clear negligence in communicating their change of opinion-an entirely
sensible burden. Thus, if Pace is applied narrowly, no responsible expert
need fear the Tenth Circuit's decision. Further, when evaluating causation in future claims of friendly expert negligence involving a change of
opinion by the expert, courts should consider the alleged negligence of
the expert in changing his or her opinion against any lack of reasonable
diligence or lack of zealous representation by the plaintiffs counsel, and
should require an act of clearly egregious conduct by the expert, which
could not have been reasonably avoided by the lawyer, in order to recognize the change of opinion by the expert as a potential proximate cause.
This test should be conducted both by the judge at the pleading stages
and, if a trial follows, by a jury in the form of jury instructions. Such a
test is desirable because it synthesizes a principle goal of tort law, that of
shifting losses from less responsible to more responsible parties, with
one of the principle tenets of lawyering, that of zealous representation.
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DANGER! BOMBS MAY BE PRESENT. CANNON V. GATES:

A JAMMED CANNON PREEMPTS CITIZEN SUIT
INDEFINITELY'
INTRODUCTION

Jesse Fox Cannon was a patriotic citizen who, during World War II,
leased property to the U.S. Army for just one dollar.2 Mr. Cannon provided the Army with key lands for testing chemical and biological weaponry against Japanese caves and underground fortifications.3 In six
months, the Army dropped "3,000 rounds of ammunition and twentythree tons of chemical weapons" on his property.4 More than sixty years
later, the land continues to be littered with hazardous waste while the
Cannon family is left waiting for the Government to uphold its agreement to return the property to "as good [of a] condition as it [was] on the
date of the government's entry' 5 in 1945.
Less than four years earlier, on December 7, 1941, the Japanese
Navy attacked Pearl Harbor, killing 2,433 American soldiers and civilians.6 The next day, in an address to Congress and the American public,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared war on the Japanese Empire,
7
marking the United States' entrance into the war.
As part of our nation's war strategy, the U.S. War Department initiated weapons testing. In February 1942, President Roosevelt withdrew
126,700 acres of land in Tooele County, Utah, creating the Dugway
Proving Ground. 8 This facility immediately became the military's test
site for incendiary bombs, chemical weapons, and biological agents. 9

1.
2.

Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1330.

3.

See ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, FINDINGS FOR YELLOW JACKET RANGES, TOOELE

COUNTY,

UTAH

§

1.2 (Nov.

1993), available at http://home.comcast.net/-dpgsurvivors/

YJRFUDSSite.htm; TECHNICAL STAFF, DUGWAY PROVING GROUND, TOOELE, UTAH,
MEMORANDUM REPORT: ATTACK AGAINST CAVE-TYPE FORTIFICATIONS 7 (Oct. 21, 1945) (to

Chief, Chemical Warfare Service; declassified by DOD Directive No. 5200.9 on Sept. 27, 1958),
availableat http://www.dugway.net (follow "Yellow Jacket Ranges" hyperlink; then follow "Project
Sphinx" hyperlink).
Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330.
4.
Id.
5.
6.

PETER JENNINGS & TODD BREWSTER, THE CENTURY 230 (1998).

See generally Our Heritage in Documents: FDR's "Day of Infamy" Speech: Crafting a
Call to Arms, PROLOGUE MAGAZINE, Winter 2001, at 284, 288, available at
http://www.archives.gov/publicationsprotogue/2001/winter/crafting-day-of-infamy-speech.htm
(noting that by the end of Dec. 8, 1941, Congress sent President Roosevelt a declaration of war).
8.
Cannon v. United States, 338 F.3d 1183, 1184 (10th Cir. 2003); West Desert Test Center,
Dugway History, http://www.wdtc.army.mil/History.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2009). The Dugway
Proving Ground was officially activated on March 1, 1942. Id. "Open air testing of chemical agents
was performed at [the Dugway Proving Ground] until 1969, when all such activities were sus7.
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By 1945, the Army initiated Project Sphinx, a testing program in
chemical and biological weapons designed to "explore means of battling
Japanese forces entrenched in caves in the Pacific Islands.'" Project
Sphinx tests were to determine "[t]he best material, either available or
under development, for reducing Japanese caves and underground fortifications ....

1

Mr. Cannon owned nearly 1,500 acres of mining land adjacent to
the Dugway Proving Ground. 12 There were 86.5 patented mining claims
on the land, 13 including the Yellow Jacket Mines, the Great Western
Mines, and Old Ironsides Mine.1 4 Because Project Sphinx was created to
test chemical weaponry against "cave type fortifications,, 1 5 this landand its mines-was invaluable to the Army's mission.
On May 25, 1945, Mr. Cannon signed a "Construction, Survey &
Exploration Permit" with the U.S. War Department. 6 In exchange for
one dollar, Mr. Cannon agreed to a six-month lease, allowing the Army
to "enter onto his land 'in order to survey and carry out such other exploratory work as may be necessary in connection with the property; to erect
buildings and any other type of improvement; and to perform construction work of any nature."' 7 At the end of the lease, the Government
as good [of a] condition as
agreed to "leave the property of the owner 1in
8
it is on the date of the government's entry."
During this lease, the Army dropped twelve-thousand-pound "Fall
Boy" bombs, and "Tiny Tim" rockets.' 9 The Army used incendiary
weapons such as "aviation gasoline, butane, gasoline, Napalm, PT Jell,
and Napalm-gasoline mixtures, '20 and released chemical toxins, including "the choking agent phosgene, the blood agent hydrogen cyanide, and
the blistering agent mustard.",2' By the time Mr. Cannon returned to his

pended." ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3. The Dugway Proving Ground continues to test
chemical and biological warfare, as well as battlefield smokes and obscurants. West Desert Test
Center, http://www.wdtc.arny.mil/History.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
9. West Desert Test Center, supra note 8.
10.
Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1184.
11.

MEMORANDUM REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.

12.
Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1184.
13.
Id.
14.
ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at §§ 5.1, 6.1.1.
15.
Id. at § 1.2; see also MEMORANDUM REPORT, supra note 3.
16.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23, 2007)
(No. 07-4107). The brief refers to an agreement with the Department of Defense. The U.S. War
Department became part of the National Military Establishment on September 18, 1947, which was
renamed the Department of Defense on August 10, 1949.
17.
Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id.
18.
19.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23, 2007)
(No. 07-4107).
Id. at 6.
20.
21.
Cannon v. United States, 338 F.3d at 1185 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003).
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land in September, 1945, the Army had "used at least 3,00022rounds of
....
ammunition and twenty-three tons of chemical weapons
Nearly five years later, Mr. Cannon was still waiting for the Army,
the Department of Defense ("DOD"), or anyone in the Government, to
return his land to its original condition.23 In the last of three claims filed
against the Government, Mr. Cannon asserted that chemical agents used
in his Yellow Jacket Mine remained in the workings of the mine and
"make it impossible for me to ever operate the mine again .... ,24 Decades after the war ended, The Cannon property-which provided vital
testing grounds for the war effort--continues to be overwhelmed with
25
hazardous waste.
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 26 creating a
"mechanism for the prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste
sites., 27 Six years later, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act ("SARA") 28 amended CERCLA, including adding a comprehensive
and critical revision: a provision for citizen suits. 29 Following SARA,
however, a citizen 30suit under CERCLA is restricted until all cleanup actions are complete.
In the 1990s, the DOD initiated a number of studies31 on the Yellow
Jacket Target Area,32 which includes the Cannons' land. These studies
marked the initial stages of a CERCLA cleanup of the Cannon property, 33 and triggered the ban on citizen suits 34 until removal of the hazardous material is complete.
Federal courts recognize the disparity between CERCLA's underlying policy of prompt and efficient cleanup and the reality faced by families such as the Cannons, who have waited decades for the government to
Responding to such concerns, the Seventh
remediate their property.
Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330.
22.
Id.
23.
24. Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1185.
25. See generally Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330-31.
26. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 2009); Brian Patrick Murphy, CERCLA's Timing of
Review Provision: A Statutory Solution to the Problem of IrreparableHarm to Health and the
Environment, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 587, 587 (2000).
27. United States v. City and County of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1511 (10th Cir. 1996).
28. Murphy, supra note 26, at 588.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2008).
30. Murphy, supra note 26, at 599.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 6-9, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23,
31.
2007) (No. 07-4107).
32. Id. at 7 n.5 ("The Yellow Jacket Site or the Yellow Jacket Target Area is the name given
the FUDS area bombed by the DOD during Project Sphinx. It is named for the Yellow Jacket patented mining claim owned today by Margaret Louise Cannon.").
33.
Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th Cir. 2008).
34.
See id. at 1336.
See generally Gates, 538 F.3d at 1336 ("We are sympathetic to the Cannons' frustration
35.
with the long delays .... "); Frey v. EPA (Frey I1), 403 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We recog-
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Circuit, in Frey v. EPA ("Frey I/ '),36 determined that without "active
steps, 37 toward cleanup, CERCLA could not require such a prohibition
to citizen suits. 38 The court held that the government "cannot preclude
review by simply pointing to ongoing testing and investigation, with no
39
clear end in sight."
After more than sixty years, the Seventh Circuit's ruling gave the
Cannons hope that their request for injunctive relief 4 0-- compelling the
DOD to remediate their land-would be granted.
Unfortunately for the Cannons, the Tenth Circuit held otherwise.
Disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held in Cannon
v. Gates that although the government was only monitoring, assessing,
and evaluating "the hazardous substances on the Cannons' land, '4 1 the
Cannons' suit was barred. Because of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
of CERCLA's ban on citizen suits until remedial actions are "complete, ' 2 the Cannons may need to wait an additional sixty years before
their property is restored to its pre-lease state.
Part I of this Comment begins by discussing the enactment of
CERCLA, pre- and post-SARA. Part II discusses the Seventh Circuit's
break from precedent in allowing citizen suits to proceed prior to completion of remediation. Part III addresses Cannon v. Gates in light of the
Seventh Circuit's ruling in Frey 11. Part IV discusses whether courts in
the future should allow citizen suits when there is no cleanup relief in
sight. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Tenth Circuit was justified in holding that during remediation and removal activities, CERCLA
is a complete bar to citizen suits.
I.CERCLA
A. Background of CERCLA
In the waning days of the Carter Administration, Congress enacted
CERCLA 43 to provide an efficient, effective means for the cleanup of
abandoned hazardous waste sites.44 Prior to CERCLA's enactment in

nize that Congress intended for remedial action to be complete before permitting judicial review.
Congress did not, however, intend to extinguish judicial review altogether.") (citation omitted).
36. Frey 11,
403 F.3d at 828.
37. Id. at 834.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 835.
40.
Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 2008).
41.
Id. at 1334.
42.
Id. at 1334-36.
43.
Megan A. Jennings, Frey v. Environmental Protection Agency: A Small Step Toward
Preventing IrreparableHarm in CERCLA Actions, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 675, 677 (2006). See also
Murphy, supra note 26, at 593.
44.
See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 26, at 591. "There are 'two overriding goals of CERCLA:
(1) to clean up hazardous waste sites promptly and effectively; and (2) to ensure that those responsi-
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1980, the public became outraged over sites such as the Love Canal, the
Valley of the Drums, and Times Beach.45 In response to this outrage,
Congress provided the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") authority to implement CERCLA's cleanup policies while also creating a
funding mechanism for the cleanup.46
CERCLA creates a process that the EPA must follow in implementing cleanup.41 Initially, an abandoned hazardous waste site is placed on
the EPA's National Priority List, which identifies the most serious
threats and thereby initiates the cleanup action.48 A Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study ("RI/FS") evaluates options. 49 Then, the EPA
selects a remedial action plan ("RAP") and issues a report. 50 At this
time, the public and other interested parties are able to provide comments
on the plan. 51 After receiving and responding to such comments, the
EPA publishes a record of decision ("ROD"), and implements the plan.
There are two types of actions that fall under CERCLA: removal
and remedial.5 3 A removal action is a short-term action taken to reduce
risk in an urgent situation.54 A remedial action, on the other hand, is
either independent of, or in conjunction with, a removal action, and provides a permanent solution to hazardous risks.55 Ultimately, the action
must "attain a degree of cleanup.., at a minimum
which assures protec56
tion of human health and the environment.,
CERCLA was drafted in a hurry, 57 without the assistance of legislative counsel,58 and passed under a suspension of the rules with little floor
debate.5 9 Partly because of this haste, CERCLA contains inconsistencies
and absurdities that require interpretation by the courts.6

ble for the problem bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they
created."' Id. at 591 n.16.
45.
Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste
Contamination, 15 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 187, 189 (1996).
46. Jennings, supra note 43, at 678.
47.
id. at 678.
48.
Id.
49. Id. (noting the Remedial Investigation "evaluate[s] the nature and extent of contamination" while the Feasibility Study "evaluate[s] costs and benefits associated with potential cleanup
methods"); Murphy, supra note 26, at 595.
50. Murphy, supra note 26, at 595-96.
51.
Id. at 596.
52. Id.
53. Frey v. EPA (Frey I1), 403 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2005).
54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23), (24) (West 2009); Frey 11,
403 F.3d at 835; Jennings, supra note
43, at 678.
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23), (24) (West 2009); Frey 1I, 403 F.3d at 835; Jennings, supra note
43, at 678.
56. Jennings, supra note 43, at 678 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 962 1(d) (2000)).
57. Murphy, supra note 26, at 593.
58. Id. at 594 n.31.
59. Id. at 593-94.
60. Id. at 594.
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B. Common Law Decisions Pre-SARA
Originally, CERCLA was silent on the issue of whether parties
could seek judicial review while remediation is ongoing. 61 As a result,
the federal courts had to decide how to respond to claims by citizen
groups and potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") attempting to delay
cleanup actions. 62 While some courts held the constitutionality of
CERCLA could be challenged at any time, other courts maintained that
all challenges-statutory or constitutional-were barred during remediation.63 Ultimately, federal courts created a "'clean up first, litigate later'
doctrine" that interpreted Congress's intent to bar suit until remediation
is complete. 64
C. SARA: Legislative History and its Implications
In 1986, Congress addressed many of CERCLA's issues when it
enacted SARA. 65 Most notably, Congress added a timing of review provision,66 codifying the "clean up first, litigate later" doctrine. 67 The timing of review provision, section 113(h),6 8 makes it clear that PRPs cannot
stall remediation actions in order to delay or avoid paying for cleanup
costs. 69 However, this timing of review provision also bars citizens from
access to judicial review when response actions--or a lack thereofcould potentially exacerbate environmental hazards.7 °
Section 113(h) provides a broad rule barring judicial review, then
provides five exceptions to the rule. The pertinent part states:
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than
under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is applicable or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating to cleanup standards) to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued
under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except...

(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens
suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under section
9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this title was in vi61.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 679.
62.
Id.
63.
ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, The Validity of the Basic Legal Structure and the
Role of the Courts, in SUPERFUND L. & PROC. § 2:13 (2007).
64.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 679.
65.
See, e.g., id.
66.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (West 2009).
Jennings, supra note 43, at 679.
67.
68.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (West 2009).
69.
Jennings, supranote 43, at 675.
70.
Id.

2009]

CANNON V. GATES

1221

olation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action may not be
brought with regard7 to
a removal where a remedial action is to be un1
dertaken at the site.
While exception (4) appears to allow judicial review for citizen suits, the
timing restriction effectively bars such suits during remediation actions.72
In enacting SARA, Congress balanced potential harms to the environment against the right to immediate access to the courts. 73 Congress

determined that "the priority must be placed on cleaning up toxic waste
sites as quickly as possible, 7 4 and therefore created a ban on judicial
review until remediation actions are complete.75
The legislative record, however, shows conflicting opinions on the
part of SARA's proponents.7 6 Senator Tom Stafford stated, "It is crucial,
if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens' rights to challenge response
actions, or final cleanup plans, before such plans are implemented...
,
Alternatively, Senator Strom Thurmond said, "Completion of all of
the work set out in a particular record of decision marks the first oppor78
tunity at which review of that portion of the response action can occur.9
Further, Representative Dan Glickman stated that "the conferees did not
intend to allow any plaintiff.., to stop a cleanup by what would undoubtedly be a prolonged legal battle.

79

The Joint Conference Committee Report summarizes the legislative
discussion:
In the new section [9613(h)] of the [statute], the phrase "removal or
remedial action taken" is not intended to preclude judicial review until the total response action is finished if the response action proceeds
in distinct and separate stages. Rather, an action under section
[9659] would lie following completion of each distinct and separable
phase of the cleanup ....

Any challenge under this provision to a

completed stage of a response action shall not interfere with
those
8
0
completed.
been
not
have
which
action
response
the
of
stages
Despite the citizen suit exception, federal courts have routinely
looked to the legislative history and plain language of the timing of re-

71.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (West 2009).
72.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 680.
73.
Murphy, supranote 26, at 599-600.
74.
Id. at 600.
75.
Id. at 601.
76. Jennings, supra note 43, at 680.
77. Id. at 681-82 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. 28,429 (1986)).
78.
Id. at 682 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. 28,441 (1986)).
79.
Id. at 682 n.35 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. 29,736-37 (1986)).
80. Murphy, supra note 26, at 607 (quoting Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of
Conference, H.Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 224).
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view provision when holding that they lack subject matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate such suits until after a cleanup action is complete.8
D. FederalCourt Interpretationsof CERCLA Following SARA
The plain language of section 113(h) permits citizen suits when the
"selected" action was "taken" and "was in violation. ' 2 This language is
critical. Congress' use of the past tense implies that once the removal or
remedial action is initiated, it must be complete before courts have jurisdiction to hear the claim. 83 Courts have consistently followed this reasoning.
84
1. McClellan EcologicalSeepage Situation v. Perry

The citizens group McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation
("MESS") filed suit against the Secretary of Defense alleging that "past
and present treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes" at
McClellan Air Force Base violated various environmental laws. 85 Since
the 1930s, McClellan had been using toxic materials while maintaining
aircraft for the military. 86 In 1979, McClellan began its first stages of
cleanup with a groundwater monitoring program.87 After CERCLA's
enactment in 1980 and the SARA amendments in 1986, McClellan modified its cleanup program.88 While the district court found that MESS's
suit lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of CERCLA's timing of
review provision, MESS argued that it was not challenging cleanup efforts, but merely seeking compliance with existing laws.89
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's interpretation of
CERCLA's timing of review provision. The court stated, "Section
113(h) is clear and unequivocal. It amounts to a 'blunt withdrawal of
federal jurisdiction.,, 90
The court acknowledged that because of
CERCLA's mission to provide a quick response, judicial review was
unavailable during cleanup, and may even be delayed permanently. 91
The court summarized, "We must presume that Congress has already
balanced all concerns and 'concluded that the interest in removing the
hazard of toxic waste
from Superfund sites' clearly outweighs the risk of
92
irreparable harm.,

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

TOPOL, supra note 63, § 2:13.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h) (West 2009); Jennings, supra note 43, at 680.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 680.
47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 327-28.
Id. at 328 (quoting North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991)).
id. at 329.
Id. (quoting Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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2. Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington93
Following the initiation of an RI/FS of a former landfill site operated by the plaintiffs and located on the Tulalip Indian Reservation, the
plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the Tribes' management of the site violated environmental laws. 94 The plaintiffs argued that the RI/FS does
not constitute a remedial or removal action under CERCLA,
so therefore
95
they should be allowed to proceed with their claim.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and upheld the district court's grant of
a motion to dismiss. 96 The court reasoned, "CERCLA defines a removal
action to include 'such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess,
and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances...
, An RI/FS, the court held, meets this definition.9 8
3. Clinton County Commissioners v. EPA99
The Clinton County Commissioners and a citizens group attempted
to block a trial bum and ultimate incineration of hazardous soils at a
chemical site in Pennsylvania. 1°° The plaintiffs argued that the planned
incineration "would result in the emission into the air of dangerous
amounts of highly toxic chemicals that would contaminate the local air,
soil, and food chain . . . ."'0' The plaintiffs' allegations of "irreparable
harm to public health" fell on deaf ears at the district court level,
where
10 2
the suit was dismissed for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court's reasoning that
"challenges to remedial action under CERCLA's response provision [are
available] only after the remedial action has been completed."'' 0 3 In affirming the district court, the Third Circuit relied on similar holdings of
other federal courts regarding barring suit during cleanup actions, even
when "impending irreparable harm is alleged.' 1°4 This decision overruled the Third Circuit's previous decision in United States v. Princeton
Gamma-Tech, Inc.,1°5 where the court "allow[ed] a challenge to an un-

93.
66 F.3d 236 (9th Cir. 1995).
94.
Id. at 238.
95.
Id. at 239.
96.
Id. at 239, 241.
97.
Id. at 239 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1994)).
98.
Id.
99.
116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
100.
Id. at 1020.
101.
Id. at 1021.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 1022.
104.
Id. at 1024-25 (citing Hanford Downwinders Coal., Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1484
(9th Cir. 1995); Ark. Peace Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th
Cir. 1993); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1990); Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d
1548, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1989)).
105.
31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994).
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completed
, 1 6 remediation based on the danger of irreparable environmental
0
harm."

The Clinton County court held that "Congress intended to preclude
all citizens' suits against EPA remedial actions under CERCLA until
such actions are complete, regardless of the harm that the actions might
allegedly cause."10 7 The court noted that the plaintiffs should have
voiced their concerns during the public notice and comment period instead of trying to block the selected cleanup action. 0 8 The court stated,
"Congress made the policy choice to substitute elaborate pre-remediation
19
public review and comment procedures for judicial review." 0
II. FREY V. EPA: CITIZEN SUITS NECESSARY FOR UNDETERMINED
REMEDIES

Breaking with precedent, the Seventh Circuit in Frey II made it
clear that the EPA and all other parties responsible for cleanup actions of
hazardous waste cannot hide behind the CERCLA curtain to avoid suit
during remediation." 0 While the Frey 11 court upheld the bar on certain
citizen suits, it opened the door where remediation actions have "no clear
end in sight."'
A. Frey II: Facts and ProceduralHistory
In 1983, the United States brought a civil action against Viacom to
remediate Superfund sites near Bloomington, Indiana."2 The sites contained polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), among other toxins. 113 A
consent decree directed Viacom to "excavate fully ... and incinerate the

PCBs" at six sites. 14a Following citizen concern, the State Legislature
banned the incinerator's construction.1 5 When Viacom and the EPA
came to an impasse over alternate remedies, the district court appointed
"a special master 'to see that the aims of the consent decree are carried
out expeditiously and to resolve possible disputes between the parties.""16
EPA and Viacom reached an agreement on PCB excavation measures, and Viacom further agreed to "investigate water treatment and sediment remediation solutions" at three of the sites: Neal's Landfill, Lem106.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 682.
107.
Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997).
108.
Id. at 1024. The court stated, "Congress clearly intended that such differences of opinion
be communicated directly to EPA during the pre-remediation public notice and comment period, not
expressed in court on the eve of the commencement of a selected remedy." Id.
109.
Id. at 1025.
110. Frey v. EPA (Frey I1), 403 F.3d 828, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2005).
111.
Id. at 835.
112.
Id. at 830.
113.
Id. at 829.
114.
Id. at 830.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
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on Lane Landfill, and Bennett's Dump. 17 Pursuant to the EPA's ROD
18
for each of the sites, PCB removal was completed at each of the sites.'
However, in the ROD for both Neal's Landfill and Lemon Lane Landfill,
the EPA stipulated that "future remedial decisions will be made regarding" water treatment measures." 9 At Bennett's Dump, the EPA discovered PCBs continuing to leak into an adjacent creek.120 There, further
investigation was needed
before a final decision on groundwater treat12
ment could be made. '
B. Frey I
Because water and sediment contamination was still at issue, Sarah
Frey and others ("Frey") brought suit in April, 2000 ("Frey F'), 122 alleging violations of state and federal law, 123 and challenging the selected
remediation plan as causing continued PCB releases to the air, groundwater, and surface water.' 24 While the district court denied the motion
and dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 125 the
Seventh Circuit
remanded the case for "further findings of 'jurisdiction126
al' fact."'
In evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the court described three
interpretations of the word "complete" as it relates to a removal or remedial action under CERCLA. 127 Most restrictive was EPA's definition
that "complete" is when the planned remedial and removal procedures
are finished, and all subsequent monitoring is final. 128 Least restrictive
was Frey's argument that "complete" is reached as particular stages of
the plan are finished. 129 However, the court settled on a middle ground,
"between the active steps designed to clean up a site and later measures
designed to monitor success.'' 13° The court differentiated between active
remediation measures and monitoring, noting that such monitoring efcleanup should not allow responsible parties to bar judicial
forts after
31
review.
With this decision, the Frey I court remanded the case back to the
district court.1 32 On remand, the district court held that since investiga117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at831-32.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 832.
Id.
Frey v. EPA (Frey 1), 270 F.3d 1129, 1131 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1130.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 689.
Id.
Frey 1, 270 F.3d at 1133.
Id. at 1133-34.
Id. at 1133.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 690.
Frey 1, 270 F.3d at 134.
Id.
Id. at 1135.
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tion of the contaminated groundwater was
underway, Frey's citizen suit
133
was barred under § 113(h) of CERCLA.
C. Frey Gets a Day in Court
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's ruling in
favor of EPA's request for summary judgment. 134 No longer
135 could the
EPA hide behind studies to protect itself from citizen suits.
In Frey II, the Seventh Circuit found that "selected" remedies for
each of the PCB sites were complete and that "no further remedies have
been 'selected' pursuant to federal regulations."'' 36 Although the EPA
argued that PCB excavation was only one step in the overall remediation
process, 137 the EPA failed to show a timeline for completion. 138 The
court asked EPA counsel "whether a reviewing court could invoke the
Administrative Procedures Act... to compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed, if EPA dragged its feet for decades."'139 The court commented that the EPA believes CERCLA's timing
of review provision shields it from suit "as long as [the EPA] has any
notion that it might, some day, take further unspecified action with respect to a particular site."'14
The Frey M court maintained that responsible parties must provide a
reasonable target completion date, and present "some objective indicator
that allows for an external evaluation."' 14 ' While the court failed to define what actually constitutes a reasonable target completion date, a 100year plan, in the court's view, was unreasonable. 142 The court noted that
it is reasonable for EPA to study the sites before selecting a remediation
plan dealing with groundwater issues. 14 3 However, "EPA cannot preclude review by simply pointing to ongoing testing and investigation, with
no clear end in sight."' 144 In assessing the EPA's action toward further
planning, the court found "only
' 45 a desultory testing and investigation
process of indefinite duration."'
Because the EPA's "selected" remedy of removing the PCB "hot
spots" was complete,' 46 and because there were no further selected plans
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2000).
Frey v. EPA (Frey 1I), 403 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 836.
Id. at 833.
Jennings, supranote 43, at 691.
Frey 1H,403 F.3d at 834; Jennings, supra note 43, at 691.
Frey M1,403 F.3d at 834 (referring to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)

(2000)).
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 835.
Jennings, supranote 43, at 692.
Frey 11, 403 F.3d at 834-35.
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id. at 833.
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for remediation, the court determined that the Frey parties should finally
get their day in court. 147 The Seventh Circuit stated, "We recognize that
Congress intended for remedial action to be complete before permitting
judicial review. Congress did not, however, intend to extinguish judicial
review altogether. After a very long wait,
148 the citizens of Bloomington
are finally entitled to their day in court."'
III. CANNON V. GATES

When Mr. Cannon leased his property to the U.S. War Department
for one dollar in 1945, he likely had no idea that his family would still be
attempting to get the land back to its original condition more than sixty
years later. 149 Mr. Cannon provided the Army with key lands for testing
chemical and biological weaponry against Japanese caves and underground fortifications during World War 11.150 In return, the Army left
Mr. Cannon with a lifetime of lawsuits15 1 as he and his family have attempted to compel the Army to uphold its part of the agreement to leave
the property in "as good [of a] condition as it [was] on the date of the
government's entry.152

After decades of ignoring the contamination issues, the Government
finally took an interest in the lands at the Dugway Proving Ground and
the Cannon property in the late 1970s when it conducted a comprehensive study of the Proving Ground. 153 It took another twenty years, however for the Government to release an engineering evaluation and cost
analysis ("EE/CA") draft report for the Army's Dugway Proving
Ground, and the Yellow Jacket Target Area, which encompass the Cannon property t 54 The EE/CA indicated that the Cannon property was
highly contaminated, and estimated that full-scale removal of ordinancerelated debris1 and
other hazardous materials would cost approximately
55
million.
$12.3

147.
Id. at 836.
148.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
149.
Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1330 (10th Cir. 2008).
150. See ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at § 1.2; MEMORANDUM REPORT, supra
note 3, at 7.
151.
These lawsuits include suits by Mr. Cannon against the government in 1945 and 1950,
Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330, and a suit by his grandchildren against the government in 2003, Cannon v.
United States, 338 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2003). The lawsuits are discussed in Section A of Part III of
this Comment.
152.
Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330.
153.
Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1185-86 (citing the U.S. Army Toxic & Hazardous Materials Agency, Report No. 140, INSTALLATION ASSESSMENT OF DUGWAY PROVING GROUND (1979)). "ITihe
Government conducted a comprehensive study of contaminated lands at the DPG. In 1979, the
Government issued a detailed report of its study. The report noted testing had occurred in the Yellow Jacket Area adjacent to DPG." Id.
154.
Id. at 1187. The Yellow Jacket Ranges refer to the Cannon property, adjacent to the
Dugway Proving Ground. ARcHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at § 6.1.1. They are named
such because of the Yellow Jacket Mines on the Cannon property, among others. Id
155.
Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1188.
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While the Frey H court clearly stated that the government "cannot
preclude review by simply pointing to ongoing testing and investigation,
with no clear end in sight,"'' 56 the Tenth Circuit declined to follow this
reasoning when it stated the twenty-year-old draft study "constitute[s]
the Government's efforts thus far to 'monitor, assess, and evaluate' the
hazardous substances on the157
Cannons' land, and therefore qualif[ies] as
an ongoing removal action.'
A.

Cannon Versus the Government: Six Decades of Litigation

When Mr. Cannon reentered his property in September, 1945, he
found "the entire area . . .covered with shell, rocket, and bomb fragments." 158 In just six months, the Army's testing turned the Cannon
property into a graveyard of ammunition and toxic chemicals. 159 Although Mr. Cannon had previously leased the patented mining claims on
his property to private individuals, he found that many of these mines
were inoperable because of the chemical weaponry left inside the
shafts.' 6°
Mr. Cannon successfully filed two administrative claims against the
Government in the Fall of 1945.61 In the first claim, he was awarded
$755.48 to "compensate him for cessation of mining operations 'due to
the use of toxic chemical agents and explosive munitions. ' ' 162 The Government further paid Mr. Cannon $2,064 on his second claim "for destruction of mine shaft timbering due to 'the
' ' 63use of toxic chemical
agents, incendiaries, and explosive munitions."'
In July, 1950, Mr. Cannon once again attempted to sue the Government. As part of the claim, Mr. Cannon stated:
I realize that when I accepted this $2064 payment from the Government it constituted full satisfaction for the claim against the Government for damages done to the Yellow Jacket Mine. However, I did
not believe at that time that the chemical agents used by the Army
would remain in the workings and make it impossible for me to ever
operate the mine again without some sort of decontamination of the
underground workings. .

.

. It is now five years since the Army

dropped their poison gas bombs on the mine and I am certain that
there is still a concentration of poison gas present in the mine that
would preclude its operation by anybody without some sort of decontamination. I do not know if the gas is present in dangerous quantities or even if the odorous material present is a poison gas but I do
156.

Frey v. EPA (Frey11), 403 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2005).

157.

Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th Cir. 2008).

158.

Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1185 n.2.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See Gates, 538 F.3d at 1330.
See generally Cannon, 338 F.3d at 1185.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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know that the miners who have looked at the property with a view of
taking a lease have shied away when they learned of the Army's use
of the min..... I believe [ I that it would require
about $5000 to put
164
the mine in condition to be worked on again."'
This third claim was denied.

65

In 1954, Mr. Cannon conveyed the property to his son, Dr. J. Floyd
Cannon, who, in 1957, conveyed a seventy-five percent interest to his
children, Mary Alice, Margaret Louise, Allan Robert, and Douglas F.
Cannon.166 Although Dr. Cannon asked the Dugway Proving Ground to
clean up the property on numerous occasions, 167 he never filed suit.1 68 At
Dr. Cannon's
death in 1980, his children inherited the remainder of the
169
property.
170
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") initiated the EE/CA
and a geophysical survey of the Cannon property 17 1 by 1994. As part of
the EE/CA, the Corps interviewed Margaret Louise Cannon, who expressed distrust toward the Government and "stated private land owners
affected by the [Project Sphinx] testing were 'probably going to have to
hire an attorney."",172 Four years later, Margaret Louise and Allan Robert
Cannon filed an administrative claim
73 with the Army for injury to their
mining interests, which was denied.1
On December 11, 1998, the Cannons filed a lawsuit against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") 74 for "not
less than $8 million.' 75 In a bench trial, the district court concluded that
the hazardous materials left by the Army's Project Sphinx testing created
a "continuing trespass and nuisance,"'' 7 6 and found for the Cannons.
They were then awarded $160,936.85 in damages. 177 On appeal, however, the Tenth78Circuit reversed the judgment and the district court's damages award.

164. Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Id. at 1185-86.
167.
Id. at 1187.
168.
Id. at 1185.
169. Id. at1186.
170.
Id. at 1187.
171.
Id.at 1186.
172.
Id. at 1187.
173. Id.at 1188.
174.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
175.
Cannon, 338 F.3d at1188.
176. Id. at 1189.
177. Id. at 1189 n. 11. The award for $160,936.85 was based on a reduced estimated value in
property from $176.26 per acre to $25 per acre because of the ordinance on the property. Id. This
estimate was based on Margaret Louise and Allan Robert Cannon's seventy-five percent interest in
ownership of the property. Id.
178. Id. at 1194.
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Applying Utah law, the Tenth Circuit held that "Utah state courts
look solely to the act constituting the trespass [or nuisance], and not to
the harm resulting from the act."' 179 The court explained that "[u]nder
Utah law, a continuous tort requires 'recurring tortuous ...conduct and
is not established by the continuation of harm caused by previous but
terminated tortuous ...conduct."' 180 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
because the act of dropping ordnance and chemical weapons ended18 in
1945, there is not a "continuing trespass or nuisance under Utah law." '
Further, the court looked to the FTCA, which waives the United
States Government's immunity from suit for
civil actions on claims ... accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for
... loss of property... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
in
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
18 2
accordance with the law of the place where the act... occurred.
An FTCA claim limits the government's waiver of immunity, stating that
a "tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years
,,83
after such claim accrues ....
While the district court overlooked the FTCA discussion in its ruling for the Cannons, the Tenth Circuit focused on the statute of limitations found within section 2401(b) of the FTCA. Pursuant to this twoyear limitation, the court held that the Cannons' claim lacked subject
matter jurisdiction.1l 4 The court reasoned that Margaret Louise Cannon
acknowledged that there was contamination on the property during her
1994 conversation with the Corps.1 85 All of the Cannon children knew
about the biological and chemical weaponry testing from conversations
with their father, Dr. Cannon, and had knowledge of his multiple requests for remediation to the Dugway Proving Grounds.18 6 Further, in
1994, the Army held a public meeting and informed the communitythe Cannons--of concerns with environmental contaminaincluding
187
tion.

179. Id. at 1193 (quoting Breiggar Props., L.C., v. H.E. Davis & Sons, 52 P.3d 1133, 1135
(Utah 2002)) (internal quotations omitted).
180. Id. (quoting Breiggar,52 P.3d at 1136).

181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1194.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).

184.
185.

Cannon, 338 F.3d at1192.
Id. at 1191.

186.
187.

Id.
Id.
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The court found it unreasonable that the Cannons waited until the
draft EE/CA report was released before filing a claim. 188 The court further held that "[a] surface investigation of their mining property would
have revealed the likely extent of the Cannons' property damage long
before the Government's study did. ,1 89 The Tenth Circuit rejected the
idea that once the Cannons were aware of the contamination and its
cause, they "need not initiate a prompt inquiry."' 190 The court concluded
that "the Cannons undoubtedly had notice of the
general nature of their
'
injury and its cause no later than August 1994. 191
Because the Cannons were aware of the hazardous materials on
their property but failed to file suit until the Government issued the draft
report, the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations barred their claim. 192
B. Cannon v. Gates: Facts and ProceduralHistory
In November, 2005, the Cannons used a new approach in attempting to obtain relief: they sued the DOD under the Solid Waste Disposal
Act. 193 The Cannons "alleged that the United States was in violation of
federal and Utah regulations applicable to generators of hazardous
waste" 194 and "that the United States has contributed to conditions on
their property that endanger the Cannons, other individuals mining on the
property, and members of the general public who come onto the Cannons' property.' 95 However, the district court dismissed these claims,
citing CERCLA's timing of review provision.196 The district court reasoned that the Government had begun cleanup actions when it' 197
initiated
needed."
were
efforts
up
clean
"whether
regarding
investigations
In 1993, an Archives Search Report stated that the Yellow Jacket
Target Area site was "potentially hazardous,"' 198 and recommended additional investigation. 199 The report noted that under the SARA amendments, a CERCLA response action is required whenever "imminent and
substantial endangerment is found at ... [a] facility or site that was under
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense and owned by, leased to, or
otherwise possessed by the United States at the time of actions leading to

188.
Id.at 1192.
189.
Id.
190. Id. (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979)).
191.
Id.
192. See id. at 1190-92.
193.
Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 2008). Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-81 (2006).
194.
Gates, 538 F.3d at 1331 (supporting the Cannons' 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) claim).
195.
Id. (supporting the Cannons' 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) claim).
196.
Id. at 1331-32.
197.
ld. at 1332.
198.
ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at § 7.0.
199.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 7, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23, 2007)
(No. 07-4107).

1232

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:3

contamination.,, 200 Later that same year, the Corps conducted an inventory project report, which initiated the CERCLA process by determining
that the area qualified as a Formerly Used Defense Site. 20 1 This report
stated that the Army had "conducted tests using persistent and nonpersistent gases and flame type munitions" on the Cannon land.2 °2
In July, 1994, the Corps requested access to the Cannon property to
"determine whether or not these lands have been impacted by unexploded ordinance. 20 3 A press release announcing an August 1994 public
availability session stated that Project Sphinx testing included "toxic,
smoke, and flame agents in bombs, mortar and artillery shells, rockets,
and . . .light case tanks. Gasoline, butane, the non-persistent agents
Phosgene, Hydrogen Cyanide, and Cyanogen Chloride, and the persistent
agent Mustard Gas were [also] used in the tests.,, 20 4 A fact sheet at the
public session read, "[I]t is highly probable that these mine areas are
contaminated with hazardous ordnance and explosive waste (OEW). It is
suspected that there is subsurface OEW throughout the area which may
come to the surface through erosion,20 5frost heaving, intrusive work such
as digging, or recreational land use.',
In August 1996, the Corps issued its EE/CA draft report of the Yellow Jacket Target Area. 20 6 The draft report noted the prevalence of hazardous materials on the Cannon property. 20 7 It concluded, 'The density
of the geophysical anomalies and ordinance-related debris, the presence
of UXO [unexploded ordinance] and UXO-related items on the surface,
and the presence of multiple spent ordinance items imply that a relatively
higher hazard exists ....,,20 While the draft EE/CA estimated that a
full-scale removal could cost approximately $12.3 million,2° it has never
been finalized, and there has been no action to remediate the property.210
However, further studies have taken place. A draft addendum to the
Archive Search Report was issued in 2001, and a draft Site Inspection
Work Plan was released in 2006.211 Nonetheless, each study remains in

200.
ARCHIVE SEARCH REPORT, supra note 3, at § 1.1 (citation omitted).
201.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23, 2007)
(No. 07-4107).
202.
Id.
203.
Id. at 7.
204.
Cannon v. United States, 338 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
205.

Id.

206.
Id.
Id. at 1187-88.
207.
208.
Id. at 1188 (quoting United States Army Corps of Engineers Engineering and Support
Center, Draft: Formerly Used Defense Site Engineering Evaluation/CostAnalysis Report: Yellow
Jacket Ranges, Site No. J08UT109800, Tooele County, Utah (1996)).
209.
Id.
210.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 10, Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. July 23,
2007) (No. 07-4107).
211.
Id. at 11.
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or any
draft form, and the government has failed to provide
2 12 a timeline
property.
the
on
actions
cleanup
of
indication
further
In upholding the district court's decision to dismiss the Cannons'
claim, the Tenth Circuit addressed (1) whether a removal or remedial
action had been "selected" and (2) whether the Cannons' claims "challenge" that action. 213 The court first established that through CERCLA,
the Government is authorized to respond to hazardous releases, and the
substantial threat of such releases, with removal and remedial actions
to protect the public health or welfare of the
that it "deems2 1necessary
4
environment.,
Concluding that CERCLA's timing of review provision barred the
Cannons' suit, the Tenth Circuit recognized its split with the Seventh
Circuit, stating, "While we share the Seventh Circuit's concern regarding
open ended remedial and removal actions undertaken by the Government, we conclude that the plain language of the statute mandates the
result we reach here. 2 15 The Tenth Circuit held that the draft studies
released by the Government constituted ongoing removal actions at the
Yellow Jacket Target Area, and therefore triggered the timing of review
provision.21 6 The court reasoned that once the Government had begun to
"monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazard' '217 parties must wait until the action is complete before
ous
substances,
suit.
initiating
The court determined that the Cannons' suit was a "challenge" to
218
the cleanup action. 2 8 Because the Cannons "requested injunctive relief
ordering remediation of their property," the court reasoned that this suit
would "undoubtedly interfere with the Government's ongoing removal
efforts., 21 9 Following the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Cannons continue
to wait for the start of a meaningful cleanup action on their property.
Meanwhile, the Government continues its decades-long process of monitoring and evaluating the parcel.
IV. ANALYSIS
With the Tenth Circuit's holding, the Cannons are required to
wait-perhaps another sixty years-for Mr. Cannon's lease agreement to
be upheld by the Government, and for the land to be restored. The Seventh Circuit clearly stated that the Government "must point to some
objective referent that commits it ... to an action or plan" in order to
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id.
Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1333 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2008)).
Id. at 1335 n.7.
Id. at 1334.
Id. (quoting Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 66 F.3d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1995)).
Id. at 1335.
Id.
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preclude judicial review. 220 However, the Tenth Circuit determined that
although more than twenty years of government studies have passed
without identifiable cleanup measures, CERCLA's timing of review provision applies. 221 While the Cannon analysis follows precedent 222 and
the plain language of the statute, it provides no relief-or justice-for the
Cannons.
A. What the Frey II Court Tried to Accomplish
In stating that Congress never intended the timing of review provision to be "an open-ended prohibition on a citizen suit, '223 the Seventh
Circuit broke from post-SARA judgments that instilled an absolute ban
on such claims while removal or remedial actions are ongoing.224 The
Frey I court has been hailed225as giving citizens "a new opportunity to
raise ... claims in the future.
Although federal courts have held that CERCLA's timing of review
provision appropriately restricts citizen suits "even if there is a possibility that plaintiffs' claims will never be heard in federal court, 226 the Frey
II court held in favor of the citizen when there is "no clear end in
sight."227 The Seventh Circuit recognized that by continuously studying
a hazardous environmental situation, responsible parties can postpone
judicial review indefinitely.228 The court called for transparency in
cleanup actions, and mandated that there be an objective measure of
some future date of completion.229
Unfortunately, the court failed to define the factors that led to its
conclusion and therefore failed to provide a clear roadmap for future
courts and future litigants. 230 Because the Frey 11 court did not require
the EPA "to actually select additional remedial measures to gain protection from suit, or at a minimum, require EPA to specifically show that it
will select them, ' 231 the Cannons, and similarly situated parties, only
have a vague outline to base their own claims on.

220. Frey v. EPA (Frey 1!), 403 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005).
221.
Gates, 538 F.3d at 1334-35.
222.
See Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1027 (3d Cir. 1997); Razore v.
Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 66 F.3d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1995); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation
v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1995).
223.
Frey I1,
403 F.3d at 834.
224.
See Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d at 1027; Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of
Wash., 66 F.3d at 239; McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d at 328-29.
225.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 675.
226.
Id. at 693 (quoting Hanford Downwinders Coal., v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1484 (9th Cir.
1995)).
227.
Frey I1,
403 F.3d at 835.
228.
Id. at 834.
229.
Id.
230.
See Jennings, supra note 43, at 693.
231.
Id. at 695.
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B. Why Cannon v. Gates Failedto Follow Frey II
The Tenth Circuit sympathized with the Cannons' frustration in attempting to compel remediation of their property, 232 but determined that
the plain language of the statute mandated a jurisdictional bar on the
Cannons' claim.233 Instead of following the Frey H court's reasoning
that the Government cannot delay judicial review by conducting studies
indefinitely, the Tenth Circuit instead followed an interpretation of Congressional intent underlying CERCLA.234
The court disagreed with the Cannons' reasoning that there must be
"a site inspection, an engineering evaluation and cost assessment report,
public comment, and a final decision based on the administrative record"
before a cleanup action is "selected. 235 While decades of draft studies
may strike some courts as a failure to select a remedy,236 the Tenth Circuit found the Cannons' argument too restrictive. 237 The Tenth Circuit
did find that because the Government had completed an initial assessment of the property, determined that the property was contaminated, and
because the Government planned a future site inspection, CERCLA's
timing of review provision applied.238
Following reasoning from the Eight Circuit's assessment of what
constitutes a "challenge, ' 239 the Cannon court noted that challenges to
the studies and other efforts put into the decision-making process of selecting the cleanup action can result in unwarranted delays. 40 The Tenth
Circuit read CERCLA provisions broadly, allowing a twenty-year-old
study to constitute a removal action.241 The court believed that the Government was moving toward a remediation action, and therefore denied
the Cannons an opportunity for judicial review until that action was
complete.

232.
Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 2008).
233.
Id. at 1335 n.7.
234.
See generally id. at 1332 ("Congress enacted CERCLA to provide a mechanism for the
prompt and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites. CERCLA protects the execution of a
CERCLA plan during its pendency from lawsuits that might interfere with the expeditious cleanup
effort." (citations omitted)).
235.
See Feds are Protectedfrom Weapons-Test Suit, for Now, 29 No. 4 ANDREWS ENvTL.
LrrIG. REP. 5 (2008).

236.
See Frey v. EPA (Frey I1), 403 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2005).
237.
See Contribution, Tenth Circuit: Bar on Pre-EnforcementReview Doesn't Require Selection of Removal Action, 23 BNA Toxics L. REP. 754 (2008).
238.
Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, What Claims Fall Within Limitation Imposed by § 113(h)
of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42
U.S.C.A. § 9613(h)) on JudicialReview of CasesArising Under CERCLA, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 69 § 3(b)
(originally published in 1993).
239.
Gates, 538 F.3d at 1335 (citing Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 675 n.8
(8th Cir. 1998)).
240. Id. at 1336.
241. Id. at 1334.
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C. What Cannon v. Gates and Frey II Mean for CERCLA
In enacting the timing of review provision, Congress did not prevent
citizens from obtaining judicial review. Rather, judicial review must
wait for the completion of remediation actions. 4 2 Courts recognize that
section 113(h) "may in some cases delay judicial review ...permanentthe interly, 243 but believe that Congress has balanced this concern with 244
est of quickly and efficiently remediating hazardous waste sites.
The Frey II court did determine that in the interest of justice, a 100year plan for remediation would "obviously" be unreasonable.245 However, the Cannon court held that twenty years of evaluating a site with no
concrete timeframe for selecting a final remediation action was reasonable. 246 While Congress provided for a citizen suit at the end of the remediation process, there is a danger that the Government may become
too complacent in its cleanup actions. 247 According to scholars, a lengfor site remediation may soon create an opportunity for citithy process
248
zen suits.
While precedent shows that the Frey II court broke with tradition,
public policy shows that the court was correct. 249 The facts of the case
establish that Frey's suit came at a time when a "selected" remedy was,
in fact, "complete," thereby meeting a requirement of CERCLA's timing
review provision. 25 0 However, because the EPA had ongoing studies
investigating future actions, the Frey facts are vaguely similar to the
Cannon facts.
In enacting the citizen suit provision, Congress clearly allowed citizens to seek judicial review of CERCLA cleanup actions. Because of the
language of the statute, however, courts have interpreted this review to
be available only upon completion of the action. If Congress is interested in making citizen suits available prior to completion, Congress will
need to modify CERCLA. Courts, in the meantime, will likely continue
to interpret CERCLA's timing of review provision based on the plain
language of the statute.
CONCLUSION
The Cannons have had many opportunities to file suit against the
Government in order to compel remediation actions on their Tooele
242.
TOPOL, supra note 63, at 46.
243.
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 329 (9th Cit. 1995).
Id.
244.
245.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 692.
246. Gates, 538 F.3d at 1334.
247.
James Stewart, Agencies' Slow Remediation Process Frustrates Courts; If Site Cleanup
Takes Too Long, Courts Will Permit Citizen Suits, 181 N.J. L.J. 128 (2005).
248.
Id.
249.
Jennings, supra note 43, at 693.
Frey v. EPA (Frey 1!), 403 F.3d 828, 833-34 (7th Cit. 2005).
250.
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County, Utah property. Because they waited until the Government
showed concrete signs of initiating cleanup, they missed their opportunity to demand action under CERCLA, and they missed their opportunity
to recover damages under the FTCA. While the Tenth Circuit sympathized with the plight of the Cannons, it was not obligated to follow the
Frey II court in holding that there must be a concrete indication of future
remediation once studies have begun. The Tenth Circuit correctly followed the plain language of CERCLA when it denied the Cannon's challenge. Until Congress clarifies when citizens may bring suit, the Cannons-and many more-will likely be relegated to wait until remediation
actions are complete.
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